


# سعوديا اسراميا

السنة الثانية والثلاثون، العدد ٢، ٢٠٢٥

مجلة إندونيسية للدراسات الإسلامية



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## ISLAM NUSANTARA IN SONG: TRANSITIVITY BENCHMARKING ON *QASIDAH NAHDLIYAH*

Darsita Suparno, Minatur Rokhim, Syifa Fauzia Chairul, & Idris Atih

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Jajat Burhanuddin

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# STUDIA ISLAMIKA



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*Wahyuddin Halim & Andar Nubowo*

## Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar: Dispersal of Muslim Organizations in and from South Sulawesi, Indonesia

**Abstract:** *This study examines the dispersal of Islamic authority within Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi and how local cultural values influence Islamic reformism. It highlights the emergence of new organizations such as Darul Istiqamah, Hidayatullah, and Wahdah Islamiyah, founded by Muhammadiyah activists with distinct institutional paths. These organizations emerged through ideological shift, cultural entrepreneurship, and political opportunity. Bugis-Makassar values, particularly siri' (shame and dignity) and pessé/paccé (solidarity), promote independent leadership and institutional creation over internal compromise. Drawing on political opportunity, resource mobilization, and sectarianization theories, the study shows that religious authority dispersal is shaped by local socio-cultural logics. The Darul Islam movement's legacy further supports more rigid reformist visions. Rather than fragmentation, this process reflects culturally mediated adaptation and innovation. The concept of "Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar" illustrates how local cultural dynamics catalyze Islamic reform into networked activism, where regional values reshape organizational boundaries and influence broader Islamic movements. This framework offers insights into cultural mediation of Islamic reform trajectories across Indonesia.*

**Keywords:** Religious Authority, Darul Istiqamah, Hidayatullah, Wahdah Islamiyah, Darul Islam.

**Abstrak:** Studi ini menelaah penyebaran otoritas keagamaan Islam dalam organisasi Muhammadiyah di Sulawesi Selatan serta pengaruh nilai budaya lokal terhadap reformisme Islam. Penelitian ini menyoroti kemunculan Darul Istiqamah, Hidayatullah, dan Wahdah Islamiyah yang didirikan oleh aktivis Muhammadiyah karena pergeseran ideologis, prakarsa budaya, dan peluang politik. Nilai Bugis-Makassar seperti siri' (rasa malu dan harga diri) dan pessel/paccé (solidaritas) mendorong kepemimpinan mandiri dan pembentukan institusi baru daripada kompromi internal. Dengan bertumpu pada teori peluang politik, mobilisasi sumber daya, dan sektarianisasi, studi ini menunjukkan bahwa penyebaran otoritas keagamaan dipandu oleh logika sosial-budaya lokal. Warisan gerakan Darul Islam memperkuat visi reformisme Islam yang lebih kaku. Proses ini bukan sekadar fragmentasi, tetapi adaptasi dan inovasi yang dimediasi oleh unsur budaya lokal. Konsep "Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar" menggambarkan bagaimana dinamika budaya lokal menjadi katalis reformasi Islam menuju gerakan sosial berbasis jaringan. Dalam proses ini, nilai-nilai regional membentuk ulang batas organisasi dan memengaruhi gerakan Islam yang lebih luas di Indonesia.

**Kata kunci:** Otoritas Keagamaan, Darul Istiqamah, Hidayatullah, Wahdah Islamiyah, Darul Islam.

**ملخص:** تستكشف هذه الدراسة انتشار السلطة الدينية الإسلامية داخل منظمة المحمدية في جنوب سولاويسي، وتأثير القيم الثقافية المحلية على الإصلاح الإسلامي. وتسلط الضوء على ظهور حركات دار الاستقامة، وهداية الله، وواحدة الإسلامية التي أسسها نشطاء المحمدية بسبب التحولات الأيديولوجية والمبادرات الثقافية والفرص السياسية. لقد شجعت قيم البوغيس-الماكاسار مثل «سيري» (الشعور بالجزى والكرامة) و«بيسي/باسيه» (التضامن) على القيادة الذاتية وإنشاء مؤسسات جديدة بدلاً من التسوية الداخلية. بالاعتماد على نظرية الفرص السياسية، وتعبئة الموارد، والطائفية، تُظهر الدراسة أن انتشار السلطة الدينية موجه بالمنطق الاجتماعي والثقافي المحلي. وقد عززت تركة حركة دار الإسلام رؤية أكثر صرامة للإصلاح الإسلامي. لا تمثل هذه العملية مجرد تجزئة، بل تكييفًا وابتكارًا تتوسط فيه العناصر الثقافية المحلية. يصف مفهوم «المحمدية البوغيس-المقسرية» كيف أصبحت الديناميكيات الثقافية المحلية حافزًا لإصلاح إسلامي نحو حركة اجتماعية قائمة على الشبكات. وفي هذه العملية، أعادت القيم الإقليمية تشكيل الحدود التنظيمية وأثرت على الحركة الإسلامية الأوسع في إندونيسيا.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** السلطة الدينية، دار الاستقامة، هداية الله، واحدة الإسلامية، دار الإسلام.

Since establishing a presence in South Sulawesi in 1926, Muhammadiyah has experienced both internal growth and dispersal. The dispersal is evidenced by the formation of various new religious movements and organizations initiated by its leaders and members. It started with the establishment of Pesantren Darul Istiqamah in 1971, Pesantren Hidayatullah in 1973, and Wahdah Islamiyah in 2002. They subsequently developed into educational foundations and religious organizations, opening branches in other cities, regencies, and provinces across Indonesia, thereby challenging Muhammadiyah's longstanding presence in those areas. The emergence of these organizations reflects a shift in Islamic reformism, with each of Darul Istiqamah, Hidayatullah, and Wahdah Islamiyah developing distinct ideological paths. Darul Istiqamah is a purist reformist movement that emphasizes doctrinal purity, Hidayatullah is an educational institution with a traditionalist and conservative approach to Islamic practice, and Wahdah Islamiyah follows a Salafi-inspired approach.

Following the collapse of the New Order in 1998, a wave of religious conservatism and Islamism rapidly gained ground, giving rise to new social and political movements (Fealy 2004; Platzdasch 2009; Buehler 2016). In South Sulawesi, most of such groups called for an Islamic state or at least the implementation of Islamic law. Among the most conspicuous are the South Sulawesi branch of Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Institute for Islamic Propagation in Indonesia or LDII), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI or the Islamic Defenders Front), Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariat Islam (KPPSI or the Committee for the Preparation of Islamic Shari'a's Enactment), Forum Umat Islam Bersatu (FUIB or the United Muslim Forum) (Buehler 2016, 141-145; Ahmad 2007). There are also local-based groups like Lembaga Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI or Institute for Research and Study of Islam) and Laskar Pemburu Aliran Sesat (LPAS or the Heresy Chaser Warriors). Many initiators, members, and leaders of these groups were Muhammadiyah activists. Like elsewhere, some Muhammadiyah members from South Sulawesi personally also took part in Aksi Bela Islam's (the Defend Islam Action) demonstration series at the National Monument in Jakarta since 2016 and their subsequent reunions (IDNTimes 2019).

This article investigates the factors behind the emergence of new socio-religious movements originating from Muhammadiyah in South

Sulawesi. It explores the historical and socio-cultural conditions that enable the dispersal of Islamic authority and institutions at the local level. This qualitative study combines library research and fieldwork conducted to confirm and supplement findings on the emergence of these organizations. Data collection primarily employed purposive sampling, for several semi-structured interviews and one focus group discussion (FGD) with twelve participants. While our analysis draws primarily on extensive library research covering the broader South Sulawesi context, targeted interviews took place in Makassar, Gowa, and Maros, representing the historical core of Muhammadiyah activity in South Sulawesi, serving to supplement and validate textual arguments with most respondents representing leaders' perspectives within these movements.

Notably, the headquarters of both Darul Istiqamah and Wahdah Islamiyah are located in Makassar, which also hosts a branch of Pesantren Hidayatullah. While the findings reflect a limited geographic and demographic scope, they provide valuable insights into elite discourses and strategic orientations within the Muhammadiyah-affiliated organizational landscape in South Sulawesi. As researchers with backgrounds in Islamic studies and anthropology, we acknowledge our positioning as both scholarly observers and participants within Indonesia's broader Islamic intellectual community. This positioning informs our analytical approach, while we maintain critical distance from organizational loyalties.

The Indonesian term "*Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar*" is used in this study to highlight the distinctive features of Muhammadiyah's development in South Sulawesi. The research sites were historically Makassarese territories but are now home to ethnically mixed populations, predominantly Bugis, along with Mandar, Toraja, and other sub-ethnic groups. The phenomenon under study reflects a shared socio-cultural ethos between the Bugis and Makassarese, especially the values of *siri*' (shame and dignity) and *pessé/paccé* (solidarity), which encourage competitive leadership and institutional entrepreneurship. This conceptual framework, elaborated in detail following our literature review, helps explain why religious authority dispersal in South Sulawesi takes forms distinct from other Indonesian regions.

This study adopts a multi-theoretical framework. First, political opportunity theory (Tarrow 1994) helps explain how shifts in Indonesia's

political environment, particularly New Order authoritarianism and Reformasi liberalization, created space for religious actors to form new institutions. Second, resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977) highlights how Muhammadiyah cadres used their leadership experience, organizational skills, and networks to establish alternative movements. Third, the concept of sectarianization (Hashemi and Postel 2017) provides insight into how doctrinal shifts and ideological polarization contribute to institutional separation.

To describe this process, we use the term “*dispersal*” rather than fragmentation or diversification. Drawing on Schoenherr’s (1987) concept of power concentration and dispersion, dispersal refers to the decentralizing movement of religious authority away from a central body into new, semi-independent entities. It reflects the ongoing tension between centripetal (centralizing) and centrifugal (decentralizing) forces within religious institutions (Schoenherr 1987, 53). In Muhammadiyah’s case, this has led to the formation of organizations that, while autonomous, continue to draw from its traditions and influence. These developments should not be seen as signs of organizational weakness. As Keane (2007) has shown, the emergence of new religious groups is a recurring feature of reformist traditions. Slama (2014) similarly illustrates how Islamic reformism in Indonesia has generated new institutional forms while preserving its foundational ideals.

Finally, this study engages the perspectives of Hefner (2000) and Bruinessen (2002, 2013) to situate these local dynamics within broader patterns in Indonesian Islam. Hefner emphasizes how democratization and civil society enable Islamic actors to reshape their roles in public life, supporting the notion that these organizational offshoots reflect adaptive strategies rather than institutional rupture. Bruinessen’s analysis of authority fragmentation and charismatic leadership emergence helps explain how former Muhammadiyah cadres can establish legitimacy through alignment with alternative ideological networks, including Salafism and the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia movement of Kahar Muzakkar (“House of Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia”, henceforth the Darul Islam).<sup>1</sup>

Our findings both confirm and extend these theoretical insights: while supporting Hefner’s view (2000) that Islamic actors reshape their public roles, we demonstrate that such adaptation can produce

institutional multiplication rather than merely reformed engagement within existing structures. More specifically, our analysis reveals how Bugis-Makassar competitive authority patterns systematically channel religious disagreements toward organizational separation rather than intra-institutional factional politics. This case thus demonstrates how regional cultural logics mediate religious authority and reform trajectories, offering fresh insights into Islamic activism across Indonesia and Southeast Asia.

### **Internal Diversity in Muhammadiyah: A Literature Review**

Extensive studies of the historical development of Muhammadiyah in general have mainly focused on Java and, to a large extent, on the islands of Sumatra and Sumbawa. Muhammadiyah's Islamic ideology across Indonesia, however, does not exhibit uniformity or homogeneity, despite its common portrayal as a modernist, reformist and puritan Islamic organization. Numerous scholars have recently observed the remarkable diversity among Muhammadiyah's members (See Bush 2014; Burhani 2018). As Fealy (2004, 104) notes, after the fall of Suharto, a fuller picture of Islamic diversity in Indonesia emerged, including previously overlooked "radical pieces". Within Muhammadiyah, this diversity is evident in the range of ideologies among its members and sympathizers, including moderate, liberal, conservative, and progressive viewpoints. Fealy (2004, 105) observes that some segments of Muhammadiyah show considerable support for certain radical perspectives and objectives, and at times, their language closely resembles that of radical organizations.

Ricklefs (2005) notes that Muhammadiyah's growing conservatism is part of a broader conflict between conservative and liberal Muslims in Indonesia and that Muhammadiyah is just the first arena where conservatives have gained ground. Efendi (2014) analyzes how ideological differences, political interests, and strategic visions among Muhammadiyah elites have given rise to internal pluralism. He classifies Muhammadiyah elites into political pragmatists, passive moderates, khittah-loyalists, and apolitical groups. Boy (2007) notes a tension between conservative and progressive factions within both leadership and membership, rooted in differing views of "pure Islam". While this tension contributes to Muhammadiyah's intellectual richness and strategic diversity, neither Boy nor Efendi link it to institutional fragmentation or the emergence of new Islamic organizations.

Such ideological and cultural diversity within Muhammadiyah has resulted in an increasingly complex and fragmented landscape, reflected in various classifications such as Al-Ikhlâs, Kiai Dahlan, MuNU (a blend of Muhammadiyah and NU), MarMud (Marhaenist-Muhammadiyah), Krismuha (Kristen Muhammadiyah), MuSyi (Muhammadiyah-Syiah), Munas (Muhammadiyah-Nasionalis), Musa (Muhammadiyah-Salafi), and Mursal (Muhammadiyah with Salafi influences) (See Mu'ti and Ulhaq 2009; Mulkhan 2000; Burhani 2018).

Burhani (2019) argues that Muhammadiyah essentially reflects Indonesian culture in general, which he describes as a “hybrid culture”. Various local cultures have been “processed and adjusted to the values embedded within the movement, particularly the principles of purification and dynamism” (Burhani 2019, 76). It is therefore reasonable to speak of Muhammadiyah of Java, Muhammadiyah of Minangkabau, Muhammadiyah of Bugis, or Muhammadiyah of Sunda.

Such hybridity, however, does not always lead to the same organizational outcomes. In some regions, ideological and ritual diversity within Muhammadiyah is accommodated internally, enabling the coexistence of reformist ideas with local religious expressions. Sila's (2020) study in Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, for instance, shows how Muhammadiyah engages with traditions such as the elaborate Maulid celebration and the Hanta Ua Pua ritual without triggering institutional dispersal.

This pattern of accommodation is not always present in other regions. In South Sulawesi, differing orientations and religious missions within Muhammadiyah circles have not led to internal adjustment, but instead triggered the formation of entirely new organizations. This institutional separation was driven by three interconnected factors: more rigid theological orientations, historical ties to Darul Islam, and Bugis-Makassar cultural values emphasizing autonomous leadership and institutional entrepreneurship. These dynamics created an environment in which religious ideological disagreements were more likely to produce organizational separation than compromise within a single institutional framework.

Despite the significance of this phenomenon, no detailed study has examined how the dispersal of religious authority within Muhammadiyah in this province has shaped such organizational developments. The only work that engages with this matter is Dinarto and Nubowo's (2021,

137–138) study of the 2018 elections in South Sulawesi in which they touch on the issue, albeit briefly (see also Nubowo 2021). This article seeks to fill that gap by analyzing the specific cultural, historical, and institutional conditions under which Muhammadiyah's internal diversity leads not to accommodation, but to the dispersal of authority, especially in regional contexts beyond Java and Sumatra.

### **The Making of Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar: Ethnic Values, Competitive Authority, and Religious Entrepreneurship**

This theoretical section introduces the concept of Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar to analytically capture its development as a socio-religious formation shaped by ethnic values, competitive authority, and religious entrepreneurship. The concept highlights the distinctive institutional trajectory of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi, where reformist orientation becomes refracted through Bugis-Makassar cultural ethos. Drawing from Burhani's (2019, 2010) conceptualization of *Muhammadiyah Jawa* (Muhammadiyah of Java), which demonstrates how local contexts reshape ideological and organizational expressions, Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar represents not merely a regional branch but an expression of Islamic reformism mediated by distinctive structures of authority, cultural values, and historical experience.

While South Sulawesi is home to various ethnic groups, including the Bugis, Makassarese, Mandar, Toraja, and several other sub-ethnic groups, the Bugis and Makassarese represent the dominant demographic and geographic presence relevant to this analysis. Throughout the Indonesian archipelago, where South Sulawesi migrants have established communities since the seventeenth century, "Bugis" has functioned as a general ethnonym encompassing all regional migrants regardless of specific ethnic affiliation (Sutherland 2001, 419). The composite term "Bugis-Makassar" has, however, evolved into an accepted identity representing these major ethnic groups (Mattulada 1998, 70), while reflecting shared sociocultural values of leadership, competition, and honor that fundamentally shape organizational dynamics

The Bugis-Makassar sociocultural framework encompasses values such as *siri'* (shame and dignity), *pessé/paccé* (solidarity), freedom, and leadership autonomy (Pelras 2006; Mattulada 1991). According to Abidin (1983, 6-15), *siri'* is divided into *siri' ripakasiri'* (defensive dignity) and *siri' masiri'* (proactive pursuit of status), with the latter

driving individuals to enhance their social position. These values align with Harvey's (1974, 34) description of the Bugis-Makassar people as "hot-tempered, stubborn, proud, and difficult to govern," reflecting a deep preference for autonomy and leadership independence. While these values complement Islamic teachings, they also shape leadership behaviors. *Siri'* motivates individuals to preserve dignity, leading to the formation of independent institutions like Darul Istiqamah, Hidayatullah, and Wahdah Islamiyah which embrace a stricter theological stance. *Pessé/paccé* strengthens solidarity, fostering tightly-knit communities within organizations, allowing them to thrive outside traditional frameworks. Thus, these values not only complement Islam but actively reshape leadership roles, leading to organizational separation and the formation of new movements.

This cultural mechanism operates through three interconnected dynamics. The *siri' masiri'* ethos generates organizational conflict resolution patterns that differ markedly from Javanese approaches to institutional tension. Where Javanese cultural frameworks typically emphasize harmony-seeking through accommodation (*rukun*), the Bugis-Makassar preference for *siri' masiri'* systematically transforms theological disagreements into opportunities for status assertion through institutional entrepreneurship (Mattulada 1991). This cultural logic links *siri' masiri'*, which values individual achievement and autonomous leadership, with a rank-based social order that rewards institutional authority. These patterns help explain why ideological tensions tend to result in separation rather than internal doctrinal compromise.

Reid (2000, 70) highlights the pluralism of South Sulawesi society, which fostered openness to new ideas, respect for customary rights and mutual agreements, and a social hierarchy that mobilized resources without suppressing initiative. He captures this paradox by asking, "Can it be at once marked by slavery and by a love of freedom; by a strict sense of hierarchy and a spirit of individual enterprise; by a tenacious clinging to old beliefs and rituals and an openness to change?" (Reid 2000, 56). Millar (1989), similarly identifies simultaneous competition for personal achievement alongside defence of inherited status, rendering social position (B. *onro*) perpetually contested. Acciaioli (2009, 67) demonstrates how "Social hierarchy and economic enterprise, pervasive rank and competitive mobility, traditionalism and opportunism" constitute the distinctive dynamic of Bugis and Makassar society.

Migration patterns manifest this *siri*'-driven dynamic, historically documented by Andaya (1995) in the seventeenth century. Fox (1995, 223) characterizes this as "lateral expansion," whereby individuals blocked from advancement at home seek new territories for leadership and wealth assertion. Contemporary expressions extend beyond territorial migration to encompass religious entrepreneurship through founding schools, *pesantren*, and Islamic organizations. Migration thus functions simultaneously as conflict resolution and institutional expansion mechanism, linking religious vision with territorial proliferation.

The *pessé/paccé* (solidarity) principle reinforces institutional multiplication tendencies. In diasporic contexts, it facilitates new community and institutional formation (Andaya 1995).<sup>2</sup> Muhammadiyah leaders experiencing organizational tension characteristically draw upon *pessé/paccé* values to construct alternative institutions while maintaining Islamic reform alignment. Rather than weakening the broader movement, institutional dispersal enables the proliferation of influential religious organizations extending well beyond regional origins, generating network-based Islamic activism.

This pattern of "competitive institutional entrepreneurship" reflects the Bugis-Makassar paradox: simultaneous commitment to reformist Islam and resistance to organizational hierarchy. Unlike other regional contexts where religious disagreements generate factional politics within existing structures, the *siri' masiri'* framework channels dissent into institutional multiplication. Theological diversity thus appears less as a source of organizational weakness and more as a catalyst for religious innovation and territorial expansion. This dynamic may help explain the prominence of South Sulawesi in the emergence of influential Islamic movements beyond Java (See Buehler 2016).

The concept of Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar serves as a framework for understanding how Islamic reformism, influenced by local sociocultural contexts, leads to the dispersal of religious authority, something not observed in Java or Sumatra. This perspective helps explain how new religious movements emerge from existing organizations, showing how local cultural values transform Islamic reform into diverse, network-driven innovations. These innovations redefine organizational boundaries and expand Islamic activism both nationally and internationally.

## Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi: Minangkabau Influences and Institutional Growth

The official presence of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi began with the establishment of its Makassar Branch on July 2, 1926 (21 Zulhijjah 1334 H) by Mansur al-Yamani and Haji Abdullah. This marked Muhammadiyah's expansion beyond its initial bases in Java and Sumatra. Mansur al-Yamani, born in Sumenep, Madura in 1894 to a father of Arab descent, had previously been active in the Muhammadiyah Surabaya Branch under the leadership of KH Mas Mansur (Bosra 2008, 117-119).

From the beginning, despite resistance from traditionalist groups and colonial authorities, Muhammadiyah gained support from the urban Muslim middle class, including merchants, Hadhrami Arab immigrants, religious scholars, and local aristocrats. This support played a key role in the organization's growth (Bosra 2008, 128). By 1978, Muhammadiyah had spread across South Sulawesi with significant influence in education, social welfare, and government (Bosra et al. 2015, 38).

Using Burhani's (2010) analytical framework on Muhammadiyah's cultural-religious orientation, the early character of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi reflects the key traits he associates with the Minangkabau (West Sumatran) tradition: revivalism, theological puritanism, rejection of syncretic or tradition-based religious practices, and a scripturalist, sharia-oriented interpretation of Islam.

Burhani (2010, 131-143) notes that post-Dahlan Muhammadiyah was significantly influenced by the Minangkabau network, especially Haji Rasul, whom Alfian (1989, 258) describes as "synonymous with Muhammadiyah Minangkabau". Unlike Java's accommodating approach, characterized by gradualism, tolerance, and cultural synthesis (Burhani 2010, xvi-xx; 2019, 76), early Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi displayed traits closer to reformist Minangkabau's Muhammadiyah traditions. This is evident in four key aspects.

First, its founder Mansur al-Yamani was mentored by KH Mas Mansur in Surabaya, who was closely linked to Haji Rasul's thought and initiated Muhammadiyah's Tarjih Council emphasizing Islamic purification. This transmitted the Minangkabau *tajdid* tradition to the Makassar branch from its inception.

Second, Muhammadiyah leaders in South Sulawesi maintained direct ties to Minangkabau intellectual networks through education

in Padang, like KH. M. Sanusi Maggu (Chairperson of PWM South Sulawesi in 1980–1984), and by recruiting Minangkabau teachers for local schools (Bosra et al. 2015). This connection was crucially strengthened by Buya Hamka's presence in Makassar (1931–1934), where Haji Rasul's son not only organized the 21st Muhammadiyah Congress in Makassar in 1932 but actively taught and mentored young cadres in Makassar and many other regencies in South Sulawesi.

Third, Muhammadiyah's growth in South Sulawesi coincided with the organization's national shift following the 1930 Bukittinggi Congress, which strengthened Minangkabau influence and established the Tarjih Council as a *tajdid* institution. Consequently, Muhammadiyah's expansion in South Sulawesi from the 1930s aligned with Minangkabau reformist tendencies rather than the moderate Javanese model.

Fourth, these historical connections established lasting institutional patterns that continue to shape Muhammadiyah's character in South Sulawesi today, as evident in its emphasis on scriptural literalism, Sharia-oriented discourse, and a systematic rejection of syncretic practices. This orientation fosters a rigid organizational culture centered on doctrinal purity and moral discipline. As Alwi (2012) observes, Muhammadiyah leaders in South Sulawesi have consistently upheld *tajdid* principles by combining ideological rigidity with institutional modernization.

These features underpin a reformist missionary framework that opposes traditional syncretism while promoting rational and ethical leadership aimed at broader social transformation. In this way, the Minangkabau reformist tradition has functioned not merely as a historical legacy but as a living institutional ethos, one that established the dominant ideological framework of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi and persisted even as new intellectual currents began to emerge in subsequent decades.

Starting in the late 1950s and continuing through the 1980s, the established Muhammadiyah framework in South Sulawesi encountered new intellectual currents as many young cadres pursued higher education in Yogyakarta, the birthplace of the movement in 1912.<sup>3</sup> Many enrolled at Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam Negeri (PTAIN), now UIN Sunan Kalijaga, where prominent academic figures, including deans and rectors, were affiliated with Muhammadiyah. There they engaged with leading reformist scholars like Prof. A. Mukti Ali and

Prof. Mukhtar Yahya and were exposed to a broader spectrum of Islamic thought, including Islamic philosophy, theology, mysticism, and religious pluralism. Equally influential was their exposure to the Javanese Muhammadiyah culture, shaped by the traditional courtly atmosphere of the Yogyakarta Sultanate.

For many, the experience was intellectually and culturally disorienting. One alumnus recalled being surprised by Muhammadiyah practices in Yogyakarta that were absent from his South Sulawesi upbringing.<sup>4</sup> Although they returned with broader perspectives, these graduates had limited influence on the dominant Minangkabau-style puritanism in Muhammadiyah South Sulawesi. Most pursued academic careers at IAIN (now UIN) Alauddin Makassar, with little involvement in leadership or grassroots *da'wah*, which curtailed their institutional impact.

### **Paths of Dispersal: The Cases of Darul Istiqamah, Hidayatullah, Wahdah Islamiyah and An-Nadzir**

Chronologically, the first educational institution established by a member of Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi is Pesantren Darul Istiqamah in Maccopa, Maros regency, founded in 1971 by Kiai Haji (KH) Ahmad Marzuki Hasan (1917–2006). When founding the pesantren (Islamic boarding school), Kiai Ahmad still held a prominent position in the Muhammadiyah Provincial Board (PWM) of South Sulawesi.<sup>5</sup> For over fifteen years before, he held several ministerial posts in the governmental structure of the Darul Islam led by Abdul Kahar Muzakkar (or Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar).

Indeed, some figures and organizations mentioned in this article have clear connections to this movement. We argue that the Darul Islam is an important source of inspiration and spirit for Islamism and political radicalism among Muslims in South Sulawesi, which Bruinessen (2013, 10) describes as “a province with a strong tradition of Islamic radicalism, and it is perhaps not surprising that after the fall of the Suharto regime the region was home to one of the most vocal movements for the enforcement of the Shariah in the country”.<sup>6</sup> The influence of its conservative or radical ideology continues to re-emerge within the South Sulawesi Muslim society, for example, in the adoption of regional Sharia bylaws (*Peraturan Daerah/Perda Syariah*) in some regencies and the establishment of the KPPSI, led by Kahar’s son, Abdul Aziz Qahhar. The two movements were seen as a continuation

of Darul Islam's ideological struggle in the province (Dinarto and Nubowo 2021; Halim 2009).

Initially, Pesantren Darul Istiqamah (the house of steadfastness) operated only elementary to senior Islamic schools. Kiai Ahmad led Pesantren Darul Istiqamah in Maros until 1983, after which his son, KH. Arif Marzuki, expanded its reach while maintaining its conservative Islamic vision. Today Darul Istiqamah (DI), after it transformed into an education institution, has about thirty pesantren branches in South Sulawesi and Central Sulawesi, North Sulawesi and West Sulawesi, Papua, and Jakarta provinces. This expansion was largely facilitated by Bugis-Makassar migrants who established DI branches in their areas of settlement, creating a network that follows traditional migration patterns while serving both religious education and cultural continuity for diaspora communities.

DI is a reformist movement, though it diverges from Muhammadiyah's version of reformism. On many religious issues, sometimes DI follows Muhammadiyah's views but not on others.<sup>7</sup> DI exemplifies rigorous religious practices within the pesantren complex and its exclusive community, aiming to instill in its students values such as steadfastness, courage to take a stand, confidence in being different, self-reliance, and independence from others (Fathurahman 2006, 165). These practices, including congregational prayers, Qur'an memorization, and mass marriages, reinforce community cohesion and reflect DI's community-centered and disciplined structure, grounded in strong ideological commitment. It also maintains economic independence through various enterprises and partnerships, including collaboration with Pesantren Hidayatullah in the plantation sector. The close relationship between DI and Hidayatullah is rooted in a family connection between their founders, Kiai Ahmad and KH. Abdullah Said, both of whom came from Sinjai, South Sulawesi (Fathurahman 2006, 165).

To better understand the emergence of DI as a religious institution, its development can be analyzed using political and social theory. Political opportunity theory, in particular, helps explain how DI was established during the early New Order era, when conservative Islamic actors navigated restricted religious and political spaces. Kiai Ahmad's initiative reflected frustration with Muhammadiyah's moderate stance and institutional constraints. Drawing on his personal charisma and the legacy of Darul Islam, he mobilized a loyal following and founded

a pesantren model that emphasized doctrinal purity and centralized authority. This model aligned with an Islamist orientation that operated within the boundaries of authoritarian tolerance.

Like DI, the Hidayatullah Pesantren also originated from the initiative of a Muhammadiyah cadre, KH. Abdullah Said (originally Muhsin Kahar), who founded the pesantren in 1973. Kiai Abdullah (1945–1988) was born in Sinjai, South Sulawesi. He was active in Pelajar Islam Indonesia or PII (the Indonesian Islamic Students Association) and Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth) in Makassar, and studied under several Muhammadiyah ulama such as Kiai Ahmad (DI leader) and KH. Fathul Muin Daeng Maggading. Although he attended various universities in Yogyakarta, including IAIN Sunan Kalijaga and Universitas Muhammadiyah, he did not complete his formal studies, prioritizing religious learning and proselytizing. His father, Abdul Kahar Syuaib, was known as a key figure in Darul Islam. Kiai Abdullah passed away on March 4, 1988 in Jakarta (Burhanuddin and Basri 2003, 292–293).

When he returned to Makassar, Muhsin reengaged with Muhammadiyah and assumed various leadership roles at regional and provincial levels. However, his direct involvement in exterminating the Chinese “Lotto gambling” in Makassar on August 28, 1969 forced him to flee and explore a new location for spreading his religious preaching. After involvement in anti-gambling activities forced him to flee Makassar in 1969, he adopted the name Abdullah Said and established a religious base in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (Burhanuddin and Basri 2003, 294).

He eventually founded his own pesantren, now known as Pesantren Hidayatullah. Similar to DI, Hidayatullah’s growth was largely propelled by Bugis-Makassar migrants who established branches in their new settlements across the archipelago. In East Kalimantan, the pesantren expanded with significant support from fellow Bugis migrants, united by *pessé/paccé* solidarity and shared religious aspirations. This communal backing provided land, resources, and legitimacy, and as these migrants relocated, alumni replicated the support model along established migration routes. The institution has since grown into a vast complex and evolved into the largest pesantren in the province, leading to the formation of a nationwide association with nearly 500 branches (Subhan 2006, 206, 215).<sup>8</sup> Since 2000, Hidayatullah has transformed

into a mass organization, promoting a conservative interpretation and practice of Islam. It advocates for an educational concept grounded in the Qur'an and its comprehensive implementation in daily life (Subhan 2006).

Hidayatullah also manages various social welfare programs and economic activities for the local community. It gained recognition through its magazine, *Suara Hidayatullah* (in print since 1984), which, according to Bruinessen, promotes militant Islamist views, anti-Jewish and anti-Christian sentiments, and covers global jihad movements and radical Islamic groups in Indonesia (Bruinessen 2008, 235-236).<sup>9</sup> The organization trains missionaries to spread its reformist Islamic message across the archipelago. Doctrinally rigid and shaped by ideological exclusivism and radical Islamic activism, Hidayatullah nonetheless maintains favorable relations with the government, receiving public support and recognition. High-ranking officials, including presidents and ministers, have visited its pesantren, which has earned awards such as the Kalpataru Prize for environmental conservation (Burhanuddin and Basri 2003, 321).

These developments, however, are not merely institutional; they reflect broader structural dynamics. Hidayatullah emerged amid a changing state-Islam relationship where *dakwah* movements were tolerated but politically contained. Kiai Abdullah's choice to form a separate pesantren stemmed from the limited scope for charismatic and militant expressions within Muhammadiyah. His background in PII and exposure to Muhammadiyah's cadre networks allowed for the construction of a more rigid religious community that appealed to young Muslims seeking activist-oriented Islam. Many young Muhammadiyah cadres from South Sulawesi came to study at Pesantren Hidayatullah and later became key leaders and organizers within the movement. Their involvement further reinforced the cross-pollination between Muhammadiyah's reformist legacy and Hidayatullah's institutional trajectory.

The next organization created by former activists of Muhammadiyah was Wahdah Islamiyah. Its initial form as Yayasan Fathul Muin (YFM) was established on June 18, 1988. The foundation is named after KH Fathul Muin Daeng Maggading, a charismatic Muhammadiyah ulama in Makassar and a sympathizer of Darul Islam who was well-known for his critical of Suharto's authoritarian government. He openly rejected the political policy of the New Order government in 1982, requiring

Pancasila (state philosophy) to become the sole ideology (*asas tunggal*) for all socio-political organizations, which was initially responded with an ambiguous stance, before eventually being accepted, by Muhammadiyah.<sup>10</sup> Kiai Muin attracted many dedicated disciples and followers, particularly among youthful Muhammadiyah activists such as members of Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (IPM or Muhammadiyah Student Association), whose membership includes individuals aged from fifteen to twenty-three, and Pemuda Muhammadiyah, aged from thirty to forty.

In 2002, YFM became Wahdah Islamiyah (WI), expanding to over 120 branches nationwide and challenging the deeply rooted stances of Muhammadiyah and NU. Its network of mosques, Islamic educational institutions, and other affiliated programs show its capacity to impact the emergence of a blended form of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia (Jurdi 2021). Commonly viewed as a “Salafi Islamic organization” (Chaplin 2018, 208-209), in its official documents and website, WI refers to itself as “[A]n Islamic mass organization that bases its religious understanding and practices on the Quran and Sunnah according to the understanding of the righteous predecessors (*Salaf as-Ṣāliḥ*) in line with the methodology of the Sunni community (*Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā’ah*)”.<sup>11</sup>

Another “non-mainstream Muslim community” led by a former member of Muhammadiyah is An-Nadzir, living in Romangpolong, Gowa Regency. This community is known for its distinct religious practices and simple lifestyle, with followers wearing distinctive attire and adopting an agrarian way of life. An-Nadzir was established by KH. Syamsuri Abdul Majid and has ideological ties with the Darul Islam movement of Kahar Muzakkar, whom they view as having special spiritual status (Pabbajah et al. 2019). After Syamsuri’s death in 2006, An-Nadzir came under the leadership of Daeng Rangka, a former IPM leader in Gowa. Some Muslim leaders in South Sulawesi view the An-Nadzir community as outside mainstream Islam, with the former Chairperson of PWM South Sulawesi, Ustaz Muhammad Alwi, calling them a “splinter” community that has deviated from “true” Islamic teachings (Pabbajah et al. 2019).

## Underlying Factors of Authority Dispersal

What factors might have contributed to the emergence of various Islamic groups and movements originating from Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi?

First, Muhammadiyah's leadership system does not rely on charismatic authority. Moral integrity and deep knowledge of Islam are more crucial for assuming leadership positions. Religious authority is not consolidated within one individual or group, and allegiance to leaders is not ideologically binding. Muhammadiyah promotes an open and progressive religious ideology that allows members to engage with other Islamic orientations or organizations without requiring formal consent from the leadership.<sup>12</sup> This structural openness creates space for ideological diversity and individual religious initiative. However, such organizational freedom alone does not necessarily lead to dispersal.

Its implications become more consequential when situated within the Bugis-Makassar sociocultural environment, which places high value on autonomous leadership, competitive status, and personal initiative. As discussed earlier in the theoretical section, the ethos of *siri' masiri'* emphasizes proactive achievement and social mobility, while the rank-based social structure rewards those who assert independent authority. In this context, Muhammadiyah's open system becomes a fertile ground for institutional dispersal, as theological disagreement is often resolved not through internal negotiation, but by founding separate institutions.

Rather than contesting influence within an existing organization, reformist actors in this setting tend to establish new platforms for leadership, thereby translating personal religious vision into independent institutional forms. This tendency becomes especially visible when theological differences emerge, whether regarding Salafi influences, the accommodation of Sufism, or approaches to Sharia implementation. In the Bugis-Makassar context, such disagreements are not typically resolved through internal compromise, but through institutional separation, driven by the cultural preference for autonomous authority and status-building.

In contrast to Muhammadiyah's more decentralized leadership model, organizations such as DI and WI have adopted leadership structures that stress loyalty and central authority. As noted by Ustaz M. Said Samad, the current chairperson of PDM Makassar, these organizations "have more efficacious cadre programs than those currently run by Muhammadiyah".<sup>13</sup> This organizational difference has made DI and WI attractive to reformist actors seeking stronger ideological cohesion and clearer leadership hierarchy, an appeal that aligns with, rather than contradicts, the Bugis-Makassar ethos of status

assertion through structured paths of authority.

Kiai Ahmad's case is a good example. Without formally leaving Muhammadiyah, he chose to establish his pesantren independently. "Let me not carry Muhammadiyah's flag," he once said, "but allow me to show [through my pesantren] what a true Islamic society looks like".<sup>14</sup> His statement reflects alignment with Muhammadiyah's ideals (that is, to realize a truly Islamic society), but also a Bugis-Makassar impulse toward independent leadership rather than internal reform.

This pattern is evident in the founders' narratives. Kiai Ahmad's statement reflects not rejection of Muhammadiyah's goals but disagreement about methods, disagreement that Bugis cultural values transform into independent organizational action rather than internal reform efforts. Since then Kiai Ahmad has never been active again in Muhammadiyah or held any leadership position there except taking part in Muhammadiyah's Tarjih Council sessions. Indeed, Ahmad has never explicitly declared his departure from Muhammadiyah.<sup>15</sup>

The second factor relates to historical fact that Muhammadiyah stands out as the first modern Islamic organization in South Sulawesi that has effective formal cadre programs (*program pengkaderan*) for teenagers and adolescence levels. It provides a basic training ground for young Muslim activists before they participate in religious activism elsewhere. As Bosra (FGD 2018) puts it, Muhammadiyah at the time became, "a large tent that shelters the local Muslim community". In Muhammadiyah's cadre programs, however, personal pledges to stay committed as an active, loyal member are not given significant ideological emphasis.

The third factor of dispersal is the perceived decline in Muhammadiyah's reformist momentum and influence, with its engagement in current Islamic debates, both locally and globally, being seen as limited and ineffective. As Bruinessen (2002) points out, the fragmentation of Islamic authority in post-New Order Indonesia is part of a broader reconfiguration in how legitimacy is constructed and distributed. Organizations like DI, Hidayatullah, and WI thrive in this environment by creating new forms of authority rooted in charismatic leadership and conservative pedagogy. Similarly, Hefner (2000) argues that the post-authoritarian expansion of Indonesia's public sphere enabled a pluralization of Islamic activism, making space for both moderate and puritan movements to flourish side-by-side. These dynamics help

explain how Muhammadiyah's traditionally open and rationalist ethos has, paradoxically, incubated movements that seek greater ideological rigidity and moral control (See Hadisaputra 2010).

Such localized patterns are part of a wider trend influenced by the growing presence of transnational Islamic movements. Since the early 1980s, various transnational Islamic movements, including Salafi variants, have gained ground in Indonesia, including South Sulawesi (Tabroni and Idham 2023). This transformation has been particularly evident in regions outside Java, where local Islamic movements have adapted transnational ideologies to regional contexts (Pomalingo et al. 2024). Some Muhammadiyah members, especially younger activists, were increasingly drawn to these more puritanical and conservative ideologies.<sup>16</sup> According to Ustaz Said, the founders of DI, Hidayatullah, and WI were motivated by a desire to implement Islamic teachings more rigorously, a commitment they felt Muhammadiyah had gradually softened. Over time, in his view, Muhammadiyah has become less conservative in its religious practice. For example, DI and WI enforce stricter norms regarding women's dress and gender segregation; many women in WI wear face veils (*bercadar*), and men and women do not share spaces at public events like weddings.<sup>17</sup>

Nevertheless, Hadisaputra (2010, 4), a young Muhammadiyah scholar and activist, argues that the split of Muhammadiyah activists to form new organizations indicates that "Muhammadiyah continues to be a moderate and open-minded Islamic movement", and "any members of Muhammadiyah attempting to push the organization toward an extreme position will find themselves separated from the movement's core ideology". Ustaz Said, however, was concerned that Muhammadiyah may lean further towards the other extreme, such as liberalism. One reason he chose to become active again in Muhammadiyah and take on a leadership role was to prevent the organization from heading in that direction.<sup>18</sup>

The fourth factor concerns the awareness of the "*krisis ulama*," or the perceived lack of religious authority at the ulama level within Muhammadiyah (Alwi 2013, 81). Muhammadiyah members who were yearning for more dynamic Islamic intellectual knowledge and discourse had to find that in other Islamic organizations.<sup>19</sup> Muhammadiyah's emphasis on managing and expanding philanthropic ventures like clinics, hospitals, general schools, and universities has

also contributed to shifting its focus away from developing specialized religious education programs, such as pesantren, to produce scholars of religious knowledge or ulama.

Alwi (2013, 202) further notes that Muhammadiyah's growing size has led to increasing bureaucratization and slower responsiveness to social change. Its strong activist orientation has limited intellectual development, while rapid institutional expansion has not been matched by quality growth, especially in producing qualified scholars and preachers. As will be discussed later, at the subdistrict (*cabang*) and village (*ranting*) levels, some study groups ceased to continue due to the lack of available religious teachers. This is also the case for mosques without a permanent imam or preacher. The void created by this will later be filled by Wahdah Islamiyah in many locations.

The fifth factor was the ideological rigidity Muhammadiyah brought when expanding into South Sulawesi. It showed limited openness to differing religious views and other Islamic groups, often resulting in tension or conflict, particularly over classical jurisprudential disputes (*khilāfiyah*). This made it difficult to build unity among Muslims from diverse backgrounds. This also explains why Kiai Ahmad established DI without adopting the Muhammadiyah name. He intended to create a more inclusive *pesantren* by minimizing doctrinal boundaries and avoiding conflict.<sup>20</sup> Leaders of WI expressed a similar view, hoping to unify Muslims, as reflected in the organization's name, which literally means "Islamic Unity". Nevertheless, Ustaz Alwi remained sceptical, stating that these new groups "tend to create new sects instead".<sup>21</sup> This confirms the authors' earlier observation that the ideological character of early Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi closely resembled the Minangkabau model. Defined by theological puritanism, scripturalism, and a rejection of local religious traditions, this pattern shaped Muhammadiyah's limited ability to engage inclusively with the broader Muslim community.

The sixth factor is that Muhammadiyah's Islamic ideology that does not formally embrace the spiritual dimension of Islam or Sufism also causes authority dispersal. KH. Abdul Jabbar Asyiri's case is a good example. He was a prominent Muhammadiyah ulama who once led Pesantren Darul Arqam of Muhammadiyah in Gombara, Makassar.<sup>22</sup> The PWM South Sulawesi presented him with two choices: either remain with Muhammadiyah or continue his involvement with Jamaah

Tabligh (JT). Kiai Abdul Jabbar permitted JT members to temporarily stay at his pesantren and sometimes joined them in *khuruj*, a typical JT proselytizing mission that usually involves traveling to distant locations for a period ranging from one week to forty days or longer. He was attracted to JT because he believed that it embodied the teachings and practices of Sufism (*taṣawwuf*).<sup>23</sup> The reluctance of Muhammadiyah to accommodate the spiritual inclinations of its members has also been a contributing factor to the establishment of new religious groups by former Muhammadiyah members, such as An-Nadzir (Pabbajah et al. 2019, 77).

The final significant factor contributing to authority dispersal is the way Muhammadiyah navigates an Islamic landscape in South Sulawesi that is increasingly defined by a Sharia-centered religious orientation. The historical Islamization of this region emphasized Sharia implementation over spiritual and intellectual dimensions of Islam (Pelras 2001), creating a religious culture that prioritizes legal formalism and puritanical practices. Post-Reformation, this Sharia-centric orientation led to expectations among local Muslims for a more stringent implementation of Islamic principles than what Muhammadiyah's moderate reformism typically offered. A 2003 provincial government survey exemplifies this tendency: 91.11 percent of 280 respondents, including officials, parliament members, and religious leaders, supported Sharia implementation, though understandings varied widely (Tempo-Online 2003; See also Halim 2009).

This cultural preference for stricter Islamic observance created fertile ground for authority dispersal within Muhammadiyah circles. Leaders like Kiai Ahmad (DI), Kiai Abdullah (Hidayatullah), and WI founders could appeal to local religious sensibilities by establishing institutions that promised more comprehensive Sharia application than Muhammadiyah's inclusive approach allowed. The new organizations attracted members seeking clearer boundaries between what is *ḥalāl* (permissible) and *ḥarām* (forbidden), stricter gender segregation, and more militant approaches to Islamic purification, orientations that aligned with local Bugis religiosity but often conflicted with Muhammadiyah's accommodative stance toward Indonesia's pluralistic society. In this context, organizational separation became a means of resolving the tension between local Islamic expectations and Muhammadiyah's national moderate positioning.

As highlighted by key informants in this study, several internal factors contribute to the dispersal of Muhammadiyah's membership in South Sulawesi. Among these factors, Ustaz Alwi mentions five, which we quote below.

First, a segment of members is easily attracted to the ideologies of other movements due to their limited understanding of Muhammadiyah's religious doctrines. Second, the spirit, militancy, and vision of the organization appear to have diminished among some members, as reflected in their low levels of engagement in advancing Muhammadiyah's institutional initiatives. Third, there are indications of weakening loyalty and commitment to Muhammadiyah's mission, ideological framework, policies, and priorities, both in religious matters and in efforts to sustain and expand the organization's role and influence. Fourth, the decline of collective solidarity is evident, characterized by the gradual weakening of brotherhood, interpersonal relationship, and collaboration among members of Muhammadiyah and with its autonomous bodies (*organisasi otonom*). Lastly, some members, including those involved in Muhammadiyah's institutional activities, tend to prioritize external organizations and enterprises, occasionally at the expense of Muhammadiyah's resources and facilities.<sup>24</sup>

How do members and leaders of Muhammadiyah in this province respond to the emergence of these new organizations? Their responses are varied. Bosra, for example, views this phenomenon positively, seeing it as a proof of Muhammadiyah's success in producing capable cadres and activists as well as contributing to broader Muslim community development.<sup>25</sup> Meanwhile, Alwi explained in the interview that the birth of these organizations caused a degree of psychological unease within Muhammadiyah, given the challenges of fragmentation.<sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, Ustaz Said believes there is no significant difference between Muhammadiyah and the three organizations discussed earlier. He notes that while Muhammadiyah, DI, Hidayatullah, and WI are all committed to establishing "a truly Islamic society" (that is, Muhammadiyah's ultimate goal), the latter three are more rigorous, measured, and consistent in their efforts "to purify the teachings of Islam".<sup>27</sup>

Dinarto and Nubowo (2021, 141), however, assert that Hidayatullah and WI foster a more conservative ideology in Indonesia, leaning towards a stricter interpretation of Islam influenced by Middle Eastern

Salafi-Wahhabism. Their networks of Islamic schools, universities, and pesantrens foster a growing conservative ideology. And this is what sets the two apart ideologically from Muhammadiyah.

Building on the preceding factors, we argue that the most decisive sources of religious authority dispersal within Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi lie in two interrelated developments. First is the enduring ideological legacy of Kahar Muzakkar's Darul Islam movement, which shaped the trajectory of several organizations founded by Muhammadiyah-affiliated figures. Second is the growing demand for Islamic educational institutions with stronger ideological orientations than Muhammadiyah's existing framework could accommodate. These historical and institutional forces have together propelled some Muhammadiyah members to either establish or actively support parallel movements such as DI, Hidayatullah, and WI.

DI, Hidayatullah, and WI were all founded by individuals with direct or indirect connections to the Darul Islam movement. DI was established by Kiai Ahmad, a former Darul Islam leader. Hidayatullah's founder, Kiai Abdullah, was both the son of a staunch Darul Islam supporter and a student of Kiai Ahmad and Kiai Muin. WI emerged from young Muhammadiyah activists who had been students of Kiai Muin, who himself was deeply aligned with Darul Islam ideology (Buehler 2016, 61). This shared ideological lineage demonstrates how Darul Islam's conservative, militant, and anti-status-quo orientation continued to influence and inspire subsequent Islamic movements in South Sulawesi, particularly among Muhammadiyah members from merchant, educated, and farming backgrounds, groups that historically formed the base of both Muhammadiyah and Darul Islam (Pelras 2006, 380).

The ideological legacy of Darul Islam also persists through KPPSI, a regional movement that advocates for Islamic Sharia through legal-political channels. While Darul Islam pursued its aims through armed struggle, KPPSI articulates similar goals "constitutionally" (Halim 2009). Several Muhammadiyah figures, including the late KH. Jamaluddin Amin (1930–2014), former Chairperson of PWM South Sulawesi, became active in KPPSI as founders or board members. However, their involvement has been personal rather than institutional, as Muhammadiyah has never officially supported KPPSI or the formal implementation of Sharia law.

Equally important is the educational dimension. DI, Hidayatullah, and WI all developed as Islamic educational institutions, DI and Hidayatullah as pesantren, and WI as a network of Islamic public schools. The creation of these institutions reflected a perceived need for more ideologically intensive educational environments than what Muhammadiyah could provide. Establishing independent schools allowed their founders to promote stricter religious curricula, tighter moral discipline, and clearer ideological orientations. Yet, paradoxically, many Muhammadiyah families chose to enroll their children in these institutions, recognizing their quality and commitment. In some cases, dual affiliations became common; for example, Ustaz Said held a leadership position within PWM South Sulawesi while also serving as head of WI's fatwa council. He stepped down from his position in WI only after being elected Chairperson of PDM Makassar on May 7, 2023.<sup>28</sup>

The case of Wahdah Islamiyah and shifting individual alignments, such as that of Ustaz Said, display the fluid ideological currents shaping South Sulawesi's Islamic sphere, aligning with the theoretical framework elaborated earlier. WI exemplifies how post-Reformasi political opportunities (Tarrow 1994) enabled religious entrepreneurs to exploit organizational gaps left by established movements. Younger Muhammadiyah activists, frustrated with bureaucratic inertia, intellectual stagnation, and doctrinal ambiguity, utilized their organizational skills and networks as key resources from their Muhammadiyah experience (McCarthy and Zald 1977) to establish WI's more rigid Salafi alternative.

This dynamic illustrates the process of sectarianization (Hashemi and Postel 2017), where Muhammadiyah's perceived moderation creates space for doctrinal polarization and institutional separation. The convergence of external political openings, mobilizable resources from existing networks, and internal ideological tensions demonstrates how splinter movements emerge through the interaction of opportunity, capacity, and sectarian differentiation.

The Limbung case in Gowa Regency represents this theoretical framework in practice. Due to disrupted cadre training programs, Muhammadiyah members gradually shifted to WI, illustrating how organizational gaps create political opportunities for alternative movements. The weakening of Muhammadiyah youth organizations

such as IPM, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, and Nasyiatul Aisyiyah led young members to seek more structured religious forums. WI's rigorous and continuous education system attracted these youth, including former Muhammadiyah leaders, displaying resource mobilization theory in action as they transferred their organizational skills to new institutional contexts.<sup>29</sup>

Ustaz Saifuddin's trajectory from Pemuda Muhammadiyah leadership to WI regency board in Gowa demonstrates this sectarianization process. As he explains: "So even though I am active in IPM, join IMM [Muhammadiyah Student Association] cadre trainings, and become the head of Pemuda Muhammadiyah, my religious activities take place more frequently at Wahdah Islamiyah... I feel that I am still Muhammadiyah, only my activities are in Wahdah".<sup>30</sup> His trajectory illustrates how structured religious programs in WI filled the institutional gaps left by Muhammadiyah.

This dynamic is not confined to Limbung. Field observations in other parts of South Sulawesi reveal similar institutional patterns. In rural subdistricts of Gowa, such as in Bajeng (Hadisaputra 2025, 257-266), Muhammadiyah and WI operate side by side with overlapping membership and minimal friction. Some individuals formally remain within Muhammadiyah while actively engaging in WI's structured religious study programs. WI's focus on Qur'anic memorization and ritual discipline appeals to younger Muslims, especially in areas where Muhammadiyah lacks consistent leadership.

In such contexts, WI cadres have taken over the management of formerly Muhammadiyah mosques, including religious events and Friday sermons. These shifts are less about open conflict and more about filling organizational vacuums. WI's clarity of structure and sustained training offer concrete alternatives for Muhammadiyah members. While retaining symbolic ties to Muhammadiyah, many become functionally embedded in WI's religious networks. We argue that this pattern, though locally observed, reflects broader dynamics across Gowa and other parts of South Sulawesi.

This dual affiliation pattern extends beyond individual cases. Our fieldwork revealed numerous figures maintaining simultaneous roles in Muhammadiyah and institutions affiliated with WI or DI. Rather than mere organizational pluralism, this reflects the systematic exploitation of Muhammadiyah's decentralized structure by competing movements

offering clearer doctrinal positions and more intensive formation programs.

These institutional dynamics are further reinforced by the cultural logic of leadership competition in Bugis-Makassar society. The dispersal phenomenon thus reflects how theological diversity within Muhammadiyah intersects with local norms of status competition and *siri*'-based religious entrepreneurship. Figures like Kiai Ahmad (DI), Kiai Abdullah (Hidayatullah), and the founders of WI held both organizational freedom and cultural legitimacy to articulate alternative Islamic visions through independent institutions.

In Bugis-Makassar culture, theological differences rarely produce prolonged debates but instead drive the creation of new institutional authority. Limited religious literacy restricts complex doctrinal discourse, while the cultural imperative of *siri*' (shame and dignity) makes theological disagreements quickly escalate into matters of personal honor (*ripakasiri*', being shamed). Rather than risk *siri*'-threatening confrontations through ideological compromise, religious innovation typically manifests as institutional differentiation, allowing competing theological visions to coexist through separate organizational structures.

## Conclusion

The emergence of new Islamic organizations rooted in Muhammadiyah in South Sulawesi reflects a complex process shaped by religious, cultural, and institutional factors. Organizations such as Darul Istiqamah, Hidayatullah, Wahdah Islamiyah, and An-Nadzir were founded by Muhammadiyah activists but developed their own institutional forms and religious orientations over time.

A major contributing factor is the lasting influence of the Darul Islam movement, whose militant and anti-status-quo spirit continues to shape Islamic activism in South Sulawesi. Many founders had direct or ideological ties to this movement, which embodied political struggle for Islamic law implementation and resistance to secular authority. This spirit, combined with Muhammadiyah's reformist legacy, provided strong ideological foundation for new Islamic institutions.

The Bugis-Makassar cultural ethos, especially the values of *siri*' (shame and dignity) and *pessé/paccé* (solidarity), played an important role in shaping leadership behavior. Religious disagreements are

often resolved through creating independent institutions rather than internal negotiation, as founding new religious movements is culturally acceptable and respected.

Muhammadiyah's open and decentralized structure allows ideological diversity but also makes room for more rigid religious visions. The organization's limited focus on intensive cadre training has led some members to seek alternative platforms with stronger ideological orientation and structured leadership, which organizations like DI, Hidayatullah, and WI have provided.

The dispersal of Muhammadiyah-related institutions reflects not internal conflict alone but broader dynamics shaped by political opportunity, resource mobilization, and cultural logic. *Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar* is not a mere regional label, but a conceptual lens to understand how Islamic reform adapts to local sociocultural patterns.

It shows how *siri'*, *pessé/paccé*, and the Darul Islam legacy intersect with Muhammadiyah's open structure to produce distinctive authority dispersal in South Sulawesi. As a framework, *Muhammadiyah Bugis-Makassar* helps explain how Islamic movements elsewhere may similarly reflect local logics in shaping their institutional forms.

## Endnotes

1. The DI/TII movement, led by S.M. Kartosuwiryo in West Java (1949), declared an Islamic State of Indonesia in response to the Republic's secular orientation. For a detailed account of this movement see, Dijk (1981). The movement spread to South Sulawesi where Abdul Kahar Muzakkar, a former independence guerrilla and Muhammadiyah activist, joined DI/TII in 1953, leading an armed rebellion until his death in 1965 (See, Harvey 1974).
2. This pattern of institutional spread from South Sulawesi was not exclusive to Muhammadiyah. Earlier Islamic institutions like As'adiyah (in Sengkang) and Darul Dakwah wal Irsyad or DDI (in Mangkoso) also expanded across Eastern Indonesia through madrasah and pesantren, driven by Bugis-Makassar traditions of migration, trade, and religious leadership (See, Halim 2020).
3. Among the first generation in this category are Andi Rasdyanah, Marliah Ahsan, Danawir Ras Burhany, Muhammad Ahmad, Nasruddin Razak, M. Ridwan Jongke.
4. Interviews with Musafir Pababbari in Makassar, July 2024. He studied at IAIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta from 1976 to 1982.
5. Henceforth, "the Muhammadiyah Provincial Board" will be abbreviated as PWM, "the Muhammadiyah District Board" as PDM, and "the Muhammadiyah Branch Board" as PCM. The terms "Chairperson of PWM," "Chairperson of PDM," and "Chairperson of PCM" will be used, depending on the organizational level.
6. Although it was ended in 1965, the DII/TI's legacy and influence remains in the collective memory of many people in South Sulawesi to this day (Druce 2020).
7. Interview with Ustaz Taufik, teacher and school administrator at Pesantren Darul Istiqamah in Maccopa, Maros, December 15, 2018.
8. As of November 2023, Hidayatullah operates across all 38 Indonesian provinces with over 880 local branches and 1,088 Qur'anic centers nationwide (<https://hidayatullah.or.id/sejarah/>, accessed February 28, 2024).
9. The magazine website is here: <https://hidayatullah.com/>
10. "Asas Tunggal Pancasila" was Suharto's policy requiring political organizations, including Islamic ones, to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis, forbidding the use of religion. This was part of his mid-1980s effort to depoliticize Islam. For more details, see (Bruinessen 2002, 132).
11. <https://wahdah.or.id/> (Accessed on March 4, 2024).
12. An opinion stated by KH. Abubakar Paka, the current chairman of Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) of Gowa Regency. Interview with him in Sungguminasa, Gowa, July 29, 2024.
13. Interview in Makassar, July 29, 2024. Ustaz M. Said Samad joined Muhammadiyah as a teenager in Pare-pare, studied under Kiai Ahmad in early DI Maros, later led the sharia council of WI, and eventually returned to Muhammadiyah as the chairperson of PDM Makassar.
14. This information was stated by Mustari Bosra in FGD July 2018.
15. Information from Bosra, FGD in July 2018. When asked whether he had left Muhammadiyah, Kiai Ahmad responded, "How could I leave Muhammadiyah when I never entered? Muhammadiyah entered me." The phrase reflected how deeply the movement had shaped his life. This was recounted by Ustaz Muhammad Alwi (former Chairperson of PWM South Sulawesi, 2010–2015), interview in Makassar, March 3, 2024.
16. Hadisaputra voiced this view during the July 2018 FGD, echoed by others who saw it as a factor in their shift toward newer Islamic groups like HTI, FPI, LDII, and

Jamaah Tabligh.

17. Interview with Ustaz M. Said Samad, Makassar, July 29, 2024.
18. Interview with Ustaz M. Said Samad, Makassar, July 29, 2024.
19. Interview with Ustaz Mustari Bosra in Makassar on April 20, 2024).
20. Interview with Ustaz M. Said Samad, Makassar, July 29, 2024.
21. Interview with Ustaz Muhammad Alwi, Makassar, March 3, 2024.
22. Founded in the early 1970s, this pesantren was a strategic response to the shortage of qualified ulama in Muhammadiyah. The initiative came from KH. Abdul Jabbar Asyiri, then one of the chairmen of PWM of South and Southeast Sulawesi, who became its first leader and shaped its early direction.
23. Interview with Syandri Syaban, a lecturer at WI's Islamic and Arabic College (STIBA), Makassar, July 17, 2024; and with Ustaz M. Said Samad, Makassar, July 29, 2024.
24. Interview with Ustaz Muhammad Alwi, Makassar, March 3, 2024. See also Alwi (2013, 81).
25. Focus Group Discussion July 2018.
26. He mentioned this during a book discussion at Graha Pena, Makassar, on December 11, 2015, attended by about forty people, including speakers Wahyuddin Halim, Ustaz Muhammad Alwi, and Ustaz Mustari Bosra. At the time, Ustaz Alwi was still the Chairperson of PWM South Sulawesi. The book, edited by Bosra et al. (2015), was the focus of the discussion.
27. Interview with Ustaz M. Said Samad, Makassar, July 29, 2024.
28. Interview with Ustaz M. Said Samad, Makassar, July 29, 2024.
29. Interview with Marwan, Chairperson of PCM Limbung, Gowa, March 13, 2024.
30. Interview with Ustaz Saifuddin, a former activist of IPM, IMM, dan Pemuda Muhammadiyah, currently an administrator of WI in Limbung, Gowa, March 13, 2024.

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Articles should be written in American English between approximately 10.000-15.000 words including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices intended for publication. All submission must include 150 words abstract and 5 keywords. Quotations, passages, and words in local or foreign languages should

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3. Feener, Michael R., and Mark E. Cammack, eds. 2007. *Islamic Law in Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions*. Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program.
4. Wahid, Din. 2014. *Nurturing Salafi Manhaj: A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia*. PhD dissertation. Utrecht University.
5. Utriza, Ayang. 2008. "Mencari Model Kerukunan Antaragama." *Kompas*. March 19: 59.
6. Ms. *Undhang-Undhang Banten*, L.Or.5598, Leiden University.
7. Interview with K.H. Sahal Mahfudz, Kajen, Pati, June 11<sup>th</sup>, 2007.

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ستوديا إسلاميكا (ISSN 0215-0492; E-ISSN: 2355-6145) مجلة علمية دولية محكمة تصدر عن مركز دراسات الإسلام والمجتمع (PPIM) بجامعة شريف هداية الله الإسلامية الحكومية بجاكرتا، تعنى بدراسة الإسلام في إندونيسيا خاصة وفي جنوب شرقي آسيا عامة. وتستهدف المجلة نشر البحوث العلمية الأصيلة والقضايا المعاصرة حول الموضوع، كما ترحب بإسهامات الباحثين أصحاب التخصصات ذات الصلة. وتخضع جميع الأبحاث المقدمة للمجلة للتحكيم من قبل لجنة مختصة.

تم اعتماد ستوديا إسلاميكا من قبل وزارة البحوث والتكنولوجيا والتعليم العالي بجمهورية إندونيسيا باعتبارها دورية علمية (رقم القرار: 32a/E/KPT/2017).

ستوديا إسلاميكا عضو في CrossRef (الإحالات الثابتة في الأدبيات الأكاديمية) منذ ٢٠١٤، وبالتالي فإن جميع المقالات التي نشرتها مرقمة حسب معرف الوثيقة الرقمية (DOI).

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قيمة الاشتراك السنوي داخل إندونيسيا:  
لسنة واحدة ١٥٠,٠٠٠ روبية (للمؤسسة) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٥٠,٠٠٠ روبية،  
١٠٠,٠٠٠ روبية (للفرد) ونسخة واحدة قيمتها ٤٠,٠٠٠ روبية.  
والقيمة لا تشمل على النفقة للإرسال بالبريد الجوي.



# ستوديا إسلاميكا

مجلة إندونيسيا للدراسات الإسلامية  
السنة الثانية والثلاثون، العدد ٢، ٢٠٢٥

رئيس التحرير:

سيف المزاني

مدير التحرير:

أومان فتح الرحمن

هيئة التحرير:

جمهاري

ديدين شفرالدين

جاجات برهان الدين

فؤاد جبيلي

سيف الأمم

داوي دارمادي

جاجانج جهرائي

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فيرداه أماليا

مراجعة اللغة الإنجليزية:

بنيمين ج. فريمان

دانيل فتريون

موسى بتول

مراجعة اللغة العربية:

يولي ياسين

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س. برنكا



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Ansori, Muhammad Iqbal Juliansyahzen, & Hijrian Angga Prihantoro

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Ronald A. Lukens-Bull & Al Makin

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