INSERTING NON-MUSLIMS INTO THE ISLAMIC PARTY:
The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) between Political Pragmatism and Ideological Coherence

A Thesis

Submitted to the Master Program of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (M.A.)

by:

Muhammad Ulil Abshor

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ABSTRACT

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This study investigates the factors influencing the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia to include non-Muslims as members and candidates, examining the balance between political pragmatism and ideological coherence. The central argument posits that PKS's insertion of non-Muslims is a strategic adaptation to Indonesia's pluralistic and democratic political environment, aimed at enhancing its electoral appeal while maintaining its Islamic ideological substance. The research employs a qualitative approach, incorporating historical analysis and in-depth interviews with key PKS figures. Historical documents produced by the party and interviews with four significant party members, including regional cadres and central figures, provide primary data for the study. This method allows a comprehensive understanding of the ideological progress and strategic decisions of the party within its institutional transformation. The findings reveal that the transformation of PKS from informal politics to a political party underscores its initial moderation process while maintaining Islamic conservative principles. This dynamic interplay between ideology and pragmatic political consideration manifests in its adoptive and open approach to the inclusion of non-Muslims within the party. The results emphasize the importance of contextual political structures and the role of party elites in shaping the ideological and pragmatic adaptations of Islamist parties in response to evolving socio-political landscapes. The study contributes to the broader understanding of Islamist moderation and the evolution of political Islam in contemporary Indonesia, offering insights into the strategic decisions and ideological shifts within PKS that enable it to operate effectively within a plural democratic framework.

Keywords: *The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), Islamist moderation, democracy, Indonesia*

TRANSLITERATION GUIDE

Arabic	Roman	Arabic	Roman	Arabic	Roman
ا	a	س	s	ل	l
ب	b	ش	sh	م	m
ت	t	ص	ṣ	ن	n
ث	th	ض	ḍ	و	w
ج	j	ط	ṭ	ه	h
ح	ḥ	ظ	ẓ	ي	y
خ	kh	ع	ʾ		
د	d	غ	gh		
ذ	dh	ف	f		
ر	r	ق	q		
ز	z	ك	k		

Short Vocal

Arab Alphabet	Roman Alphabet	Arabic Example	Transliteration
◌َ	a	جَلَسَ	*jalasa*
◌ِ	i	رَكِبَ	*rakiba*
◌ُ	u	كُتِبَ	*kutiba*

Long Vocal

Arab Alphabet	Roman Alphabet	Arabic Example	Transliteration
ى/ا	ā	جرى/سافر	*jarā/sāfar*
ي	ī	سليم	*salīm*
و	ū	سجود	*sujūd*

Diphtong

Arab Alphabet	Roman Alphabet	Arabic Example	Transliteration
وْ	aw	مولا	*mawlā*
يْ	ay	غيب	*ghayb*

Notes:

1. Consonant with shaddah (ّ) for instance, أمّة is written as *ummah* (double letters).
2. Arabic letter *hamzah* (ء) at the beginning of a word is transliterated into "a" not into "`a". For instance, أحمد is written as *aḥmad* not *`aḥmad*.
3. Arabic script of *alif-lam qamariyah* (ال) is written as "al" at the beginning of words and *alif-lam shamsiyah* (ال) is written in accordance with the first letter at the beginning of words. For instance:

   المائدة : al-māidah

   الرحمان : ar-rahmān
4. Arabic letter *ta' marbutah* (ة) is written as "h" when it is located at the end of the words, such as البقرة is written as *al-baqarah*. When located in the middle of a sentence is written as "t", such as أمّة وسطا is written as *ummatan wasaṭan*.

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GLOSSARIES OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
Al-Nour Party	Party of The Light
Al-Qaeda	A militant Islamist organization founded by Osama bin Laden in the late 1980s.
Al-Wasat Party	The Center Party in Egypt
Asas Islam	Islamic ideology for Indonesian Islamic parties
DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council)
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representatives Council)
DPP	Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Council)
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (The House of Representatives)
DPRD	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional Legislative Council)
DPW	Dewan Pimpinan Wilayah (Regional Leadership Council)
Ennahda	The Renaissance Party
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
FPI	Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Front)
GRP	Government of the Republic of Philippines
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Liberation Party)
IAF	Islamic Action Front
ICMI	Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals)
IPKI	Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (Association of Supporters of Indonesian Independence)
JT	Jamaah Tarbiyyah
KAMMI	Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Student Action Unity)
MB	Ikhwanul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council)
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
MS	Majelis Syura (Consultative Council)
MUKERNAS	Musyawarah Kerja Nasional (National Work Consultation)
NKRI	Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (The Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia)
NTT	Nusa Tenggara Timur
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party)
Pancasila	Indonesian five principles
PAS	Partai Islam Se Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Party)
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon Party)
PBR	Partai Bintang Reformasi (Reform Star Party)
PDI	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party)

PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)
PDS	Partai Damai Sejahtera (Prosperous Peace Party)
PJD	Party of Justice and Development
PK	Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party)
PKI	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
PNI	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party)
Politik Aliran	Political cleavage based on socio-cultural discrepancy
Poros Tengah	Indonesian Islamic parties' coalition in the presidential election of 1998 (The Central Axis)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party)
PPTI	Partai Persatuan Tarikhah Indonesia (Islamic Tharikah Unity Party)
PRRI	Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia)
PSI	Partai Sarekat Islam (Islamic Sarekat Party)
PSII	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Sarekat Party)
PULO	Pattani United Liberation Organization
RPP	Republican People's Party
SBY	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
UMNO	United Malays National Organization
UUD	Undang-Undang Dasar (Constitution)

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Background

Islamic parties are one prominent feature of how Islam as a set of belief systems could play a significant involvement in a modern political landscape that consists of different ideological cleavages. Islam, with its popularity of being traditional, conservative, or extremist, has so far been able to adapt to particular changes in political conditions. Adaptations occur due to modern development in which Muslim societies are fragmented into political cleavages based on nationalities instead of the Islamic caliphate after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924. The presence of nation-state forms has resulted in diverse political development patterns among Muslim societies. Some have retained monarchical frameworks, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Oman. Others have established republican states and progressively embraced party-based democratic systems. In essence, as a modernized form of political effort, Islamic parties signify a conceptual form of how far the religion could maintain its rigidity while at the same time operating within inevitable vagaries of politics, placing them in between continuity and deadlock.

Turkey, Iran, and Egypt serve as examples of nation-states that have adopted republican systems wherein political Islam acts as a significant rival to secular political forces.[1] The Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) stands out as a prominent example of the success of political Islam in Turkey. This party supported an agenda of Islamization in both the socio-economic and political spheres, presenting a counter-narrative to secularism within the country. In Iran, Islam emerged as a political force that catalyzed a revolution, transforming the nation from a secular monarchy to a complex Islamic theocracy. The Islamic Republican Party and the Islamic Coalition Party were the principal political forces during the Iranian Revolution 1979. Similarly, the influence of Islamic groups in Egypt underscores significant developments in political Islam. The two prominent Islamic political forces in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis, play crucial roles in the country's political landscape. The former is represented by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), which advocates for the compatibility of Islam with democracy. At the same time, the latter established the Al-Nour Party, which tends to be more conservative.

[1] Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar and A. Kadir Yildirim, "Religious Parties and Ideological Change: A Comparison of Iran and Turkey," *Political Science Quarterly* 135, no. 4 (2020): 11.

In Indonesia, the party system tended to follow ethnic-regional distribution, and support for parties was in line with socio-religious discrepancies.[2] Here, the idea of nationalism could potentially compete with religious ideology. To some degree, both ideas could be combined as political promises by political parties. This condition led to the country's emergence of diverse political parties from the beginning of its independence. Social cleavages manifested in the political struggle of specific communities in the aftermath of 1945 have shaped the rise of the multi-party-political landscape with three ideological divisions, namely nationalism, communism, and religious fundamentalism. However, the recent political landscape of Indonesia has eliminated communist parties from formal politics due to very complicated political factors, therefore leaving Nationalism and Islamism in ideological competition.

The political competition between nationalist and Islamist groups in Indonesia unfolded within a dramatic political landscape. During the Suharto regime, authoritarian politics dominated the democratic stage. Nationalists and religious groups faced intense political pressure, with only the ruling party, Golkar, enjoying political privileges. However, the New Order regime established by Suharto collapsed in 1998 due to severe protests from nationalist and Islamist factions. This marked the onset of democratization, leading to the emergence of new political parties that reshaped the Indonesian political arena in the aftermath of 1998. During this period, Islamic forces seized a significant opportunity, forming an Islamic coalition that won the presidential election.

The Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS)[3] is one of the Islamist parties in Indonesia that attracts considerable attention from scholars.[4] Not only did the party successfully become a respectable rival for nationalist parties such as the

[2] Daniel S. Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 8, no. 1 (1967): 56.

[3] The party had been well-known as just the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan or PK) before it changed the name and added the word Sejahtera in 2003.

[4] See for examples: Mathias Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia: The Partai Keadilan. Some Insights into Its History and an Analysis of Its Programs and Statutes," *Archipel* 64, no. 1 (2002): 101–15, https://doi.org/10.3406/arch.2002.3727. See also, Anthony Bubalo and Greg Fealy, *Joining the Caravan? The Middle East, Islamism and Indonesia*, Lowy Institute Paper (Double Bay, New South Wales: Longueville Media, 2005); Najwa Shihab and Yanuar Nugroho, "The Ties That Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)" 10 (n.d.); Noorhaidi Hasan, "Post-Islamist Politics in Indonesia"," *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* 157 (2013); Sunny Tanuwidjaja, "PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia: Catching the Catch-All and Moderation Wave," *South East Asia Research* 20, no. 4 (December 2012): 533–49, https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2012.0127; Dirk Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia: Tracing Patterns of Party Change in the Prosperous Justice Party," *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 3 (September 2012): 486–98, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912911404566.

Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, or PDI-P) and the Party of Functional Group (Golongan Karya, or Golkar), PKS also demonstrated the innovative form of political Islam compared to other Islamic parties such as the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or PPP) and the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, or PBB). PKS proves in what manner an Islamist party can navigate the ethnic-regional dispersion and socio-religious distinctions inherent in the Indonesian political landscape. It has succeeded in maintaining a robust ideological foundation rooted in Islamic principles with its flexibility in adopting pragmatic political strategies to broaden its support base. This dual approach allows PKS to compete effectively within a diverse political arena where nationalism and religious ideologies intersect.

As Indonesia undergoes continuous social and political changes, the ability of PKS to balance ideological coherence with political pragmatism will be crucial for its sustained relevance and influence. This adaptability is particularly evident in the party's recent efforts to attract non-Muslim members and candidates, reflecting a strategic response to the evolving dynamics of party support and the need for broader inclusivity in a democratic Indonesia. As many scholars have elaborated, the party's adoption of non-Muslim membership engages with the issue of religious moderation,[5] ideological alteration connected to the post-Islamism trend[6] and the party's internal dynamic.[7] However, a closer look at the party's historical institutionalization concerning the adoption had not been undertaken comprehensively.

In this context, this research aims to take a historical account of the development of PKS regarding the occasion of adopting and nominating non-Muslims in the party's political institution. By addressing the beginning and the continuation of PKS in developing its political force with the adoption of other religious identities to enter the party, this research further explains the previous literature on PKS. Disentangling the historical puzzle of the party's development about its openness to non-Muslim political engagement within the party led to questions revolving around factors shaping the decision of the party to adopt or nominate non-Muslims and its interpretation of the decision. Therefore, this research

[5] Shihab and Nugroho, "The Ties That Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)"; Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia."

[6] Whit Mason, Anthony Bubalo, and Greg Fealy, *Zealous Democrats: Islamism and Democracy in Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey* (Longueville Media, 2008), 51, https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/33899; Hasan, "Post-Islamist Politics in Indonesia"."

[7] Kees van Dijk and Ahmad-Norma Permata, "A Study of the Internal Dynamics of the Prosperous Justice Party and Jamaah Tarbiyah," in *Islam, Politics and Change*, ed. Kees van Dijk and Nico J.G. Kaptein, The Indonesian Experience after the Fall of Suharto (Leiden University Press, 2016), 29–78, https://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.1011744.7.

proposed two critical questions: under what political structures and conditions does PKS include non-Muslims as its members or candidates? And, to what extent does the party balance this insertion between political pragmatism and ideological coherence?

This study argues that the PKS's adoption of non-Muslims as members or candidates is a consequential awareness to follow the logic of Indonesia's political structure, giving the party a political incentive on the one hand, and therefore positioning the party between embracing political pragmatism and maintaining ideological coherence on the other. To detail the argument, this thesis investigates what factors contributed to PKS, including non-Muslims becoming the legislative members of the party. It will also discuss whether the party's decision to include non-Muslims was part of its political pragmatism or ideological coherence. Or, to some degree, the decision is an intertwined effort to balance the pragmatic feature and the Islamic ideology of the party at the same time. Finally, it assesses the motivation for adopting non-Muslim members and its implication to PKS' interpretation of the decision.

1.2 Literature Review

I divide the literature review into three research maps. First, understanding the PKS dynamic and development issues entails paying attention to the extent of Islamic parties' moderation and openness in Muslim democratic states. Second, although this research focuses on PKS, it is also essential to appraise the recent development of Islamic parties in Indonesia before focusing on literature about the party's adoption to non-Muslims. Last, reviewing the literature focusing on the transformation of PKS being open to non-Muslims narrows the perspective of this thesis.

1.2.1 Islamist Parties' Moderation and Openness in Muslim Countries

Studies on Islamist parties' moderation exist within the discussion of the 'inclusion moderation' hypothesis. This theory explains that involvement in a more open and democratic political landscape shapes the moderation of radical groups. Kalyvas's (1996) study of the Christian Democratic Party seems to pioneer research on political party moderation.[8] By examining the origin and development of Christian Democratic parties in Western Europe, he investigated the extent of those parties in moderating their platform so it would be a crucial aspect of their emergence and success. The key feature of Christian

[8] Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe* (Cornell University Press, 1996), https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501731419.

democratic parties' moderation, according to Kalyvas, is their ability to adopt progressive socio-economic reform in countries like Italy, Germany, and Belgium.

Meanwhile, a comparative study by Schwedler (2006) on Jordan's Islamic Action Front (*Jabhat al- 'Aml al-Islami*, or IAF) and the Yemeni *Ishlah* Party is likely the most cited book in Islamic parties' moderation.[9] She argued that the relationship between Islamist and democratic pluralism is not static and that Muslims are capable of maintaining their belief in moderation. She defined moderation as a change in worldview, not just behavioral alteration. She highlighted essential factors such as historical development, organizational structure, participation in the democratic landscape, coalition building with secular parties, and platform reform that collectively contribute to the moderation of the Islamist worldview. In other words, Islamist parties' moderation is not just about the shift in behavior but also the change in ideology from rigid and closed *Weltanschauung* "to more tolerant and open of alternative view."

Many scholars attributed the political shifting of Islamic parties in Muslim-majority countries to the Arab Spring phenomenon in 2011. Asef Bayat has been the leading scholar in this discussion since he invented the term "post-Islamism" in 1996, with regard to the modernization of Muslim society in Iran, even before the Arab Spring happened.[10] Eventually, he led a research publication on post-Islamism, where many scholars contributed to the discussion on "changing faces of political Islam" in Muslim [majority] countries such as Turkey, Morocco, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and so on.[11] At this juncture, Bayat and other scholars have reached an agreement that Islamism had been transforming into post-Islamism, whereby societal pressure and internal contradictions forced Islamist groups and parties to 'reinvent themselves' in specific qualitative shifts. However, the discussion about the PKS party is included in this publication, and to narrow the review, I will independently assess it in more detail later on.

Other research correlating Islamist parties' moderation with Arab Spring has also exposed and touched the issue of openness to alternative views. A study by Al-Anani (2012) discussed Islamic parties such as El-Nahda in Tunisia, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco, and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt are inclined to adopt

[9] Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[10] A. Bayat, "The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society, Critique," *Critical Middle East Studies*, 1996, 43–52.

[11] Asef Bayat, ed., *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

a more moderate view toward individual rights for women and non-Muslims. However, other parties affiliated with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis maintained illiberal attitudes toward personal freedom.[12] Al-Nur party, for example, shows an illiberal stance toward non-Muslims, considering them as *dhimmi* in the context of Islamic polity.[13] This consideration is at odds with its predecessor, the Al-Wasat party, which sees non-Muslims as equal citizens to Muslim ones.[14]

1.2.2 Indonesian Islamic parties' acceptance of non-Muslim

Some studies are essential to highlight the issue of the Islamic party's stance toward non-Muslims. A survey by Diederich (2009) about Indonesian Islamic parties' stances towards women and minorities is a general review of how Indonesian Islamic parties perceive the rights of women and non-Muslims.[15] He concludes that the stances of Islamic parties towards non-Muslims show the unequal relationship between Islam and other religions. Islamic parties in Indonesia see non-Muslims as "second-class citizens." Moreover, Sinaga's study (2023) tried to answer the question about factors that enable the National Awakening Party PKB and PAN to accommodate non-Muslim candidates.[16] He found that the Indonesian electoral system, the party platform, and the availability of legislative candidates are three dominant factors causing Islamic-nationalist parties such as PKB and PAN to nominate non-Muslim candidates.

Research on this issue is also captured from the landscape of Indonesia's pluralism. The study of Noor on Indonesian Islamic parties' response toward Pluralism, for example, explores, among other things, the attitudes of Islamic parties toward secular and non-Muslim groups.[17] In addition to his point of view that Islamic parties in Indonesia still hold

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[12] Khalil Al-Anani, "Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring," *Mediterranean Politics* 17, no. 3 (November 2012): 466–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2012.725309.

[13] Shaimaa Magued, "The Inter-Islamic Competition and the Shift in al-Nur Party Stance towards Civil State in Egypt," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 49, no. 1 (January 1, 2022): 10, https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2020.1767539.

[14] Meir Hatina, "The 'Other Islam': The Egyptian Wasat Party," *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 14, no. 2 (June 2005): 171–84, https://doi.org/10.1080/10669920500135553.

[15] Moithiois Diederich, "Islamic Parties In Indonesia's Political Landscape and Their Respective Stances on Women and Minorities," in *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, ed. M. A. Mohamed Salih (New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2009), 83–101, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230100770_4.

[16] Rudi Salam Sinaga, "WHY DO ISLAMIC MASS-BASED PARTIES ACCOMMODATE NON-ISLAMIC LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES: THE CASE OF CHINESE ETHNIC IN INDONESIA," *GOVERNANCE: Jurnal Ilmiah Kajian Politik Lokal Dan Pembangunan* 9, no. 4 (August 16, 2023), http://governance.lkispol.or.id/index.php/description/article/view/85.

[17] Firman Noor, "The Response of Contemporary Indonesian Islamic Parties Toward Pluralism," *Journal of Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities* 7, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): 1–18, https://doi.org/10.14203/jissh.v7i1.69.

a mutual relationship tendency toward secular and non-Muslim groups[18], this tendency stems seemingly from external pressures that Indonesia's politics should be free from politics of totalitarianism threatening the nation's pluralism. At this juncture, the acceptance of Islamic parties toward non-Muslim political rights, even in terms of opening the door for them to join the parties, guarantees the absence of such a threat.

So far, it could be arguably said that studies on Indonesian Islamic parties' acceptance of non-Muslims have not been providing a more nuanced understanding of the current Islamic ideological parties' development. Scholarly discussions related to Islamist parties and non-Muslims' relationship have only arrived at dimensions such as democratization,[19] the issue of populism,[20] and intolerance.[21] Indeed, such dimensions have touched on the discussion of the ideological dynamic of Islamic parties in Indonesia's current political landscape. However, all of such elaborations do not suffice to understand Islamic parties' ideological progress from a particular logical explanation, meaning that a certain political action by political actors needs to be correlated to earlier contingent developments. Furthermore, an investigation of the PKS's adoption of non-Muslims within the context of Indonesian democracy's competitive contention and the macro-historical development of Indonesian plural-religious society is apparently little elaborated.

1.2.3 The Openness of PKS to Non-Muslim

A study by Shihab and Nugroho (2008) concludes that the PKS has three stages of transformation in its relationship with non-Muslims. The first stage is tending to be exclusive and displaying anti-Western rhetoric. Second, after the party transformed into the PKS, it started to accommodate and cooperate with non-Muslim and non-Islamist groups. Third, in 2008, when the party declared itself as an open party, it showed a more inclusive stance toward non-Muslim by adopting political openness to non-Muslim candidacy and

[18] This tendency is apparently coming inherently from the predecessor Islamic party, the Masyumi. Firman Noor discussed it separately in his historical account of the Masyumi stance toward Pluralism. Firman Noor, "Islamic Party and Pluralism: The View and Attitude of Masyumi towards Pluralism in Politics (1945-1960)," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 54, no. 2 (December 14, 2016): 273–310, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2016.542.273-310.

[19] See for example, Mark Woodward, "Indonesia's Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia," *Asian Security* 4, no. 1 (January 23, 2008): 53, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799850701783197. Also Vedi R. Hadiz, "No Turkish Delight: The Impasse of Islamic Party Politics in Indonesia," *Indonesia*, no. 92 (2011): 5.

[20] Kurniawan Netanyahu and Deri Susanto, "The Sustainability of Interreligious Dialogue in Indonesia under the Phenomenon of Intolerance by Islamic Populists," *Dialog* 45, no. 2 (December 29, 2022): 248–57, https://doi.org/10.47655/dialog.v45i2.664.

[21] Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation," *Asian Studies Review* 42, no. 3 (2018): 479–97.

membership.[22] Meanwhile, Tomsa (2012) examines moderation and its effect on the PKS' electoral success. He argues that the moderation of the party was driven by pragmatic opportunism to increase the party's vote. Yet, this moderation poses serious challenges to the party's structural coherence and is neither linear nor positive for democratization.[23] What Tomsa concluded about the party's moderation, despite it has touched the issue of the openness to non-Muslim membership, tells us little about what competitive political factors have been the moderation driving-force of the party.

Moreover, the argument made by Tomas is in contrast to Hasan's (2017) claim that moderate groups, as well as the democratization process, are the causes of the transformation of PKS to moderate. Hasan's elaboration of PKS's alteration to be a more moderate party illustrates the shifting pattern of political Islam to a post-Islamist approach that contributes to Indonesia's democratization process. Hasan likewise shows that even though the party has moderated itself, it still maintains its Islamist platform; therefore, he understands that two sides are the paradoxical role of the party.[24] Hasan acknowledged that the effort to establish democratic Islam by moderate groups has contributed to the failure of radical groups, including the PKS, to exercise their radical agenda, therefore forcing them to evaluate their previous strategy.[25] This is equally to say that the moderation of Islamist parties such as the PKS stems from a political structure shaped by democratization and the narratives of moderate groups. Therefore, questioning the outside influences of PKS's moderation and investigating the Islamist ideological dynamics are arguably still relevant.

Based on reading the above literature, this study proposes an understanding of PKS's adoption by non-Muslims with dispositional considerations as follows. First, this study situates the hypothesis of "inclusion-moderation" as foundational reading to the party's level of moderation. It means that the degree of moderation in PKS's institution has been present since the very beginning of its inception. Therefore, it is problematizing narratives on PKS's radical natures as it was a preconception that stems from what Menchik called a "devaluation" toward primary sources of Indonesian Islamists." Menchik believes that "primary sources allow scholars to better understand actors' worldview and the concerns

[22] Najwa Shihab and Yanuar Nugroho, "The Ties That Bind: Law, Islamisation and Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)," *Austl. J. Asian L.* 10 (2008): 252.

[23] Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia."

[24] Noorhaidi Hasan, "NEW HORIZON OF READING ISLAM AND POLITICS: POST-ISLAMISM IN INDONESIA," *IN RIGHT: Jurnal Agama Dan Hak Azazi Manusia* 4, no. 2 (March 27, 2017), https://doi.org/10.14421/inright.v4i2.1281.

[25] Hasan, "Post-Islamist Politics in Indonesia"."

that motivate their behavior."[26] Second, this study does not follow a logical explanation of previous observations on PKS related to its seemingly contravene position in Indonesian democracy. It is because Indonesian democracy and Islam have shaped and reshaped each other. Simply put, it is not democracy alone that influences Indonesian Islamists' moderation, but at the same time, Indonesia's democracy is also the product of non-violent Islamists' political involvement. This study, therefore, attempted to position PKS with its Islamic normative ideology as coexistent elements of parallel developments of Islam and democracy in Indonesia. Last, this study employs the adoption of non-Muslims as a unit analysis of the historical coexistence of Islamist moderation and Indonesian typical democracy.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

This research uses 'Islamist moderation' theory to examine the transformation of PKS pertaining to the party's openness to non-Muslim members and leadership candidates. As mentioned above, the subject of Islamist moderation is highly correlated to the "inclusion-moderation" discussion. Yet, despite the inevitable political inclusion of Islamist within the democratic backdrop of many Muslim-majority states, the degree of Islamists moderation may be a disputed theoretical discussion that is important to elaborate. Relevant questions to this issue may revolve on: firstly, what essential condition do affect the moderation of Islamists; and secondly, what the indispensable feature of moderation Islamist must have. The study of Yildirim (2017) has answered the first query by drawing upon his observation on the socioeconomic development of Turkey, with the presence of economic liberalization above the existence of diverse Islamists. He concludes that "moderation essentially owes its existence to the leveling of socioeconomic competition. As long as severe inequalities in opportunities for competition persist, moderation is unlikely to follow."[27]Additionally, Tabaar and Yildirim (2020) underlined key theoretical foundation of ideological change of religious parties based on their study on religious parties in Iran and Turkey:

> "… religious ideologies are not fixed theological doctrines but malleable tools highly susceptible to the particular circumstances of specific political contexts. Elites continuously and strategically calibrate ideas and narratives to meet perceived threats and

[26] Jeremy Menchik, *Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 24.

[27] A. Kadir Yildirim, *Muslim Democratic Parties in the Middle East: Economy and Politics of Islamist Moderation,* Indiana Series in Middle East Studies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2017), 36.

> opportunities. Political elites—including religious party leaders—are ideational entrepreneurs. They instrumentally craft—not just deploy—religious ideologies for political ends. Additionally, ideational shifts are reversible and multidirectional, and they correlate with changes in elite positioning within the political system."[28]

This theorization comprised of two important focal points. First, ideology formulation within Islamists is highly depending on the particularity of political context as well as the awareness of "Elites" on political opportunities and constraints. Second, as its dependency on what "Elites" say, Islamist ideology is therefore alterable and less or more coherent in direction that in line with elite political bargaining. In other words, how Islamist parties' ideology may evolve would be influenced by political opportunity structures on one hand and the role of parties' elite in such ideological development is determinant factor on the other. Therefore, the problem then is how to justify the extent of religious ideological transformation within an Islamist group happening if the elite interpretation does not change while the institutional behavior shows a degree of alteration.

Meanwhile the rather old concept of moderation by Schwedler is perhaps precise to answer the second question about the essential feature of moderation. By drawing upon to her observation on the IAF party in Jordan and the Islah party in Yemen, she has faith in that moderation should happen in changes of worldview and has nothing to do with the political behavioral changes.[29] This definition has been inspired by Wickham's study on the Wasat Party in Egypt:

> Ideological moderation refers to the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals that enables an opposition movement to accommodate itself to the give and take of "normal" competitive politics. It entails a shift toward substantive commitment to democratic principles, including the peaceful alternation of power, ideological and political pluralism, and citizenship rights.[30]

In order to substantiate the initial moderation of PKS with the insertion of non-Muslim in the party as focal point of historical analysis, this research contextualize the political condition of Indonesia in which efforts to democratize political competition has

[28] Tabaar and Yildirim, "Religious Parties and Ideological Change," 6.
[29] Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*, 120.
[30] Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, "The Path to Moderation: Strategy and Learning in the Formation of Egypt's Wasat Party," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 206, https://doi.org/10.2307/4150143.

been increasing.[31] Therefore, it is assumable that equalities of political opportunities tend to provide a space for certain political group such as PKS to moderate itself within the competitive democratic contestation. However, since PKS has a historical background influenced by the transnational ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and the genealogy of the da'wah movement of the previous Masyumi people, Schwedler and Wickham's theorization of the essential feature of moderation is very useful to study the development of PKS, especially related to its openness to non-Muslim membership and candidacy.

1.4 Research Significance

This research contributes to the literature on political Islam and party politics in Indonesia, particularly in understanding the moderation strategies of Islamic political parties. It engages with the scholarly discussion on PKS' institutional and ideological nature by emphasizing historical development of the party as to its particular political behavior, namely the adoption of non-Muslim membership and candidacy. Using political pragmatism and ideological coherence as diametrical variables, this research introduces the current political positioning of PKS under the relationship between Islamic ideology and the state political structures. This study not only sheds light on PKS's adaptive strategies but also provides insights into the complexities of balancing religious principles with practical political considerations in a pluralistic society. Ultimately, the study underscores the dynamic interplay between ideology and pragmatic politics in shaping the actions and evolution of Islamic political parties in contemporary Indonesia.

1.5 Methods

This research is qualitative in nature and incorporates a historical analysis of the development of PKS from its inception to its recent existence. Data of this study are ranging from historical documents produced by the party from the period of PK to the ones of PKS. This study also draws upon in-depth interviews with important party figures. I conducted four interviews with four important people. The first is a cadre in the regional-level PKS. This is intended to understand the party's attitude towards local politics and the cadre's respective perception of the openness to non-Muslims. I have successfully approached three elites of the party, namely Hidayat Nur Wahid, the leader of the party's declaration in 1998, Ahmad Mabruri as the head of public relations of PKS, and the non-Muslim figure,

[31] See for example Robert W. Hefner, ed., *Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization*, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

Soleman Nd Ayi, who has been invited by the party to be one of council of experts on religious affairs at the central level of the party. These primary sources allow me to elaborate and, to some extent, criticize secondary sources that address the party, such as books, journals, news, and so on.

In analyzing those data, this research employs historical institutionalism approach to analyze political opportunity structures and circumstances that influenced the PKS's adoption to non-Muslim candidacy and membership in the party. The approach, according to Fioretos and Sheingate, maintains a particular tradition of qualitative methods that mainly employ historiography and process tracing to examine temporal processes and events influencing the origin and transformation of political institutions.[32] In understanding a party's degree of pragmatic or ideological innovation, this approach provided set of analytical tools to explicate 'how and why parties form the way that they do in a certain moment, the importance of timing and sequence in party formation […] and what pathways are available for adaptation and evolution as parties continue to exist in a changing world.'[33] Specifically, the approach can be a tool to analyze political action and events affected and restructured "the institutional or ideological setting"[34] of PKS in a certain structure of time and place.

1.6 Thesis Outline

This thesis encompasses six chapters. This first chapter is an introductory section consisting of background of the study including problem statement and research questions. It also presents research objectives, divided literature review, theoretical framework of Islamist moderation as well as research significance. Moreover, this part describes the research methodology including data sources and analytical approach.

The next section is the second chapter. Here, I address Islamist parties' attempts to adapt their existence to democracy. Examples from Muslim-majority nations are useful for discussing and comparing the current position of PKS among Islamist parties on a worldwide scale. It also engages with the post-Islamism discussion, which represents

[32] Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, *Historical Institutionalism in Political Science*, ed. Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.013.1.

[33] Rachel Riedl, "Political Parties, Regimes, and Social Cleavages," in *The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism*, ed. Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2016), 2, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.013.13.

[34] Peter A. Hall, *Politics as a Process Structured in Space and Time*, ed. Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2016), 2, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199662814.013.2.

Islamist moderation. This chapter also highlights issues of cross-ideological competition and coalition as the awareness of political inclusivity within a democratic landscape. This chapter also considers the Southeast Asian political backdrop highlighting Islamist political movements participating in political crises in Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore. Finally, it elaborates Indonesia's political environment, where PKS is one of several Islamist groups involved in the state democratization.

The third chapter covers the historical forebears of PKS as well as the ideological structure of the party in relation to the moderation issue. It describes in detail how PKS has embraced moderation since entering the formal democratic system. Furthermore, it is important to talk about how PKS views religious concerns in the context of state politics. The institutional reform of PKS that is influenced by the failure in the first electoral experience is an important elaboration to understand its moderation. Regarding this, I contend that PKS has maintained a moderate political vision ever since it was willing to accept democracy in Indonesia, therefore disentangling earlier assumptions towards PKS' extremist tendencies and immoderate hidden objective.

The fourth chapter discusses the way of PKS in adopting political stances towards non-Muslim. The chapter highlights the intricate balance PKS maintains between ideological purity and political pragmatism. The party's openness to non-Muslim members, both at the grassroots and central leadership levels, reflects its deliberate adaptation to Indonesia’s multicultural and multireligious society. This chapter also examines the internal tension and external perceptions around the pluralistic policies made by the party to provide a full understanding of the party's role in shaping Indonesia's democratic and pluralistic political scene. Finally, it elaborates the strategic effort to organize the membership of non-Muslim within the party.

The fifth chapter elaborates the party’s interpretation towards pluralistic nature of Indonesian societal structures. This circumstance led the party to politically behave in accordance with the state religious diversity. Additionally, it explores the party’s dedication to embodying inclusivity and reflecting Islamic ideology by developing policies that maintain Islamic values while also strategically facilitating the assimilation of non-Muslim leaders. This involves balancing religious coherence with practical political engagement in Indonesia's pluralistic society. Moreover, it elaborates on how those interpretations and arguments affect the party's narratives and campaigns. Complementing the discussion of Islamic pragmatism in PKS institutionalization is an explanation of how the party

constructed the religious argument for its decision to accept non-Muslim membership and candidacies

The last chapter is conclusion of the study. It is highlighting the main point and argument of this research. It also presents the further potential research that can be a future discussion on political Islam and post-Islamism.

CHAPTER II
THE MODERATION OF ISLAMIC PARTIES

2.1 Introduction

This chapter addresses the attempt of Islamis parties to adjust its existence to the democracy. It highlights the context of post-Islamism in order to provide a basic understanding of the trend in which Islamic parties are experiencing a significant alteration. Examples from Muslim-majority countries are relevant for discussing and correlating PKS current position among Islamist parties in global scale. It also engages with the trend of post-Islamism that signifies the Islamist moderation. Issues on cross-ideological competition and coalition were important to highlight as well. Moreover, this chapter also takes a consideration for Southeast Asian political context where Islamist political movements involved in political situations of countries such as Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Finally, it highlights the political environment of Indonesia in which PKS is one of Islamist parties that engages in the state democratization.

It is crucial to understand how Islamic political parties in Muslim-majority countries adapt to the political landscapes in which they operate. This chapter is structured in an inverted pyramid format, beginning with a global context and narrowing down to specific examples of Islamic political movements in Southeast Asia. The focus is particularly on the Indonesian political context, where the nature of Islamism may differ from that in other Muslim-majority countries. Understanding these differences is essential for comprehending the position and character of Islamic parties in Indonesia. There may be certain correlations between Islamist moderation in Indonesia and in other countries, despite differing historical periods. Therefore, this chapter emphasizes the patterns of moderation within Islamic parties rather than seeking a correlational chronology between Indonesia and other countries.

2.2 The Context of Post-Islamism

The ideology of Islamism is highly correspondently to the notion of "religious fundamentalism." The core idea of religious fundamentalism is that "religion cannot and should not be confined to the private sphere, but finds its highest and proper expression in the politics of popular mobilization and social regeneration."[35] Islam becomes the source of political legitimacy for the institution of Islamist parties. The religion is often proclaimed

[35] Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, Seventh edition (London: Macmillan Education, 2021), 246.

in their statute. As Salih and El-Tom (2009) argued, the common operation of Islamist political parties has revolved around "creating a society that adheres to, or is at least influenced by, Islamic teachings and values derived from the sources of Islamic legislation or law."[36]

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the level of political creation by Islamist parties everywhere should possibly differ from one Islamist party to another, the contour of ideology among Islamists is not static. On the one hand, Islamist's ideology may show the level of cohesiveness in which attitudinal politics and values as well as norms they embrace are sticking together. On the other, it is possible for an Islamist party to have inconsistent political decisions in which such decisions are not in line with the Islamic political philosophy or are causing internal politics and factionalism. At this juncture, Islamists may experience what popularly known as post-Islamism.

The term post-Islamism was invented by Bayat as his study on Muslim society after Iranian revolution shows an upcoming new stage of changing style that Islamist movement would conduct.[37] The term becomes more visible and mature when Islamism across Muslim world really experiences an alteration from rigid and closed worldview to flexible and compromise politics. Here, Bayat and other scholars propose a new 'project and condition' Islamists in Muslim world experience and struggle in a new scenery that drives them into embracing 'post-ideological, civic, and democratic character'.[38] These new characters might be the foundations of political awareness for Islamist parties to engulf the bitter reality of the Islamic world's underperformance attributable to the earlier-achieved democratization by the Western world politics. However, the spot of Islamic parties in these new 'project and condition' could be informative not only as comparative subjects but also to find the extent of project and condition that have been undertaken by an Islamist party in particular areas of Muslim world.

What elements that the so-called *project* and *condition* contain might be different in each context Islamists have. The expected results, however, shall be same for all scholars who believe that post-Islamism would have been a persistence style of Islamists. Subsequently, in studying an Islamist party within the milieu of post-Islamism, there is a need to define the extent of *project* and *condition* of an Islamist party that are unique and inimitable. In other words, the project of new political Islam differs from one Islamist party

[36] Mohamed Abdel Rahim M. Salih and Abdullahi Osman El-Tom, *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, ed. Mohamed Abdel Rahim M. Salih (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1.
[37] Bayat, "The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society, Critique."
[38] Bayat, *Post-Islamism*, 30.

to another, so it is with the condition. No political landscapes are same, nor societal pressure and cultural background are similar for all Islamist parties. However, an engagement with the discussion of post-Islamism is still relevant in examining Islamist parties' progress though its degree could not be generalized. It is because regional aspects could not be ignored as they have significant influence to the subject of Islamic activism.

Post-Islamism can be possibly considered the global phenomenon of Muslim world. Yet, the regional socio-political features are equally important to deliberate. It is because by their presence, as explanatory variables, the extent of post-Islamism can be clearly justified. Societal and civic pressures, as Bayat mentioned, must be enough dissimilar from one area to another. The comparative political studies on the Middle East remain consider the regional aspects even though authoritarian landscapes are the only common one behind all political dynamics involving Islamists either as rulers or oppositions.[39] Thus, socio-political features in the peripheral Muslim majority countries such as in Southeast Asia are unable to underestimate as the distinct backdrop of Islamist parties' transformation. Here, as it would be discussed later, Indonesia has been possibly having the degree of distinctiveness as it has a historical dynamic that involve the balancing between Islamization and the nation building.[40]

Focal factors driving to the Islamic parties' alteration from radical point of view toward a being that more open and moderate come from internal and external field. According to scholars of post-Islamism, "societal and civic pressures" as well as "internal contradictions" lead to Islamist groups and parties to "reinvent themselves" to optimize their presence in more democratic political landscape.[41] Furthermore, the extent of being self-reinventing in Islamic parties might be caused by a loss of their legitimacy even among their supporters. With an ever-changing economic and cultural condition in modern time, civil society where Islamist parties attract popular support no longer entrust political struggles to old and inflexible approaches. Rigid and closed political narratives are exhausted as the new society is willing to get more autonomy spaces and opportunities. This is in line with the modern campaign of freedom, justice and liberty therefore desiring a political narrative that promises such progress.

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[39] See for example, Michele Penner Angrist, ed., *Politics & Society in the Contemporary Middle East*, Second edition (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013).

[40] For further discussion see Carool Kersten, *A History of Islam in Indonesia: Unity in Diversity*, The New Edinburgh Islamic Surveys (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 128–30.

[41] Bayat, *Post-Islamism*, 10.

Additionally, internal contradictions have been an important driving-force of Islamist to rethink and change their ideological stance. Here, Iqtidar (2013) notes three contradictions within Islamist themselves. The first is a contradiction between militancy and apolitical pietism. The second inconsistency is a denial tendency to elitism but interested in elite position. The third is a willingness to create modern Muslim subject but reluctant to project the own modernity.[42] Islamists that want to project militant movements face narrative challenges of Muslim groups themselves. There is a narrative to encourage the importance of renovating Islamic society from inner piety but this would lead to losing the framework of political practice within Muslims themselves. In the interim, the problem of elitism within Islamists has been also their paradoxical role in which their inability to create egalitarian environment once they come to power. In case of modernization, the Western's modern framework always be the only one that is seemingly an overarching progress of the world thus making Islamists' own modernization project difficult to venture.

The mounting democracy, however, is a modern political landscape impossible to avoid because it directly shapes the interest of people in maintaining their political and economic rights. In modern Arab civilization, according to Al-Gabiri, the vocabulary of *al-Shura* (or consultation) has been long assumed more meaningful than democracy. At this point, there is a discrepancy among Arab Muslims. Who are from second generation of *salafis* refused to use the idea of Western democracy and who are embracing Muhammad 'Abduh and Jamaluddin al-Afghani's thought still maintain the coexistent approach between Islam and democracy.[43] Therefore, the political openness of Islamic parties in Muslim society is possibly to grow more and more.

However, the fear of Islamist persistence toward closed or even hidden worldview still exists. Bassam Tibi is one scholar doubting the Islamist moderation as illustrated in his point of view on the impossibility of Islamist adoption to democratization.[44] Either jihadists with violence political agenda or institutional Islamists who use election just for instrumental reason, as he dichotomized, are not to fully accept democracy despite the latter partnership is ostensibly enthusiastic. The Islamist struggle for ideology, such as *din wa*

[42] Humeira Iqtidar, "Post-Islamist Strands in Pakistan:," in *Post-Islamism*, ed. Asef Bayat (Oxford University Press, 2013), 274, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199766062.003.0009.

[43] Muḥammad ʿĀbid al-Ǧābirī, *Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought*, Contemporary Arab Scholarship in the Social Sciences, vol. 1 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009), 123.

[44] Bassam Tibi, "Islamist Parties and Democracy: Why They Can't Be Democratic," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 3 (July 2008): 43–48, https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.0.0002.

dawlah (religion above state), in the power-sharing political landscape, based on Tibi's perspective, might manifest in two conditional futures.

If Islamists still face difficulties in a competitive election situation, from their weakness to fight against secular parties to their underperformance in satisfying public demands, such frustrated conditions can be a driving-force to their self-reinventing whether in artificial face or in more radical in nature. If they won, as assumable from the perseverance close network between institutional and jihadist Islamists, it is not impossible to their prepared to bring back their Islamist political axis declining the progress of democratization. However, despite these disputed opinions on the Islamist moderation, the reality that Islamists are keen to participate in democratic political scene has been a chamber for further discussion and analysis. The issue of political inclusivity is one main loophole less-elaborated by literatures on Islamist moderation and post-Islamism.

2.3 The Awareness of Inclusivity in Democracy

At least, there are three manifestations of Islamists involvement in a competitive electoral context. First, ideological clashes between Islamists and other political rivals will always be the main feature of competition. Second, as all political participants may compete to for the same voter bases, the source of their political motivation might fundamentally come from the same societal awareness. Last, the competition might also manifest in the effort of policy making that would potentially be the political weapon to weakening opponents. Nevertheless, within the complex and plural political structures, where the actors varied in range of nationalist, secularist, Islamist and not to mention other possible political cleavages, the political competition is not the only scenario because a cooperation between particular elements might also occur.

Gaining popular support in democratic path is an ultimate goal for all political participants, whether nationalist-secularist or Islamist. At this juncture, an ideological encounter between the two might present in conflictual scenery, or show an astounding political display, wherein an un-ideological alliance occurs. The contravene between Islamists and its ideological rivals, although it might stem from a same awareness of emancipating society[45], has been a political realism that characterize one of Islamist

[45] Amin Zaki discussed this dialectical connection of religious and secular camps' encounter in the Middle East and ended up with the conclusion that the awareness of social backwardness conditions is the source for ideological struggles between Islamist and Secularist. Dr Mamoon Amin Zaki, *The Dialectical Conflict of Religious and Secular Ideologies in the Middle East: A Philosophical and Historical Analysis* (Outskirts Press, 2018).

political constraints. In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood faces a cycling pattern of political challenges from secularist political actors that making alliance with the authoritarian regimes even though a coalition between these Islamist and secularists might have almost always cultivated before their divide.[46] What made the coalition between Islamists and secularist failed to maintain is undoubtably their ideological clashes.

Unlike in Egypt with its republicanism political system, ideological crash between Islamists and secularists also occurs in a monarchy country. In Morocco, for example, with the existent of its never-unreplaced monarchy but open for different ideological parties' involvement in a limited way, the interpretation of building better society becomes a basis of party-political disagreement. As studied by Cavatorta (2013),[47] the Morocco's experience as a postcolonial country, which encourages the choice to take political sources from Islam or European enlightenment, led to the fraction between the Islamist PJD as well as *Al Adl* and a secular-liberalist group *Al-Ittihad Al-Ishtirakiy Lilqawat Al-Sha'abiyah* or the Socialist Union for Popular Forces. In the Turkey's case of Islamist-secularist rivalry, "the articulation of key sociopolitical, ethnic, and sectarian identities along partisan lines" polarizes Islamist and secular political parties[48] although certain political situations might bring together the two political forces.

For the meantime, situations of Islamist partnership to other ideological opponents may happen in many different political set-ups. In Turkey, for instance, an encouragement to build political alliances between Islamists and secularist stems from its election circumstance where ideological cleavages do not affect the fraction between them. Instead, the Islamist-secularist coalition really happen as the result of political struggles in achieving power. Balaban's study present this Turkish political dynamic in which the Turkey's ruling party, the AKP, along with secularists the Nationalist Movement Party, the Patriotic Party and the Mother Land Party become an election bloc to repress the political impediment opposition comprised of the Islamist Felicity Party allying with the main opposition Republican People's Party (RPP), the ultranationalist Good Party, the liberal conservative

[46] Dina Shehata, *Islamists and Secularists in Egypt*, 0 ed. (Routledge, 2009), 117, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203863480.

[47] Francesco Cavatorta, "'Divided They Stand, Divided They Fail': Opposition Politics in Morocco," in *The European Union's Democratization Agenda in the Mediterranean* (Routledge, 2013), 137–56, https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315875743-9/divided-stand-divided-fail-opposition-politics-morocco-francesco-cavatorta.

[48] Senem Aydın-Düzgit, "The Islamist-Secularist Divide and Turkey's Descent into Servere Polarization," in *Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization*, ed. Thomas Carothers and Andrew O'Donohue (Washington (D.C.): BROOKINGS INSTITUTION PRESS, 2019), 17–37, https://ixtheo.de/Record/1761244744.

Democrat Party.[49] In Tunisia, an interesting political setting present, wherein the Tunisian secularist willingness to engage with the Islamist party Ennahda is successfully built. The study of Monica Mark (2018) on cross-ideological coalition building between secularists and Islamists in Tunisia underlines that the cooperation between the two camps has also been dedicated by the secularist intention to cooperate with the Islamist groups.[50]

In Jordan, a cross-ideological alliance between the Islamist IAF and the Leftist group exists consistently from 1993 as an opposition bloc. As Schwedler (2006) highlighted, the Islamist-Leftist's coalition there did not require each division to "agree on all issues or share a common ideology" but instead all joining parties "must recognize that strategic bargaining and cooperative agreements are among the most efficient and effective means of political contestation."[51] In so far, it has been shown that coalition between Islamist and secularist do not suffice for the explanation of Islamist ideological alteration as it only shows the extent of pragmatic role played by Islamists.[52] Quite the opposite, it is justifiable enough to say that Islamist-secularist alliances facilitate the perseverance of Islamist radical nature. Furthermore, illustrations of ideological clashes between Islamists and secularists do not also provide a general explanation for Islamists' radical nature because the conflict does not contextually matter. It is worth reiterating that the mirror of political moderation of Islamist parties has only manifested in their changing worldviews and has nothing to do with their willingness to ally with their ideological rivals nor their reluctant to do so. As Tibi (2008, 45) noted, "taking part in elections and renouncing violence are not enough, if they remain unaccompanied by decisive shifts in thinking and cultural values."[53] Thus, to measure Islamist moderation is not only to generalize it from their readiness to formally involve in politics but it needs a careful account on their root ideological stances toward issues presenting their political opportunities and constraints.

A later image of Islamist openness to a more competitive politics also revolves around the issue of negotiation and compromise to political opportunities and constraints.

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[49] Utku Balaban, "The Islamist-Secularist Coalition and Social Class in Turkey," *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 88, no. 2 (June 2021): 271–97, https://doi.org/10.1353/sor.2021.0015.

[50] Monica Marks, "5. PURISTS AND PLURALISTS: Cross-Ideological Coalition Building in Tunisia's Democratic Transition," in *Democratic Transition in the Muslim World*, ed. Alfred Stepan (Columbia University Press, 2018), 91–120, https://doi.org/10.7312/step18430-008.

[51] Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*, 110.

[52] For further discussion, see Alfonso Casani, "Cross-Ideological Coalitions under Authoritarian Regimes: Islamist-Left Collaboration among Morocco's Excluded Opposition," *Democratization* 27, no. 7 (October 2, 2020): 1183–1201, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1772236.

[53] Tibi, "Islamist Parties and Democracy," 45.

Unlike coalition-alliance cases of Islamists and secularist that portray external political dynamics. Compromise and negotiation related more to the Islamist self-determination. Here, logics of interpretation of Islamist on their thinking themselves may experience the degree of renewal and reform. Here, looking at the way Ennahda party in Tunisia presented a renewal thinking on the new form of Islamic state is insightful. Led by Rachid Ghannouchi and inspired by *Makasid Sharia* rational of Ben Ashour, Ennahda shows a degree of Islamist ideological evolution where it no longer interprets Islamic state as the classical form. Conversely, as noted by Cavatorta and Merone (2015),[54] the party claims that the current Tunisian democratic state, though it does not constitutionally refer to *sharia*, is an Islamic state preserving justice and liberty. This ideological stance is in contrast to *Ikhwani* groups there, inspired by the idea of pan-Islamism society, that has no choice but to against such that Ennahda's interpretation.

Another portrayal of Islamist's willingness to renovate their rational may not only spin in the discourse of Islamic-state building in spite of its all-encompassing nature. However, discourses such as foreign politics, human rights and gender issues may also become a focal point of Islamist ideological adjustment. It is also because occasionally Islamic state discourse, or Islamic solidarity in particular, may be just a symbolic instrument for Islamist actors to appeal voter but at the same time maintaining a flexible approach toward foreign policy with Amerika, just like the AKP's strategy in Turkey.[55] An open approach toward foreign policy from Islamist parties might manifest in normalizing relation with Western countries or specifically opening as well as maintaining relation to Israel. Arab Spring, according to Al-Anani (2012), is one important factors of Islamist parties' tendency to renovate their stance in international relation.[56] Nonetheless, at the heart of Islamist's inclination to open approach toward a seemingly moderate foreign policy is the prioritization of "the politically possible" as the result of structural constrains that drive them to abandon their radical rhetoric to West or Israel for instance.[57]

According to Salih and El-Tom (2009), Islamist parties' position toward human rights and gender equality issues, among other things, is correspondingly the key point of

[54] Francesco Cavatorta and Fabio Merone, "Post-Islamism, Ideological Evolution and 'La *Tunisianité* ' of the Tunisian Islamist Party *al-Nahda*," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 20, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 32–35, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2015.991508.

[55] Yildirim, *Muslim Democratic Parties in the Middle East*, 125–26.

[56] Al-Anani, "Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring."

[57] Haoues Seniguer et al., *The Foreign Policy of Islamist Political Parties: Ideology in Practice*, ed. Mohamed-Ali Adraoui and Olivier Roy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 43.

radical-moderate distinction among Islamists.[58] Radical Islamist may not have a clear willingness to embrace an open policy toward these issues while the moderate ones are potentially to have. The Muslim Brotherhood's totalitarian response to the "End Violence to Women", a social campaign by the United Nation, may mirror an example of Islamist radical character.[59] On the contrary, the Egyptian *al-Wasat* Party, and the Tunisian Ennahda, have a more positive rejoinder toward such an issue,[60] therefore distancing them from radical perceptions. Such varied stances may stem from their disputed interpretation of Islamic ethics and principles. The MB perceives that kind of campaign as oppose to "established principles of Islam" and demoralizing "Islamic ethics."[61] Thus, the positive attitude of the MB counterparts has been assumable be what we can call as Islamist moral reform.

The AKP as the ruling party in Turkey has an ambiguous stance toward non-Muslim community. As Yildirim noted, "the emphasis of the nation-state and its perception as raison d'etat", on the one hand, thwarted the party from having a more liberal policy toward the Kurdish and Alevi communities. On the other hand, its instrumental approach to accommodating Armenian religious minorities has been a successful project in extending the party voter base.[62] What has been made by AKP in accommodating other identities shows that moderation behavior to some extent could present a positive incentive for political institutions and conversely it also makes democratic representation progress better.

2.4 Islamist Political Parties in Southeast Asia

Illustrations of the typical shift of Southeast Asian Islamic parties is crucial to highlight because it is an area where tremendously diverse democracies exist.[63] The persistence of Islamist parties there shows a level of distinction. Unlike in the Middle East where the end of colonialism is correspondent to the fall of the Islamic Ottoman empire,

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[58] Salih and El-Tom, *Interpreting Islamic Political Parties*, 2.

[59] Patrick Kingsley, "Muslim Brotherhood Backlash against UN Declaration on Women Rights," *The Guardian*, March 15, 2013, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/15/muslim-brotherhood-backlash-un-womens-rights.

[60] Mojtaba Mahdavi, "Whither Post-Islamism: Revisiting the Discourse/Movement After the Arab Spring," in *Arab Spring*, ed. Eid Mohamed and Dalia Fahmy, Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 27, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24758-4_2.

[61] "Muslim Brotherhood Statement Denouncing UN Women Declaration for Violating Sharia Principles," *Ikhwanweb* (blog), accessed May 20, 2024, https://ikhwanweb.com/muslim-brotherhood-statement-d/.

[62] Yildirim, *Muslim Democratic Parties in the Middle East*, 101.

[63] T. Carothers and A. O'Donohue, eds., *Political Polarization in South and Southeast Asia Old Divisions, New Dangers* (Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2020), 3.

the independency of most South Asian states was much colored by struggles to fight against colonizers and the role of Islamic movements in such struggles is historically undeniable. Those historical Islamic movements were in fact seed of Islamic parties later when independency came true. Even in countries where Islam is a minority like in the pre-independence of Thailand and the Philippines, Islamic movements such as the Pattani and the Moro Islam played the extent of struggling role in conflict against the colonial governments.[64] In Muslim majority countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, the role of Islamic movements in fighting against colonial rulers was more visible. The existence of such movement persists even until today, not only playing role in the era of independence struggle but also involving in the nation-state building and giving birth to many nowadays Islamist parties. These parties played and contributed dynamic role in democratization, struggled to fight against authoritarian regimes, and experienced changes and continuations within the ever-altering political landscapes.

Along with the ending process of colonialism in Southeast Asia, ideological encounters between liberalism, communism, nationalism, Islamism and not to mention ethnicism shaped complex political systems to each nation-state there. At this juncture, as Bijpai and Bonura (2013) highlighted,[65] Islam as a source of political religious ideology along with state ideologies and state democratic institutions formed and reformed each other in reciprocal way. It is perhaps correct enough to say that Islamist parties in Southeast Asia has presented as a result of complex political history colored by politics of independency, decolonialization and nation-state building projects. However, for the purpose of this research, elaborating Islamist parties and their ideological dynamic in Southeast Asia may be well limited to context of moderation within democratic and plural sociopolitical condition.

Malaysia may be a decent departure for this discussion. As a state with a highly "religious establishment" where it maintains a formal connection with a specified religion, namely Islam, while at the same time recognizing limited democratic base-lines of religious

[64] Syed Serajul Islam, "The Islamic Independence Movements in Patani of Thailand and Mindanao of the Philippines," *Asian Survey* 38, no. 5 (1998): 441–56, https://doi.org/10.2307/2645502.

[65] Rochana Bajpai and Carlo Bonura, "South Asian and Southeast Asian Ideologies," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*, ed. Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), https://academic.oup.com/edited-volume/34324/chapter/291341561?searchresult=1&utm_source=TrendMD&utm_medium=cpc&utm_campaign=Oxford_Academic_Books_TrendMD_0.

freedom and non-discrimination,[66] Islamist party's existence there seems to have a little appreciation toward democracy. The *Partai Islam Se-Malaysia* PAS believes that electoral democracy is just a procedural way to escalate the establishment of Islamic law, or even Islamic state, in its own version which use the term *Negara Islam Kebajikan yang Diridhai* (A Prosperous Islamic State Endorsed by God). Nevertheless, the party's perception toward non-Muslims as second-class citizens that should be protected (*kafir dhimmi*) does not restrain the party to put them as the party members.[67] Nevertheless, in the current Malaysian political dynamic bringing the party to defeat, such ideological stance does not change. The 2018 election race show that kind of Islamist continuity where the PAS allying with the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), an ultra-nationalist party, campaigned for the "Malay Muslim rights" and the "continued restrictions on civil and political liberties for the country's citizens, the limiting of inclusion of minorities in governing national politics, and the preservation of the political power of the country's hereditary Malay monarchy."[68]

In a country where Islam is minority religion such as Singapore, Muslim community's political interest would always rely on their respectable dialogue to and perception of major society.[69] In Philippines and Thailand, with the existence of authoritarian regimes and the weakness of party institutionalization system[70], it is difficult to find an open and democratic political space for Islamic communities. Within this kind of political structure, oppressed Muslim groups in those countries are very likely to become 'radical' in order to maintain their liberation agenda. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Philippines is a perfect example of that possibility in which this organization at first maintains a moderate and conciliatory approach to the Government of the Republic of Philippines (GRP). Later on, after it has been frustrated and oppressed by the GRP and the Christian-Filipino settler in the Southern Philippines, the MILF hardened its position by

[66] Dawood Ahmed, *Religion–State Relations* (Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2017), 12.

[67] Ahmad Ali Nurdin, "Islam Supports Democracy: The Views of Partai Islam SE-Malaysia (PAS) and Their Implementation in the Recruitment of the Party's Members and Leaders," *Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies* 7, no. 1 (2019): 111.

[68] Sebastian Dettman, "Authoritarian Innovations and Democratic Reform in the 'New Malaysia,'" *Democratization* 27, no. 6 (August 17, 2020): 6, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1705791.

[69] Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, "THE NECESSITY AND IMPORTANCE OF THEOLOGICAL ENGAGEMENT WITH NON-MUSLIMS FOR SINGAPORE MUSLIM COMMUNITY," *Journal of Al-Tamaddun* 15, no. 2 (December 21, 2020): 29–43, https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol15no2.3.

[70] See, Andreas Ufen, "Political Party and Party System Institutionalization in Southeast Asia: Lessons for Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand," *The Pacific Review* 21, no. 3 (July 4, 2008): 327–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740802134174.

pursuing independence and struggling for an Islamic state.[71] In Thailand, the case is similar where the National Revolution Row (BRN) and Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), insurgents' groups in Southern Thailand, struggle to achieve special autonomy from the Thailand Government based on religious cleavage between Buddhism and Islam.[72]

Observing on the moderation of Islamist movements in Southeast Asia is informative for readers that it is imperative to understand the bottom-up relationship between political entities. In areas where authoritarianism was preoccupying to oppress Islamists, it is arguably accurate to perceive that political behavior of Islamist would always maintain a resistance attitude toward rulers acting as dangerous subjugator towards political-economy Islamists may struggle. Here, Islamic principles such as building territorial ownership based on religion (Islamic state) and hostility towards other identities were only a catalyst to legitimate resistance attitudes and not the basic political decision from the very beginning of the political context Islamists have been facing. In sum, moderate or radical nature of Islamists, as could be seen from the Moro and Pattani Islamist movements, highly depends on the context of the political-economy underlying the relationship between Islamists and their rivals. Again, this malleable stance is based on the reality that Islamists are a minority subject like what happened in Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and the Philippines.

2.5 Islamist Parties in Indonesia: The Political Milieu of PKS

Among Southeast Asian states, Indonesia may be the most successful country in balancing between nationalism, political Islam, and democratic institutional building. With its long-rooted historical presence, Islam in Indonesia does not only succeed in Islamizing cultural dimensions of the country but also does well in politically taking part at the construction of an exceptional party-political environment. As Lev (1967) noted, along with the Indonesia's party system originated from "the influence of Dutch ethical policy", Islamic and European ideas were experiencing political contestation that grouped Indonesian elites into diverse political gatherings; Nationalist, Islamist, Communist.[73] The ideological cleavages had been continuing from the era of Liberal Democracy (1950-1959)

[71] Shamsuddin L. Taya, "The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the Philippines," *Intellectual Discourse* 15, no. 1 (June 30, 2007): 61–62, https://doi.org/10.31436/id.v15i1.61.

[72] Ahmad Anfasul Marom and Bayu Mitra Adhyatma Kusuma, "The Comparative Dialectic of Islam, Politics, and Government in Indonesia and Thailand," *Islamic Insights Journal* 1, no. 2 (2019): 123–35, https://doi.org/10.21776/ub.iij.2019.001.02.3.

[73] Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," 53.

to the president Sukarno initiative to design national political structure to be Guided Democracy (1959-1966).

The first debate on state statutory building, however, was the fight between Islamist and Nationalist camps in which the issue of *Sharia* establishment[74] in the Preamble of the Constitution as Islamists' aspiration was in dispute. Eventually, all camps agreed to build Indonesia as not based on Islam but based on "belief in the one and only God" in order to accommodate to non-Muslim communities' aspiration.[75] In the first Indonesian election 1955 those three ideological camps shared about 75% of the popular vote[76] as represented by the National Indonesian Party (PNI) for the nationalist group, the Masyumi and the NU parties for Islamic groups, and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) for the last group. Other Islamist parties such as the PSII, the Perti (Islamic Education Party) and the PPTI (Tarikhah Unity Party) were underperformed as not attractive as the Masyumi and the NU parties. During the Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime, however, there was a decline of the Indonesia's party system as the result of the increasing role of the president Sukarno and his deprivation of 'the parliament and the remaining parties of most of their power'.[77]

Islamic parties suffered when Sukarno became authoritarian. Lev (1967) noted that "from the beginning Guided Democracy was also framed in antiparty terms, and the parties and their institutions deteriorated rapidly after early 1959".[78] The president banned the Masyumi and the PSI parties, in 1960, as his accusation of them getting involve in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion.[79] Thus, only the NU party remained the largest Islamic party at that time. It has opposed the PKI since its trial to rebel in Madiun 1948, which murdered several NU members. It also rejected PKI influence on the government as the President appointed PKI members to cabinet posts.[80] The conflict between those two parties ended in large-scale exterminations of communists in 1965/66. At this juncture, the Sukarno

[74] The first draft of Indonesia was known as *Piagam Jakarta* in which seven words "with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practice Islamic law" initially existed.

[75] B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1982), 36, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-7895-2.

[76] Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Modern Indonesia Project (New York: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1957), 58.

[77] Andreas Ufen, "The Evolution of Cleavages in the Indonesian Party System" (Germany: German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), 2008), 12, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07525.

[78] Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," 61.

[79] Vedi Hadiz, *Indonesian Politics and Society A Reader*, ed. David Bourchier (London: Taylor and Francis, 2015), 6.

[80] Greg Fealy and Katharine McGregor, "Nahdlatul Ulama and the Killings of 1965-66: Religion, Politics, and Remembrance," *Indonesia*, no. 89 (2010): 39–40.

political power faded away and the general Suharto with his military force took over the regime at the rationale of repress national conflict that causing instability.

During the early New Order era, a term signifying the government of Suharto, although the new regime was benefited from the Muslim-communist conflict, its attitude toward Islamist forces took an ambiguous stance. On the one hand it promoted individual piousness and spiritual practice in private life. In the political context, on the other, the government took a hostile policy toward political Islam.[81] Besides its fight against Muslim insurgents in West Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi, the regime prohibited the re-establishment of the Masyumi party in 1967 and thwarted the rise of an alternative Islamist modernist party made by Mohammad Hatta and Deliar Noer.[82] Moreover, a political control was made by the regime with its creation of a new modernist party called the Parmusi (Muslim Party of Indonesia) in 1968 aimed at preventing Masyumi political maneuver. In facing such regime political repression, as compromise of the failure of reestablishment, former Masyumi actors, led by Mohammad Natsir, turn their political strategy by establishing the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council; DDII), "which went on to become a major source of dissent against the regime."[83]

The main reason behind the creation of the DDII was to pursue a substitute means to absorb into Indonesian politics through informal arena. For Natsir, *dakwah* or Islamic proselytization could be equivalent to politics as in his popular saying "We no longer preach with politics, but we do politics with preaching."[84] Through the *dakwah* movement, Natsir advanced his idea of antiauthoritarian discourse while at the same time stressing the importance of moral values and norms based on religion.[85] As Kayane (2022) noted, the DDI actively recruited and trained university students to escalate activism in building future leadership and democracy through campuses and mosques. This activism was paving the

[81] Liddle quoted in Michael Buehler, *The Politics of Shari'a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 45.

[82] Hadiz, *Indonesian Politics and Society A Reader*, 82.

[83] Greg Fealy and Bernhard Platzdasch, "The Masyumi Legacy: Between Islamist Idealism and Political Exigency," *Studia Islamika* 12, no. 1 (2005): 82, https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v12i1.646.

[84] Yusril Ihza Mahendra, "Combining Activism and Intellectualism: The Biography of Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993)," *Studia Islamika* 2, no. 1 (1995): 112, https://doi.org/10.15408/sdi.v2i1.844.

[85] Mas'oed Abidin, *Gagasan Dan Gerak Dakwah Natsir*, Cetakan pertama (Yogyakarta: Gre Publishing, 2012), 118–19.

way future political Islam within next generation.[86] To some extent the DDII's *dakwah* initiative has also been the seed of the later *Jamaah Tarbiyah* in 1980s,[87] the initial history of PKS. In sum, the *dakwah* movement has kept its political Islam influence throughout the Suharto era by appealing to wider society with the antiauthoritarian discourse and the emphasis of religious moral importances.

There were, at least, two controlling policies of Suharto that made political Islam restricted and repressed. According to Aspinall (2005),[88] the first policy, released in 1973, was the restructuration of party system where "the surviving political parties were forced to fuse into two unstable agglomerations." At that moment, the government established the Golkar (Golongan Karya) party as its political vehicle to monopolize voters. Other parties have been enforced to fuse into two camps, namely the nationalist camp the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI) and the Islamist camp the PPP party. The PDI party consisted of the PNI, the Murba (Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak) party, and the Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia) party and the IPKI (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia) party. The PPP party was formed in 1973 by Islamist parties' coalition in the People's Representatives Council (DPR), that are the NU, the PSII, the Parmusi and the Perti (Islamic Education Movement) parties. The second policy was the construction of Pancasila as the state ideology (*asas tunggal*) in which it was the effort of the government to justify for its authoritarian rule.

Furthering that policy, the government banned the use of Islam as political platform in the PPP. Additionally, the party was also prohibited to use *Ka'ba* as the symbol of the party. As the result, the PPP became increasingly ineffective as the political vehicle of Islamist groups and lose support in election dropping from 28 percent in 1982 to 16 percent in 1987.[89] Another factor that possibly reduced the power of the PPP in election was the NU withdrawal from the party in 1984. Led by Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), the NU wanted to bring back its sociocultural role as an Islamic mass organization, well-known as *Khittah* 1926, rather being a political party.[90] At this juncture, Islam did not have a strong

[86] Yuka Kayane, "Historical Formation of Islamist Ideology in Indonesia: The Role of the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII)," *Critical Asian Studies* 54, no. 1 (January 2, 2022): 6, https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2021.2008261.

[87] Mason, Bubalo, and Fealy, *Zealous Democrats*, 53.

[88] Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia*, East-West Center Series on Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2005), 22–23.

[89] Peter Riddle quoted in Zachary Abuza, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*, 1st ed, Asian Security Studies (New York: Routledge, 2007), 18.

[90] C. Van Dijk, "Ulama And Politics," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde* 152, no. 1 (1996): 110.

political force in formal arena. However, as the DDII and the NU played their role in sociocultural activism, Islamic politicking from below could possibly pave the way of the growth of Islamic intellectualism. This religious intellectual activism was arguably the result of many Muslim figures that are frustrated by the regime. They are eager to build Islamic social order from outside formal politics while constructing seeds of objection against Suharto regime. Consequently, with the emergence of strong resistances toward the regime, Suharto was eventually fallen in 1998 through the massive revolt brought together activists and students from Islamic and nationalist camps.

The fall of New Order regime paved the way of Indonesia's democratization and led to the beginning of the Reformation era. As Ufen (2008) noted, "Suharto's downfall in May 1998 enabled radical political reforms and the rise of more than two hundred new parties, forty-eight of which participated in the national elections in 1999."[91] At this juncture, with the opening of new political opportunity, three new Islamic parties rose along with discrepancy of Islamic organizational tendency. Figures of the NU, led by Gus Dur, established PKB as a political vehicle of *Nahdliyyin*, members and followers of the NU. The Muhammadiyah camps, initiated by its leader Amin Rais, established PAN. The Tarbiyyah movement was also developing its *dakwah* agenda by founding the Prosperous Party (PK).[92] These three parties along with the PPP were welcoming the 1999's election by establishing the Central Axis coalition (Poros Tengah) to fight against the Nationalist camps, namely the Golkar and the Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (PDI-P).

[91] Ufen, "The Evolution of Cleavages in the Indonesian Party System," 13.

[92] Ken Miichi, "Democratization and 'Failure' of Islamic Parties in Indonesia," in *Southeast Asian Muslims in the Era of Globalization,* ed. Ken Miichi and Omar Farouk (the United State of America: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 129.

Table 2.1 Results of the legislative election of 1999



Source: Suryadinata et.all[93]

This first democratic election was the critical stage for the progress of political Islam in Indonesia. Although Muslim camps gained the victory, with Gus Dur elected as the President through representative election in the MPR, the accumulation of the Central Axis voters could not match the nationalist parties in total. Indeed, the representative forces of the Islamist camp were enough to compete with the winner party, the PDI-P, in legislative making decision. Nevertheless, as the requirement of threshold for a party to have seats in legislative is 4% minimum, the opportunity of the PK and the PBB parties to help Islamist camp were meaningless. Inasmuch as the 3.3% decrease of the Islamic coalition seats in the legislative, the political performance of Islam was not as strong as the PDI-P in parliamentary decision making. However, in this first critical opportunity, Islamic forces do not show later significant power as they were divided with the political interests based on historical path in which their political struggles were seemingly impossible to unite. As the result, the failure of Gus Dur to maintain his presidential position in 2001, among other things, was because of Islamists' inner-division. Even PAN, PBB and PK were Islamist parties that even involved in the demand to step down Gus Dur from presidency.

[93] Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Leo Suryadinata, *Emerging Democracy in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 10.

The impeachment of Gus Dur brought Islamist forces to the insignificant political opportunity in which after him none of Islamist parties could present promising figure to compete in the presidential election. Even worse, figures from Islamists after Gus Dur were mostly used as secondary instrument for national-secular candidates. Therefore, Indonesia's democratization was not utilized by Islamists to build strong power within the unity of Islamic ideology. Yet, this condition may arguably be one factors that make Islam and democracy in Indonesia seen as not contradicted. Even Buehler argued that the weak institutionalization of Islamic parties is one factor of political Islam's insignificance and, therefore, is making Islam-Democracy relationship in Indonesia is "less problematic".[94]

2.6 Conclusion

Islamist parties from Muslim-majority countries has been experiencing political moderation to maintain their continuity within the changing political circumstances. Here, political pressures from society and their internal deadlock were the main factors influencing the moderation behavior of the parties that initially rooted in religious fundamentalism. This is what Asef Bayat and his colleagues called as post-Islamism trend in which political Islam in Muslim-majority countries has been changing their behavior and altering ideological narratives. Gaining popular support in democratic path shapes the Islamist parties' willingness to embrace competitive political constellation. On the one hand, Islamist parties would insist ideological exclusiveness by reluctancy to cooperate in cross-ideological political agency. On the other, when the political circumstances have not provided beneficial incentives for Islamists forces, they will compromise their religious ideology through negotiated cross-ideological coalitions with nationalist parties.

In the context of Southeast Asian countries, including Indonesia, Islamist forces have a distinct political position since the political dynamic of those countries are originally rooted in the decolonialization efforts. Fighting for independence from western colonialization has made Islamist movements in Southeast Asia more resilient in facing authoritarian regime and contributive to democratization. Moreover, in Indonesian political context, Islamist parties have a long historical roots and genealogies. Indonesian Islamists were experiencing up and down political circumstances, manifesting radical movements and moderate ones at the same time. However, with the emerging democracy in Indonesia, moderate Islamists movements are more likely representing political nature for the major society. With multi-party system and democratic consolidation after 1998 reformation, the

[94] Michael Buehler, "Islam and Democracy in Indonesia," *Insight Turkey*, 2009, 51.

growing political Islam manifested in the emergence of new Islamist parties such as PKS, PBB besides PPP has been a framework of inclusion moderation even a decade before Arab Spring and post-Islamism events.

CHAPTER III
FROM UNDERGROUND TO FORMAL POLITICS: COMMITMENTS AND CHANGES OF PKS

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the historical development of PKS at the first stage. It discusses the ideological structure of the party with regard to moderation issue. It elaborates the way PKS embraces moderation from its very departure to enter Indonesia's formal democracy. Moreover, in what manner PKS perceives religious issues within the state political contestation is also crucial to discuss. Consequently, such elaboration and discussion enable this study to emphasize the starting point of PKS institutional transformation. In this regard, there is a question if PKS has had a moderate political vision since the very willingness to embrace democracy in Indonesia.

It is significant to understand the extent of moderation the party has been taking since it enters to democracy. Previous studies highlighting the ideological structure of PKS indicate that the moderation of the party has been undertaken after its failure in the election of 1999.[95] In contrast, I argue that the party has a degree of moderation since the very beginning of its declaration under the name of the Justice Party (PK). Indeed, the historical genealogy of PKS might position the party in a suspicious condition. The connection of its founders with transnational ideology derived from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is one of its suspicious characters. However, a closer look on the stances of the party towards the political circumstances of Indonesia can probably be critical for underscoring the party's moderation. Additionally, the way PKS adapts to that circumstances manifested in its institutionalization may also prove the extent of progressive nature of the party.

3.2 Joining Democracy and Calibrating Islamism

As previously mentioned, the vertebral of the rise of *Jamaah Tarbiyah* was the *dakwah* movement by the DDII in the era of Suharto. It was Islamic movement served as an incubator for political activism of the PKS' founding fathers and the first generation. According to Buehler (2016), the DDII Islamic missionary activism, such as the program *Bina Masjid Kampus* (or Functioning Universities' Mosque), served as an important transmission belt for Islamist ideologies from the Sukarno era to post-1998 Indonesia.[96]

[95] See for example, Hasan, "Post-Islamist Politics in Indonesia""; Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia."

[96] Buehler, *The Politics of Shari'a Law*, 47.

Through cultural activism and educational program, the DDII developed and spread narratives to balance between Islamic moral values and future democratic leadership.[97] Many young Muslims have triggered to join the movement especially in the scholarship program sending Muslim students to have an advanced Islamic education in the Middle East and Pakistan.[98]

However, the movement was not shaping one character of Muslim activists. Because of the influence of transnational ideology from the Middle East, the generation of DDII varied ideologically. For example, Jafar Umar Thalib, one of the students benefited the DDII scholarship facilitation, went back to Indonesia and brought extremist ideology, establishing a 'militant Islamist' and 'anti-Christian' the *Laskar Jihad.*[99] Most of the Middle East graduated students, however, were not as extreme as Umar, particularly who involved in the establishment of *Jamaah Tarbiyyah.*

The *Tarbiyyah* initial movement was the *dakwah* activities propagated by figures such as Hilmi Aminuddin, Rakhmat Abdullah and Abdi Sumaithi (Abu Ridho). Inheriting the *dakwah* activism from the DDII, they organized study groups and cells on campuses and in mosques. As Dijk and Permata (2016) noted,[100] besides those seniors of *tarbiyyah*, Salim Segaf al-Jufri, Abdullah Baharmus, Encep Abdusyukur also played significant roles in *tarbiyyah* foundation. They return to Indonesia and start to involve in *dakwah* movement by adopting the model of Muslim Brotherhood's organizational framework and structure. In employing cell-like groupings, each of them acts as a mentor recruiting five to ten members to be educated and supervised under a specified group, and the group only knew each other without knowing members of other groups. Those activisms were particularly initiated from the larger campuses such as the University of Indonesia, the Institute Technology of Bandung and Gadjah Mada University to other tertiary institutions.[101]

The main *dakwah* activism conducted by the JT was *halaqah*, study circles developed in mosques in and outside campuses. These *dakwah*-groups were established by

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[97] Kayane, "Historical Formation of Islamist Ideology in Indonesia," 6.

[98] As Hasani and Naipospos noted "[the] DDII became the main agent for scholarship distribution from Rabithah Alam Al-Islami whose funding is supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to study in Middle East." See, Ismail Hasani and Bonar Tigor Naipospos, *The Faces of Islam 'Defenders'* (Jakarta: Pustaka Masyarakat Setara, 2010), 35, https://www.academia.edu/download/48068697/Ebook-The-Faces-of-ISLAM-Defenders.pdf.

[99] Florence Lamoureux, *Indonesia: Aglobal Studies Handbook*, Global Studies (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 73.

[100] van Dijk and Permata, "A Study of the Internal Dynamics of the Prosperous Justice Party and Jamaah Tarbiyah," 41.

[101] Mason, Bubalo, and Fealy, *Zealous Democrats*, 53.

borrowing the MB's communal concept *usrah* (family) to indicate the solidarity and the potential cell-structure that will develop further in large number of family-like networks.[102] Another term used by the *tarbiyyah* in organizing its activity was *liqo'*, a regular meeting for members to study particular Islamic text.[103] According to Azra (2000), the establishment of Campus Dakwah Institutes, *dakwah*-based campus organizations, in many universities was one of the significant roles of the *tarbiyyah* activism.[104] Students involving in those study circles usually discussed the religious and political matters. As many figures of this activism were graduated from the Middle East universities, it is not surprising that the movement then embraces the framework of Muslim Brotherhood political narratives. The works they used are actually not only from the MB's figures such as Hasan Al-Banna, Qutb, Said Hawwa and Yusuf al-Qardhawi, "books by the Iranian intellectual Ali Shariati, the Pakistani Islamist Abul Ala Maududi, the Sudanese Islamist Hasan al-Turabi, and the Egyptian Islamic scholar Muhammed al-Ghazali were also frequently studied."[105] Therefore, such mixture Islamic references are arguably one factor shaped the eclectic character of *tarbiyyah* in building its political ideology at first.

As the movement consolidated its unity during the last moment of New Order regime, the ICMI (Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Union) existed by support of the Government. Benefited from ICMI facilitation, *tarbiyyah* activist formed the student association KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia) in April 1998. Through this organization that led by Fahri Hamzah, many *tarbiyyah* activist joined roles in protest against the Suharto regime.[106] According to Azra in Diederich (2008), this association was the "backbone" of the establishment of the Justice Party (PK).[107] However, based on my analysis on the organization, KAMMI was just the first political learning of the JT in formally exercising their desire to embrace democracy because the *tarbiyyah* itself did not have a sense of formal legitimacy for its *dakwah* underground nature. This is in line with Bubalo and Fealy's argument that during 1990s there was a pressure within the *tarbiyyah* goup 'to become more politically active'.[108] Therefore, the backbone of establishing political party was the Jamaah Tarbiyyah itself and KAMMI was just an

[102] Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia," 103.
[103] Mason, Bubalo, and Fealy, *Zealous Democrats*, 53.
[104] Azyumardi Azra, *Islam Substantif: Agar Umat Tidak Jadi Buih* (Bandung: Mizan, 2000), 169.
[105] Mason, Bubalo, and Fealy, *Zealous Democrats*, 54.
[106] van Dijk and Permata, "A Study of the Internal Dynamics of the Prosperous Justice Party and Jamaah Tarbiyah," 42.
[107] Azra in Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia," 106.
[108] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*, 69.

instrumental pilot project of *tarbiyyah* activists. Additionally, KAMMI was not really active and prominent as organization after the PK was officially founded.

Following the political opening in the state when the regime of Suharto was stepped down, the *tarbiyyah* was undergoing the internal tension on the possibility of founding a political party as a tool to advance *dakwah* activism. A complete agreement was not reached within the JT as there were two fractions disputing the readiness of the movement to appear as formal political institution. Some argued that the time was precisely right to enter in democratic competition; others maintained that it is better to stay as Islamic missionary movement.[109] To resolve this disagreement, KAMMI senior activists made an internal survey to map the extent of *tarbiyyah* activists' support for establishing a political party by distributing opinion polls to around 6000 tarbiyyah activists. The result has shown that the majority of *tarbiyyah* activists (68 percent) supported the initiation to compete in Indonesia's democracy as an Islamic political party. After the appearance of answers favorably to the idea, the seniors and notable *tarbiyyah* alumni as well as dakwah activists discussed the formation the Justice Party (PK) in July 1998.[110]

The emergence of PK, according to an earliest observation by Diederich (2008), is not really drawing public attention by presenting a similar political actor. Instead, the party is apparently, to some extent, hiding a non-transparent background and unusual approach.[111] This assumption is understandable as he may not see in detail that the nature of the *tarbiyyah* movement was kind of informal activism. However, it is clear that the party start its politics by forming its first platform to provide the programmatic approaches that could be read publicly regardless some ambiguities within the platform narratives led to perception suspecting the radical agenda behind the party. The term *Khilafah* in the PK platform is interpreted by Diederich as 'the re-establishment of Caliphate'.[112] This kind of understanding, held by many observers, led to the assumption that the party did not have a sense of moderation from the very beginning of its transformation into formal politics. Furthermore, assumptions made by those observers then portrayed the party's gradual moderation that was actually confrontational to the party's own narratives and political attitudes.

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[109] van Dijk and Permata, "A Study of the Internal Dynamics of the Prosperous Justice Party and Jamaah Tarbiyah," 32.

[110] Julie Chernov Hwang, "When Parties Swing: Islamist Parties and Institutional Moderation in Malaysia and Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 18, no. 4 (December 2010): 658, https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2010.0016.

[111] Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia," 105.

[112] Diederich, 109–11.

For instances, according to Shihab and Nugroho, the implementation of Islamic law and the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia was the earlier desires of the PK's political agenda. This can be seen from the party's first platform stating that the party's vision was 'to lead the way in upholding the Islamic system'.[113] Such assumptions also could effortlessly be found in the observations of Hasan,[114] Assyaukanie,[115] Tanuwidjaja,[116] Hadiz,[117] Dijk and Permata[118] and so on, with various markers such as "hidden agenda", "radical rhetoric", and "long-term objective."

All of these predictive notions are understandable for three reasons. First, the party has had a historical genealogy of Masyumi party that favors Islamic basis in the era of Indonesian constitutional debate therefore the idea of Islamic state may arguably be attributable to the early presence of PK. Second, the party's enthusiasm to implement *sharia* through parliamentary struggle tortuously shows the party's imagined future of Indonesia in condition the complete implementation of Islamic law would be achieved. Last, the transnational ideas the party had absorbed rendered the perception of its willingness to unify Indonesia with pan-Islamic movement.

However, it is important to note that there is a significant difference between *Khilafah* (succession and regeneration) and *Khalifah* (a political leadership for all Muslims). While the former could suggest the universal meaning of continuing and making generation in the world by upholding Islamic values, the latter denote clearly to the political entity that Muslim's history had in a long time before the world has been divided by nationalism ideas. Additionally, the political platform of PK embraced democracy from the beginning of its declaration.[119] The party has also been aware of its presence as a political party that is in line with legal politics of nation state therefore, although it made no mention to the Pancasila in the first platform but the party was not explicitly aiming at Islamic state building either.[120] Its early disposition to Pancasila is not based on the party's full rejection

[113] Shihab and Nugroho, "The Ties That Bind," 233.

[114] Noorhaidi Hasan, "Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da 'wa Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia," *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,* 2009, 24, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/WP1845.pdf.

[115] Luthfi Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 462.

[116] Tanuwidjaja, "PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia," 537.

[117] Vedi R. Hadiz, "A New Islamic Populism and the Contradictions of Development," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 44, no. 1 (January 2, 2014): 4, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.832790.

[118] van Dijk and Permata, "A Study of the Internal Dynamics of the Prosperous Justice Party and Jamaah Tarbiyah," 31.

[119] Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia," 108.

[120] Diederich, 109.

to it but based on its denial to the way that *asas tunggal* policy is a political repression of New Order regime.

The party ideological program is represented by the Manifesto Politik, the Jati Diri, and the Agenda Nasional.[121] Diederich (2008) suggested that this document contain several components that have a broad and universal applicability. Democracy, for example, is portrayed as the ability of humanity to shape its own future. It is seen essential to establish a civilian administration that ensures democracy, citizen freedom, and the safeguarding of vulnerable individuals.[122] When interviewed by Republika, Nur Mahmudi Isma'il, the first president of PK answered a question on why PK choose Islam as its political base although using justice for the party's name:

> We clearly take the Islamic path as the party's foundation, but it also needs to be explained, it is our foundation in a political party and a mass organization within a country based on Pancasila and based on UUD 1945. Our struggle to use the principles of Islam is the same as our struggle to ask other religions to also use their religion as the principle of the party. This is proof of the democratization process that we are fighting for. It does not mean that we are fighting for the principles of Islam alone.[123]

PK has a clear distinction on state authority in which the party wanted to place Ulama and intellectuals along with the "government apparatus" in a system of collaborating state institution.[124] This advancing religious figures role in the state is currently represented by the party's support to the draft law on the protection of religious figures. According to the official statement of the party, this law does not mean to only protect symbols and figures of Islam but also of other recognized religions in Indonesia.[125]

The reason why previous literatures highlighted the radical nature of PK, although it has joined Indonesian democracy, is because the relics of Islamic ideas might still be upheld by the party in an integral way with democracy. However, the party's normative ideas on Islam, although to some degree seems to be radical, is apparently becoming more open and moving away from exclusive nature. This could be seen from the party's willingness to

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[121] Partai Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan* (Sekretariat DPP Partai Keadilan, 1998).

[122] Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia," 108.

[123] Hamid Basyaib and Hamid Abidin, eds., *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah? Perjalanan Politik Islam Dari Pra-Pemilu '99 Sampai Pemilihan Presiden* (Jakarta: Alvabet, 1999), 138.

[124] Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia," 108.

[125] "PKS - Memahami RUU Perlindungan Tokoh Agama dan Simbol Agama yang Diusulkan Fraksi PKS," accessed July 1, 2024, https://pks.id/content/memahami-ruu-perlindungan-tokoh-agama-dan-simbol-agama-yang-diusulkan-fraksi-pks.

build coalition with nationalist parties, as in 2004 election. Also, the party's adoption of Indonesian legal pluralism places the party in a moderate stance. The party does not always want Islamic law as official law as long as Islamic universal values can be the spirit of Indonesian law. Moreover, the party's openness to non-Muslim membership and candidacy also shows its inclusive approach in operating its politics in Indonesia. Thus, it is worth to elaborate further how the party configures itself into Indonesia's political realities regarding religious issues and the state ideology.

3.3 The Moderation Feature towards Religious Issues

As the inclusion-moderation hypothesis suggested, parties that are involved in open democratic system are no longer categorized as radical. It is important to question why there were still assumptions stating that the PKS or its predecessor the PK was supposed to be radical. Machmudi (2008) has tried to answer this questionable hypothesis about the radical nature of the PK by emphasizing the distinctive feature of PK that is misunderstood by some scholars. At least, three approaches have been depicting PK as a continuation of the *tarbiyyah* movement which led to the assumption of its radical nature. The depictions conclude that firstly PK is a splinter group apart from mainstream Islam. Secondly, it is also an extension of the radical nature of Masyumi. Lastly, the party might therefore be less committed to Indonesia's democratization. However, according to Machmudi, the transformation of PK as a political party with contributions of modernist-traditionalist Muslims in its establishment was a sign of its potential in cultivating moderation. Additionally, its participation in and compromise with political realities displays a distinct feature of the party dismissing radical character of the party.[126] In other words, although some historical attributions of the party might position it in the radical landscape, framing and analyzing the party in a broader context may generate a new perspective on the party.

At its first beginning, PK claims to continue the *dakwah* tradition of Masyumi as the main goal of its political agenda.[127] This means that the party does not abandon its ideally-cultural program although the place the party gets into requires it to act in formal political ways, in line with legal constitution of Indonesia. The *dakwah* engagement in formal politics is a major topic in the PK political programs. The party even defines politics as equal as Islamic propagation and emphasizes its *dakwah* culture repetitively. Instead of

[126] Yon Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesian: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)* (ANU Press, 2008), 5–14, https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/33709.

[127] Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia," 109.

referring directly to the structures and ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the party named its genealogy originally from Indonesian student movement inheriting Masyumi leaders' *dakwah* path.[128] However, as Machmudi (2008) noted, the MB's absorbed ideas were not implemented precisely. Some domestications and modifications happened because the *tarbiyyah* activists have been aware of political and cultural contour of Indonesian society, diluting the fundamentalist nature of the MB's initial movement.[129]

Religious issues were most significant factor that shape Indonesian political Islam landscape. Utilizing religions as political ideologies and symbols in politics was a debated focus at that time. There were two opposing opinions in terms of the use of religion as the ideological basis of political parties. In this case, the debate involves not only political actors but also scientists and political observers. Political actors of parties favoring Islam as the party-basis such as Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB), Mutammimul Ula (PK) and Alimarwan Hanan (PPP) argued that the *aliran* politics, a term referring back to "the 1950s when political parties and mass organizations were organized on the basis of broad ideological orientation,"[130] is a normal phenomenon in Indonesia. This pro-religion idea was supported by scholars like Quraish Shihab, Franz Magniz Suseno and Jusuf Kristiani Wanandi.[131] B.J Habibie, the former Indonesian president after Suharto, argued that founding parties should be based on Pancasila ideology and be free from religious and communist elements. Matori Abdul Djalil, a PKB politician, and Said Aqil Siradj as the NU figure reject the use of religion as a treat for national integration and as a backwardness. This opinion was backed by Nurcholis Majid and Saiful Mujani.[132]

Issues on Islamic state and sharia law were also the questioned political discourse in the aftermath of Reformation era. Those issues have been inherent discourses of Indonesian history that still promoted by Islamic fundamentalist camps in the democratization era of Indonesia. Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) has been the most popular group promoting the agenda of transnational Islamic state in Indonesia since 1983. Yet, this organization had never been eager to enter formal politics as its ideology did not acknowledge the democratic political system, assuming democracy as 'system of non-belief' (*kufur*).[133] Besides such

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[128] Diederich, 114.

[129] Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesian*, 13.

[130] Mitsuo Nakamura, "Prospects for Islam in post-Soeharto Indonesia∗," *Asia-Pacific Review* 6, no. 1 (May 1999): 100, https://doi.org/10.1080/13439009908720008.

[131] Kamarudin, *Partai Politik Islam Di Pentas Reformasi: Refleksi Pemilu 1999 Untuk Pemilu 2004* (Jakarta: Visi Publishing, 2003), 58–59.

[132] Kamarudin, 60–61.

[133] Syamsul Rijal, "The Origins of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia: Global and Local Interactions," *Islamic Studies Review* 1, no. 1 (July 5, 2022): 113, https://doi.org/10.56529/isr.v1i1.22.

transnational movements, local radical movements have also rose thank to the political openness of democracy. The rise local fundamentalist movements such the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI) was aiming at encouraging Islamic law being established in Indonesia's constitution. However, these local Islamist organizations were only involving in an idea contestation about sharia establishment without being able to exercise their agenda in parliamentary system.

Within those ideas' constellation, PK has always shown a distinctive political attitude. The party seems to position itself in an ambiguity between accommodating and rejecting. Yet, with regard to *asas Islam* (Islam as ideology), the party tends to accommodate the idea of utilizing religion as political philosophy. Not only did the party advocate Islamic political struggle in maintaining *asas Islam* but also it supports other religions in Indonesia to operate in politics using religious philosophy. This could be seen from the first PKS' president, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, point of view. He used to deliver a statement in an interview with Republika, answering a question on why the PK choose Islam as its political base although using 'justice' for the party's name.

> We clearly take the Islamic path as the principle of the party. But it also needs to be explained, it is our principle in politics and organization in a country based on Pancasila and based on the 1945 Constitution. Our struggle to use Islamic principles is the same as our struggle to ask other religions to also use their religion as the principle of the party. This is proof of the democratization process that we are fighting for. It does not mean that we are fighting for the principles of Islam alone. We have the first precept stating the One Godhead. This means that every person has a responsibility to *rabbaniah*. Both Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, and Protestants. Not a person with a split personality, becoming an opportunist and pragmatic society. What easy would be done, what uneasy would be so.[134]

This statement of PKS consisted of a complex thoughtful of the party's worldview about Islam and state-society relationship. On the one hand, the party maintained its persistence toward Islamic ideology, struggling for the religion in the reality of Indonesian politics. On the other, it recognized its political position within certain rules of game with diverse political group of actors. Here, PKS situated its political ideology as a micro struggle subjugated by wide-ranging rules of the nation-state ideology (Pancasila) and

[134] Basyaib and Abidin, *Mengapa Partai Islam Kalah? Perjalanan Politik Islam Dari Pra-Pemilu '99 Sampai Pemilihan Presiden*, 138.

constitution (UUD 1945). Its appreciation toward other religious political rights also could not be underrated, proofing that its stance toward political diversity has a level of open-mindedness and inclusivity. The stance of PKS on this issue has evidently never changed since its entrance in politics until here and now. The party has consistently preserved *asas Islam* even though several internal transformations happened within its platform. From 1999 until recently, *asas Islam* has been sustained by PKS while admitting the typical ideology and diversity of Indonesia. This what Hidayat Nurwahid called as the unchanging character of PKS, namely upholding Islam as the sole political philosophy while at the same time embracing the democracy and legal pluralism of the state.[135]

Issues regarding the Islamic state and sharia law are two things that make PKS susceptible to suspicious assumptions about the agenda to change the form of state. In this case, PKS shows an ambiguous attitude. According to Hefner (2011), although some rank and file of PKS supported the Islamic establishment in the nation, they were certain that prioritizing it would only serve to undermine the party's electoral prospects and the long-term aspirations for sharia law.[136] Therefore, PKS seems to be showing increasingly real moderation progress. This can be judged from the development of the party's platform. The old platform of PKS in 1998 did not mention Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia at all. Yet, the party's latest platform emerged with a new and developing political attitude of the party towards the ideology of the state.[137] Therefore, the suspicion against the tacit politics of PKS is refuted by the political promises of PKS enshrined in the development of the platform.

It is important to highlight that the stance of PKS towards issues on Islamic state and law is based on its moderate elite thought. Well-educated supporters of PKS tend to embrace the higher 'objective' of sharia (*maqashid*) rather than that of literal understanding. This approach underscores a gradual and more realistic pattern that other supporters of PKS favor in the pursuit of establishing Islamic sovereignty. These two different poles of support within the party create a dynamic that positions PKS in a unique place on the political spectrum. According to Hefner (2011), this combination of viewpoints and approaches categorizes PKS as "moderately conservative Islamist," reflecting a blend of traditional and progressive elements within its political and ideological framework.[138]

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[135] Hidayat Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid, June 28, 2024.

[136] Robert W. Hefner, ed., *Shari'a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 295.

[137] Shihab and Nugroho, "The Ties That Bind," 241.

[138] Hefner, *Shari'a Politics*, 306.

This balance allows PKS to navigate the complexities of modern governance while staying true to its religious principles.

Put concretely, political actors of PK in parliament have a distinctive interpretation of how religious law enforcement should occur in Indonesia. When the MPR was about to conduct the Annual Session of the MPR in 2001, PK released its stance toward the 1945 Constitution amendment related to Article 29 concerning the implementation of religious law based on the Jakarta Charter. The proposed amendment comes from the Reform Faction, a coalition of PKS and PAN in parliament, who want to change the law so that religious elements are included in the law in Indonesia. Here, PKS emphasizes that such implementation should be in line with the Madina Charter[139] context where the first Islamic plural society had been built by the prophet Muhammad.[140] With this reference to the Medina Charter, PKS offers a plural accommodation to the constitution related to religion so that it does not only include Islam but also includes plural elements that can govern all religions in Indonesia. The party believed that the Madina Charter is a justice manifestation for all religions that guarantees morality, integrity, and the unity of a nation-state.

The attitude of PK to not be too enthusiastic about enforcing Islamic law comes from the substantive way of thinking of its party elite. PK does not necessarily use a totalitarian approach in terms of enforcing Islamic law. It is an unusual approach compared to the other two Islamist parties, the PPP and the United Nations. For PK, as Damanik noted,[141] the implementation of Islamic law should be a social agenda, not Islamist political parties' agenda. Reflecting on the two major Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah and NU, which are culturally firm in their commitment to Islamization from the social course, PK believes that the indecisive attitude in supporting the Jakarta Charter does not mean that the party is anti-Islamic law. This substantial way of thinking in enforcing Islamic law has brought PK to a sense of sufficiency to make Islamic law a color in the legislation of laws in the House of Representatives, such as the Zakat Law, the Banking Law, the Marriage Law and so on.

That sort of substantive point of view, under certain conditions, positions the party in a controversial situation. Islamist parties, PPP, PBB and Masyumi, which agree completely with the inclusion of the Jakarta Charter in the 1945 Law, consider PK to be a

[139] The Medina Charter refers to the historical agreement made by the Prophet Muhammad and non-Muslim inhabitants in the early period of Islam.

[140] Sekretariat Jenderal DPP PKS, *Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik PK & PKS Periode 1998-2005* (Bandung: Harakatuna Publishing, 2007), 256.

[141] Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyahdi Indonesia* (Jakarta: Penerbit TERAJU, 2002), 248–51.

strange Islamic party.[142] However, PK has an answer to explain its position which is so strange according to other Islamist parties. For example, Mutammimul Ula, the late PK representative in the House of Representatives from 1999 to 2004, argues that Indonesian law may come from Western methods, but the position of sharia must be sufficient as one of the main inspirations. In this case, Ula does not reject the position of customary law as a complementary instrument so that national law provides a local context, nor does he reject Western legal methods that benefit from technological advances.[143] This means that PK has had a sense of realistic understanding on how the legal system of Indonesia could potentially be built with an eclectic approach. PK does not want to enforce Islam as the only component for the state legal development. Apparently, this substantialist approach is what in principle underlies every political decision of PKS in dealing with a national-scale political situation.

3.4 The Responsibility of PK to the National Plurality

With awareness of the scope of the power struggle, PK shows consciousness of the magnitude of the political scope in Indonesia. The party views that imposing an Islamic state and Islamic law through democracy is something impossible if it is only achieved by totalitarian means. A realist and gradualist approach as well as pragmatic, as Platzdach (2009) pinned on the PK,[144] positioning the party on a dual, ideological and pragmatic, character at the same time. Nevertheless, this kind of Islamic political attitude is, among other things, what makes democracy in Indonesia not seriously threatened by the totalitarian way of Islamic politics like in other Muslim countries. Thus, it can be concluded that PKS's awareness of the reality of national politics and its substantive viewpoint on religious issues are the hallmarks of the party that plays its political role in Indonesia's democratic competition.

One of the reasons for the uniqueness of politics in Indonesia is its multicultural social structure. Indonesia is a country with a multiparty political system and a fairly complex ideological division. Therefore, it can be understood that the existence of a multireligious alliance is one main factor that drove democratization in Indonesia. This political force played a significant role in the decrease of Suharto's power in May 1998. However, after the fall of the authoritarian regime, the hardline movement of the regime's

[142] Damanik, 247.

[143] Bernhard Platzdasch, *Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 241.

[144] Platzdasch, 243.

legacy still leaves the problem of ethnic and religious violence in several regions, such as Ambon and Maluku. Hefner (2001) argues that the effort to eliminate this bitter political legacy depends on the consensus of national political actors to strengthen the citizenship and pluralism of the nation. At the same time, this led the majority of the people are encouraged to choose pluralist political parties.[145] Such political conditions trigger concerns about exclusive politics which may cause the disintegration of national unity.

Furthermore, democratization brought important changes in political openness. It had an effect on 'the re-emergence' of a diversity of political ideologies. This was mainly due to the revocation of the *asas tunggal* policy in 1998 so the forerunner of mainstream politics (*politik aliran*) returns in the formal political arena. Additionally, the transitional government, led by B.J. Habibie, issued the Political Parties Law No. 22 of 1999. This law was created to repeal Law No. 3 of 1975 which limited the number of political parties.[146] As a result, new parties have emerged including those with Islamic nuances or those based on the Islamic masses. PK is a party that stands on Islamic principles in addition to PPP and PBB. On the other hand, there are PKB and PAN which are Islamic mass-based parties. The prominent difference of all these parties is the use of Pancasila as an Islamic companion ideology for parties based on the Islamic masses.

The rise of political Islam triggered the issue of exclusivism emerged at that time. The chaos in some regions, especially outside Java, which is mainly considered a conflict between religious communities, causes a negative assumption towards Islamist parties. A main presumption is that those parties will bring an exclusive lens in looking at the nation's problems. In this case, PK received a negative spotlight from PKB political actor, Khafifah Indar Parawansa. When speaking to the foreign press, she called PK an exclusive party and worried that the party would use only Islamic yardstick to look at national issues. But this impression was immediately refuted because it turned out that there were PK party members who came from Christians and Buddhists. The president of PK, Nur Mahmudi Ismail, responded to Khafifah's impression that the presence of members from non-Muslim groups "proves that our [PK] intention is participating in nation building."[147] The party was also assumed to have ties to revolutionaries who wanted to establish an Islamic state in

[145] Robert W. Hefner, ed., *The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), 36.

[146] Lili Romli, "Electoral Power Structure of Islamic Parties in Reform Era Indonesia," *Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review* 5, no. 2 (August 21, 2020): 6, https://doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v5i2.22865.

[147] Hairus Salim, Uzair Fauzan, and Umar Ibnu Sholeh, *Tujuh Mesin Pendulang Suara* (Yogyakarta: LKiS dan CH-PPS, 1999), 178.

Indonesia. Thus, arty members responded to the accusation by asserting that PK was a tolerant party. In a related vein, Pompe noted Nur Mahmudi Ismail's exposed statement: "we are open to everyone, regardless of race, religion or origin."[148]

Although there are no reports that clearly show how many non-Muslim members had joined PK, a small number of non-Muslims within the party was sufficient evidence to contend that PK is not a closed and exclusive party. In the party manifesto, according to Diederich, the membership rules of PK do not limit certain races, ethnicities, skin colors, languages or religions because the ideological similarity is the principle of PK in accepting members.[149] PK indeed made an ideological distinction between *hizbullah* (the party of God), in which the party belongs to, and *hizbussyaithan* (the party of Satan)[150] to justify which ideology the party embrace. However, this dichotomy does not rule out the possibility of being open to other religions. The party also lists "national unity" as one of the basic principles in order to achieve its normative political goals of Islam with a credit of Indonesia's plurality.[151] Therefore, it is reasonable that observers would consider PK's openness to be a mere small coincidence. However, in terms of the party's historical development this inclusivity could have been a critical juncture being importantly considered as the basis of its future institutional progress.

The openness of PK to non-Muslim members was aligned with Indonesia's macro development level during that period. Hefner (2020) described the post-Reformation era in Indonesia as one of "covenantal pluralism," an era marked by the collective efforts of pluralist elites to achieve a mutual commitment among all citizens.[152] This concept of pluralism extends beyond mere diversity; it involves a mutual pledge to engage, respect, and protect each other without necessarily endorsing each other's beliefs and behaviors. It maintains exclusive faith prerogatives without relativizing theological truth claims of any religious community and avoids enforcing the assimilation of minority beliefs and behaviors into majority practices. Instead, this form of pluralism aims to integrate minorities as vital contributors to the common good, positioning them as equal members of the national political community.

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[148] Sebastiaan Pompe, *De Indonesische Algemene Verkiezingen 1999* (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 1999), 126.

[149] Diederich, "A Closer Look at Dakwah and Politics in Indonesia," 111.

[150] Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan*, 24.

[151] Keadilan, 42.

[152] Robert W. Hefner, "Islam and Covenantal Pluralism in Indonesia: A Critical Juncture Analysis," *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 18, no. 2 (April 2, 2020): 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2020.1753946.

Between 1999 and 2002, Indonesia underwent significant constitutional amendments aimed at re-establishing a liberal constitutional democracy with a separation of powers.[153] These amendments introduced new regulations on religious freedom and human rights, reinforcing the nation's commitment to pluralism. Complementing these developments, the Political Parties Law No. 2 of 1999 mandated that every political party must have open membership to all citizens.[154] This regulation ensured that no political party could exclude any citizen from its ranks. Although subsequent changes to the law were made, they did not significantly alter the principles of ideological freedom and membership openness.[155] This rule on the openness of political parties nurtures a dynamic ideological ownership system among Indonesian citizens. Therefore, it prevents political parties from adopting exclusive practices and ensuring a more inclusive political landscape.

In the political party theory, Heidar (2006) argued that the nature of party membership varies according on social circumstances the party operate. Political membership is an expression of belonging such as a basic representation of religious, social, or ethnic identity.[156] However, with the existence of diverse and multicultural society, it is not shocking that organizations or parties varied in line with social and cultural cleavages. With the rules that force party openness to all citizens, the nature of party membership in Indonesia cannot be generalized according to that theory. For nationalist parties such as the PDI-P and Golkar, based on their party regulation and objective the nature of the membership is open without the coercion of the law. The ideology of nationalism, the parties have had, will not give much consideration to religious differences. However, the opening of Islamist parties to followers of other religions to become party members, as in the example of the PK above, shows that the nature of political party membership in Indonesia can be said to have gone beyond identity or cultural belonging.

The formation of PK's branches in regional area mostly focused on Muslim majority regions, particularly in Java and Sumatera. The first branch of PK established in non-Muslim majority region was in NTT (Nusa Tenggara Timur), in 18 October 1998.[157]

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[153] Tom Lindsey and Simon Butt, "State Power to Restrict Religious Freedom An Overview of The Legal Framework," in *Religion, Law, and Intolerance in Indonesia*, ed. Timothy Lindsey and Helen Pausacker (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), 27.

[154] Presiden Republik Indonesia, "Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 2 Tahun 1999 Tentang Partai Politik," Pub. L. No. 2 (1999).

[155] BPK, "UU No. 2 Tahun 2008," Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK, accessed July 6, 2024, http://peraturan.bpk.go.id/Details/38859/uu-no-2-tahun-2008.

[156] Knut Heidar, "Party Membership and Participation," in *Handbook of Party Politics*, ed. Richard Katz and William Crotty (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2006), 302.

[157] DPP PKS, *Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik PK & PKS Periode 1998-2005*, 61–63.

Establishing a branch in a predominantly non-Muslim area is undoubtedly a challenging endeavor. However, this move serves as a strategic political pattern beneficial for the party's future development, particularly in the context of fostering political relationships with non-Muslims. It appears that PK, in its initial establishment of a branch in NTT, undertook preliminary alignment concerning the party's relations with other religions.

At this moment, in his inauguration speeches, Mahmudi did not mention any issue about Muslim and non-Muslim relationships. Instead, he encouraged all cadres and sympathizers in NTT to build awareness and preparedness for what happened to NU followers in Banyuwangi where several *nahdliyyin* are murdered. It is ostensibly that the official of the NTT branch shall be aware of potential conflict based on primordial issues given that Muslims in NTT are a minority group. Beside of such sentimental encouragement, Mahmudi also mentioned the party's stance toward the policy of *asas tunggal* and the TAP P4, denying the relics of New Order monolithic control. However, Mahmudi did not mean that the party denied Pancasila as the product of the political dynamic of the Indonesian citizens.

The uniqueness of the membership of Islamist political parties in Indonesia also occurs in the PAN party. This party, despite having the background of the Islamic Community organization, Muhammadiyah, since its inception also has non-Muslim members. According to Muhammad Najib's report, 9 of the 85 or 10.6% of the PAN central management board (Dewan Pengurus Pusat) are non-Muslims, varying from Catholic, Protestant, Hindu and Confucian.[158] As for other Islamist parties such as the PPP and the United Nations, their party membership cannot be ascertained whether there are non-Muslims or not since the beginning of the establishment of the two parties, as well as the PKB which has characteristics similar to PAN. Nevertheless, PK and PAN, which accept the presence of non-Muslims in their parties, emphasized Hefner's theory, as mentioned above, about pluralism in Indonesia which is a critical juncture in the course of political history in Indonesia in the future.

The character of PK and PAN, in their acceptance of the inclusion of other religious identities into their parties, underscores the general pattern of Islamist parties in Indonesia, which in the early era of the Reformasi formed an exclusive coalition (the Central Axis Coalition, or *Koalisi Poros Tengah*). However, although bound by the basic unity of Islamic political ideology, it turns out that the Central Axis does not have solid political cohesion.

[158] Muhammad Najib dalam Kamarudin, *Partai Politik Islam Di Pentas Reformasi: Refleksi Pemilu 1999 Untuk Pemilu 2004*, 71.

One possible reason for the Islamic coalition's lack of unity is PKS's fundamental disagreement with some of Gus Dur's religious ideas, which are frequently controversial. As a result, PK unenthusiastically supports Gus Dur instead of endorsing the female presidential candidate, Megawati.[159] PK believes it is more important to support man candidate, despite the controversy surrounding Gus Dur's ideas. The intricate nature of this Islamist parties' coalition places the PK in a strange position, on the one hand it open to plurality even with other religion, the party does not completely have a strong support for a Muslim leader on the other.

At this critical juncture, during the early reformation era, PK has displayed itself as an Islamist party with a distinct political stance. Not only did the party embrace pluralism in its internal membership but also it asserted its reluctantcy toward Islamic leadership that is not in line with the political perspective of PK. Even so, this party has always tried to maintain its ideological struggle and preserve its political existence in the formal Indonesian politics. The defeat in the first election brought this party to a valuable lesson to rise again and to grow the spirit of its *dakwah* struggle, as claimed by the party's actors. In 2003, PK tried to change itself to be more adaptive and stronger in politics. Increasing awareness to political-economy is a one of new elements that the party carries as its national political agenda.

3.5 Failure and Starting Point of Development

Nur Mahmudi Isma'il does not accept assumptions of political observers about the defeat of political Islam in the post-reformation era. For him, the 1999's election was the very useful and cheap political learning process for PK. Only with 1.5 billion rupiah, the party could place its seven representatives in DPR. Compared to other parties that finish a ten or even a hundred billion, the achievement of PK in the first democratization of Indonesia was really cheap.[160] Appearing as a small party in 1999 did not make the PK lose its political spirit in Indonesian democracy. In addition to being enthusiastic in the political arena in the legislature through the stembush accord seat, the PK evaluated its achievement on a national scale. In accordance with the 1999 election rules, political parties that do not meet the threshold of 2% cannot participate in the 2004 election, unless they join another party or meet the requirements as a new political party through verification. At this moment,

[159] Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesian,* 75.
[160] DPP PKS, *Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik PK & PKS Periode 1998-2005*.

the Reform Faction, in which the PK was a member, supported the latter option as a solution to avoid the power play of the major parties in determining the electoral threshold.[161]

Winning only 1.6 percent of total vote gave the party an experience that as a new Islamic party its political promises do not enough provide a suitable incentive for a large scale of Indonesian society in general and for Muslims in particular. Liddle (2000) argued that its representative voice of educated young Muslim modernist from university students may be one of the primary political constraints positioning the PK as too much exclusive for Indonesian people in general where almost society's structure of the state is not really well-educated.[162] This is not to mention the existence of traditionalist society that certainly would choose political parties such PKB and PPP that are more possible to satisfy the traditionalist interests. Nonetheless, Liddle's argument would face a limitation to explain the failure of PK to enter parliamentary. It is understandable that PKS has a party's representative vote from well-educated Muslims and this representation cannot be attributed to the failure of PK in 1999 election. Actually, this representation is the very foundation of PK's emergence as a political party.

The more realistic reason of PK's failure to enter parliament, besides the 2.5 threshold system, was that Muslim voters from traditionalist and modernist were crystalized in NU and Muhammadiyah groups. PKB and PAN, representing two big camps traditionalist and modernist, are constraints for PK to appeal Muslim voters therefore restricting the attractive of the PK in broader scale. Additionally, the rise of PBB could not be neglected as well because this party was claiming as the continuation of the Masyumi, just like PK genealogical movement. With PKB and PAN that more possibly to gather voters of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah than PK, and the existence of PBB that is coincidently competing with PK in gathering Masyumi's inherent voters, it was simply predicted that PK would only get small number of Indonesian Muslim voters. This argument would be increasingly accurate when correlated to the evaluation of PK in in evaluating its weakness and strengthening its electoral power before the election of 2004.

The first evaluation carried out by the PK was by rejecting the results of the 1999 election. Nur Mahmudi Ismail was reluctant to sign the election results because of the PK's objection to the lack of clean elections. PK highlighted the existence of intimidation, money politics, and patterns of fraud that occurred in the election. The PK's focus on the election

[161] Kamarudin, *Partai Politik Islam Di Pentas Reformasi: Refleksi Pemilu 1999 Untuk Pemilu 2004,* 159.

[162] R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 1999: Democracy Restored," *Asian Survey* 40, no. 1 (2000): 35.

process was responded positively by the Election Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu), by acknowledging that the election was still colored by dishonesty and the Panwaslu would correct it. With this positive response, the PK then wanted to sign the election results on the grounds that their correction was accepted by the General Election Commission.[163]

The second assessment conducted by PKS is to calculate and develop political networks on a wider scale. It was an important political attribution in causing PKS to subsequently develop very extraordinarily. Four years before the 2004 elections came, the PK planned to expand its infrastructure network to deal with the election. The first National Working Conference (Mukernas) of PK was held in 2001, in which in this event the leadership of PK changed from Mahmudi to Hidayat Nur Wahid, the figure who became the leader of the PK declaration committee in 1998.[164] Under Nur Wahid's leadership, the scenario of facing the 2004 election became the main concern of the party's program. By using the tarbiyah method, PK prepares *murabbi* (cadre educators) to militantly recruit new cadres through *halaqah*. The PK management gives a certain target to each *murabbi* who is in charge of multiplying the tarbiyyah cadres. PK also prepared an economic team to raise funds (*infaq*). It resulted in the allocation of funds from which was only 50 million rupiah to an increase of 400 million. The proceeds of this fundraising are used to finance the *dakwah* safari of the PK central elite to the Regional Leadership Council (DPW) in several areas. The purpose of this safari is to consolidate the political network of PK. Sumatra is one example of the target for the expansion of political infrastructure. Tifatul Sembiring is in charge to organize this region. One of the programs to expand the network is to send seven to ten Islamic preachers, which are financed by the Central Leadership Council (DPP), to campaign in several regions for one month.[165] The decision to maintain the character of cadre party seemed to be even more evident when in 2001 the PK held a national cadre training in Jakarta, which was attended by 300 important cadres from all over Indonesia.[166]

The third scenario is to rebrand the party and re-register it with the General Election Commission like a new party. This process began with talks between PK leaders in the DPP, preparing a new lifeboat to sail in the 2004 elections. The leaders of the party agreed

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[163] Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyahdi Indonesia*, 252.

[164] Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan*, 3.

[165] Usamah Hisyam, Andi Nursaiful, and Sahrudi, *Sepanjang Jalan Dakwah Tifatul Sembiring*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Dharmapena Citra Media, 2012), 96–104.

[166] DPP PKS, *Sikap Kami: Kumpulan Sikap Dakwah Politik PK & PKS Periode 1998-2005*, 256.

to add the name Sejahtera so that the party's name was new. The inspiration for the name was permeated by an Islamic party in Turkey, the Refah party, which means welfare. In addition, the name was used on the grounds that the platform of PK since its inception was to fight for Civil Society, realizing justice and the welfare of the people. Al Muzammil Yusuf was appointed as the first president of PKS who was responsible for preparing party verification to the General Election Commission. However, the entity of PK was not officially dissolved because the result of the party's elite discussions recommended PK to join the new established one, PKS. On April 20, 2003, PKS declared itself at the Silang Monas in Jakarta, which was attended by around 40000 cadres. This declaration event confirmed Hidayat Nur Wahid as the party's president again, therefore replacing the presidency of Yusuf. The peak of this political process occurred in early July 2003 when all verifications at the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights had been completed and administratively and juridically PK merged with PKS.[167]

In line with the development of PKS, the number of non-Muslims who voluntarily join the party has also increased. Lutfi Assyaukani recorded what was reported by Nur Mahmudi Ismail in an interview in Melbourne, September 26, 2003.[168] According to Mahmudi, more and more non-Muslims in Papua and Maluku are consciously joining PKS. In this case, Mahmudi emphasized that PKS adopted the term "Medina Charter" as proof that the party is an inclusive political institution in order to escape the accusations of being a puritanic party.[169] According to Mabruri, the reason of non-Muslim eagerness to join is that the party has been carrying out social service activities in remote areas for a long time, including in Papua.[170] This may be one of the strategies to brand and expand the voter market segment. However, the choice of Papua, which is a Muslim minority area, as a field to seek sympathy dismissed the assumption of exclusivity that is often pinned to PKS.

Approaching the 2004 elections, PKS launched its political platform with the tagline "Clean, Caring and Professional." in this case, the party even took decisive action, encouraging its legislative candidates to promise to act cleanly or else they would be sanctioned and expelled from the party.[171] This tagline gives rise to the perception that PKS has abandoned its ideology and Islamic tone, becoming more moderate for the pragmatic

[167] Hisyam, Nursaiful, and Sahrudi, *Sepanjang Jalan Dakwah Tifatul Sembiring*, 113–15.
[168] Assyaukanie, *Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia*, 217.
[169] Assyaukanie, 195.
[170] Mabruri, An Interview, June 10, 2024.
[171] "Caleg PKS Berikrar Bersih - Nasional Tempo.Co," accessed July 7, 2024, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/39902/caleg-pks-berikrar-bersih.

purpose of reaching voters on a wider scale.[172] According to Bubalo and Fealy, with religiously neutral language, issues such as anti-corruption, good governance, socio-economic equality and political reform become the PKS's main campaign as manifested in its slogan 'clean and caring.' However, because the party leaders claim that the tagline is based on inspiration from Islamic values, it cannot be said that PKS has abandoned its ideology.[173]

The legislative election results in 2004 showed that PKS increased by about 650 percent. This attracted the attention of observers. Many attribute the increase in votes for PKS, from 1.3 percent to 7.3 percent, to the party's campaign strategy, such as the one mentioned above, which does not appear as Islamic as before.[174] Such an opinion may be factual, but electoral issues are not only related to more moderate campaign matters. Political economy plays a more important role in this matter so the attribution of PKS's success in 2004 is more accurate if it is associated with the ability of the party to expand its political network through the regeneration promoted by the party coupled with the fundraising pattern behind it.

3.6 Conclusion

PKS has made fine adjusments towards political circumstances of Indonesia. This is becoming possible because the party has the basis moderate character to take an alternative stances with regard to its political agency. The effort to adjust with the democracy of Indonesia in post-1998 clearly shows the willingness of the *tarbiyyah* movement to embrace a being within reasonable limits. The party has never imposed a political attitude in ways far beyond the logic of democracy. Conversely, PKS has frequently avoided the closed and rigid interpretation towards religious issues in Indonesia. It openly embraces an alternative point of view to respond the issues regarding Islamic state and law. In sum, the party has been showing its character in necessitating a choice between mutually exclusive possibilities. Therefore, this choice can enable the party to further its development within the political landscape of Indonesia.

In the next chapter, I intend to discuss the approach of PKS in increasing its political legitimacy. The effort done by the party to develop its political poweris inseparrable from the adoption of non-Muslims to be the members of this Islamic party. The transformation

[172] Tanuwidjaja, "PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia," 537.
[173] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?,* 71.
[174] See, Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesian,* 66. Noorhaidi Hasan, "Islamist Party, Electoral Politics and Da'wah Mobilization among Youth: The Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Indonesia," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 6, no. 1 (2012): 3. Shihab and Nugroho, "The Ties That Bind," 239.

the party from PK to PKS illustrates the framework of the party's political struggle in maintaining its Islamism with moderate ways. The adoptive approach of PKS to include and to nominate non-Muslims as the party members or candidate highlight external factors influencing the behavioral and idelogical adjusment of PKS towards the landscape of politics in Indonesia.

CHAPTER IV
THE ADOPTIVE APPROACH OF PKS TO NON-MUSLIM UNDER POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND CONDITION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the development of PKS in embracing inclusivity within the landscape of plural society in Indonesia. It begins with the first basis factors that shape the willingness of the party to hold an accommodative approach in political conditions. This approach proves that PKS has a strategic way in compromising its Islamic ideology manifested in cross-ideological coalitions taken by the party. Local political circumstances serve as the preliminary political learning for PKS to develop its inclusive attitude. This political learning process influences the way PKS maps its electoral position. It thus enables the party to advance the pattern of party institutionalization through the inserting of non-Muslim within the party.

The chapter therefore discusses challenges and opportunities faced by PKS in maintaining its internal cohesiveness because the decision to adopt non-Muslim membership causes a tension within the party. In this regard, it also is critical to elaborate the strategic approach conducted by the party in achieving political incentives of non-Muslim membership. Subsequently, this chapter includes the discussion on how the party parameters and administrates its membership for non-Muslims. In conclusion, this chapter aims to generate the explanation of PKS development from the perspective of its openness towards non-Muslim. The argument of this section is that the adoptive approach of PKS to non-Muslim membership has been in line with the moderation progress of the party.

4.2 Cross-Ideological Coalitions and Local Politics: The Initial Step

When it comes to the 2004 presidential election, PKS faced internal divisions regarding their support for the candidates. The internal party was split into two groups: one supported Amin Rais, who shared the party's ideology but had a lower chance of winning, while the other backed Wiranto, who had a better chance of winning but did not share the same religious or political values.[175] However, the internal disagreement within PKS was swiftly resolved by the *Majelis Syura* (MS)[176] decision to choose a coalition with the

[175] Ahmad Norma Permata, "IDEALISM, PRAGMATISM, OPPORTUNISM: Explaining Islamist Movements in Contemporary Indonesia," *Jurnal Sosiologi Agama* 17, no. 2 (January 9, 2023): 13, https://doi.org/10.14421/jsa.2023.172-05.

[176] It is the deliberative council of the party having the highest authority in decision-making for all external and internal political matters. See, Permata, 225.

National Mandate Party (PAN) in support of Amin Rais as the presidential candidate, with Siswono Yudhohusodo as his running mate. Following their defeat in the first round, the remaining presidential pairs were Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) – Jusuf Kalla (JK) and Megawati – Hasyim Muzadi. Once again, the decision to form a coalition was determined by the MS, whose majority supported SBY-JK. The issue of Islamic law regarding the limitations of female leadership was one of the considerations for PKS to neglect Megawati. Also, PKS wanted for a progressive leadership transition.[177] This instance represents PKS's initial foray into determining its political strategy. The party consistently prioritizes political actions that closely align with its religious values. It resorts to tactical political rationality only when options grounded in religious principles are unavailable.

Having established itself as a significant political force in the legislative and presidential elections, PKS extended its political influence to the regional level. It involves in the competition of gubernatorial elections and other local leadership positions, including regent and mayoral roles. In this context, PKS began to experience local politics, which presents a different atmosphere compared to national politics. Just as at the national level, where there were calls for reform to elect the president directly, there were also demands for political decentralization. The public desired the direct election of regional leaders, whether governors, regents, or mayors, rather than elections conducted by the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD). This preference arose from concerns that if regional leaders were elected by the DPRD, the central political elite might potentially interfere with local community choices. This demand illustrated the electorate's desire for autonomy in granting power to individuals who would represent local community aspirations.[178] Consequently, Law 32/2004 was enacted to regulate local elections, thereby extending the democratization process to the local political level.

In the evolving political landscape of Indonesia, the strategic decisions of PKS reflect the broader trends of political adaptation and alignment with grassroots aspirations. The party's calculated approach in choosing coalitions and candidates underscores its commitment to maintaining ideological purity. It also, to some extent, shows the way PKS

[177] Hisyam, Nursaiful, and Sahrudi, *Sepanjang Jalan Dakwah Tifatul Sembiring*, 133–36.

[178] M. Ryaas Rasyid, "Regional Autonomy and Local Politics in Indonesia," in *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation*, ed. Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, Books and Monographs (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, 2003), 65, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/local-power-and-politics-in-indonesia/regional-autonomy-and-local-politics-in-indonesia/4CEF8A2FA7354911E064F4608323C8F1.

navigating the pragmatic realities of electoral politics.[179] This balancing act is particularly evident in the context of regional elections, where the stakes and dynamics differ significantly from national contests. The shift towards direct elections for regional leaders, formalized by Law 32/2004, marked a significant step in Indonesia's democratization process. This law responded to public demands for greater political decentralization and local autonomy, aiming to reduce central elite interference and ensure that regional leaders more accurately represent local communities' aspirations. As PKS engaged in these local contests, it had to adapt its strategies to the unique challenges and opportunities of regional politics, further solidifying its role as a versatile political actor within Indonesia's democratic framework. This strategic maneuvering at both national and local levels illustrates the broader objective of PKS in influencing governance.

The impact of decentralization has been significant on the patterns of local political coalitions. It has been resulting in the alignment of national political coalitions corresponding with local coalition dynamics. This condition has rendered the relationships between political parties at the regional leadership level highly fluid. It is entirely possible for dominant parties in specific regions to refrain from forming coalitions with other parties, even if they have consistent national partners. Moreover, parties allied at the national level may find themselves in opposition at the local level. Additionally, a political party might very well align with another party, whether local or national, that lacks national political strength. This fluid political process significantly impacts PKS, particularly in terms of how the party strategizes for local elections by building coalitions, or maintaining the status quo when PKS is the leading party in a region. Notably, one of the intriguing aspects of PKS is its willingness to form coalitions with secular-nationalist and even non-Muslim parties in local politics.

The flexibility of local political dynamics shapes the attitude of political parties in terms of the rationale for building coalitions. According to Park (2023), considerations of local political conditions are important factors determining support for political Islam.[180] The ambition of PKS to achieve greater electoral strength is a key aspect of the party's engagement in Indonesia's democratic political dynamics. The table below clearly

[179] Michael Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in The Context of Decentralized Institutions: The Behavior of Indonesia's Prosperous Justice Party in National and Local Politics," *Party Politics* 19, no. 2 (March 2013): 218, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068812462933.

[180] Jung Hoon Park, "Localised Impacts on Islamist Political Mobilisation in Indonesia: Evidence from Three Sub-Provincial Units," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 54, no. 3 (October 2023): 450, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463423000474.

illustrates that the party's stance in forming political coalitions is driven by the potential for easier electoral victories. Consequently, ideological coalitions are less frequently pursued by PKS, given the superior strength of secular-nationalist parties at most local levels. This local political landscape likely serves as the foundation for PKS to subsequently embrace the possibility of inclusive politics within regional communities.

Table 4.1 PKS coalitions in local executive head elections, 2005–2008

	Absolute	Percentage
Gubernatorial Elections		
Coalition with secular-nationalist parties	23	69.7
Coalition with Islamist parties	2	6.1
PKS single nominations	1	3.0
n.a.	7	21.2
Total	33	100
District Head and Mayor Elections		
Coalition with secular-nationalist parties	115	63.9
Coalition with Islamist parties	4	2.2
PKS single nominations	5	2.8
n.a.	56	31.1
Total	180	100

Source: Buehler's calculation based on JPPR and party internal documents[181]

In the 2005 local elections, besides forming coalitions with nationalist parties such as PDI-P and Golkar, PKS also established a local political coalition with the Christian-oriented Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, or PDS) during the regent election in Boyolali. This was a small move but significant to show early signs of the willingness of PKS to formally collaborate with non-Muslims in the political arena within a pluralistic society. Despite being a coalition at the district level, the daily newspaper Kompas highlighted this event in a special report on August 1, 2005, titled "PKS Practices Pluralism in Local Elections, Including Coalition with PDS."[182] Although the PKS-PDS coalition might be considered a minor case, it represented a critical juncture for PKS,

[181] Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions," 218.

[182] Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesian*, 215.

establishing a foundational precedent for the party's future political coalition strategies within the broader political landscape.

PKS implements a pattern of expanding support that crosses the boundaries of ideology, history and socio-political identification which has been a fence between existing political forces. PKS is a big party that enters the camp, all programmatic matches. The program offered by PKS departs from the image of a clean party, free of corruption and is an ideal representation for political progress because it also carries diversity. Even so, PKS is still very closed in political regeneration and candidate selection. The desired political game is to get as many sources of political support as possible by embracing voters from various circles, but still maintaining the oligarchy and clientelist relations of the party.[183] This characteristic shows that on the one hand, PKS is pragmatic, but on the other hand it still maintains the party's political line. Such a programmatic match-all pattern basically only thickens the line of pragmatism and opportunism.

Even though PKS uses an Islamic ideology or political line as the background of its platform, the party opens up the widest possible opportunities with various kinds of program agendas that often collide with each other.[184] According to Buehler, the central party board of PKS shows moderation over time at national and local scale. It has adapted its stance on Pancasila, the role of women, and membership inclusivity, allowing non-tarbiyah Muslims and non-Muslims to join. In local politics, PKS branches have formed coalitions with secular-nationalist and other faith-based parties, and have nominated diverse candidates, including military personnel and figures from the entertainment industry. Despite these inclusive practices, PKS has not pursued more radical local politics, as evidenced by the limited adoption of sharia regulations in regions where the party has political influence.[185] The political compromises undertaken by PKS at the local level appear to be an initial step towards broader concessions, including the recruitment of non-Muslims into the party, as a strategy to enhance its political legitimacy.

4.3 The Pattern of PKS in Attracting non-Muslim

The primary objective of recruiting party members is to increase membership numbers. However, according to Heidar's theory of political parties, there are two

[183] Andreas Ufen and Dirk Tomsa, "Party Politics in Southeast Asia," n.d., 32.

[184] M. Faishal Aminuddin and Moh. Fajar Shodiq Ramadlan, "Match-All Party: Pragmatisme Politik dan Munculnya Spesies Baru Partai Politik di Indonesia Pasca Pemilu 2009," *Jurnal Politik* 1, no. 1 (August 1, 2015): 9–10, https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v1i1.9.

[185] Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions," 220.

additional goals: seeking *internal legitimacy* and enhancing *electoral legitimacy*.[186] The former involves creating internal party solidarity by incorporating individuals who share the same ideological commitment. The latter aims to provide voters with a sense of representation, whether social or cultural, through party membership. Regarding PKS's policy of including non-Muslims in the party's political activities, a pertinent question arises: to what extent does PKS position itself in achieving these two recruitment goals? Is it feasible for PKS, as an Islamist party, to pursue internal legitimacy by recruiting non-Muslim personnel, or does the inclusion of non-Muslims primarily relate to the pursuit of pragmatic electoral legitimacy?

When PKS first emerged as an Islamist political party under the name Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK), its initial popularity was deeply rooted in its Islamic identity politics. During this formative period, the presence of non-Muslims within PKS likely stemmed from a strategic need for internal legitimacy. This was particularly significant given the party's focus on consolidating its base among devout Muslim constituents. At that time, PKS did not field any non-Muslim candidates for legislative elections, resulting in limited electoral appeal among non-Muslim voters. Consequently, efforts to target non-Muslim voters were not prioritized by PKS. However, the political landscape and regulatory framework governing political parties in Indonesia necessitated a shift in PKS's approach. Mandatory regulations required political parties to demonstrate inclusivity and openness in their membership.

Faced with these legislative mandates, PKS found itself in a position where embracing non-Muslim members could enhance both its internal coherence and broader electoral appeal. By welcoming Indonesian citizens regardless of their religious identity, PKS could pursue dual objectives: bolstering its internal legitimacy and enhancing its electoral viability. This strategy aligns with the broader trend observed in Islamist parties worldwide, where the inclusion of diverse groups within the party structure serves to project a more moderate and inclusive image. According to Hamayotsu (2011), such inclusivity is crucial for Islamist parties seeking to transition from fringe movements to mainstream political entities.[187] Furthermore, the need for inclusivity is underscored by Aspinall and Mietzner (2010), who highlight that political parties in Indonesia must

[186] Heidar, "Party Membership and Participation," 305.

[187] Kikue Hamayotsu, "The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 43, no. 4 (November 2013): 14, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.780471.

navigate a pluralistic society and cater to a diverse electorate to maintain relevance and electoral success.[188]

In conclusion, PKS's initial reluctance to prioritize non-Muslim voters gradually evolved in response to external regulatory pressures and the strategic imperatives of political inclusivity. This evolution underscores the dynamic nature of political strategies employed by Islamist parties as they seek to balance ideological commitments with pragmatic considerations of electoral success. In addition to its cadre development programs, PKS expanded its political network by branding itself through community service activities. The party frequently organized social welfare initiatives, such as emergency aid for flood and fire victims, mobile health clinics, and other similar services. According to Bubalo and Fealy, this is a unique characteristic of PKS that sets it apart from other parties, earning it a reputation for genuine social concern.[189] These service programs were not limited to urban areas; PKS also extended its outreach to remote regions like Papua, despite these areas being predominantly non-Muslim. Mabruri recounts that long before PKS declared itself an open party, the residents of the Central Highlands in Papua sympathized with PKS's social services, which led them to express a desire to establish a party branch in the region. This desire eventually materialized in 2009. The strategic community engagement initiatives by PKS highlight its innovative approach to fostering broad-based support across diverse demographic groups.

> We visited the Central Papua Highlands, specifically the slopes of the Jaya Wijaya Mountains, for the inauguration of the newly established DPD PKS branch. The declaration and inauguration ceremony took place in a large field. To get there, we had to charter a Susi Air plane, which could only accommodate 12 passengers. Upon arrival, Tifatul and I were welcomed by the newly appointed officials. However, I was instructed not to publicize the event at that time due to its sensitivity within the party. Interestingly, all the PKS officials in that region were Christians. They wore shorts and PKS blazers during the inauguration ceremony, which took place in an open field. The prayer for the event was led by a pastor.[190]

The establishment of a PKS branch in the Papua province represents a strategic effort by PKS to seek political legitimacy among non-Muslims. This initiative, driven by the local

[188] Edward Aspinall and Marcus Mietzner, eds., *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions, and Society*, Indonesia Update Series (Indonesia Update Conference, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010).

[189] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*, 72.

[190] Mabruri, An Interview.

non-Muslim community's desire, enabled PKS to simultaneously achieve both *internal* and *electoral* legitimacies. By establishing a branch in a predominantly non-Muslim area, PKS could attract a broader base of non-Muslim sympathizers. The local political context in these areas plays a crucial role in shaping the composition of the party's branch. This move not only reflects PKS's adaptability and willingness to engage with diverse communities but also underscores its broader strategy of expanding its political influence beyond its traditional Muslim base. By doing so, PKS demonstrates a pragmatic approach to coalition-building and voter engagement, which could potentially enhance its overall political standing and electoral success. This example highlights the importance of local political dynamics in the party's expansion strategy and its efforts to foster inclusivity within its ranks.

According to Bubalo and Fealy, PKS epitomizes a true cadre party, drawing parallels with the Muslim Brotherhood network in Egypt. [191] When PKS branches are staffed or even led by non-Muslim cadres, the strategy for expanding the party's network is determined by the respective PKS leadership. Hidayat Nur Wahid notes that as a cadre party, PKS remains selective in choosing and accepting non-Muslims, adhering to its established cadre recruitment mechanisms.[192] Consequently, even though PKS leaders in predominantly non-Muslim regions possess political autonomy in recruiting party members, the overarching guidelines for membership selection will consistently align with the party's broader framework. This careful balancing act ensures that while local branches can adapt to their unique contexts and leverage local dynamics, they still operate within the parameters set by the central party organization. This structured yet flexible approach allows PKS to maintain its core identity and principles while engaging with a diverse and pluralistic electorate, thereby strengthening its political legitimacy and expanding its influence across different demographic segments.

[191] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?*, 71.
[192] Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid.

Figure 4.1 A non-Muslim woman in the party executive expert council

Source: The official website of PKS[193]

In addition to gathering party members through its local branches, PKS also recruits non-Muslims to serve in central leadership positions. However, these non-Muslim recruits typically occupy roles that are not considered strategically significant. For instance, non-Muslim individuals are often placed in positions with secondary policy-making authority. An example is Evalina Heryanti, a Christian woman appointed by PKS as an expert council member in the field of sports.[194] Similarly, Soleman Nd Ayi, a Protestant pastor, was recruited by PKS as an expert council member in the field of religion. I have an opportunity to interview Soleman and ask him about the way he is interested in joining to PKS.

Although the positions of Heryanti and Soleman are not strategically influential, the inclusion of non-Muslim experts in PKS projects an image of the party at the central level as a party that exhibits a considerable degree of openness and tolerance towards diversity. This recruitment strategy not only enhances the party's internal legitimacy but also sends a positive signal to the broader public, indicating the willingness to embrace a pluralistic approach in the organizational structure of PKS. Such actions contribute to fostering an

[193] "PKS - Evalina Heryanti, Perempuan Kristiani Pakar Olimpiade Gabung Dewan Pakar PKS," accessed July 10, 2024, https://pks.id/content/evalina-heryanti-perempuan-kristiani-pakar-olimpiade-gabung-dewan-pakar-pks.

[194] Liputan6.com, "Sosok Evalina Heryanti, Perempuan Non-muslim yang Dilantik Jadi Anggota Dewan Pakar PKS," liputan6.com, January 26, 2022, https://www.liputan6.com/news/read/4870461/sosok-evalina-heryanti-perempuan-non-muslim-yang-dilantik-jadi-anggota-dewan-pakar-pks.

inclusive image of the party, aligning with its broader objectives of political expansion and societal acceptance.

The recruitment methods employed by PKS for Heryanti and Soleman significantly differ from each other. Heryanti was recruited due to her expertise and extensive experience in data analysis and the field of the Olympics. Conversely, Soleman's entry into PKS stemmed from an initial offer to become a regional legislative candidate in NTT (East Nusa Tenggara). However, due to insufficient preparation for this role, Soleman was eventually appointed as an expert council member in the field of religion. Initially, PKS nominated Soleman in response to aspirations from non-Muslim PKS cadres in NTT, who wanted Soleman to be a regional legislative candidate.[195] However, this candidacy was ultimately transferred to his colleague, as Soleman was still residing in Jakarta. The strategic considerations behind these appointments highlight PKS's adaptive approach to recruiting individuals with specific skill sets and meeting the local aspirations of its cadres, thereby reinforcing the party's inclusive and pragmatic strategies in broadening its political base and enhancing its legitimacy across different demographics.

In conclusion, non-Muslims enter PKS through diverse mechanisms. Those appointed as representatives of PKS in predominantly non-Muslim regions such as Papua, NTT, and Bali join the party through a mechanism aimed at expanding the party's infrastructure. According to Mabruri, PKS branches in non-Muslim areas were established from the grassroots level, driven by local community sympathy towards the party, leading to aspirations for PKS to establish branches in those regions. From these foundations, there are instances where the aspirations of non-Muslim PKS members in these areas encourage the nomination of specific individuals, often non-Muslims, to run in regional legislative elections.[196] This pattern represents a political strategy aimed at achieving internal legitimacy. On the other hand, the quest for electoral legitimacy is illustrated by the case of Soleman, who is now an expert council member at PKS's central level. Initially, he was put forward as a legislative candidate in the NTT electoral district.[197] These recruitment patterns reflect the strategic efforts pf the party to balance internal cohesion with broader electoral appeal. Those are also enhancing the party's legitimacy and representation across different demographic segments.

[195] Soleman, An Interview with Soleman Nd Ayi, June 8, 2024.
[196] Mabruri, An Interview.
[197] Soleman, An Interview with Soleman Nd Ayi.

4.4 PKS Internal Factionalism on Inserting non-Muslim

PKS is not immune to internal conflicts despite its reputation for institutional solidity strengthened by rigorous grassroots cadre training through *tarbiyyah*. The tension between upholding ideology and addressing practical political interests has been a primary factor in the emergence of internal discord within the party. There are two divisions between two factions: (1) those who were resistant to change, and (2) those who are adaptive to political developments. According to Bubalo and Fealy, PKS's inner circles can be categorized into 'ideologues' and 'pragmatists.' [198] The ideologues emphasize the importance of maintaining the Islamic elements derived from Brotherhood teachings, arguing that creating a new type of society in Indonesia requires adherence to Islamic norms and values. They contend that accommodating non-Islamic teachings and guidelines endangers the party's foundational mission. In contrast, the pragmatists argue that for PKS to effect change in Indonesia, it must gain power and support from the political mainstream. For pragmatists, the party's rigid adherence to a strict Islamic ideology disadvantages its political prospects and position.

The seeds of internal differences within PKS essentially emerged when the party chose to form a coalition with SBY after the PAN-PKS coalition failed to secure a victory for the Amien-Yudhoyono ticket in the first round of the 2004 elections. Facing the second round, PKS experienced internal indecision between continuing to compete without supporting either SBY or Megawati. Tomsa (2012) argued that this initial internal split marked the beginning of the division between the party's pragmatic and idealistic factions.[199] The role of the party elites at the MS level was crucial in resolving these internal differences, ultimately leading to the significant political decision to support SBY. This marked the first time PKS formed a coalition with nationalist parties on a national scale.[200] This also indicated that the pragmatic faction within PKS was more dominant than the idealistic faction, with access to power being prioritized over idealistic goals. Hasan (2017) noted that the objections from PKS members and sympathizers to the party's decision to form coalitions with secular parties, and even with a Christian party like PDS, constituted "the most heated debate" within PKS. In response to such conflicts, PKS intensified its

[198] Bubalo and Fealy, *Joining the Caravan?,* 64.
[199] Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia," 492.
[200] "PKS Resmi Dukung SBY-Kalla," detiknews, accessed July 9, 2024, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-198085/pks-resmi-dukung-sby-kalla.

cadre training activities at the grassroots level[201] to manage the discontent among its members and sympathizers.

In its coalition policy, PKS has essentially developed its own concept of Islamic politics. For the party, types of political coalitions are divided into three categories. The first is the ideological coalition, which is paramount and determined by a comprehensive ideological alignment. This type of coalition is not intended for cooperation with other parties but rather with societal groups or organizations that share PKS's background, namely tarbiyah. The second category is the strategic coalition, meaning that PKS joins forces with groups whose ideologies have a significant level of similarity. An example of this is when PKS allied with the Islamic Central Axis parties in the 1999 elections or formed a coalition with PAN, which also has an Islamic ideological base, during the first round of the 2004 elections. The third category is the tactical coalition, which involves collaborating with other political parties that have similar steps and political agendas as PKS, such as nominating leadership candidates at the regional level, and so on. This last type of coalition can be established with any party, whether Islamist or non-Islamic, provided that it does not violate Islamic law.[202]

The dynamic disagreement between the ideologues and pragmatists within PKS revolves around fundamentally different perspectives on the role of morality in politics. Tomsa[203] notes that for the idealists, such as Abu Ridho, Daud Rasyid, and Mashadi, participation in electoral politics and entering the government cabinet would inevitably lead PKS into political compromises and moral degradation. These idealists argue that the essence of PKS as an Islamic party should remain pure and untainted by the often corrupt and morally ambiguous nature of political power plays. They believe that engaging too deeply in the political system could dilute the party's religious principles and mission, thereby weakening its ideological foundation and alienating its core supporters. Conversely, the pragmatists within PKS, represented by Anis Matta and Fahri Hamzah and supported by the influential Hilmi Aminuddin, argue for a more flexible and strategic approach. They contend that active participation in the political arena, including forming alliances and entering the cabinet, is crucial for PKS to gain practical political experience and increase its competitiveness. This faction believes that political engagement is necessary for the party to effect real change and implement its policies on a broader scale.

[201] Hasan, "NEW HORIZON OF READING ISLAM AND POLITICS," 308.

[202] Suhud Alynudin et al., *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Menjawab Tudingan Dan Fitnah*, ed. Mochamad Bugi (Jakarta: Pustaka SAKSI, 2004), 27–29.

[203] Tomsa, "Moderating Islamism in Indonesia," 492.

According to the pragmatists, such involvement does not necessarily contradict the party's da'wah (missionary) character. Instead, they argue that it provides a platform to promote Islamic values within the government and society.

Criticism from party sympathizers regarding the decision to accept non-Muslims began as early as 2004. As Machmudi reported,[204] the email of PKS, partai-keadilan-sejahtera@yahoogroups.com, was inundated with questions and criticisms in March 2004. Those inboxes were concerning the party's decision to appoint non-Muslims as members of the PKS leadership in Papua Province and as legislative candidates. The primary concern was that this policy did not align with the teachings of the Prophet and early Muslim predecessors. The main argument presented by the sympathizers cited the Qur'an, stating, "Let not the believers take disbelievers as allies rather than believers. And whoever [of you] does that has nothing [i.e., no association] with Allah, except when taking precaution against them in prudence. And Allah warns you of Himself, and to Allah is the [final] destination." In other words, they argued that appointing non-Muslims meant demanding allegiance to disbelievers, which starkly contradicts the teachings of the Prophet.

In the political discourse of 2008, the notion of PKS becoming an open party to non-Muslims emerged as a significant issue, intensifying internal debates within the party. Some party elites and candidates questioned the concept of an open party, expressing concerns about how the party would maintain control over candidates admitted through such openness, the potential for non-Muslim leadership within the party, and the possibility that religious values might be diminished by this inclusivity.[205] The younger faction, led by Anis Matta at the time, came under scrutiny from party elites for too aggressively promoting this discourse, which had not yet become an official decision. Tifatul Sembiring faced protests during his tour in Aceh, where PKS sympathizers threatened to withdraw their support if the party adopted an open stance. Sembiring subsequently clarified that the openness was merely a discourse proposed by PKS branches in minority regions such as Papua, NTT, and Bali. The party leadership found themselves struggling to clarify this information, even resorting to public statements in the mass media.[206]

Although the discourse on becoming an open party did not become an official decision in 2008, two years later, PKS held its second National Conference (Munas) at the Ritz Carlton Hotel in Jakarta. One of the key discussions during this meeting was the

[204] Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesian*, 199.
[205] Shihab and Nugroho, "The Ties That Bind," 243.
[206] "Isu Partai Terbuka, Gejolak Kaum Muda di PKS," detiknews, 2008, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-892122/isu-partai-terbuka-gejolak-kaum-muda-di-pks.

mechanism for including non-Muslim members in the PKS organizational structure. The debate over allowing non-Muslims to hold party positions was contentious, but the PKS elite members in the MS who opposed this inclusion were not in the majority.[207] In this context, PKS experienced internal uncertainty regarding its legitimacy when incorporating elements of other religions into its party structure. However, the significant presence of non-Muslims within PKS at the time—many of whom had successfully become PKS legislative representatives at the regional level—and the increasing number of PKS branches in non-Muslim areas made the party's commitment to openness more resolute. Ultimately, PKS decided that while the party would maintain its Islamic cadre development mechanism, non-Muslim party officials would not be required to take an oath of allegiance (*bai'at*) but would instead pledge loyalty to the party.[208] PKS elites likely felt more confident in this approach, especially since the party's vote share increased from 7.34% in the 2004 elections to 7.89% in the 2009 elections, following the National Working Meeting (Mukernas) in Bali.

However, the increasingly confident stance of the PKS elite was not without the risk of internal conflict. Beyond the debates among the elites, the grassroots of PKS experienced turmoil following the 2010 National Conference (Munas). Criticism emerged through articles on grassroots PKS websites, with some arguing that the party's mission as a da'wah party had ended with the second National Conference at the Ritz Carlton Hotel.[209] Other critiques compared PKS to the syndrome experienced by Amin Rais when he founded a new party based on secular principles, viewing Islamic principles as too constraining.[210] The issue of party cadres threatening to leave due to PKS's perceived loss of Islamic identity also gained traction.[211] Alongside this internal tension, PKS's image deteriorated further when one of its leaders, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, was implicated in a corruption case

[207] "Munas II PKS Bahas Kemungkinan Non Muslim Jadi Pengurus Partai," detiknews, June 16, 2010, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1379722/munas-ii-pks-bahas-kemungkinan-non-muslim-jadi-pengurus-partai.

[208] "PKS Tak Akan Baiat Warga Non Muslim yang Jadi Pengurus," detiknews, June 18, 2010, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-1381314/pks-tak-akan-baiat-warga-non-muslim-yang-jadi-pengurus.

[209] Mashadi and Mohammad Fatih, "Segala Cita-Cita Berakhir di Ritz Carlton," Eramuslim, June 21, 2010, https://www.eramuslim.com/berita/opini/segalanya-berakhir-di-the-ritz-carlton/.

[210] Abu Zahra, "PKS Terjangkit Sindrom Kekecilan Baju - VOA-ISLAM.COM," June 28, 2010, http://www.voa-islam.com/read/suaraislam/2010/06/28/7522/pks-terjangkit-sindrom-kekecilan-baju/.

[211] Sigit Pranowo, "Tinggalkan Islam, PKS Ditinggalkan Para Kadernya - VOA-ISLAM.COM," April 14, 2011, http://www.voa-islam.com/read/tweaking/2011/04/14/14163/tinggalkan-islam-pks-ditinggalkan-para-kadernya/;

involving the Ministry of Agriculture in 2013.[212] The disappointment among the grassroots and the corruption scandal likely contributed to PKS's decline in vote share, dropping to 6.77% in the 2014 elections.

Figure 4.2 The effort of PKS to reemphasize Islamic Ideology



Source: https://pks.id/

Experiencing a decline in vote share in the 2014 elections likely prompted PKS elites to reassess the tensions within the grassroots. In 2015, the party held its fourth National Conference (Munas) under the theme of reaffirming the position of PKS as a political party based on Islamic principles.[213] This theme was likely chosen to restore confidence among the grassroots members, who had been critical of the party's policies perceived as threatening its Islamic ideological mission. Despite the conflicts, the institutional mechanisms of the party for conflict resolution are noteworthy and arguably among the best compared to other parties. Tanuwidjaja argued that PKS's ability to maintain party solidity amidst internal conflict stems from its strategy of isolating the effects of conflict exposure and finding ways to maintain solidarity through reconciliation.[214] This approach mirrors the commitment PKS to internal cohesion and its ability to navigate ideological and strategic differences while preserving the party's foundational values. The emphasis on reaffirming Islamic principles during the 2015 Munas was a strategic move to address

[212] "Luthfi Hasan Disebut Terbukti Terima Suap - Nasional Tempo.Co," accessed July 9, 2024, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/535925/luthfi-hasan-disebut-terbukti-terima-suap.

[213] "PKS | Munas ke-4, Teguhkan PKS sebagai Partai Berasas Islam," PKS Design, accessed July 9, 2024, http://pks.id/design/munas-ke-4-teguhkan-pks-sebagai-partai-berasas-islam.

[214] Tanuwidjaja, "PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia," 541–42.

internal discontent and reassert the party's core identity, aiming to align both elite and grassroots members under a unified ideological framework.

Additionally, unresolved internal conflicts within PKS often culminate in deliberations by the *Majelis Syuro* (MS). To maintain internal coherence, PKS has implemented a policy of expulsion for any member, regardless of their position within the party, who engages in defiance of party regulations. This policy was notably applied to the factions led by Anis Matta and Fahri Hamzah, who, according to senior PKS members, frequently violated party rules. Hidayat Nur Wahid emphasized that the numerous violations committed by this group warranted their expulsion, clarifying that their departure from PKS was not voluntary but enforced. Nur Wahid denied that this expulsion was connected to the open party issue of 2008.[215] Subsequently, the expelled group founded a new party named Gelora.[216] Although Nur Wahid negated any link between the expulsion of Anis Matta and Fahri Hamzah's faction and the 2008 open party issue, the connection remains evident. Mabruri revealed that "They have already formed a new party, called Gelora, so there is no longer any conflict. They felt that their vision for an open party was not accommodated. In reality, it was not about being unaccommodated, but rather a matter of poor timing."[217] This statement underscores the underlying tensions and the perceived lack of alignment between the expelled faction's ideas and the broader party's strategic direction.

Given the presence of PKS branches in non-Muslim regions, with local leadership often dominated by non-Muslims, the party requires strong internal cohesion to maintain its internal legitimacy. Therefore, it is not surprising that tensions within PKS regarding its openness must be addressed by the elites through educating grassroots cadres and constructing narratives based on Islamic law to reinforce legitimacy among members of the party. The resolution of internal factionalism within PKS hinges on the party's ability to reconcile ideological purity with pragmatic political engagement, ensuring that its core values are upheld while adapting to the diverse political landscape of Indonesia. This balance is crucial for PKS to sustain its relevance and unity in the face of internal and external challenges.

[215] Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid.

[216] "Anis Matta Akui Gelora Lahir Karena Konflik Internal PKS," accessed July 9, 2024, https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20191110171314-32-447092/anis-matta-akui-gelora-lahir-karena-konflik-internal-pks.

[217] Mabruri, An Interview.

4.5 Crafting Policy toward Non-Muslim Membership

To manage non-Muslim membership within the party, PKS has decided to uphold a kind of limited *internal legitimacy*. It does not require non-Muslim members to state the two sentences of *syahadat* that are a sign of a person who converts to the religion of Islam. Even the former president of PKS, Luthfi Hasan Ishaq, emphasized that since the presence of non-Muslim members in 1999 within the party, PKS had never wanted non-Muslims to embrace Islam.[218] This policy implied an attempt of PKS to politically engage non-Islam persons in the party's structure without producing problems for them. On the one hand, the party wanted its Islamic political legitimacy to increase through non-Muslim involvement within the party. On the other, the party has no ways to forcing others to divest their personal social and political rights.

Such a policy has a very important role in maintaining the convenience of non-Muslims to express their exclusive political rights within the PKS. For example, non-Muslims in Papua who joined PKS were initially hesitant to join this Islamic party. However, because the openness of PKS reveals political opportunities for these non-Muslim citizens, they are finally confident and comfortable to join the party.[219] These non-Muslims are therefore free to fight for the non-Muslim communities they represent. In addition, they are also possible to achieve the highest position in the PKS branch where they are located, for example, competing to become the chairman of PKS at the provincial or district level.

[218] Okezone, "Pengurus PKS Tak Perlu Ucapkan Syahadat : Okezone News," https://news.okezone.com/, June 18, 2010, https://news.okezone.com/read/2010/06/18/339/344199/pengurus-pks-tak-perlu-ucapkan-syahadat.

[219] "PKS - Keluarganya Penginjil, Ketua PKS Papua Pegunungan: Saya tidak Harus Pindah Agama," accessed July 16, 2024, https://pks.id/content/keluarganya-penginjil-ketua-pks-papua-pegunungan-saya-tidak-harus-pindah-agama.

Figure 4.3 Non-Muslims of the PKS local branch from Papua

Source: https://pks.id/

The party seems to have no problem with non-Muslim leadership at the branch level. However, it seems impossible that PKS would give non-Muslim leadership positions at the party central level. This is a local political policy of PKS that reflects the dynamic trend of electoral competition in local politics. Limiting non-Muslim leadership at the level of non-Muslim majority regional branches will make PKS there politically weak because the representation of local communities intervened by the central PKS is very likely to be a problem for the party. In this regard the party always maintain the concept of political collaboration to reflect their political stance toward non-Muslim existence within PKS.[220] This collaborative policy is important to balance the position of PKS as an Islamic party that is open to other religions in terms of the same political vision.

PKS also wants its policy as an open Islamic party to teach religious moderation to non-Muslim communities.[221] Through such political education, PKS seems to want to highlight its position as part of the religious moderation movement in Indonesia. The party thus has the legitimacy to say that the PKS has been a party that has involved itself in religious moderation and is not an Islamist party that has been affected by religious moderation policies. This may be the result of the stigma that has been embedded by the general public that PKS was initially not moderate and then altered to moderate itself due to the stigma. On a broader scale, PKS seems to guarantee that if the party comes to power,

[220] Mabruri, An Interview.
[221] Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid.

an open and tolerant attitude towards people of other religions will become the leadership character of PKS at the national level.

But behind all these policies, PKS appears not to allow non-Muslims to become a dominant figure in Muslim-majority areas. According Pipin Sopian, a young popular PKS cadre, the party maintained a proportional policy in accepting non-Muslim leadership in which voters' political preferences should be accommodated. Sopian emphasized that there are four types of voters, namely: ideologues, rational, emotional and pragmatic. All of these types shape PKS to decide its proportional accommodation toward voters' context with regard to the number of majority voters.[222] Put differently, PKS would only accept non-Muslim leadership in the area where non-Muslims are the majority. This proportional policy toward non-Muslim leadership highlights the PKS's limited stance toward democracy in which the party still maintained majoritarian superiority above democracy.

However, PKS underscores that as long as non-Muslim leaders have the integrity to become regional candidates, the party will always accept them in their local politics. According to Mardani Ali Sera, an elite figure of PKS, this is in line with the concept of "Island of Integrity" upheld by the party.[223] In this regard, it is understandable that PKS would and would not accept non-Muslim leadership depending on the local context where the party operates. The case of the PKS rejection to accept Ahok in the Jakarta gubernatorial election of 2017 was arguably in line with such concept. PKS might see Ahok as not having integrity as his doing blasphemy toward Islam. [224]

Making such a vague policy has enabled PKS to coherence the unity of the party. It is reflecting an alternative way of political Islam that is beneficial to preserve the party's *internal* and *electoral* legitimacies. Here, Indonesia's local political context gives PKS a flexible opportunity to exercise a contextual political approach that in line with the competition condition. Either in terms of limiting or legitimizing non-Muslim leadership in the regions are two policies that seem to strengthen the position of PKS as an open Islamic party. For example, when PKS faces a narrative challenge that corners PKS regarding its Islamic exclusivity, the party can easily show its rebuttal by referencing PKS's

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[222] *PKS Partai Islam, Terbuka Dukung Pemimpin Non-Muslim, Emang Bener? #Diatalks Eps 7* (Jakarta, 2023), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TsaVxUeJ-k.

[223] Mardani Ali Sera, PKS Ingin Non-Muslim Juga Dapat Haknya, September 14, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wyErd5dDjak.

[224] Bilal Ramdhan, "Dugaan Penistaan Agama Ahok, PKS: Pemimpin Yang Tak Bijak," Republika Online, October 10, 2016, https://republika.co.id/berita/nasional/pilkada/16/10/10/oetku0330-dugaan-penistaan-agama-ahok-pks-pemimpin-yang-tak-bijak.

openness in non-Muslim areas. Conversely, if PKS would maintain Islamic majoritarian superiority in certain local elections by not accommodating non-Muslims in Muslim-majority areas, the Islamic legitimacy of the party would be more consolidated among Muslim voters therefore positioning the party in a political advantage.

One important to emphasize is that the policy to restrict the requirements for non-Muslim members is an effort to cohere the party structure. This effort functions as a modest way to increase the party members. The attempt to open up the party should consider its ideological line so the party have to differentiate its recruitment between cadre recruitments and others. Here, Anis Matta named the party's effort to open the door for non-Muslims or other non-tarbiyyah persons as "political recruitment."[225] This recruitment pattern differs from the main cadre recruitment of PKS which normally uses the method of *tarbiyyah*. Although this seems to have a sense of dysconnectivity within the organizational structure of PKS, it serves a system to maintain the ideological coherence of PKS.

The term ideological coherence refers to the issue of consensus and or disagreement within a party or organization. Kenneth Janda (1980) eloquently defined coherence as "the degree of congruence in the attitudes and behavior of party members" and stressed the importance of understanding a disagreement within a political party, and how the discrepancy expressed in intraparty politics. One of important variables of party coherence, in Janda's theorization, is "ideological factionalism" where "a party is assumed to lose coherence as its energies are dissipated in factional conflict."[226] Accordingly, when a political party is able to maintain the degree of cohesiveness in its internal factionalism, either affecting to individual incoherence or not, it is ideologically coherent.

PKS has attempted to create a conducive organizational structure by giving non-Muslim members the freedom to join the party without having to convert to Islam. This level of conduciveness is helped by proportional efforts of the party to only prioritize openness to non-Muslims in Muslim-minority areas. The party seems to see that non-Muslim leadership deserves to be given its rights, especially in areas where they are the majority. This effort makes the political organization of PKS ideologically coherent even though the existence of other identities within the party seems to create a line of difference. Between Muslims and non-Muslims in the party's institution lies a sense of religious diversity and political unity at the same time.

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[225] Hwang, "When Parties Swing," 670.

[226] Kenneth Janda, *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey* (New York: Free Press, 1980), 118.

4.6 Conclusion

Political circumstances of Indonesia after the reformation era have shaping the way of PKS increased its electoral power by accommodating non-Muslim membership within the party. Cross-ideological coalitions with secular-nationalist parties are the initial stage of PKS in opening up itself to plural politics. Those coalitions show how political structures of Indonesia cannot be treated by exclusive attitudes unless Islamic parties such as PKS underestimate the benefit of political incentives and mainstreaming a closed political Islam. In this regard, the local political context of regional areas serves as a map for the party to decide its proportional agenda to openly include non-Muslim as the political agency of PKS. Although this decision has an impact on the internal coherence of PKS, the party has successfully maintained its cohesiveness through the internal-policy making in order to organize "political recruitments" to non-Muslim and non-tarbiyyah persons.

CHAPTER V
BEING AN OPEN PARTY: PRACTICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEGITIMACY OF PKS IN INSERTING NON-MUSLIM

5.1 Introduction

PKS constantly navigates the tension between adapting to the practical realities of politics and maintaining its ideological foundations. Through strategic policy formulation, coalition building, adaptive campaign strategies, pragmatic governance, internal management, public engagement, and long-term planning, they strive to achieve a balance that allows PKS to be both effective in the political arena and accurate to its normative Islamic values. This balancing act is particularly evident in their approach to expanding their membership base to include non-Muslims, a move that underscores the party's commitment to political pragmatism without completely forsaking ideological roots. By incorporating inclusive policies to maintain stringent adherence to Islamic principles in its internal decision-making processes, the party shows the complex interaction between ideology and practical politics.

This intricate behavior not only defines the political identity of PKS but also positions the party uniquely within Indonesia's multifaceted political landscape. It is because PKS must constantly reconcile their religious convictions with the demands of a diverse electorate and a pluralistic society. The necessity to adapt while remaining ideologically coherent poses ongoing challenges and opportunities for PKS. To deal with such dynamics PKS attempts to build kind of legitimacies for its existence as a part of political Islam agency in Indonesia. This reflects broader trends in how Islamist parties worldwide operate within modern democratic frameworks. This dynamic has significant implications for understanding the evolution and operational strategies of Islamic political parties, particularly in contexts where religious and political identities are deeply intertwined.

This chapter elaborates the PKS' interpretation towards pluralistic nature of Indonesian societal structures that led the party to politically behave in accordance with the state religious diversity. It also investigates its commitment to reflecting Islamic ideology while embracing inclusivity by crafting policies that not only uphold Islamic principles but also strategically support the integration of non-Muslim leadership, thereby navigating the delicate balance between religious coherence and pragmatic political engagement in Indonesia's pluralistic society. Explaining how the party construct the religious argument on its decision to embrace non-Muslim membership and candidacy will complement the

discussion of ideological judgment in PKS institutionalization. Also, it elaborates impacts of those interpretation and argumentation on the party campaigns and narratives. Finally, it analyzes how the party manifests its Islamic pragmatism by correlating its transformation as a political party and the decision to adopt non-Muslim membership.

5.2 Acknowledging the Plurality of Indonesia

The terminology of an "open party" encompasses a complex discourse and broad meaning, particularly within the political context of Indonesia. As a nation characterized by diverse religious communities, with regional variables reflecting different religious compositions across areas, political parties in Indonesia incorporate the multicultural nature of Indonesian society as a foundational element in shaping their political ideologies. For national parties, it is evident that they transcend these variables, as their nationalism inherently embodies pluralistic values rooted in the reality of the Indonesian nation. The issue of plurality becomes particularly intriguing when it pertains to the formation of political ideologies in parties whose cultural environments are closely tied to religious identities. This is the reason of mass-based Islamic parties to emerge and ground themselves in their cultural and societal base, such as the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the National Mandate Party (PAN). These parties simultaneously employ Islamic principles and Pancasila as the fundamental philosophy of their political identity.

Given these circumstances, the term "open party" has developed an ambiguous connotation. Some argue that being open entails combining Pancasila as the foundation of the political ideology alongside its cultural and religious principles. Conversely, some parties do not align their Islamic ideology with the state ideology, such as PPP, PBB, and PKS. Herein lies the interpretation that an "open party" not only embraces plurality but also incorporates Pancasila as the political philosophy of the party institution. This is clearly suggesting a shift in terms of ideological structure. However, those parties firmly maintain their independent Islamic ideology. They are treating Pancasila solely as the foundation of the state rather than the basis of the party's political struggle. For PKS, as Hidayat Nur Wahid emphasized, Islam itself is initially an open ideology that is potentially compatible with the political openness of society.[227]

When PKS declared itself as an open party, many assumed that PKS and perhaps other parties following its path, had begun to incorporate Pancasila as their political ideology. However, there were no amendments to the party's statutes when the younger

[227] Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid.

faction of PKS declared this openness. The phrase "Party based on Islam" remained unchanged from its inception through the open declaration and even up to 2021, when PKS updated its logo and anthem.[228] In 2004 and 2008, PKS revised its platform twice. According to Shihab and Nugroho, the difference between the 1999 and 2004 platforms lies in the mention of the foundational principles and the form of the Indonesian state, specifically Pancasila and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), in the latter, albeit without further elaboration. In contrast, the 2008 platform elaborated more extensively on these characteristics, highlighting the party's commitment to the state's ideology.[229] In this context, PKS's commitment to the ideology and form of the state appears more emphasized. However, this did not lead to a change in the party's principles to align with incorporating the state's ideology into PKS's Islamic political philosophy as PKS had always been distinguishing between the state ideology and the party's Islamic principles.

PKS implicitly aims to delineate the boundary between political ideology and state ideology. In other words, PKS acknowledges the political foundation of the state but insists that there is no compromise on its Islamic political ideology, advocating that other parties should also uphold their respective religious ideologies. When PKS leaders are questioned about their Islamic ideology in relation to the inclusion of non-Muslims in the party, the typical initial response highlights the legal and democratic realities in Indonesia, which permit political parties to have diverse ideologies as long as they do not conflict with Pancasila. In an interview, Mabruri explained the rationale behind PKS's openness to non-Muslims: "Since the very beginning PKS has always embraced the concept of Islam as a mercy to all creation (*rahmatan lil alamin*). Additionally, the Political Parties Law does not restrict citizens from joining any party, regardless of their ethnicity or religion. There must be alignment between the party's ideological platform and the country's laws."[230]

This statement reflects the logic of PKS's Islamic ideology, based on the principle of *Rahmatan Lil 'Alamin*, aligning with Indonesia's political party regulations. Consequently, PKS offers its own definition and interpretation of the term "open party," maintaining its distinct perspective.

> "Some interpret "openness" as transforming into something akin to PKB or PAN, parties that shifted their foundations from Islamic to non-Islamic. However,

[228] PKS, "Anggaran Dasar Dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Keadilan Sejahtera" (Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Pengurus Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, August 2021), 3.
[229] Shihab and Nugroho, "The Ties That Bind," 241.
[230] Mabruri, An Interview.

> PKS maintains its Islamic foundation. The openness PKS refers to is within the context of both Islam and Indonesian law. In the context of Indonesian law, all political parties adhere to the same legal framework, the Political Parties Law, which mandates adherence to Pancasila, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), and the 1945 Constitution, as well as requiring open membership to all individuals."[231]

PKS recognizes the realities of democracy and law in Indonesia without framing them in opposition to its Islamic ideology. The party also uses ideas derived from the Quran as legitimacy, asserting its right to define political realities through its normative perspective, independent of Western liberal terminology. Additionally, PKS holds its own worldview regarding the plurality of Indonesian society. On the issue of plurality, PKS again brings its normative perspective, rejecting Western terminology and the concept of pluralism. PKS firmly opposes the Western standard of pluralism. For PKS, as articulated by Tifatul Sembiring, Indonesia should be built on the reality of its diversity without adopting Western ideological constructs. He rejects pluralism as an ideological concept originating from the West, emphasizing instead that Indonesia's diversity should be understood as an existing reality without attributing it to an imported ideology. [232]

Nonetheless, PKS maintains that there has been no change in the status of non-Muslims in Indonesia from the perspective of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) regarding the term "kafir" (disbeliever). Unlike NU, which has developed a *fiqh* perspective that avoids using the term "*kafir*" for non-Muslims in the context of Indonesian citizenship,[233] PKS sees no relevance in altering this term, as it originates from the sacred texts. When NU suggested not using the term "kafir" within the Indonesian context, Hidayat Nur Wahid responded on his social media account with a slightly cynical tone. He stated, "'Kafir' and 'Muslim' are terms originally found in the Quran. There is a surah called Al-Kafirun (the disbelievers) which concludes with a teaching of religious tolerance: 'For you is your religion, and for me is mine.' If 'kafir' is referred to as non-Muslim/Muwathin (citizen), then would Muslims be called non-citizens (non-muwathin)?"[234]

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[231] Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid.

[232] Hisyam, Nursaiful, and Sahrudi, *Sepanjang Jalan Dakwah Tifatul Sembiring*, 346.

[233] "NU Usul Sebutan Kafir Ke Nonmuslim Indonesia Dihapus - Nasional Tempo.Co," accessed July 8, 2024, https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1180643/nu-usul-sebutan-kafir-ke-nonmuslim-indonesia-dihapus.

[234] Hidayat Nur Wahid [@hnurwahid], "'Kafir'&"Muslim"," Tweet, *Twitter*, March 4, 2019, https://x.com/hnurwahid/status/1102391050897784832.

PKS appears to view NU's progressive recommendation through its own lens, strongly committed to preserving religious terminology from being erased. NU, on the other hand, clarifies that their recommendation to avoid using the term "kafir" in the Indonesian context is not intended to remove the term from the foundations of Islam, the Quran, and Hadith. Thus, fundamentally, both NU and PKS agree on retaining the term "kafir" as a legacy of Quranic terminology. The point of divergence lies in the status of non-Muslims within the governance framework. NU is motivated to equalize the position of non-Muslims in terms of citizenship, while PKS appears to adhere to the view that non-Muslims remain a second-class community, consistent with traditional Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Nonetheless, PKS seems to adopt a proportional perspective that, in the context of state practice, non-Muslims are equal, but from a normative-theological standpoint, they remain second-class citizens.

> "Well, the term "kafir" is a religious term. Our holy book says that those who aren't Muslim are called "kafir," meaning disbelievers. But when it comes to national unity, we have concepts like ukhuwah Islamiyah (Islamic brotherhood), ukhuwah wathaniyah (national brotherhood), and ukhuwah basyariyah (human brotherhood). When it comes to human or national interactions, we engage without issues. We can't change terms in the Quran, so we continue using "kafir." It means non-Muslims. We explain this to them; it's not something PKS decided—it's in our holy scripture. Besides religious brotherhood, we practice national and human brotherhood with non-Muslims, and they understand this. They see that in Islam, and within PKS, interaction with non-Muslims is allowed. We have not only ukhuwah Islamiyah, but also ukhuwah wathaniyah and basyariyah."[235]

At a broader institutional level, PKS also holds a perspective on other parties that are not based on Islam. For PKS, the ideological differences among political parties are essentially a matter of differing branches of thought (furu'iyah fikriyah) and not a criterion for determining the Islamic faith or disbelief (kafir) of a group. PKS does not regard those who establish parties on non-Islamic foundations as kafir. Furthermore, for PKS, the use of the term "Islamic party" merely indicates a political connotation, facilitating the classification of political parties.[236] In this context, PKS, as a political party in a democratic environment, adopts a non-exclusive viewpoint, recognizing political differences within a modern system. This perspective likely underpins their willingness to cooperate with other

[235] Mabruri, An Interview.
[236] Alynudin et al., *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Menjawab Tudingan Dan Fitnah*, 26–27.

parties that are not based on Islamic ideology, including those with a Christian political philosophy.

Nonetheless, the views of the party elites, to some extent, do not immediately resonate with the grassroots tarbiyah community. The Islamic fervor of PKS's grassroots members often manifests in critical perspectives towards the elite's policies, especially concerning religious issues. The notion of becoming an open party, as disseminated by the mass media, caused some turbulence among PKS's grassroots members, although not significantly. Some PKS sympathizers questioned the party's decision to accept non-Muslims as members and cadres. This is why the majority of PKS elites, particularly from the MS ranks, were actually displeased with the open party declaration, considering it would unsettle grassroots cadres whose religious understanding had not yet reached the advanced level of the party elites. This highlights that the ideological dynamics within PKS, particularly concerning religious tolerance, largely hinge on the party elites' capacity to effectively educate and manage the grassroots cadres.

To facilitate the understanding among grassroots cadres regarding PKS's policy of incorporating non-Muslims into its Islamic political framework, the party elites conducted consolidation efforts in various regions. The role of the party's public relations officials was crucial in this regard. Mabruri, the head of PKS's public relations division, explained that the younger faction, led by Anis Matta, had caused internal turmoil by hastily declaring the party's openness. Mabruri noted that the grassroots cadres were initially unable to accept this reality due to their limited religious understanding. Nevertheless, the internal conditions have since stabilized, and the grassroots cadres have been educated about the party's openness. Mabruri played a key role in mitigating the tensions within PKS following the 2008 National Working Meeting (Mukernas) in Bali.[237]

5.3 Religious Argumentation in The Engagement of Non-Muslim

To provide a comprehensive understanding to grassroots cadres and address external inquiries regarding the legitimacy of PKS's inclusion and nomination of non-Muslims within its political framework, arguments, and logic rooted in Islamic norms and values play a pivotal role for the party. As a party founded by numerous scholars proficient in theology and Islamic law, it is unsurprising that the elite of PKS would undertake an Islamic legal review to establish a basis for legitimizing its position as an Islamist party that accommodates non-Muslims within its structure. Arguments based solely on the Indonesian

[237] Mabruri, An Interview.

political party law, pluralism, national unity, and democratic narratives are insufficient; PKS's Islamic foundation must be elaborated to maintain internal legitimacy and coherence. It is crucial to highlight the party's Islamic rationale for engaging non-Muslims that accentuates PKS's integration of Islamic jurisprudence with contemporary political strategies to uphold the party's ideological and organizational integrity.

The terminology of "Masyarakat Madani," inspired by the Medina Charter devised by the Prophet Muhammad, frequently serves as a primary narrative cited by PKS elites to justify the inclusion of non-Muslims within the party. This term was originally included in PKS's manifesto from its inception and continued to exist as before when the party was under its previous name, PK. [238] In the latest party manifesto, this term remains central to the party's mission. PKS describes its mission as: 'The Party's mission is to make the Party a means of realizing a civil society that is just, prosperous, and dignified within the integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.'[239] This mission statement is a key narrative of the party's Islamic-based political program.

Interestingly, in the description of this clause, PKS situates this mission within the framework of the Indonesian state by explicitly mentioning the NKRI and Pancasila as an integral polity within the objective of PKS. Pluralism activists, such as Nurcholis Madjid, also frequently reference this term "Masyarakat Madani" in promoting interfaith harmony in the country. Therefore, according to Yon Machmudi, PKS's proposal to enchance a civil society in Indonesia is neither new nor unique to the party itself.[240] Hence, the party' invocation of "Masyarakat Madani" not only aligns with its foundational Islamic principles but also demonstrates a strategic integration of the party's normative principles within the broader national framework, reflecting a commitment to fostering an inclusive and harmonious society while reinforcing the party's longstanding ideological continuity.

In addition to the concept of Masyarakat Madani, PKS also embraces the principle of *Islam rahmatan lil'alamin* in its approach towards non-Muslims. This principle signifies that Islam promotes compassion towards all creatures regardless of their religion. PKS employs this phrase as a political narrative in its latest manifesto. Mabruri told me that "although we are an Islamic party, the Islam we advocate is *rahmatan lil Alamin*, in accordance with PKS's policy platform. Therefore, we reach out to all religious communities, fostering relationships and collaboration."[241] From this statement, it appears

[238] Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan,* 49.
[239] PKS, "Anggaran Dasar Dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Partai Keadilan Sejahtera," 5–6.
[240] Machmudi, *Islamising Indonesian,* 120.
[241] Mabruri, An Interview.

that PKS educates its regional party members to understand this perspective, as evidenced when one of them explained PKS's openness towards non-Muslims, quoting this very phrase.[242] In conclusion, PKS's adoption of Islam *rahmatan lil'alamin* and the spread of this phrase among its members exemplifies its inclusive political stance towards diverse religious communities, emphasizing mutual respect and cooperation.

However, despite PKS proposing a societal design that incorporates elements of tolerance, the frameworks of Masyarakat Madani and Islam *rahmatan lil'alamin* within PKS are closely intertwined with its agenda of party Islamization. In its latest platform, PKS divides the prospects of Islamization into two models. Firstly, the cultural model has become fundamental to PKS's identity, stemming from their initial cultural propagation agenda. Secondly, as a political party integrated into the state system, PKS also formulates a framework for structural Islamization through legislative roles and public policy within the government. PKS asserts that "the structural Islamization struggle must still present better alternative solutions and maintain fair and wise attitudes towards non-Muslims or those with different political organizational backgrounds from PKS while adhering to constitutional principles."[243] The flexibility in structural Islamization, in this context, characterizes PKS's Islamic political stance to navigate religious political movements without disrupting the state's political structure. Henceforth, PKS engages in numerous negotiations and compromises in pursuing its Islamic political agenda in Indonesia.

The political narrative of PKS openly bases its arguments on several verses from the Quran and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad. When explaining the Islamic principles underlying their party's openness, Hidayat Nur Wahid cites several Quranic verses: Al-Maidah (5:2) on the principle of cooperation (*ta'awun*), Al-Baqarah (2:148) on competing in righteousness, Yusuf (12:55) emphasizing integrity in carrying out duties, Hud 61 advocating civilization-building, and Al-Hujurat (49:13) addressing human diversity.[244] These scriptural foundations are used by PKS leaders to emphasize that the inclusion of non-Muslims in their party is a legitimate Islamic political step, aligned with the sacred texts of Islam. Additionally, PKS seeks legitimacy for this openness in the hadiths of Prophet Muhammad, which recount his collaborations with non-Muslim Quraysh and Jewish communities.[245]

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[242] Fransisca, An Interview with Fransisca Santa Clause, May 22, 2024.

[243] PKS, "Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani" (Majelis Pertimbangan Pusat Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, March 1, 2008), 228.

[244] Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid.

[245] Alynudin et al., *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera Menjawab Tudingan Dan Fitnah*, 26.

In addition to Quranic and Hadith arguments, PKS also formulates Islamic jurisprudential foundations as normative bases for nominating non-Muslims as regional heads. A prominent example is the 2010 mayoral election in Solo. As Solo is predominantly Muslim, the PKS Sharia Council at the Surakarta district level crafted fiqh arguments to legitimize the party's political move to support the non-Muslim pair of mayor Jokowi and his deputy, FX Hadi Rudyatmo. PKS developed a narrative titled "The Appointment of Non-Muslims in Government."[246] In this decision document, the support for the Jokowi-Rudy pair was based on the integrity of the candidates. PKS perceived the effective management of Jokowi as a Muslim leader and Rudy's support for Islamic preaching activities such as reciting blessings. In this regard, the party categorizes leadership into three levels:

Firstly, the concept of *wilayatul 'aamah* (general leadership) holds a profoundly strategic religious value, such as the position of a high Islamic religious leader or a caliphate. Secondly, *wazho'if qiyadiyah* refers to strategic positions below the level of general leadership, such as ministers, governors, or other regional heads. Thirdly, wilayat madaniyah denotes positions that require specific technical expertise in particular fields. PKS Surakarta contends that appointing non-Muslim leaders at the second and third levels is permissible. In this regard, PKS cites the opinions of some Muslim scholars like Ar-Razi, Al-Mawardi, and Yusuf Qaradhawi, who permit the appointment of non-Muslims below the level of general leadership in an Islamic polity. Additionally, PKS Surakarta draws parallels with other Muslim countries. It points to Sudan, which implements Islamic law but has a non-Muslim vice president, and mentions Faris Al-Khuury, a Christian who served as Prime Minister of Syria.

However, due to the localized nature of regional elections, which vary significantly between different areas, the attitude of PKS towards non-Muslim candidates has never been consistent. This was evident in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. During this election, PKS adopted a stance rejecting the candidacy of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), a non-Muslim, in Jakarta. One of the primary factors underlying PKS's decision was the controversy surrounding Ahok regarding allegations of blasphemy against Islam.[247] According to Mangunson, this ambiguous stance by PKS demonstrates that while on one hand, PKS exhibits pragmatism in supporting Jokowi-Rudy in the 2010 Solo election, on

[246] Dewan Syariah Daerah PKS Surakarta, "Pengangkatan Non Muslim Dalam Pemerintahan," January 2010, https://groups.google.com/g/hallopim/c/EFP13a01tC4?pli=1.

[247] *PKS Tegaskan Tolak Dukung Ahok*, 2016, https://www.metrotvnews.com/play/NAvUA50L-pks-tegaskan-tolak-dukung-ahok.

the other hand, it adopts an ideological approach, integrating its Islamic politics in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.[248]

However, a deeper observation reveals that these differing stances of PKS are rooted in three main factors. Firstly, in the context of the 2010 Solo gubernatorial election, and possibly in other regions where PKS collaborates with political partners containing non-Muslim elements, there were no sensitive religious issues surrounding the candidates and partners supported by PKS. Secondly, PKS's strength in the region also determined this stance; in Solo, where PKS held a mediocre position due to other nationalist parties controlling local legislative seats, PKS tended to engage in survival politics to maintain its existence. Conversely, in Jakarta, where PKS held a prominent position even surpassing parties like Golkar and Demokrat, its presence was stronger. Thirdly, the presence of alternative candidates aligning closely with PKS's Islamic culture also significantly influenced its stance. While in the 2010 Solo election, the Jokowi-Rudy ticket presented religious diversity within its candidacy package, the alternative candidacy of Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno in Jakarta, more culturally aligned with PKS's ideology, offered a closer ideological fit. As a result, the intersection of religious sensitivities, PKS's strong position in Jakarta, and the availability of candidates closer to its ideological framework converged in a political contingency that led PKS to adopt an ambiguous stance towards non-Muslim leadership.

To summarize, PKS's fluctuating approach towards non-Muslim candidates in regional elections reflects a nuanced interplay of pragmatism and ideological commitment. While the party demonstrated pragmatic flexibility in supporting non-Muslim leaders like Jokowi-Rudy in specific contexts, such as the 2010 Solo election, its ideological adherence became pronounced during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, driven by concerns over religious sensitivities. This dual approach underscores PKS's complex navigation of political dynamics, balancing strategic considerations with ideological principles in its pursuit of electoral influence and the promotion of Islamic governance ideals. Institutionally, PKS has positioned itself as a catch-all party, open to all segments of society.[249] However, PKS's selective openness in specific circumstances reflects a level of selectiveness influenced by the party's position and the local political context in which it operates. In this regard, it is challenging to determine whether PKS has evolved into a

[248] Nurainun Mangunsong, "Sikap Dan Argumentasi Hukum Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) Terhadap Kepala Daerah Nonmuslim," *Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah Dan Hukum* 53, no. 2 (August 10, 2019): 297, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v53i2.585.

[249] Tanuwidjaja, "PKS in Post-Reformasi Indonesia."

moderate Islamic party or remains fundamentally radical. Nevertheless, from a political perspective aimed at embracing Indonesia's political pluralism, PKS has endeavored to navigate towards a position of religious moderation, acknowledging the complexities of maintaining its Islamic ideological coherence amidst challenges related to religious issues.

5.4 Campaigns and Narratives

Since 2004, PKS has endeavored to move away from its exclusive stance towards adopting an electoral position. According to Muhtadi's observations, following its setbacks in the 1999 elections, PKS pursued an electoral competition strategy aimed at attracting attention from nationalist-secular, non-Muslim segments, and rural single-issue voters. PKS employed electoral tactics such as the innovative campaign slogan "PKS for all," which aligned with themes of "cleanliness, care, and professionalism."[250] This electoral strategy aimed to enhance PKS's political appeal and, to a certain extent, bolstered its confidence in cultivating an image as a moderate party that respects diversity. Ultimately, PKS's strategic shift towards electoral competition since 2004, marked by innovative campaign slogans and a broader appeal to diverse voter segments including nationalist-secular and rural demographics, reflects its evolving institutional strategy aimed at positioning itself as a moderate political force capable of accommodating diverse societal values and aspirations.

However, PKS initiated the construction of its moderate party image through internal organizational development. Indeed, since its inception as PK, its manifesto has embedded moderate principles within its ideology.[251] Thus, even as it gained significant national electoral consideration, PKS maintained its focus on internal education for all cadres, emphasizing that the party's Islamic ideology is moderate. This is aimed at nurturing political balance, particularly, for entrusting its Muslim supporters.[252] This internal emphasis is crucial for PKS to mitigate potential conflicts and tensions among grassroots members who may still hold exclusive views of their Islamic beliefs. PKS strategically developed its moderate party image through extensive internal organizational growth. The party has been ingraining moderate principles in its ideology since its inception in 1998. Navigating its evolution into a nationally influential political entity while emphasizing

[250] Burhanuddin Muhtadi, *Dilema PKS: Suara Dan Syariah*, Cet. 1 (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 2012), 234–35.

[251] Keadilan, *Sekilas Partai Keadilan*, 33.

[252] "PKS - Presiden PKS: Tanamkan Islam Moderat Cegah Radikalisme Sejak Dini," accessed July 11, 2024, https://pks.id/content/presiden-pks-tanamkan-islam-moderat-cegah-radikalisme-sejak-dini.

continuous internal education to uphold a balanced Islamic ideology and mitigate potential grassroots tensions shapes the party's attitude in spreading campaigns and narratives.

PKS has been at the forefront of utilizing the internet in Indonesia as a means to garner public sympathy. It is recognizing the cost-effectiveness of internet platforms which require minimal investment compared to owning television or radio stations. Through internet, PKS strategically mediates its interaction with the public.[253] The party has developed its own website and actively disseminates its activities to reach a wide audience. The party frequently highlights national and local issues, demonstrating its political stance on current developments. As PKS grows more confident in integrating non-Muslim members into its ranks, its central website actively disseminates news about these members joining the party. Typically, these displays of inclusivity occur during ceremonies for the appointment of cadres or party officials. For instance, when PKS established a council of experts and appointed a Christian woman as one of its members, PKS publicized the event, showcasing its non-discriminatory political approach towards other religions.[254] In addition to the central website, PKS's regional branch websites also highlight news about the presence of non-Muslim members within their respective areas, like what PKS's branch in Bekasi has done.[255] Through such internet-based media, PKS reaffirms that its openness is not merely rhetoric.

PKS consistently showcases its openness towards non-Muslim members on its website. This is strategically positioning itself as a nationalist and moderate Islamic party. The existence of non-Muslim members within PKS serves to challenge misconceptions and underscore the party's inclusive ethos to the public. By actively promoting these instances, PKS aims to dispel the notion that it is an exclusive or radical entity, emphasizing its commitment to diversity and tolerance within its ranks. Furthermore, campaigns featuring PKS cadre candidates in non-Muslim regions often highlight complex contradictions that defy straightforward interpretation, revealing the party's nuanced approach to navigating political and ideological landscapes beyond its traditional support base.

[253] Mabruri, An Interview.

[254] "PKS - Evalina Heryanti, Perempuan Kristiani Pakar Olimpiade Gabung Dewan Pakar PKS."

[255] ADMINHUMASPKS, "Terima Anggota Baru Non Muslim, Heri Koswara Serahkan KTA Dan Sematkan Jas PKS," *DPD PKS Kota Bekasi* (blog), February 23, 2022, https://bekasi.pks.id/2022/02/23/terima-anggota-baru-non-muslim-heri-koswara-serahkan-kta-dan-sematkan-jas-pks/.

Figure 5.1 A non-Muslim candidate campaign

Source: merdeka.com[256]

The aforementioned figure exemplifies how the legislative campaign strategies of PKS to some extent contradict its Islamic ideology. Despite being an Islamic-based party, PKS's central leadership did not raise objections to the campaign of Jesiska Tando, a Christian woman who campaigned without wearing a hijab and quoted Saint Teresa in her campaign posters. However, viewed from the perspective of seeking electoral legitimacy, such a campaign approach appears strategically sensible given that PKS's constituency in the Tando region is predominantly non-Muslim. By refraining from challenging the Gospel quotation, the central PKS leadership aims directly to maintain party solidarity and coherence. This decision is rooted in the understanding that contesting such campaigns could jeopardize PKS's electoral legitimacy and provoke voter skepticism. Thus, PKS navigates a nuanced balance between ideological consistency and electoral pragmatism, illustrating its adeptness in political strategy and constituency management.

Additionally, although the above campaign seems to be internally at odds with the Islamic ideology, the religious narrative used by Tando actually strengthens PKS's view of

[256] "Viral Flyer Caleg Jesiska Tanod, Ini Penjelasan PKS," merdeka.com, June 8, 2023, https://www.merdeka.com/politik/viral-flyer-caleg-jesiska-tanod-ini-penjelasan-pks.html.

the virtues of accommodating religious politics in Indonesia. Accommodating other religions to express their religious narratives in formal politics is indirectly beneficial for PKS to maintain its Islamic ideology in the Indonesia's democracy. This is because of political structure of the country that has been Muslim majority nation state in which Islam and Muslim society would always have a political incentive through the recognition of political identity of all official religion. In sum, Islamic ideology has a strongest position among religious political ideologies upheld by Christian or Hinduism political institutions for example.

The reluctance of the central leadership of PKS to intervene in the campaign of lower-level cadres also extended to Fransisca Santa Clause, who targeted non-Muslim voters despite being in a predominantly Muslim area. Fransisca, a Muslim woman married to a Muslim husband from a non-Muslim background, raised eyebrows when she ran as a legislative candidate representing PKS in Sleman. Her campaign strategy not only surprised the public due to her name resembling that of a Christian figure but also for its deliberate targeting of non-Muslim constituents. In response to Fransisca's campaign tactics and her public profile, the central leadership of PKS merely sought clarification on the validity of her strategy without intervening.[257]

The presence of non-Muslim members has significantly contributed to the party's acquisition of political incentives, reflecting a strategic adaptation in its political posture. This inclusion of non-Muslims serves as a tangible demonstration of the very commitment of PKS to moderate and inclusive political principles. Therefore, the demonstration is enhancing its appeal to a broader electorate. By integrating religiously diverse members, PKS can more effectively position itself as a party that transcends sectarian divides and promotes narrative of unity and moderation.

This strategy not only bolsters the party's claims of moderation but also enhances its legitimacy in the eyes of both national and international observers. The political dividends of such inclusivity are evident in the party's ability to attract a wider base of support. By so doing the party is able to increase its influence within the political landscape. Consequently, engagements with non-Muslim constituents highlight a calculated effort of PKS to expand its political capital by embodying and promoting a more pluralistic and tolerant vision of political Islam. Moreover, campaigning to non-Muslim is also an effective strategy for PKS

[257] Fransisca, An Interview with Fransisca Santa Clause.

to compete with other Islamic parties, even with nationalist parties, focusing on only Muslim voters.

5.5 Politically Pragmatic but Ideally Islamic

This section aims to elaborate the way of PKS to accept pragmatic rules of politics while refocusing its ideology towards moderate and inclusive narratives to legitimate the decision to open the membership of the party. Indeed, the party could have retained the exclusive point of views because Islamic ideology is open to interpreted in that way. However, the dynamic political conditions in Indonesia have put PKS in a choice between losing and being buried with an exclusive ideology or embracing pragmatic politics. Because pragmatic steps risk reducing the ideological agenda, PKS needs to reposition its commitment to an Islamic perspective that is not only legitimate for the institution but also accommodating to practical steps.

Generally, pragmatism is the doctrine that practical consequences are the criteria of knowledge and meaning and value. It is arguably significant to use the concept of pragmatism that combined from classical and contemporary theories. Here, Knight and Johnson (2011) conceptualized and reconstructed the character of pragmatism by offering a distinctive formulation of pragmatism. They were drawing upon classical and contemporary resources of the concept. They argued that there are three commitments central to pragmatism for thinking about political institutions in general and democratic political organization in particular.[258] The first commitment is *fallibilism*, meaning that problematic circumstances may drive pragmatists to revise their belief as their recognition to "unforeseen contingencies that will challenge their ostensibly settled beliefs and judgments". The second commitment is *anti-skepticism*, meaning that it is impossible for pragmatists to suppose the fully falseness of their belief although to some extent 'it may prove false'. The last commitment is *consequentialism,* stem from Dewey's 'pragmatic rule' conception, meaning that in order to find the meaning and the truth of an idea, it is crucial for pragmatists to ask for the consequences of idea they are thinking about.

Scholarly observations on Islamic-political pragmatism rarely comprehend the commitments that Islamists may have taken when they exposed the degree of ideological transformation. The work of Karakir,[259] for example, proved such lack of comprehensive investigation of Islamist pragmatism. She positioned the ideological transformation of

[258] Jack Knight and James Johnson, *The Priority of Democracy Political Consequences of Pragmatism* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011), 25–27.

[259] İrem Aşkar Karakır, "Rising Political Islam: Is It a Matter of Ideology or Pragmatism?," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (2006): 93.

Palestine's Hamas, Turkey's AKP, Lebanon's Hizbullah and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood as a political instrument without showing commitments Islamist have taken in organizing such transformation. Often, investigations of Islamist alteration to be more open and pragmatic, or moderate in particular, has been trapped in emphasizing outside factors such as socioeconomic ones just like Karakir's study. Even the discussion of post-Islamism Bayat and his colleagues have offered also contained such stress, although to some extent, it recognized the way Islamists "reinvent themselves."[260] As a result, the theoretical contributions of scholars in the book *Post Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam* are positioning the political Islam transformation as a consequence of external political factors and are less recognizing ideological commitments of Islamists in organizing the inner *fallibilism, anti-skepticism,* and *consequentialism* Islamists dedicated. By drawing on Knight and Johnson's pragmatism concept, I could arguably say that understanding the political pragmatism of PKS, which operates in a democratic landscape, requires questioning if the party really embraces those three commitments.

Table 5.1 The distinctive pragmatism of PKS

	Pragmatism		
	Fallibilism	*Anti-skepticism*	*Consequentialism*
Underground *Dakwah*	Democracy	*Asas Islam*	*Dakwah* Party
Non-Muslim	Citizenship	*Kafir*	Open Party

The decision of PKS to become a political party represents a pragmatic move on one hand, but it also signifies an ideological evolution on the other. In this regard, PKS has revised the underground movement that the party maintained for more than two decades under the authoritarian regime of Suharto. When becoming an underground Islamist movement, the level of exclusivity within the *tarbiyyah* group reached its peak. It is difficult to imagine the participation of non-Muslims in activities such as *halaqa*, *liqa*, and so on. In its most extreme form, the *dakwah* activities within tarbiyyah were a manifestation of preserving Muslims from non-Muslim influences. This exclusive and extreme character could not be sustained when the tarbiyyah elites decided to enter the democratic competition in post-1998 Indonesia. However, since entering democracy, the party has been operating a political approach adapting to the political circumstances of Indonesia.

[260] Bayat, *Post-Islamism*.

The transformation of PKS from an underground movement to a political party reflects that pragmatism often necessitates ideological flexibility. This shift is comparable to other Islamist movements that have entered the political mainstream, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia. These movements have also undergone significant ideological transformations to adapt to the political realities of their respective countries while upholding Islam as the solution to political problems.[261] The process of democratization in Indonesia post-1998 provided a unique opportunity for PKS to reconfigure its approach, balancing its religious ideals with the demands of a pluralistic political landscape.[262] This ideological evolution is indicative of a broader pattern where Islamist movements transition from exclusivist positions to more inclusive and participatory roles within democratic frameworks[263]. Such adaptations are essential for political survival and relevance in diverse societies. Those adaptation also demonstrating the dynamic interplay between ideology and pragmatism in political Islam.

PKS must conform to the logic and principles of democracy as the logic of becoming a political party. However, the party also recognizes the imperative to preserve the Islamic values upheld by its members. It is because the genealogy of *tarbiyyah* movement is impossible to abandon. This dual commitment has led to the party's adoption of an *anti-skepticism* stance. This means that the party must maintain its Islamic ideology (*asas Islam*) as the foundation and philosophical underpinning of its political endeavors. Consequently, PKS has instituted policies that align with its mission as a *dakwah* (preaching) party. Here, the party is reflecting the integration of its ideological beliefs with the political realities of Indonesia. The ideological revisions undertaken by PKS primarily involve its acceptance of democratic values and regulations. Despite this, the party steadfastly retains its character as a *dakwah* movement deeply rooted in Islamic teachings.[264]

Maintaining Islamic preaching values is crucial for PKS for two primary reasons. Firstly, the party must preserve its connection with the *Tarbiyyah* movement, which serves as its core support base and the foundation for party cadre development. The practice of *dakwah* is an essential element for PKS to reinforce its internal legitimacy. In instances where the party elite need to disseminate ideological developments, the *dakwah* functions

[261] Quintan Wiktorowicz, ed., *Islamic Activism: S Social Movement Theory Approach*, Indiana Series in Middle East Studies (Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, 2004), 16.

[262] Greg Fealy, "Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?," in *Islamic Radicalism in Indonesia: The Faltering Revival?* (ISEAS Publishing, 2004), 107, https://doi.org/10.1355/9789812306944-010.

[263] Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation*, 45.

[264] Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid.

as an instrument for PKS to educate its grassroots members about party programs and policies. This has been evidenced in the way PKS has communicated its policies, particularly when taking an inclusive stance towards non-Muslims.[265] Here, the *dakwah* is a political instrument of PKS not only to carry out structural and cultural Islamization programs as PKS outlines in its political platform,[266] but also to organize its institution.

In maintaining its ideology, PKS appears to pursue a linear approach of *anti-skepticism*. This is evident from its policy of using *asas Islam* and maintaining the term "*kafir*". However, simultaneously, the party remains anti-skeptical regarding the term "*kafir*," a concept it continues to hold firmly. This anti-skeptical stance is deeply ingrained not only among the party elites but also among its grassroots supporters.[267] This duality underscores the party's commitment to its ideological roots while navigating the complex landscape of Indonesian democracy and religious diversity. This linear pattern is positively correlated with the coherence of the PKS institution which from election to election can maintain its electoral power. In addition, the ideological coherence reflected in its *anti-skepticism* can make PKS develop political education to ranks and files within the party, including non-Muslims. The elites of PKS such as Nurwahid claimed that the party, despite using Islamic principles, tried to teach religious moderation to non-Muslims who joined the party.[268] Such claims are even more valid when non-Muslims in PKS claim to understand religious moderation through their membership in the party.[269]

The decision to become an open Islamic party is the awareness of the consequences of being included in citizenship-based political rules. Despite the potential of the terminology *kafir* to be interpreted in radical ways, the attitude of the elite to open the party to non-Muslims can reduce extreme interpretations of the term. Additionally, given that all local party branches are imperative to allow non-Muslims to join the party, it is impossible to the rise of exclusive interpretation for the term especially in non-Muslim majority areas where the issue of openness is socialized.[270] Therefore, PKS in its latest development has become a *dakwah* party as well as an open Islamic party, an ambiguous and complex party character that is difficult to be generalized by black-and-white logic.

[265] Mabruri, An Interview.
[266] PKS, "Memperjuangkan Masyarakat Madani," 70.
[267] Fransisca, An Interview with Fransisca Santa Clause.
[268] Nurwahid, An Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid.
[269] Soleman, An Interview with Soleman Nd Ayi.
[270] Buehler, "Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation Thesis in the Context of Decentralized Institutions," 223.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter concludes that the policy of PKS to be an open party is inseparable from political conditions of Indonesia, particularly in terms of the religious plurality as an aspect of the political dynamic of the state. Therefore, it is reasonable that recognizing such an aspect is one practical argument of PKS in deciding to be an Islamic party that opens up itself to non-Muslim political rights. This serves as the legitimacy for PKS to position itself within the plural political landscape of Indonesia. However, such practical legitimacies only satisfied the perspective of external perception. Therefore, to convince its internal legitimacy, argumentations based on Islamic norms and values are also crucial for the party in educating the party's supporters at grassroot level. Both practical and religious interpretation thus influence the way PKS narrates its inclusivity and moderation in the party's communication towards public attentions. To some extent, in particular context, the campaign of the party seems to have a sense of contradiction where a non-Muslim candidate exercises the narrative based on non-Islamic teaching. However, the party has been maintaining a careful approach to deal with that kind of contradiction by not intervening non-Muslims' aspiration, otherwise the party would face a problem within its institution.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

6.1 Conclusion

This research shows that the political structure and conditions in Indonesia significantly influence the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in adopting moderate political steps since its establishment as an Islamic political party. Democracy in Indonesia, similar to other Muslim-majority countries, only provides a platform for political ideologies that can adapt to social and political demands. This arguably underpins the theory of moderation inclusion in discussions about the moderation of religious parties globally. However, the historical ideological background of religious parties rooted in fundamentalism cannot be negated for its influence on the persistence of religious groups in channeling their political aspirations. The religious perspective seemingly will always color the political ideology in every country that embraces a democratic system.

In this context, issues surrounding pragmatic politics concern academics in formulating their views on Islamic parties striving in tight and balanced competition. The political rights of citizens and the state of social unity have amalgamated various societal aspirations. Differences concerning religious identity do not hinder Islamist parties from becoming an inclusive political aspiration platform. Although there is still a tendency towards illiberal attitudes displayed by Islamic movements such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi group An-Nur party towards religious freedom, there are Islamic parties like El-Nahda in Tunisia, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco, and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt that are inclined to adopt a more modest view toward individual rights for non-Muslims. While often regarded merely as pragmatic political steps, the religious normative side of Islamist parties' openness towards non-Muslims cannot be entirely disregarded.

Without a normative framework for openness and cooperation with other political identities, it would be challenging to imagine how Islamist parties would be willing to compromise in cross-ideological coalitions involving religious and secular nationalist parties. Furthermore, if Islamist party elites fail to reach inclusive Islamic norms, it is impossible for Islamist parties to open themselves towards non-Muslim membership within their religious institutions. In this regard, PKS appears to represent Islamist parties that compromise ideology with the realities of a democratic and plural social context.

Nevertheless, this compromise still involves an inclusive Islamic normative framework, as manifested in the ideas of *Madani* Society and Islam *rahmatan lil'alamin.*

Efforts in balancing pragmatic incentives with Islamic ideology, as demonstrated by PKS in adopting non-Muslim membership and accommodating their leadership potential, have proven the flexibility of political Islamic ideology. However, such efforts in moderating religious ideology are inseparable from the influence of political conditions and the state's ideological structure that accommodates its social plurality. In this context, PKS exemplifies the impact of cultural regulations and political competition that compel the party to follow the logic of Indonesia's plural and democratic politics. If Indonesia's political rules did not require inclusivity, it is highly likely that Islamist parties in Indonesia like PBB, PPP, and PKS would never strive to become inclusive institutions open to other religious identities within their organizations.

Regarding PKS's decision to become an open Islamic party, there are political influences that place the party in internal tension. Internal conflicts over openness towards non-Muslims also pose a unity problem within PKS. Ideologically inclined members tend to worry that policies accommodating non-Muslim membership will threaten the party's Islamic-based ideology. However, for pragmatic elites, openness towards non-Muslims will provide political incentives to enhance electoral strength, enabling PKS to more effectively pursue its structural and cultural Islamization agenda. This research finds that the efforts of PKS elites to make the party an open party encourage them to actualize inclusive political Islam ideas. Thus, the balance between pragmatism and ideology becomes one of the recent characteristics of PKS.

6.2 Research Trajectory

This research still leaves room for further studies. In terms of methodology, the use of historical institutionalism can be applied to study the history of gender equality in other Islamist parties. The issue of the relationship between political Islam and religious freedom remains wide open in terms of how Islamic norms are interpreted by political elites to legitimize their pragmatic steps. Additionally, quantitative studies to measure the openness level of Islamist parties towards non-Muslims would be a highly interesting research area. All potential further studies could contribute to the previous literature on political Islam and Islamic parties, particularly in reviewing the extent of the post-Islamism trend.

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