UNRAVELLING THE DYNAMICS OF AUTHORITARIAN STRATEGIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SUHARTO'S NEW ORDER IN INDONESIA AND JAMMEH'S RULE IN THE GAMBIA

A Thesis

Submitted to the Master's study Program of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Science in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (M.A.)

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Musa Bah

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ABSTRACT

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The dynamics of authoritarian power consolidation is receiving more attention today than it has ever been before as a result of rising authoritarianism and democratic backsliding. However, there exists an undertheorized and variations on autocrat's decision calculus for prioritizing repression over co-optation, vice versa. Drawing from this, I make two assumptions that state: 1. Low resource endowment leads to high repression, and 2. High resource endowment leads to low repression and high co-optation. To understand this phenomenon, I compared Yahya Jammeh (1994–2016) in the Gambia (a low resource authoritarian regime) and Suharto (1966–1998) in Indonesia (a high resource authoritarian regime). I used the Gambian case (1994-2016) to explain the first assumption, and the second assumption is examined using the case of Indonesia (1965-1998). By observation, both regimes on the surface appear similar as both were military juntas in Muslim-majority countries. However, the literature shows that their authoritarian strategies and tactics varied in profoundly – Jammeh primarily imposed repression as strategy, whereas Suharto was inclined more towards co-optation. However, I do not argue that this explanation is exclusive, as it is context dependent. To examine this phenomenon, I drew data from government websites, international reports, journal articles, news outlets, and other online resources. Thus, this study intends to contribute to the understanding of autocrats' decision-making strategyies.

Keywords**:** *autocrat, authoritarianism, repression, co-optation, and resource endowment*

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I thank Allah, the Almighty, for granting me the life and strength to reach this stage of my studies. During the course of this thesis writing, there were many mentors, family members, friends, and colleagues who contributed greatly towards the progress and completion of this thesis, be it in term of intellectual, material or mental supports. Firstly, my sincere thanks go to my humble and dedicated mentors and supervisors, Dr. Gde Metera and Dr. Djayadi Hanan, for their firm and wholehearted support and guidance. Both have immensely provoked and pushed my limits positively during the course of the project. I would say their mentorship has been one of a kind and invaluable.

I would also want to thank my two examiners, Dr. Philips Vermonte and Dr. Tesriono, for the great recommendations they gave during the proposal and final defense, which aided greatly in the transformation of this thesis. I am equally sincerely grateful to the head of the MA programme, Dr. Sirojudin, not only for the rigorous methodological trainings during the coursework but for organising various motivational gatherings that directed our focus during the thesis process.

I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to other intellectuals who have passionately moulded and inspired my intellectual growth during the two years in UIII, namely: Dr. A'an Suryana, Dr. M. Syafi Anwar, Dr. Ridwan, Dr. Nia Deliana, Dr. Rifqi Muna, Prof. Farish Noor, Prof. Munirah Alatas, Prof. Greg Fealy, and Prof. Dan Slater. These people were not only instructors but role models. They have imparted in me everlasting memories and lessons. Also, this would have been a dusty journey without our selfless faculty officers, particularly Mas Syahrul Miladi, for always being there for us. Thank you all for your humble services.

Yet, this academic journey would have been a boring and restless one without my humble and good colleagues at the political science department of Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia. I would sincerely like to thank them for accompanying me throughout my journey, and listening to Bobi and I making annoying intellectual nuisance during classes. It indeed worth remembering the debates and intellectual exchanges we had in and outside classroom to sharpen our

understanding. To this too, I would sincere acknowledge my African brothers who accompanied me during this journey particularly Momodou Salieu, Famara Jawla, and Abdoulaye Bamba. Salieu's friendship and statistical input, Famara's associate and reasoning and Bamba's companionship were indeed part of the success story.

I would also like to sincerely thank my former lecturers at the University of The Gambia, particularly my undergraduate mentor and the current Minister of Higher Education Prof. Pierre Gomez, for motivating me to climb the ladder of intellectualism. I would also like to express my gratitude to both the department of graduate studies in International Relations and Diplomacy and the department of English language at school of Arts and Science at the University of the Gambia for sharpening both my language and theoretical foundations, which made my journey in UIII easier than it would have been otherwise.

To my family, my mother, siblings, and wife, I thank you all for supporting me financially and spiritually for my 22-year academic journey without complaining about me being away from home or spending too much of time or resources on this journey. Thank you, mum, for constantly reminding me that Sabr (patience) and hard work are the bedrock of success.

Finally, I would thank the UIII library staff for always responding to my messages whenever the need arises. Your services have been a tremendous help during my studies and thesis writing. That been said, I am also sincerely grateful to UIII administration for granting me this opportunity, as well as granting me the necessary facilities during the two-year programme.

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ABBREVIATION DIRECTORY

APRC : Alliance Patriotic Re-orientation and Construction

UN : United Nations

TRRC : Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparation Commission

AFPRC : Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council

ABRI : Angkatan Bersenjat Republik Indonesio (Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces

GNA : Gambia National Army

AU : African Union

EOWAS : Economic Community of West African States

PKI : Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

KAMI: : Kesatuan Aksi Masasiswa Indonesia

MNCs: : Multinational Corporations

GDP : Gross Domestic Product

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The growing phenomenon of democratic backsliding has renewed attention to the politics of authoritarian regime[1]. As stated by Glasius (2018) there is "no reader of political commentary" in this contemporary era who would "fail to notice a concern, perhaps even a panic, about a global tide of authoritarianism that may now be affecting even established democracies." Important scholarly literature scrutinizes authoritarian power consolidation, emphasizing on power-sharing (Svolik, 2009), institutional structures (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006), patronage distribution (Wintrobe, 2013; Sudduth 2017), and durability of authoritarian regimes (Levitsky & Way, 2013). By authoritarian power consolidation I mean how authoritarians utilise strategies and tactics in solidifying, improving and sustaining their legitimacy and capabilities in governing societies (Goebel, 2010; Svolik, 2009).

The literature identifies three strategies of authoritarian power consolidation; namely, legitimation, repression, and co-optation.[2] These three strategies are the bedrocks of a stable authoritarian regime.[3] However, there is an interesting variation in what type of strategy is dominantly deployed by autocrats to maintain the tenure of their regime and to ward off opposition. Why certain authoritarian regimes are more inclined towards repression than co-optation, and vice versa? In the literature, there are various explanations as to why certain autocrats are more repressive than others. These include economic conditions, political conditions, and external pressure. However, despite the variations in the explanations, the literature on autocrats' decision calculus for the prioritisation of repression over co-optation, and vice versa, is undertheorized. This piqued my

[1] Bemeo, 2016; Norris, 2017
[2] Gerschewski, 2015; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Bove & Rivera, 2015
[3] Gerschewski 2015, Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006

interest in examining this phenomenon by using a cross-regional study of The Gambia and Indonesia.

Focusing on the two pillars of authoritarian power consolidation, co-optation and repression, this study compares the authoritarian regimes of Jammeh (1994-2016) and Suharto (1966-1998). Specifically, this study examines the interplay between resource endowment and the dynamics use of repression and co-optation by autocrats. By examining these two regimes, the research seeks to uncover the dynamic strategies of authoritarian leaders in their quest to sustain and consolidate power.

Comparing Jammeh's and Suharto's regimes is intriguing for compelling reason. Both Jammeh and Suharto were military juntas, and climbed power through military backing. However, in the case of Suharto, even though there was repression but the regime was more inclined to co-opting oppositions especially after the oil boom, from the 1970s upward. Yet, in the case of Jammeh, the regime saw a consistent pattern of repression throughout, though there might have been elements of minor co-optation. Moreover, both Indonesia and Gambia are Muslim-majority countries and both experienced colonialisation. Despite these similarities, there is one thing that solidly distinguishes these regimes. In Indonesia, Suharto's regime was characterised by prosperity due to its resource endowment such as oil, minerals, foreign investments, and loan. Whereas, in case of the Gambia, Jammeh's regime was characterised by poor economic growth and low resource endowment, meaning it lacked a comparative advantage that could have been used to leverage Western support. Having many resources at its disposal, unlike the Jammeh regime, Suharto was able to ward off oppositions through incentives, patronage, and power-sharing; whereas, the poor regime of Jammeh leveraged the coercive state apparatuses to quell dissent. Therefore, in this research I proposed two hypotheses: 1. A low level of resource endowment leads to more repression. 2. a high level of resource endowment leads to more co-optation. To test these hypotheses, I examine the first hypothesis in the case of the Jammeh regime, whereas the second hypothesis in the case of the Suharto regime. Therefore, uncovering these variations in the approaches of regimes facing different resource endowment, we contribute in

refining our understanding of why certain authoritarian regimes prioritize co-optation over repression, and vice versa.

Consequently, this research intends to provide a more profound understanding within the body of literature on why certain regimes are more repressive than others. However, the research does not intend to generalise the outcome or insinuate that resource endowment is the only factor that influences the dynamics of authoritarian decision-making. Rather, the research intends to examine the relationship between the employment of co-optation and repression by autocrats and a regime's resource endowment. In doing this, the finding may help us to understand more about autocrat's power consolidation, and thus aiding, researchers and policymakers in better understanding authoritarian regimes, which could contribute to promoting democracy.

Research Question:

1. In comparison, why did Jammeh's regime predominantly use more repressive tactics than co-optation as a strategy, and why did Suharto's regime lean more onto co-optation as a strategy than repression?

A Brief History of the Jammeh Regime (1994-2016) and the Suharto Regime (1966-1998)

The Jammeh regime is acknowledged for its gross human rights violations. In the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations Commission (TRRC) Report 2022, this stretched from a bar on opposition parties, execution and incarceration of critics and journalists, killings and disappearances of political opponents, and rapes (TRRC, 2022). In 1994, Jammeh and his junior comrades[4] of the Gambia National Army (GNA) seized power through a bloodless military coup (Wiseman 1996; Saine 2002; Perfect 2008). Like many coup plotters, the 'gang' justified toppling the democratic elected government of Jawara for its rampage of corruption, tribal sentiments, and developmental impotency (Njie & Saine, 2019), which would later come to be the so-called saviours, the Jammeh regime.

[4] Sana Sabally, Sadibou Hydara, Edward Singhateh and Yankuba Touray – these were the major comrades of Yahya Jammeh in the military coup in the Gambia on 22nd July 1994

Jammeh and comrades promised the masses of what Perfect (2008) called ‘root and branch reform of the government’. These endless promises engrossed the hearts of the Gambian youths and the aggrieved populace. Thereby, four days after the coup, on July 26, Jammeh and his comrade formed a council called the Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), with Jammeh as its chairman (Perfect, 2008). However, by 1995, two of the members of the council, Sabally and Hydara, were arrested and imprisoned for an alleged coup attempt, where Hydara was slowly murdered by 3rd June (Hughes & Perfect, 2006). In April 1995, towards the end of the two-year transition, the Constitutional Review Council was formed, which was tasked with enacting a new constitution, the 1997 Constitution of the Gambia, which was endorsed by 70% of the electorates (Perfect 2010; Hughes and Perfect 2006; Sarr 2007; Saine 2009). According to Saine (2002), this twisted constitution would be Jammeh’s trump card, making him politically and economically unrivalled in the Gambia, winning him the election for two solid decades. Yet, even though Jammeh and comrades promised to return the country to civilian rule after the transition, a month before the election in September 1996, just like any autocrat, Jammeh retired from the army (Hughes & Perfect, 2006) and swiftly established a political party which would be known as the unrivalled Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC). With the aid of the manipulated electoral system, the APRC would make Jammeh the unrivalled chess player for two decades, winning elections in 1996 (56% of votes), in 2001 (53% of votes), in 2006 (67% of votes), (Perfect, 2010) and in 2011 (72% of votes) (Njie & Saine, 2019).

However, by December 2016, in the midst of growing discontent, the diaspora called for a coalition, unifying seven opposition parties along with an independent aspirant, with Adama Barrow as the ‘unexpected’ flag bearer (Njie & Saine, 2019). Yet Jammeh was relaxed, unrealising this coalition was so formidable and different from the coalitions he faced previously, leading to the abrupt end of the 22-year authoritarian regime (Njie & Saine, 2019). Despites Jammeh’s reluctant to step down, with the threatening intervention of international forces such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union

(AU), Jammeh was left with no alternative but to go into exile in Equatorial Guinea (Kreß & Nußberger, 2017).

Similar to Jammeh's regime, the Indonesian New Order, led by Suharto, emerged from the aftermath of the 1965/66 political turmoil, a military purge against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) members and sympathizers. It is reported that in September 1965, the army led by General Suharto intercepted an alleged coup, purportedly championed by the PKI communists[5], which lead to a massacre of about a million people (Robinson, 2018). Following the purge, with the mounting pressure from *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (*KAMI)[6] and growing public opinion against the first president Sukarno, Suharto was issued the presidential degree, granting him the sole power to maintain security (Vickers, 2005). Regrettably, using this degree, Suharto cleaned up the PKI remnants and its sympathizers in the military and bureaucracy (Elson, 2001). Taking advantage of this tumultuous time, Suharto replaced the democratically elected government of Sukarno, establishing his authoritarian reign that lasted until 1998 (Hadiz, 2015). Consequently, his reign was characterized by mixed strategies of repression and co-optation, using a centralized government approach to achieve economic development and stability (Hadiz, 2015).

Just like the Jammeh regime, Suharto hijacked the so-called vague state ideology of Pancasila to establish his reign and justify his actions. According to Ward (2010), Pancasilla was a double-edged sword, potential to harm. To make his indoctrination a widely spread amongst Indonesians, according to Ward (2010), Suharto did not only secure resolutions in 1978 and 1983 to make Pancasilla absolute, but he instituted the teaching of this doctrine from primary education to

[5] The issue of whether the massacre that occurred in Indonesia between 1965 and 1966 is a communist attempt coup or a coordinated military purge against the communist is not very clear in the literature. Scholars such as Crouch 1978, Cribb 1990 and others did not make a good account, but Robinson 2018 and Melvin 2018 accounts show a multifaceted account, pinning the blame on both the military and international intervention. Though, their account did not explicitly state that it was a military plot, the accounts show a blurry account of military conniving with Western powers to unseat the Sukarno regime due to its diplomatic ties

[6] It is an anti-communist student-led movement that rose in 1965 to combat against communist, also called Indonesian Students' Action Front.

office level. Therefore, with this, he was able to ban all movements that sounded like threat to his reign such as the Muslim political parties and movements.

The military, under Suharto's command, played a dominant role in crushing the alleged communist threat and helped consolidate power (Mietzner, 2018). As the regime leaned towards economic performance by 1970, the regime implemented policies aimed at nurturing economic growth, attracting foreign investment, and upholding social order. Though the New Order was able to achieve economic growth during this period, it was painted with widespread corruption, nepotism, and human rights abuses (Cribb, 1990).

Due to the widespread corruption and selective repression in annexed states like Papua and East Timor, just like the Jammeh's regime, the New Order attracted criticism both domestically and internationally. Subsequently, the regime faced challenges, predominantly in the later years, which lead to series of demands such as political reform and greater democratic freedoms. This, eventually in 1998, in the midst of the Asian economic crisis, waves of protests erupted like a volcano, particularly students' movements, leading to Suharto's resignation.

Major Reports of Repressions During the Jammeh and Suharto Regime



Figure 1: Frequency of repression in Gambia and Indonesia

The above chart shows major reports of repression during the Jammeh and Suharto regimes. This data was obtained from the revelations of both countries' commissions of enquiry, Amnesty International, and journal publications. To

determine the frequency of repression in these two regimes, I examined the qualitative data on both regimes which was later quantified using the following steps: 1. I only selected major cases, by major in this case here I mean that the repression had affect a group of people or a major political opponent or influential individual that attracted international attention. 2. Each case was counted as one regardless of the severity. The crimes (repressions) considered in this chart include unlawful mass arrest of oppositions or civil society movements, mass killings of soldiers, civilians or alleged coup plotters, and the arrests and killings of journalists and religious leaders. However, discriminative cases such as Aceh, East Timor, and Papua are not a target for this research but areas that happened to be part of Indonesia at Independence.

The revelations and findings of the enquiry commissions[7][8] in Indonesia along with an Amnesty International report and reviewed journal articles, shows that there were five[9] major repressions during the 32-year rule (1966-1998) of General Suharto; whereas, according to the reports of the conclusive Truth, Reconciliation and Reparations Commissions (TRRC) in the Gambia (2022) and Amnesty International, amongst other news outlets and journal articles, there were over 15 cases of serious repressions that took place in the 22-year rule (1994-2017) of Yahya Jammeh.

Remarkably, despite Jammeh's shorter tenure than Suharto's long-standing 32-year rule, the data explicitly discloses a frightening reality - Jammeh perpetrated three times more repressions than his Indonesian counterpart, General Suharto. In an average percentage considering the duration of their regimes, Suharto's regime was committing at an average of 15.6% of the time, whereas, Jammeh was at an average of 68.2%. That is to say, there was an act of major repression every 1.4 years in Jammeh's regime, whereas, in Suharto's regime major repression occurred

[7] Read Transitional justice fact sheet: Indonesia (2004) from https://asia-ajar.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Indonesia-English-Transitional-Justice-Factsheet.pdf;
[8] ICTJ. Background: A 32-year campaign of repression from https://www.ictj.org/location/indonesia
[9] Even though the cases of Aceh, East Timor, and Papua were severe, it was not internal repression, but a discriminatory repression. Those cases were mounted on regions that were not part of Indonesia but were annexed for resource extractions.

every 6.6 years. This unadulterated revelation challenges preconceived beliefs about the association between the span of a regime and the degree of human rights violations, demonstrating that the degree of repression is not solely determined by the duration of a leader's rule.

Therefore, the data posits that Jammeh predominantly relied on repression as a means of governance during his regime, a stark departure from the co-optation strategy associated with General Suharto. Suharto's regime, it suggests, was characterized by the misappropriation of resources through corruption and malpractices, which is typical of co-optation tactics. In essence, this data-driven analysis brings to light the nuanced dynamics of authoritarian rule, urging a deeper understanding of the multifaceted strategies employed by oppressive regimes. However, this argument does not indicate that Jammeh did not apply co-optation as a strategy, but it was not the dominant approach of his regime as demonstrated in chapter three, and vice versa Suharto. Whereas, even though Suharto used repression, it was not comparable to that of Jammeh. This was especially the case after the oil boom, when the regime generally shifted to co-optation using the oil and mineral money and contracts to lure oppositions into Golkar and giving subsidies to farmers, which we established in chapter four. Thus, both regimes applied both co-optation and repression, but to a varied degree.

Limitations of the Study

This research has various limitations. Primarily, in trying to set up the question, it was quite difficult to measure the variables: the number of cases of repressions and co-optations in each regime. This is because data on authoritarian regimes not so readily available like democratic regimes. Secondly, even with the available data conclusive ones are rare. This poses a challenge in measuring the indicators because even Freedom House and Amnesty International could not substantially measure such variables because of the difficulties such as safety and openness.

However, in this study, the researcher observed repression in indiscriminative cases, and not discriminative cases. For instance, in the case of Indonesia, the cases of Aceh, Papua, and East Timor are considered as discriminative cases because these three regions were not considered as Indonesia at the time, but rather annexed territories. Moreover, in measuring the frequency of repression in both regimes, the researcher only considered cases that were internationally pronounced or reported on the media, and could not cover cases that were not revealed on important websites such as Amnesty International's. Likewise, in the case of co-optation, since it is extremely difficult to measure, the researcher describes it mainly on the empirical chapter.

Furthermore, in this research, the researcher only considers to explain one independent variable – resource endowment – and how it affects autocrat's decision-making. Other factors such a religion, ethnicity, and other alternative factors are controlled in this research. Thus, the research is limited in explaining how the wealthiness of a regime can impact the trajectories of the regime. Finally, the researcher solely focused on explaining the relationship between the independent and dependent variable without looking deeper into the trajectories due to the limitations of the thesis: time, resources, and word count.

Thesis Structure

Firstly, chapter I (1) gives a general overview of the thesis. It contains the framing of the discussion, the problem statement, aims and objectives, justification of the topic, research question, significance, and clarity of concepts used in the thesis. Thus, in a nutshell, this chapter hights the background to the study.

Secondly, chapter II (2) entails the theoretical foundation of the research topic. It highlights the theories used to answer the research question, past contributions of scholars regarding authoritarian power consolidation. Thus, this section mainly revolves around the literature of previous studies on authoritarian regime and power consolidation – the theoretical foundation.

Thirdly, chapter III (3) contains the argument regarding the research question and hypothesis. I would discuss and present the supporting data about resource endowment in Gambia, particularly stressing particularly the economic and political resources, and its correlation with autocrats' decision-making on the type of strategy to employ when consolidating power. In addition to chapter 3, chapter IV (4) also contains the argument regarding the research question and hypothesis. In the chapter, I discuss and present the supporting data about resource endowment in Indonesia, stressing particularly the economic and political resources, and its correlation with autocrats' decision-making on the type of strategy to employ when consolidating power.

Finally, chapter V (5) provides a summary of the findings, significance, and the theoretical implication of the study. It synchronizes chapter 3 and 4, making a comparison of the two cases in order to support the theoretical argument or hypothesis. It further highlights the limitations of the research and also gives recommendation for future research.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION & METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I examine the theories on authoritarian power consolidation, conceptualize the three authoritarian strategies (co-optation, repression, and legitimation) and their interplay, and the literature on the possible explanations on why certain regimes prioritise certain strategies over the other. This chapter will also embed the theoretical framework and hypotheses, as well as the methodology of the research.

Authoritarianism Power Consolidation: Tactics and Strategies

Authoritarianism can be explained as a political system that is characterized by a dominant government that rejects democracy, human rights, and political diversity. It relies on strong centralized power to maintain the existing political order, often eroding the rule of law, separation of powers, and democratic processes (Kalu, 2019). Geddes (1999) identifies three forms of autocratic governance: dominant party style, military style, and personalistic style. Whereas, some countries exhibit a blurred line between democracy and authoritarianism, known as "hybrid democracies" or "competitive authoritarian" states (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Linz (1964) conceptualizes authoritarianism into four key characteristics: limited political pluralism, political legitimacy through emotional appeals, minimal political mobilization, and ill-defined executive powers. In essence, authoritarian governments lack competitive election, civil liberty, and are overshadowed by manipulated democratic institutions. Pegging the definition from Geddes, I classify Jammeh's and Suharto's regimes as authoritarian regimes because both were marked by a single dominant party, military backing, and personalistic leadership.

Autocratisation, the shift from an initially competitive system to an authoritarian regime, poses a perplexing challenge. This section of the research

proposes to explain the interplay between repression, co-optation, legitimation and authoritarian stability. Most importantly, it highlights the previous body of literature that intend to answer the research question: Why do certain states choose to prioritize repression over co-optation, while others opt for co-optation over repression?

In authoritarian governance, the challenge of maintaining political order without electoral accountability prompts autocrats to navigate the delicate balance between repression and co-optation (Ezrow & Frantz, 2011). Whilst examining the range of scholarly contributions on authoritarian strategies, Gerschewski (2015) identifies three main strategies use by autocrats for regime's stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation. This comprehensive and complex theoretical framework is designed for it to be enough to account for the complexity of autocratic systems and flexible enough for universal understanding of authoritarian power consolidation.



Figure 2: The three authoritarian strategies

Source: (Gerschewski, 2015)

As shown from the above diagram, Gerschewski's conceptualisation of autocrats' power consolidation, the three pillars of stability, serve as monument or a dynamic framework for understanding how authoritarian regimes consolidate power. According to Gerschewski (2015), these pillars lack inherent self-reinforcing mechanisms and depend on constant external support and resources. The institutionalization process within these pillars is contingent on the availability of external resources, and if regimes fail to maintain them due to budget constraints

or declining power resources, the institutionalization process would halt (Gerschewski, 2015). This could also be seen at the end of Suharto's regime, when the economy dwindled, co-optation proved impossible, whereas repression was long waning and lacked effectiveness to fend off opposition.

Autocrats consolidate power by strategically managing these pillars. The core lies in the coordinated and reinforcing interactions within the "arena" of legitimation, repression, and co-optation. Gerschewski (2015) further suggests that institutionalized legitimation involves citizens internalizing the regime's norms, while institutionalized repression structurally prevents opposition, and institutionalized co-optation fosters cooperation between political, business, and military elites.

Importantly, authoritarians face the challenge of maintaining these pillars through constant external support. The availability of power and material resources determines the limits of institutionalization. The metaphor of a plate spinner aptly illustrates this dynamic: if the ruling regime fails to sustain the motion of the plates (institutions) due to budget constraints or declining power resources, the institutionalization process halts, and the regime's stability is compromised (Gerschewski, 2015).

Moving further, the concept of authoritarian power consolidation has garnered attention for its profound implications in understanding the dynamics of autocracy. Power consolidation is a complex process as it involves numerous strategies and mechanisms employed by autocrats to consolidate and maintain power. The three main strategies deploy by autocrats are legitimation, co-optation, and repression.

Legitimation

Legitimation is a complex strategy employed by autocrats in sustaining and consolidating power. Autocrats deploy various means and mechanisms to justify their powers. Terzyan (2020, as cited from Lipset 1959) defines legitimacy as the

capability of an autocrat to stimulate and sustain the notion of citizens or subjects that his or her rule is the "most appropriate and proper" for the development of the state. As further discussed by Terzyan (2020), autocrats justify their power through attributing domestic challenges to external forces by creating narratives that champion them as the guardians or protectors of the state's interest. This kind of propaganda politics was, and still is, a common trend amongst former Western colonies. For instance, Jammeh portrayed himself as a hero by using Pan-Africanism as a stand to oppose the Western dominance, in which, he secured loyalty amongst his subjects. Many Gambians supported Jammeh when he stood and denounced the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer plus LGBTQ+ narratives and colonialism. Furthermore, he also used Islam as propaganda to win votes, as Gambia is a majority-Muslim country and sympathizers of Islam. This could also be seen in Malaysia where the Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called Israel's act as 'heights of barbarism' (Chew, 2023), using the case of Palestine and Israel as a mean to mobilize voters.

Authoritarian legitimation involves multidimensional strategies reflecting nationalism and modernization (Gerschewski, 2015). Thus, legitimation inattention hinders understanding of authoritarian stability. Studies on authoritarianism highlight the critical role legitimation plays in the survival of for coercive regimes (Soest & Grauvogel, 2015). Despite scholarly efforts in post-Soviet Eurasia, understanding authoritarian legitimation remains in its infancy (Dukalskis & Gerschewski, 2017). Modern authoritarian regimes, exemplified by the Arab Spring, necessitate a strong legitimizing basis beyond hierarchical power (Joshua, 2017). Besides, legitimacy crises, manifested in protests, are challenging to trace with early symptoms involving declining trust and loyalty (Booth & Seligson, 2009).

By and large, in authoritarian legitimation, religion plays an important role, as rulers leverage religious narratives to boost their grip on power. Luft (2020) speculates that autocrats utilize ideological, personalistic, and performance-based narratives to mobilize support, with religion serving as a central element in legitimation. Though both autocrats and democrats seek legitimation internally and externally (Hoffmann, 2012), autocrats are more inclined towards this strategy

since, at first, they came into office illegally (not through an electoral processs) through coups or inheritance.

Co-optation

Co-optation in authoritarian regimes varied, but it includes the strategic inclusion of potential oppositions parties or forces in the decision-making process (power-sharing), use of incentives, and patronage. Gerschewski (2015) conceptualises co-optation as the ability to attach key oppositions to the regime's institutions, which could be by means of power-sharing, incentives, and patronage distribution or clientelism. Similarly, Bove and Rivera (2015) add that co-optation is the co-opting of elites through incentives and power-sharing. For this, Trantidis (2022) asserts that, the strategic inclusion of potential actors is crucial in regime survival.

One of the most applicable tactics in co-optation amongst autocrats is power-sharing. In the case of co-optation, scholars have long recognized the significance of power-sharing arrangements and patronage distribution in authoritarian politics. Wintrobe's (2009) comparison of dictatorships to "warehouses or temples of pork" vividly illustrates the crucial role played by power-sharing dynamics. De Mesquita et al. (2005) assert that even the most oppressive dictators rely on the support of their core constituents, emphasizing the need for leaders to engage in concessions and negotiations with essential supporters. This we would come to see as a very key component of the Suharto's regime which was characterized by power-sharing and patronage.

The primary criterion for effective power-sharing agreements is the equitable distribution of benefits among participating parties. Svolik (2012) defines authoritarian power-sharing as agreements involving the division of spoils from joint rule. Cheeseman (2013) underscores power-sharing as the establishment of an inclusive government where major parties, though not always all, share cabinet posts and executive power. Nomikos (2021) extends this concept to post-conflict

scenarios, defining power-sharing as an arrangement where former combatants agree to share policymaking responsibilities at the state level.

The second requirement for effective power-sharing is the reallocation of power between the ruler and challenger. The extent to which the ruler's actions are constrained against reneging varies. Enforcement mechanisms, both institutional and coercive, play a crucial role. Institutional enforcement involves delegating agenda control to challengers through mechanisms such as regular elections or third-party enforcers like courts (Meng, Paine, & Powell, 2022). However, weak institutions can undermine the credibility of power-sharing promises, creating a catch-22 situation. Strong institutions, while capable of imposing costs on rulers for reneging, may lead to unintended consequences, conferring excessive power to challengers. The stakes of this conceptual distinction are high, as it determines the operational dynamics of power-sharing deals.

Recent literature on authoritarian institutions has expanded on this argument, demonstrating that institutionalizing power-sharing relationships through mechanisms like elections, legislatures, or political parties can have profound impacts on the longevity of authoritarian regimes (Brownlee, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Wright, 2008). Furthermore, such institutionalization has been shown to contribute to economic growth and attract investments (Gehlbach & Keefer, 2011). However, the delicate balance of power-sharing can be disrupted when autocrats' attempts at restructurings alter the established dynamic, leading to the creation of short-term losers (Gehlbach & Keefer, 2011). In practice, compensating potential losers becomes a critical strategy during reform implementation, as seen in historical cases such as Deng Xiaoping's reforms in China and Putin's manipulation of electoral rules in Russia (Gandhi, Heller, & Reuter, 2022).

In addition, another crucial tactic of co-optation used by authoritarian regimes is patronage distribution. Pepinsky (2007) refers patronage distribution as the allocation of resources, benefits and favours to ruling elites and potential oppositions to enhance support and loyalty. In practice, formal institutions, such as cabinets, serve as conduits for patronage distribution, allowing dictators to reward

elites from various affiliations. Ruling parties also play a role in rent distribution, offering collaboration opportunities within a stable patronage system. This leads to electoral processes and legislative bodies becoming venues for controlled bargaining, enabling leaders to provide policy concessions and rents to opposition parties (Fukuoka, 2015). Whereas, in conflict states, civil war settlements may include provisions for rebels to access benefits through national-level offices or regional autonomy deals.

Furthermore, co-optation is a crucial aspect of coup proofing. According to Bove and Rivera (2015), co-opting elites is strategic coup-proofing. This is when autocrats co-opt coalition members to avoid coup plots by giving them incentives or sharing power. This is true in the case of Suharto and Jammeh. Jammeh due to lack of resources, co-optation was a limited practices resulting in many coups, whereas, Suharto's regime was free from coups as demonstrated by the literature. Similarly, as argued by Sudduth (2017), for autocrats to eliminate rival elites and diminish their coup-making capabilities, incentives play a crucial role. On the other hand, scholars argue that when an autocrat faces a high risk of coup, they tend to employ - "coup-proofing" - strategies by purging and politically replacing strong military and elite figures (Biddle & Zirkle, 1996). However, existing studies often overlook how elites might react strategically to these elimination efforts, potentially launching counter-coups to replace the leader. The second line of research emphasizes the secrecy of authoritarian politics as a key factor, asserting that a dictator can diminish elites' capabilities when these efforts go unnoticed (Boix & Svolik, 2013). However, this assumption of secrecy does not always align with the observable nature of elite purges in dictatorships, as these actions are often well-witnessed by other regime insiders. The puzzle remains: under what conditions do dictators eliminate rivals without triggering a coup, considering that such efforts are often observable? The existing theories, while partially accurate, are incomplete, prompting the need for a formal model that explores why dictators undermine elites even when their actions are observable (Svolik, 2012; Boix & Svolik, 2013).

In the examined political context involving an autocrat and a ruling coalition, the central challenge in authoritarian governance, is a conflict of interest

between the two entities. Once the ruling coalition delegates executive powers to the autocrat, concerns arise about the potential misuse of those powers to consolidate and strengthen the ruler's position at the expense of the coalition (Svolik, 2009). The autocrat might divert resources, such as economic or military assets, to expand their loyal followers, ultimately eliminating coalition members deemed unnecessary. The ruling coalition's ability to stage a coup relies on maintaining sufficient power, making the dictator's opportunism a central concern. The moral hazard p stems from the difficulty of detecting the dictator's power consolidation attempts, given the secrecy and back-channel politics inherent in dictatorships. The ruling coalition relies on imperfect signals, such as loyalty shifts within the bureaucracy, to infer the dictator's actions and potential threats to their influence (Svolik, 2009).

To this end, in a more recent studies, Trantidis (2022) identifies the critical role of co-optation in helping the ruling elite passing institutional reforms and escalate repression without jeopardizing their legitimation, suggesting that successful authoritarian efforts may involve a strategic combination of co-optation and repression. In a similar vein, Bove & Rivera (2015) postulate that the use of proxies for repression and co-optation improves the performance of the model, highlighting the significance of these factors in understanding autocrats' behaviour.

Repression

This strategy in authoritarian power consolidation is a complex approach that involves various tactics aimed at consolidating and sustaining power. It is said to be a primary mechanism autocrats employ to fend off opposition and maintain control (Gandhi, 2008; De Mesquita, 2003). Golstein (1978) defines repression as a mean in which autocrats impose physical or psychological threat on individuals or groups in order to deter dissent. This tool is mostly deployed when autocrats perceived a threat, be it genuine or not, to counter or eliminate. According to Bhasin and Gandhi (2013), autocrats mostly repress oppositions before election, and repress civilian after election.

Repression stands as a defining feature of authoritarian rule, with autocrats relying on coercive measures to thwart perceived threats to political stability (Goldstein, 1978). Unlike democracies, where leaders may face electoral penalties for repression, authoritarian regimes function with limited accountability (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006). Repression manifests in rights limitations (e.g. censorship) and physical integrity rights violations (e.g. torture and political imprisonment). Frantz and Kendall-Taylor's (2014) study establishes that post-WWII autocrats universally engage in restriction of rights to variable degrees, with the majority resorting to physical rights violations through violence.

Furthermore, Giustozzi (2011) challenges conventional narratives about the gradual consolidation of power by monarchs over feudal nobility. Giustozzi (2011) explores the role of violent coercion in the creation of states, emphasizing the ruthlessly violent nature of power accumulation and the strategic use of violence in conflicts. He delves into historical records to understand how coercive power is accumulated, translated into geographical control, and expanded outward. He proposes that institution-building, hostile collective action, and the role of policing are crucial in consolidating the monopoly of violence (Giustozzi, 2011).

Similarly, in Liu's (2022) article, he examines how rebel groups govern after winning a civil war, focusing on post-war governance strategies. He argues that rebels consolidate power through ties in their strongholds, coercion in rival strongholds, and co-optation in unsecured terrain (Liu, 2022). The research, based on the Zimbabwe Liberation War, shows that development increased most rapidly in unsecured areas and least in rival strongholds, indicating the impact of rebel-civilian ties on post-war governance strategies (Liu, 2022).

In a similar study, Mathur (1992) explores the dynamics of state power and coercion in India since independence. He reflects on the challenges faced by the Indian state, including social conflicts and the erosion of democratic institutions (Mathur, 1992). He draws on various perspectives to analyse the relationship between the state and society. Mathur (1992) emphasizes that the dual nature of state coercion, highlighting its role in maintaining order and legitimacy while

cautioning against overuse leading to the erosion of legitimacy. Thus, he theorizes that the overuse of repression leads to the erosion of state legitimation.

Additionally, other studies conducted by Morrow and Üngör explore the social mechanics of organized violence and emphasize the central role of the nation-state in the proliferation of violent actions in modernity. Morrow (2020) challenges views that see mass atrocities through the collapse of moral norms, emphasizing the presence of norms rather than their absence. Whereas, Üngör (2020) analyses the historical and structural basis of violent action, specifically focusing on the relationship between the state's coercive apparatuses and violent non-state actors.

Consequently, this body of literature highlight how various authors analyze the use of repression by authoritarian regimes to consolidate power. From the primitive accumulation of coercive power to rebel governance, and the dynamics of state power in different contexts, these perspectives contribute to a nuanced understanding of authoritarian strategies.

The examination of control over political offices explores how leaders manipulate positions to neutralize potential opponents. Purges, the reshuffling of state officials, and the concentration of power through key political positions are identified as indicators of power consolidation (Sudduth, 2017; Banks, 2011). This was a key strategy in both Suharto's and Jammeh's regime. For instance, individuals and groups who had initially supported Suharto's rise to power found themselves sidelined as the regime consolidated its control. The army's ascendancy led to significant changes in the political landscape. Former power brokers such as influential generals like Dharsono and Sumitro, were replaced, while political figures like Nasution faded into obscurity (Grant, 1978).

By and large, the body of literature on authoritarianism and autocratisation has explored deeply into the interconnectedness of autocratic strategies and toolkits employed by autocrats to consolidate and sustain power. Autocrats strategically balance these tools based on perceived threats, emphasizing the importance of understanding how co-optation reshapes repression dynamics. The findings underscore the interconnected nature of the autocrat's 'toolkit', providing insights into the complexities of autocratic survival strategies in the absence of electoral

accountability. Moreover, there is an interesting variation in why certain types of strategies are dominantly deployed by autocrats in maintaining the tenure of their regimes and to ward off opposition, and the factors influence the decisions of autocrats. Thus, the literature on authoritarianism and authoritarian power consolidation has comprehensively discussed the complex web of mechanisms employed by autocrats to consolidate and sustain power despite the variations.

Alternative Explanations on Why Certain Regimes are More Repressive

In examining the conditions behind why certain states are more politically repressive than others, scholars have variant of explanations. Firstly, some scholars posit that the more democratic a government, the less likely it is to engage in repression. According to Gurr and Lichbach (1986), even though democracies have sometimes used repression during crises, they generally offer alternatives like bargaining and compromise to manage conflict. Democracies with genuine participatory channels, such as political parties and elections, are less inclined to use repression as a tool of governance (Mitchell, Howard & Donnelly, 1987). That is to say, the more democratic the states' institutions, the lesser the repression. Scholars further argue that the commitment of states in internationals agreements such as the human rights act, make states to refrain from excessive repression. For examples, ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights influence the behaviours of states as it influences their domestic law, lowering their repression (Simmons, 2009). Similarly, Conrad and Ritter (2013) also postulate that states with commitment to human rights are more likely to not repress.

Secondly, scholars also argue that the greater the socioeconomic needs in society the more it leads to increased repression by the government. Economic dissatisfaction becomes a political variable, and governments often face pressure from citizens needing jobs, housing, health, and other essentials (Duff, McCamant, & Morales, 1976). Meanwhile, authoritarian governments, in particular, may resort to repression to maintain control amidst economic scarcity (Estates, 1984).

Another assertion made by scholars is that, the more societal inequality increases the more likely the government is to repress the population. According to Moon and Dixon (1985), inequality, intensified by elite exploitation, creates strife and instability, leading authorities to use repression to protect their interests. This pattern is prevalent in many case studies, showing how elites use state power to maintain economic advantages (Scott, 1985).

Fourthly, another alternative explanation is that rapid economic growth can lead to increased repression as leaders attempt to control the development process and prevent political mobilization of the masses (Gurr, 1986). Rapid growth often benefits the rich disproportionately, leading to resentment among the poor, which governments may suppress through repression (Ward, 1978). However, according to Lopez-Pintor (1987) the relationship between economic growth and political effects can be complex and ambivalent.

Finally, some scholars hypothesize that higher levels of economic development are associated with less government repression. That is simply to say, higher economic development levels often correlate with greater societal satisfaction, reducing the need for repression (Duff, McCamant, & Morales, 1976). This is because, as stated by Dye and Zeigler (1988), developed societies can afford to share wealth more equitably, mitigating conflict. Again, Banks (1985), shows that specific evidence ties higher economic levels to lower repression, although this relationship is not universally agreed upon.

In conclusion, the degree of democracy, socioeconomic needs, societal inequality, economic growth rate, and level of economic development all significantly influence the likelihood of government repression. These explanations could be classified into three: external pressure explanations, state-centred explanations, and societal-centred explanations. However, even though these alternative explanations tried to answer the reason why repression is more prevalent in one state over another, the explanations did not put into consideration the trade-off of repression – the rational calculus of costs and benefits. Secondly, these explanations did not explicitly explain why certain regimes are more inclined to repression than co-optation and, vice versa. Moreover, less repression does not

necessarily indicate being more democratic, autocrats steal democratic features (dissent, association, and assembly) through economic performance such as the case of China, Singapore, Rwanda, and Equatorial Guinea. Also, inequality may not necessarily lead to repression, because targets of autocrats in co-optation is potential rivals and not the general population like in the case of democracy. Thus, the dissatisfaction of low-class individuals cannot affect the longevity of regime since the regime depends mostly on the middle class, who are intermediates between the rulers and the rule, as described in resource mobilisation theory. Additionally, there is lack of concession on the economic explanation. Therefore, considering these limitations, the alternative explanations do not offer a sufficient explanation on 'why certain regimes are more inclined towards repression than co-optation, and vice versa?' For this reason, my research is built upon this gap using the utilitarian-rational approach on cost and benefit to explain why resource endowment best explain the autocrat's decision-making process.

Theoretical Framework

The utilitarian-rational approach is one of the longest tanding theories in history. It has given birth to branches of thoughts. However, in this study, I draw inspiration from Dahl's (1972) concept of a utilitarian-rational approach of cost and benefit on decision-making processes. In Dahl's (1972) work, he argues that when regimes are moving towards polyarchy (partial democracy), the regime becomes more tolerant, giving civil society priority in decision making, which, in turn, makes repression a less valuable mechanism for governments. This viewpoint emphasizes on how government manoeuvre between repression and co-optation in shaping political systems (Brownlee, 2009). Therefore, in this research we borrowed Dahl's first two assumptions: 1. If the costs of tolerance decrease the government would likely increase tolerance; 2. If the costs of suppression increase, the government would also increase tolerance. Adopting this argument, considering the authoritarian decision-making strategy of co-optation and repression, I conclude with the diagram below:



Figure 3: Autocrat's decision-making calculus

The assumptions above suggest that: when the cost of co-optation is low, the government tends to adopt tolerance; similarly, when the costs of repression is high, the government adopts tolerance. That is, when the government wants to legitimise, it normally calculates the cost of co-optation and repression. If the cost of co-optation is higher than the cost of repression, in a place where the civil society is weak and government coercive apparatuses are strong, the government's likelihood to adopt repression to consolidate power would be high. Similarly, when the costs of repression exceed the costs of tolerance (co-optation) the government would opt for co-optation to minimize costs.

Utilitarianism is a philosophical approach that emphasizes maximizing overall happiness or well-being, which usually involves rational decision-making based on the principle of 'the greater good for the greater number' (Wright, 2003). This approach is usually taken when leaders calculate the benefit and cost of decision or policy on society before undertaking it (Wright, 2003). This approach is often associated with rationality and cognitive processes in the realm of decision-making and the state's behaviour. That is to say, utilitarianism is characterized by a rational approach, where decision making by a state is driven by logic (Santini, Ladeira, Sampaio, & Falcão, 2015).

This approach is key to understanding the underlying factors that influence the decision-making strategies of autocrats, why some autocrats are more inclined toward repression than co-optation as a mechanism for power consolidation, and vice versa. Since autocrats are incline to power consolidations, they often employ various mechanisms such as co-optation, repression, and legitimation (Conway &

Gawronski, 2013). However, it worthy to note that even though autocrats employ various tactics and strategies, situations, such as resource endowment, often dictate the dominant strategy. For instance, in the case of Suharto, he was more inclined to repression until the years of the oil boom in the early 1970s, which opened another door for 're-strategization'. Thus, the utilitarian perspective on decision-making can help us to understand the rationale behind the choices made by authoritarian leaders to maintain their grip on power.

According to Martin et al. (2021), utilitarian decision-making, in the context of authoritarian regime, can be understood through the lens of maximizing utility or minimizing disutility (for the regime in power). As a result, when autocrats employ co-optation, their main intention is to maximize the gains or minimize the potential loss of power by incorporating selected political opponents into the ruling structure to create a facade of inclusivity while sustaining control. That is, in other words, leaders, who are rational beings, weigh the pros and cons of co-optation in terms of regime stability and longevity against the potential risks it may pose to their regimes.

Just like co-optation, repression in authoritarian regimes can also be examined using the utilitarian rational approach. Autocrats use of force to consolidate power are justified based on the perceived consequences for the regime's survival and stability (Goldstein, 1978). For autocrats to improve decision-making, the utilitarian rational approach prescribes calculating the expected utilities of different courses of action, such as the level of dissent that can be quelled through repression and the potential backlash or resistance that may arise as a result (Olar, 2019). Therefore, by considering the greater good of the regime, autocrats may justify repressive measures as necessary for maintaining order and control.

Besides, in understanding the underlying reasons as to why autocrats consider using more of repression than co-optation and, vice versa, we can further elucidate by considering the psychological and cognitive processes involved in moral judgment. That is, as per the dual-process theory of moral judgment, it posits that individuals may rely on deontological principles (the essential nature of actions) or utilitarian considerations (consequences of actions) when faced with

moral impasses (Everett & Kahane, 2020). Therefore, autocrats who face moral dilemma most likely would prioritize utilitarian outcomes that serve the interests of the regime, even if it involves compromising on ethical or moral principles (Everett & Kahane, 2020).

In conclusion, the utilitarian approach serves as a framework for decision-making, in which leaders or individuals use to weigh the costs and benefits of their actions, determining the course of action that maximizes general utility or well-being. In the case of autocrats, the concepts of cost and benefit is crucial. Before autocrats implement any decision, they weigh the outcome. For instance, if an autocrat were to prioritise co-optation over repression, it first assesses the costs and benefits of co-optation, which involves incorporating potential opposition through power-sharing or patronage, to neutralize opposition and maintain control. Whereas the benefit dwarfs the cost, autocrats might consider co-optation, but on the other hand, when autocrats perceive co-optation as a threat to their powers or regimes' stability, the autocrat would utilise repression. For instance, Suharto, during the oil boom period, he had both the loyalty of the military and also enough resources, however, since repression was more expensive because it meant crushing the strong civil society and killing fellow countrymen, Suharto chose co-optation over repression to minimise the costs. Through patronage, resource distribution, and power-sharing, he was able to consolidate power and ensure the regime's longevity. On the other hand, Jammeh, due to a lack of resources, had no other option but to crush his oppositions despite the cost – since tolerance was more expensive. As a result, his regime was unstable, which led to countless coup attempts. Thus, by applying a utilitarian calculus, autocrats may justify co-optation based on the perceived benefits of maintaining power and the costs associated with potential dissent.

The Argument

This thesis aims to explain *why certain regimes are more inclined towards using repression than co-optation, and vice versa*, to fend off oppositions or

potential rivals. I argue that autocrats' rational calculus for the use of repression or co-optation is influenced by resource endowment. That is to say, simply, a regime with enough resource at its disposal, would likely use co-optation as a dominant strategy to fend off oppositions; whereas, a regime with limited resources at its disposal, would likely use repression as a dominant strategy to fend off oppositions.

Resource endowment in this research simply means any resource that could generate revenue for autocrats such as natural resources, government corporations, investments, loans, foreign exchanges, agriculture and so forth, which could be used in the provision of the common good as a fulfilment for the social contract (for public interest). Hence, in my argument, I hypothesize that: 1.A high level of resource endowment leads to low repression and high co-optation. 2. A low level of resource endowment leads to high repression and low co-optation.



Figure 4: Resource endowment vs autocrat's decision-making

Source: Prepared by author

Since the ultimate goal of all autocratic regimes is survival, as rational beings, autocrats use the cost-benefit calculus to assess their decision-making processes. Resource endowment as a primary factor that shape the expected costs and benefits of autocrats' use of repression and co-optation, shows that high or low a,oumt of resources signifies the expected cost of repression or co-optation. That is to say, an authoritarian regime with low level of resource at its disposal may likely resort to exaggerated repression to minimise the cost of oppositions and maximises the survival of the regime. On the other hand, a regime with enough resources to ward off its oppositions through incentives, patronage, and power-sharing, would likely tolerate to maximises regime's survival, stability, and longevity, as well as to minimise the cost of repression and oppositions.

Resource endowment is a significant determinant in the decision-making process in authoritarian regimes. In the utilitarian calculation of costs and benefits in the context of co-optation and repression, autocrats weigh the number of resources at its disposal. For instance, in the case of Jammeh's regime in the Gambia, I argue that Jammeh was more inclined to repression than co-optation due to inadequate resource endowment. Co-optation could be feasible if a regime has enough resource to support the state's economic power, such as in the case of Suharto. My second argument is that, Suharto was more inclined to co-optation because he had adequate resource to co-opt oppositions. Suharto gained acknowledgement not only from civil servants and service men, but also the farmer. This was because there was lot of wealth in the regime after the oil boom. He was able to patronize businessmen, co-opt oppositions through incentives and lucrative positions, and give subsidies to farmers. Through this, he was able consolidate and maintain his grip on power for three decades. Unlike Suharto, Jammeh's poor regime, was not able to use the 'carrot' to fend off opposition. Thus, Jammeh, in order to consolidate power, resorted to exaggerated repression throughout his reign, leading to resentment that resulted in unending protests and coups, involving both the military and civilian.

Therefore, low resource endowment can limit a regime's ability to co-opt dissenting groups through material incentives or patronage (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006), leading to a greater reliance on repression as a means of social control. This was affirmed by Smith (2004) who argues that co-optation may be viable in environments where resource is abundant. Despite the trade-offs involve in repression such as the significant costs in terms of human rights violations and societal unrest, in order to consolidate power and ward off oppositions, which is for the greater good for their regimes, authoritarian leaders would still choose repression over co-optation. Thus, as compensation for their inability to provide resource benefits to oppositions, authoritarian regimes with low resource endowment may resort to high levels of repression, thereby consolidating their grip on power (Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014).

However, by providing material incentives or access to resources, authoritarian leaders can co-opt opponents and reduce the need for overt repression,

thereby enhancing regime survival. In contrast, repression, while costly in terms of resources and potential backlash, may be employed to increase the costs of collective action and eliminate opposition actors, thereby strengthening regime control.

Yet, if the government is strong and has enough resource and military capacity to contain the cost of tolerance, it tends to adopt more co-optation. Thus, this research identifies low resource endowment and high resource endowment as the independent variables, whereas repression and co-optation serve as the dependent variables. In order to measure the variables, particular indicators are identified. For instance, in order to measure the resource endowment, I examine the economic and political conditions of the countries, the gross domestic production (GDP) per capita, economic growth rate and diplomatic exchanges and aids would be used. Whereas, to measure the degree of repression I analyse the number of political arrests, killings, the degree of censorship, and human rights reports, and to measure the degree of co-optation, I examine the established political parties, alliances, and executive power-sharing.

In summary, the hypothesis that states *low resource endowment leads to high repression* can be elucidated through a cost-benefit analysis framework that considers the strategic calculations made by authoritarian regimes to maintain control in resource-constrained environments. By weighing the costs and benefits of repression, co-optation, and resource allocation, authoritarian leaders navigate the complex dynamics of governance, seeking to maximize their utility and ensure regime survival in the face of internal and external challenges.

Case Selection

Certainly, the body of literature has offered us a variety of cases on authoritarian regimes and their dynamic use of co-optation and repression. Whilst the existing literature has provided numerous cases on authoritarian regimes, however this research has chosen the Suharto regime in Indonesia (1966-1998) and the Jammeh regime in Gambia (1994-2016). There are numerous reasons behind the case

selection. In the table below, it shows the comparisons of Jammeh's and Suharto's regimes:

	The (1994-2016)	**Indonesia (1966-1998)**
Similarities	Military junta	Military junta
	Single party dominance (APRC)	Single-party dominance (GOLKAR)
	Muslim-majority country	Muslim-majority country
Differences	Poor economy	Prosperous economy
	Weak civil society	Strong civil society
	Western Pressure	Western Support

Table 1: Comparison of Jammeh and Suharto regimes

Source: Prepared by author

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research approach. To answer the question *why do certain autocrats prioritize more of repression than co-optation, and vice versa?* I used a comparative case study by comparing the authoritarian regimes of Yahya Jammeh in the Gambia (1994 to 2016), and Suharto in Indonesia (1966 to 1998). I used comparison method in order to test my hypotheses: 1. *Low resource endowment leads to more repression than co-optation in authoritarian regimes, and; 2. High resource endowment leads to more co-optation than repression in authoritarian regimes*. In the case of the Gambia (1994-2016), I tested the first assumption, and I used the case of Indonesia (1966-1998) to test the second assumption. This approach enhanced a solid analysis on *why Jammeh prioritized more of repression than co-optation, and Suharto prioritised more of co-optation than repression?*

As desk research, I collected data from various online sources such as documents and reports from official government websites, international websites such as the United Nations, the World Bank database, Amnesty International, and Freedom House. Additionally, I also reviewed scholarly articles, books, news outlets, periodical reports, YouTube videos, and online statements from political commentators.

Furthermore, this research used content analysis – a systematic approach to analyse the documents, videos, and audios obtained during the data collection in order to identify themes, patterns, and variations in the strategic employment of repression and co-optation by the two regimes. Also, where triangulation of the data was possible, I made sure that various data sources were used to enhance the validity and reliability of the narratives.

CHAPTER III

REPRESSION AND RESOURCE ENDOWMENT IN THE GAMBIA

This chapter examines the relationship between repression and resource endowment in the Gambia. Firstly, it starts by examining the resource endowment in the Gambia during the Jammeh's regime. I then briefly examine the economy of the Gambia and its sources such as agriculture and tourism, and the impact of foreign investment and foreign aid, which were the main sources of revenue for the government. Secondly, I examine how repression, as a strategy, was administered by Jammeh's regime in order to consolidate power. In doing this, I will examine the major crackdowns that occurred between 1994 to 2016 under three major institutions: the security sector (National Intelligence Agency, the NIA), the justice system (the court and the ministry of justice), and the prison system. However, these events may not follow chronological order (according to dates the events occurred), but I would maintain a coherent description of the narration. Finally, I conclude on the interplay between the low resource endowment and Jammeh's repression in The Gambia.

Interplay Between Resource Endowment and Repression in the Gambia

To understand "why Jammeh leaned more on repression than co-optation during his 22-year dictatorship", I draw my insights from Dahl's explanation of utilitarian rational approach of cost and benefit. I argue that authoritarian regimes with low resource tend to lean more on repression because it is cheaper, as co-optation needs more resources, although is less risky than repression as a primary tool. Due to The Gambia's limited land size and poor agricultural practices coupled with little to no resources, Jammeh's authoritarian regime was economically disabled, making it a dysfunctional government, compelled to repress. As it is argued by Banks (1958), Dye and Zeigler (1988), and Duff, McCamant, and

Morales (1976), the level of economic growth or resource endowment has a positive influence on the level of repression in a state. As argued by Dahls (1971) leaders are rational beings; therefore, in the event that they are to prioritise one strategy over the other, they calculate the cost and benefits of their policies or approaches. Hence, to put it simply, more repression is predicted if the advantages outweigh the disadvantages (i.e. when the alternatives are unfavourable and the likelihood of success is high). On the other hand, very little or no repression is anticipated if the costs outweigh the benefits, alternatives exist, and the likelihood of success is minimal (Moore, 2000). As a result, since the Jammeh regime was poor and it was easier to mobilize and pay uneducated and less advantageous individuals in the military and police to eliminate any obstacles, Jammeh chose repression over co-optation. With The Gambia's high levels of unemployment, Jammeh was able to mobilize the youth and formed gangs such as the 'Junglers' (within the NIA) who were given unrivalled power even above high-ranking officers, these 'Junglers' would become the nightmares of Gambians due to their mysteriousness. Due to their brutality, and ways they got information, this group left a permanent scar in the minds of Gambians, making every neighbour a suspect. Wintrobe (2000) argues how, for autocrats to eliminate their fears, they have to repress more in order quell opposition, like adding sugar to a peppery soup to ease the tension. Thus, in the case of Jammeh's regime, since repression was easier to employ due to its poor resource endowment and weak civil society at that time, Jammeh's government pushed the Junta's draconian laws in order to legalise and justify its killings, disappearances, unlawful imprisonment, and public crackdowns.

Overview of The Gambia Economy

The Gambia is a small nation-state with a land area of 4,361 square miles, which is position at the drought-prone Sudano-Sahelian region of West Africa (Sillah, 1990). As a semi-land locked state, it is surrounded by Senegal in three sides except at the westernmost side of the Atlantic Ocean. The Gambia depends solely on a single cash crop, groundnut, which made it vulnerable in term of land

productivity and export rates – because of its vulnerability, Sallah (1990) describe the Gambia as a 'price taker'.

After the coup, between 1995 to 1996, The Gambia was said to be one of the fastest growing economies in West Africa, where it was ranked third after Ivory Coast (Sanyang & Camara, 2014). Although by 2014, the Gambia's economy was ranked at the bottom of the 16 member states of ECOWAS (Sanyang & Camara, 2014), showing a continuous economic crisis in the country. Moreover, as reported by the International Monetary Fund (1995), the Gambia's economy in 1993 and 1994 suffered a stagnant economic growth, leading to an economic contraction of at least 4% in 1994 and 1995. Moreover, during this period, both export (agriculture) and tourism, the roots of the country's economy, declined harshly, leading to a serious domestic revenue fall above 4% of the GDP in 1993 and 1995; likewise, foreign aid in to the country dropped by 2% as a result of sanctions and the suspension of balance-of-payments after the coup (International Monetary Fund, 1995). The graph below shows the Gambian GDP per capita and GDP growth between 1994-2016:



Figure 5: Gambia' GDP growth and GDP per Capita 1994-2015

Source: Prepared by author

The graphs above illustrate the GDP and GDP per capita in the Gambia during the authoritarian regime of Yahya Jammeh in its actual values (US$). It

shows a country that lived through economic recessions between 1994 and 2016, which could be identified in five time periods: 2002, 2005, 2006, 2011, and 2014. This data shows the scale of the extreme poverty[10] of the Gambia, with governance between 1994 and 2016 a harsh reality filled with military purges, torture, murder, and illegal imprisonment. Despite these solemn fluctuations, Jammeh was able to rule the Gambia for two solid decades. Though there were some points where the graph indicate growth, this does not reflect the living standards of the Gambian people. For instance, between 1994 and 2000, the Gambia's GDP increased from $750 million to $780 million; however, the GDP per capita declined from $619 to $545. Despite the Gambian economy showing positive growth at the time, the poverty level was still very significant. According to a 2007 Gambia Bureau of Statistics report, during Jammeh's authoritarian regime, the poverty rate was widely spread at 58% in 2003. Moreover, Gambia's GDP was still less than $1 billion, unlike the Suharto's regime that ranged between $50 billion to $200 billion, which meant Jammeh's regime faced challenges in buying opponents, because there was not enough wealth for patronage or incentives.

Likewise, the graph also shows that in the years between 2001 and 2010, the Gambia suffered a continued economic volatility. This could be attested, for instance, in 2010, where the Gambia's GDP rose to $1.54 billion from the $0.69 billion in 2001, whereas GDP per capita rose from $465 (as in 2001) to $797 (as in 2010). However, this significant growth was not persistent because in both 2002 and 2011, the country experienced a sharp downturn with an economic contraction of -3.25% and -8.13%, respectively. Even though the economy saw 7.05% growth in 2004, reflecting a little comeback, there were fluctuations in 2009, GDP growth fluctuated from 7.05% to 6.67%, which worsened by 2011. Moreover, in Jammeh's final years between 2011 and 2016, the country also saw economic fluctuations with poor economic growth. For instance, 2011and 2014 saw a solemn recession with economic contraction of -8.13% and -1.41%, respectively. This economy instability also led to political instability and unrest throughout the regime, with

[10] Gambia was not blessed with resources that could elevate its economic growth. For instance, Jammeh's regime could hardly reached 1.5 billion GDP throughout the 22 years rule, unlike Indonesia that rose from 50 billion in 1966 to 200 billion by early 1990s. This has shown a disparity in riches.

attempted coups in 1996, 2000, 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2014 and numerous other protests that led to crackdowns. Thus, in the following sections, I would present the two major drivers of the Gambia economy and revenue generation, which are agriculture and tourism, and along with trade and investment.

Agriculture

Agriculture is the backbone of the Gambian economy. It is a source of employment for about 70% of the state's labour force, and also accounts for 33% of the Gambia's GDP, as recorded in 2007 (Heintz, Oya, & Zepeda, 2008). However, according to Sallah (1990), the Gambia is a poor agricultural state. Agriculture, though, a chief component of the country's GDP, has not elevated the living standards or food security in the country because agriculture can only supply half of the population due to poor agricultural practices, low commercialisation, low rainfall and others factors, which has led to low crop yields (International Trade Administration U.S. Department of Commerce, 2022). Though, 54% of the Gambian land is arable for farming (Ndow, 2013), the lack of mechanisation has meant, the sector has not been optimally productive since independence. This had lowered the main cash crop, groundnut, to form only 6% of the GDP though grown by about 80% of farmers (Gajigo & Saine, 2011). At the same time, the fishing sector contributes about $55.5 million per year, which is about 12% of the Gambia's GDP (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change , 2022). This sector account for 30,000 employments of the populace (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change , 2022). The graph below shows the contribution of agriculture to GDP from 1994 to 2016:



Figure 6: Agriculture's contribution on GDP growth

Source: Prepared by author

Tourism

Domestically, the military regime proclaimed support for free-market capitalism but faced economic challenges, particularly in the tourist industry, a crucial sector for foreign exchange earnings. After the 1994 coup attempt, many British tour operators withdrew from the Gambia, followed by similar advice from other European governments (Perfect, 2008). This led to a decline in tourist numbers, causing hotel closures and mass unemployment in tourist-related occupations. Second only to agriculture during Jammeh's era, tourism was the pride of the country, which earned The Gambia the name 'the Smiling Coast of Africa' because of its attractive tourist locations. Tourism serves as the second - largest source of revenue for the state. For instance, between 1994 and 2012, the contribution of tourism to the Gambia's GDP swelled from 12% to 22% (Sanyang & Camara, 2014). However, tourism was greatly affected after the coup due to external donors' sanctions (Perfect, 2008). By 2016, tourism accounted for 53% of the Gambian GDP. Below shows the tourism contribution in percentage between 1995-2021.



Figure 7: Tourism's contribution to GDP growth

Source: Gambia Tourism Sector

In terms of trade, the Gambian economy operated under an open and liberal regime, leveraging its strategic location and efficient port facilities to serve as a gateway to the West African region. Re-exports dominated the external sector, and the country had been part of the exchange rate mechanism of the West African Monetary Zone since 2002. Import tariffs were capped at 18%, with export taxes restricted to fish and fish products.

Efforts were made to integrate the country into the global trading system through initiatives like the Integrated Framework programme of the EU. Despite progress in sectors like health, education, and access to water supply, poverty remained a pervasive issue, particularly in rural areas, where more than 62% of the population were described as 'very poor' (Heintz, Oya, & Zepeda, 2008). Urban poverty also rose due to increased rural-urban migration and a narrow employment base with associated low wages (Heintz, Oya, & Zepeda, 2008).

During this time, foreign aid played a significant role in the country's economy. Historically, Gambian foreign policy aimed to maintain independent statehood and secure funding from foreign donors for development projects, often benefiting government elites as well. Under President Jawara, the Gambia obtained considerable funding from Western states during the Cold War era by aligning with the West and demonstrating an anti-Soviet stance (Wiseman, 1996). Aid also flowed in from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and conservative Gulf states, where the country leveraged its Islamic identity (Wiseman, 1996). However, the

transition from civilian rule to military rule posed challenges to this policy, especially in the post-Cold War world. As the Cold War ended, Western powers reduced financial assistance following the coup, with significant cuts from the EU, the US, and the UK, as Cold War foreign policy was no longer important (Wiseman, 1996). Thus, following this, Japan to also completely withdrew its aid for the Gambia in 1994 (Wiseman, 1996).

In response to this diminishing foreign income, the military regime sought alternative sources of funding, by restoring its diplomatic relations with Libya and also fostering its diplomatic relations with the Gulf states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to enhance its aid (Wiseman, 1996). Following denouncement of these moves from the West, Jammeh in 2006 developed bilateral relations with Iran and Venezuela. In December 2006, Jammeh visited Iran, where a deal was made for Iran to loan the Jammeh regime $15 million to invest in agriculture. In August 2007 following a treaty agreement, Venezuela donated a million-dollar project for building a hospital specially for treating HIV/AIDS (known as Jammeh's year of the so-called 'HIV treatment') (Perfect, 2010).

Despite the partial recovery of the economy, Jammeh's regime was continuously affected by the sanctions imposed by external donors on the regime (Perfect, 2008). Even after the sanctions were lifted, the country has struggled between inflation and economic recession. As reported by the Human Poverty Index in 2009, the Gambia was ranked 123rd out of 135 nation-states (Perfect, 2010), which shows the ill of the Gambia economy at the time. Though the tourism recovery fared mildly better, it did little to relieve ordinary Gambians from poverty. In addition, the regime's economy was married to foreign loans and grants and there were little to no resources such as oil to attract heavy investment as in Suharto's regime in Indonesia.

Institutionalisation of Repression in the Gambia (1994-2016)

This section will examine how Jammeh institutionalized repression in order to consolidate power. In doing this, I will examine the major cases of repression that occurred between 1994 and 2016 through the notoriously repressive institutions such as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), the judiciary system, and the prison system, showing how Jammeh used these institutions to administer fear and fend off opposition in order to consolidate power. It is worth noting that, these institutions were like a 'food chain'. The NIA was combined with selected military and police officers, making it hard to distinguish the three forces in the repression process. This organ was also directly link with the prison system, meaning the NIA had access to prisoners anytime it needed to eliminate or torture a target. Meanwhile, the police, which was responsible in handling law and order was also bound to the court, making the repression systematic.

Repression and the Security Agency

The rise of the military Junta in July 1994 marked a dark period in Gambian history, characterized by the erosion of fundamental rights and freedoms through draconian decrees (Njie & Saine, 2019). One such decree, No. 13, birthed the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) on November 3, 1994, supplanting the National Security Service of the prior regime (Office of the National Security, The Gambia, 2009). However, Decree No. 45, enacted on June 29, 1995, replaced its predecessor, endowing the NIA with sweeping powers previously reserved for the police, including the authority to probe both national security concerns and private matters (Dwyer, 2023). This decree reshaped the NIA's role, granting it almost unchecked authority under President Yahya Jammeh's rule. Its functions, expanded beyond intelligence gathering, were now geared towards suppressing dissent and violating citizens' rights. With the President's sole command over key personnel appointments, the agency became a tool for his consolidation of power. Consequently, this agency, together with its accomplice, the Junglers, we would

come to know as the vehicle of repression for the regime, where heinous and unforgettable atrocities were committed.

The NIA was known for its consistent patterns of gross human rights violations, including torture, arbitrary arrests, and extrajudicial killings, which were used to maintain and consolidate power for Jammeh's regime. This was exemplified during the TRRC's 2017-2020 hearings. As a result of its sanctified and immune body, the agency was impenetrable. Therefore, this made it easier to transform the agency into a tool of repression for the Jammeh's regime, underscoring the willpower of Jammeh in safeguarding his authoritarian regime at all cost, making horror and viciousness the hallmarks of this regime.

In his obsession for power, by the end of 1994, Jammeh and his gang had arrested and imprisoned about 29 military and police officers, and by October 1995, another 35 civilians and militants were arrested and detained (U.S. Department of State, 1997). As a result of his paranoid behaviour, Jammeh oversaw kidnappings and disappearances, extrajudicial killings, the framing of major shareholders of the regime, and the intimidation of journalists, which led to unending resentment toward the government, which would eventually lead to a string of coup attempts.

One of the earliest most gruesome military purges was the 1996 Farafenni coup. According to Amnesty International's (1997) report, the coup was led by rebel fighters alleged to associates of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). Amongst the known military officers implicated in this saga were Ballo Kanteh, Omar Joof Dampha, and Sulayman Sarr (Amnesty International, 1997). To legitimize his authority and power, Jammeh made sure this so-called coup ended with the lives of several Gambian soldiers. In proceeding to their way to Banjul, these framed coup plotters were intercepted, some were either killed, captured to be tortured, or fled for their lives, disregarding all protocols of the rule of law. From the account of Ballo Kanteh (a victim) in a TRRC hearing, he has shared how the captured 'rebels' faced brutal treatment upon their arrival at the NIA, in a situation where death was a blessing in disguise. He recounted how he had been subjected to brutal physical abuses such as flagellation, electrocution attempts, and the insertion of destructive substances into his body (TRRC, 2022).

Furthermore, on April 10 and 11, 2000, The Gambia was rocked by an unprecedented student demonstration triggered by two incidents perceived by the Gambia Students' Union (GAMSU) as government negligence. The first involved the assault and subsequent death of a 15-year-old technical school student at the hands of fire service personnel, while the second was the rape of a provincial female student by a security officer at an inter-secondary school sports competition (Reid, 2016). Despite GAMSU's attempts to engage the government to redress, negotiations failed, leading to student-led protests.

On April 10, students gathered at the Gambia Technical Training Institute for a peaceful demonstration. However, the law enforcement's response led to chaos, with warning shots fired and students retaliating with stones. The situation escalated as more students joined, resulting in 14 fatalities and injuries from live ammunition and beatings by security forces (Njie, 2019). The unrest spread to Banjul and other towns, leading to vandalism and further violence that resulted in the manhandling of teachers and injuries of students. The following day, April 11, saw protests erupting in rural areas in solidarity with their urban counterparts. In turn security forces cracking down on demonstrators, leading to series of arrests, injuries, and hospitalizations. Yet, despite the government being accused of the deaths and injuries of students and teachers, the so-called investigations into the events was covered up and civil and military officers involved in the crackdown were granted immunity through the Indemnity (Amendment) Act of 2001.

In July 2005, approximately 67 economic migrants, primarily from Ghana and Nigeria, embarked on a perilous journey to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, believing they would find passage through The Gambia were executed after having been incarcerated by Jammeh’s closest deputies in the army, navy, and police forces (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Kyere, a Ghanaian among them, recounted the events leading to their tragic fate. Initially lured by promises of assistance from individuals like Mark Essien and Daniel Amankwa (Human Rights Watch, 2018), they were abandoned upon arrival in The Gambia by their supposed agent, Lamin Tunkara (TRRC, 2022). Upon reaching Banjul, they were immediately apprehended by state authorities, including the Marine Unit, the Police, and National Intelligence Agency

(Human Rights Watch, 2018). One of the Junglers, Bai Lowe, recounted how the migrants were killed, he said:

> Tumbul [head of the Junglers] said let the guys [the two Junglers] say, "We are going to kill you in the interest of our nation." He said once the guys say that, then the boys are not responsible but The Gambia as a nation will be responsible...There are these old wells in the bush [in Senegal] belong to Fulas [a pastoralist ethnic group] where they fetch water for their cows. Two guys will just bring you to the well, execute you and throw you in the well. That is where I saw them use a pistol to kill…They will just put a plastic bag over your head, shoot you and throw you in the well...They killed up to 40 people. (Human Rights Watch, 2018)

The above testimony was attested by Malick Jatta during a TRRC seating (23rd July, 2019), who recounted a similar disturbing scene where migrants were executed in Casamance. According to Jatta, the victims, purportedly mercenaries, were shot and thrown into an abandoned well, following orders from higher authorities. Other witnesses affirmed the direct involvement of senior military figures and President Yahya Jammeh in orchestrating these killings. This depicted a frightening narrative of state-sponsored violence, where military personnel and government officials entangled into a systemic heinous act, shedding light on the dark underbelly of power and the vulnerability of civilians in paranoic regime.

In 2006, came another failed coup plot orchestrated by Colonel Ndure Cham, then Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), aimed at overthrowing the government of President Yahya Jammeh in The Gambia (Darboe, 2020). Cham's frustration with Jammeh's autocratic rule and alleged clandestine assassinations fueled his motivation. Despite lacking interest in assuming leadership himself, Cham planned to hand power over to a civilian, identified as Alieu Jobe, following the coup's success (AllAfrica.com, 2020). However, differing testimonies emerged regarding Jobe's knowledge and involvement. The plot garnered support from disillusioned military officers, including Captains Yaya Darboe and Bunja Darboe, who felt compelled to act against what they perceived as a dictatorial regime (TRRC, 2022).

They believed that the coup was a moral obligation to save the country from tyranny.

Scheduled for March 21, 2006, during Jammeh's absence on a state visit to Mauritania, the coup was leaked by Deputy CDS Lang Tombong Tambam (Amnesty International , 2006). Subsequently, this led to the arrest of 25 military officers and civilians (including lawyers and journalists) alleged for coup attempt; however, Colonel Ndure Cham, former NIA Director General Daba Marena, Lt Ebou Lowe, 2nd Lt Alieu Cessay, Regimental Sergent Major Alpha Bah and Staff Sergent Malafi Corr later fled (Amnesty International , 2006). Later, an investigation panel, appointed by Jammeh, was tasked with probing the coup attempt. Led by Lang Tombong Tamba and overseen by Harry Sambou, it comprised members from various security agencies (TRRC, 2022). However, the panel's operations were heavily influenced by military leadership, particularly Lang Tombong Tamba, who acted as the de facto head, side-lining NIA officials (TRRC, 2022). Yet, the panel's modus operandi involved coercive interrogation tactics, including threats and torture by a military unit known as the Junglers (Dwyer, 2023). Suspects were subjected to late-night interrogations in intimidating environments, coerced into confessionary statements, and broadcasted on national television to demonstrate remorse and seek presidential forgiveness (Dwyer, 2023). In essence, the 2006 coup plot and its aftermath have underscored the deep-seated grievances within the Gambian military against Jammeh's regime. Despite its failure, the event exposed the regime's repressive tactics, including coercive interrogation methods and media manipulation, in maintaining power.

In the same year, May 2006, amidst the growing political tension in the Gambia, when the murder of newspaper editor Deyda Hydara still unsolved, there was “a string of arson attacks on independent media outlets” (Committee of Protect Journalists, 2007). The *Freedom Online Newspaper* found itself at the centre of a disturbing attack on dissenting voices. The newspaper, known for its critical stance against the APRC’s government, was hacked, and a false declaration was issued in the name of its editors, falsely claiming allegiance to the ruling party (Committee of Protect Journalists, 2007). Many journalists, such as a BBC correspondent Lamin Cham, were shocked to find their names listed as informants for the newspaper

(Committee of Protect Journalists, 2007). What began as a bewildering situation soon escalated into a nightmare of arbitrary arrests and brutal interrogations.

Lamin Bojang, in a TRRC sitting (22 October, 2020), described the upsetting sequence of events following the publication of the false declaration. According to his account, he and his co-workers were subpoenaed by the Farafenni Police Station, but on their arrival, they were arrested and detained without formal charges. Later on, they were transferred to the Banjul Police Headquarters, where they were rounded up by the notorious NIA officials and forced into a tiny shared cell, leading to a nightmare of interrogation and torture from NIA operatives and their crime partners, the feared Junglers. Thus, this poignant saga, again, portrayed the precariousness of civil liberty in an authoritarian regime.

Yet, in 2007, another heart-shattering event unfolded in the Senegalese region of Casamance[11] that would leave lasting scars on the lives of several individuals associated with the MFDC rebel movement. It began with the arrest of multiple rebels by the NIA, which subsequently led to the apprehension of security officers and civilians suspected to be linked with the rebels (TRRC, 2022). For this, a panel was convened at the NIA to probe the matter, but what followed a sequence of torture and inhumane treatment endured by the suspects.

One of the victims was Sgt. Sam Kambai, the Guard Commander at Bamba Tenda in 2007. According to him, in a testimony in TRRC sitting December 2020, he was deceived into traveling to Banjul under the guise of preparing for a deployment to what was then East Timor. Upon arrival, he found himself at the mercy of the NIA, subjected to interrogation and physical abuse. Kambai recounted being taken to a room where he was beaten, stripped naked, and forced to endure excruciating pain for hours of no end. The torture inflicted upon Kambai and others was relentless, lasting for days. They were denied food, adequate shelter, and basic human dignity (TRRC, 2022). Kambai described being left alone in a cell, his body battered and bruised, with no reprieve in sight. Even after enduring weeks of torture,

[11] Casamance is a region in Senegal bordering by Gambia's region of Foni, the people have similar background and intermarried, serving as haven for criminals of boths countries.

Kambai's ordeal did not end; he was eventually transferred to Mile II Prison, where he languished for two years without being charged.

Moreover, following years of political and economic disgruntlement after the 2006 election, in 2009, the narrative of power and betrayal unfolded once again in Gambia as CDS Lang Tombong Tamba found himself ensnared in a web of accusations he once helped spin in 2006 (France 24, 2010). Accused of plotting a coup alongside several others such as "former intelligence chief Lamin Badjie and the former deputy head of police Modou Gaye as well as two businessmen and three military officers" (France 24, 2010), Tamba's life took a tumultuous turn. The arrest, led by heavily armed soldiers, unfolded with the involvement of high-ranking officials like Inspector General of Police (IGP) Ensa Badjie and NIA Director General Numo Kujabi, allegedly under the orders of President Jammeh (TRRC, 2022). However, Tamba's denial of involvement fell on deaf ears, leading to his imprisonment.

Inside the walls of the NIA, Tamba faced a surreal ordeal. Knowing Tamba's endurance during physical torture, the Junglers staged a mock execution, subjecting him to psychological agony (TRRC, 2022). In order to pleased Jammeh, they used all kinds of cruel methods to break him psychologically. This charade, appeasing the higher ups, accentuated the political conspiracies at play. According to Momodou Gaye[12] in a TRRC seating (24 November, 2020). he was forced to navigate a labyrinth of false accusations and inducements; however, due to Gaye's refusal to fabricate testimonies against the defendants, he was resubjected to dire treatment (TRRC, 2022). This highlights the grave risks of dissent in a regime fuelled by paranoia and sleaze – a regime eager to sacrifice truth and justice to consolidate its grip on power.

In the same year of 2009, yet another gruesome event was staged by Jammeh, guided by his belief in superstition and supernatural phenomena - a state-sponsored witch-hunting exercise in The Gambia between 2008 and 2009. The witch hunters, accompanied by armed militia groups and security forces, targeted various villages and government institutions such as the police, army, and other

[12] Another figure caught in the turmoil of the 2009 saga.

branches of the government that were barely threat to the government (Amnesty International , 2009). Victims, in the hundreds if not thousands, primarily elderly individuals but also including pregnant women, and even students, were forcefully detained and subjected to inhumane treatment, including being forced to drink poisonous herbal concoctions called 'kube jara' (Amnesty International , 2009). The witch hunters, adorned in elaborate and intimidating attire, paraded from village to village, rounding up individuals accused of witchcraft. As stated by an eyewitness in one of the villages in Fonni, Sintet:

> At 5:00 am the paramilitary police armed with guns and shovels surrounded our village and threatened the villagers that anyone who tries to escape will be buried 6 feet under…Fear gripped the village…children were crying and traumatised. They randomly identified over 300 men and women who were forced at gunpoint into waiting buses and ferried to the President's hometown. Once there, they were stripped and forced to drink 'dirty water' from herbs and were also bathed with these dirty herbs. A lot of these people who were forced to drink these poisonous herbs developed instant diarrhoea and vomiting whilst they lay helpless. I stayed there for five days. I experienced and witnessed such abuse and humiliation… (Amnesty International , 2009)

These arrested victims were subjected to ritualistic cleansing activities involving drinking and bathing in harmful herbal mixtures and as well as torture and intimidation. Besides, most of the victims were from the opposition camps deemed as threat to Jammeh's power. The exercise, backed by the state and its security apparatuses, instilled fear and compliance among local authorities, villagers, and victims alike. A scene not see before in the 21st century civilization.

This event was followed by the arrest of a freedom fighters in the Gambia, Halifa Sallah[13], for exposing the witch-hunt activities on Foroyya, a newspaper outlet which he co-founded. Later, he was falsely charged with sedition and spying, and barricaded in Mile II, the Central Prison in the Gambia (Amnesty International

[13] The former flagbearer of PDOIS, an opposition party stemming from the first regime in the 1980s

, 2009). This shows how the Jammeh's regime was intertwined with the government's apparatuses, to the extent of framing people it deemed as threat to the regime.

Furthermore, following protests in 2015 demanding electoral reforms, there was a brutal crackdown, where dozens of opposition leaders were arrested, detained, and brutally tortured (UN News Centre, 2016). Solo Sandeng, a prominent figure in the protests, and other two United Democratic Party (UDP) members, were subjected to severe beatings and humiliation on the NIA premises, which eventually led to their deaths (UN News, 2016). They were slowly murdered. There were also female detainees such as Fatoumatta Jawara and Fatou Camara who endured brutal treatment, including threats of sexual violence and physical assaults (TRRC, 2022). The TRRC testimonies reveal a pattern of systemic torture and brutality orchestrated by the NIA, particularly the SOU, to suppress dissent and maintain Jammeh's grip on power. Despite the extreme cruelty inflicted on detainees, impunity prevailed within the agency, with little accountability for those responsible.

Additionally, in the same year, November 2015, about 40 peaceful protesters were arbitrarily arrested by the police in Kartong, they protested against sand mining causing the destruction to the environment, of which 33 of them were later charged "with conspiracy, breach of the peace, riot, causing malicious injuries and riotously interfering with a vehicle" (Amnesty International , 2015). Despite the series of arbitrary arrest amidst the coming 2016 election, a series of online and onsite protests continued to loom, which would lead to the end of the two-decade regime that consolidate power through repression. Thus, this is in line with the third argument made by Robert Dahl – more repression leads to instability, which would eventually bring down a regime.

By and large, the killing sprees, detainments, enforced disappearances, sexual assaults, rapes, and other brutal scenes linked to the NIA, such as killing of the West African migrants, the framing of journalists and officials, the killing of military officers perceived to be threats, and pre-election crackdowns, exemplify the NIA's intimidation tactics to suppress opposition voices. Therefore, the NIA's

actions reveal a pattern of abuse, intimidation, and disregard for human rights under Jammeh's regime. Thus, the TRRC testimonies and other media's reports paint a grim picture of systemic oppression and impunity within this institution.

Repression and the Judiciary

To further consolidate and legitimise his regime, Jammeh also weaponised and fragmented justice institutions, using them as tools for repression. According to Darboe (2021), the judiciary, along with police force, and other entities were used by Yahya Jammeh to serve his personal agenda, which led to widespread of systematic human rights violations and a decline in public trust in the justice system (Darboe, 2021). However, due to the resistance from legal practitioners, the relationship between Jammeh and the legal fraternity was marked by tension, persecution, and a struggle for independence.

This was why, from the onset of Jammeh's regime, there was a clear disdain for the legal community, with Jammeh disregarding legal proceedings even before assuming power. For him, the legal fraternity was his sworn enemy. For this reason, The Gambia Bar Association (GBA), which was dedicated to upholding legal standards and human rights, found itself entangled in conflict with the government and being continously targeted. To some extent, Jammeh orchestrated the creation of a rival bar association to undermine the GBA's influence, known as his divide and rule tactics. This could be attested in one of his speeches in 2014 where he stated "I just want you to understand that there is nowhere in the world where the judiciary is independent […] We pay your salary, we appoint you, and you are part of the government - how can you be independent?" (Darboe, 2021).

Due to Jammeh's personal misconception of separation of power, the executive branch frequently interfered with judicial proceedings, resorting to arbitrary dismissals, threats, and harassment against judges and magistrates who opposed its agenda. Judges who resisted such interference often faced punitive measures, including dismissal or arbitrary detention (Darboe, 2021). In the TRRC's (2022) report, it pointed the allegations of irregularities and insufficient scrutiny of

the appointment procedures for judges, particularly "mercenary judges" appointed on short-term contracts. These judges, whether local or foreign, were perceived to be compliant with the executive's wishes, compromising the integrity of the judiciary.

The Constitution provides procedures for the removal of judges, but these mechanisms were often manipulated by Jammeh, as seen in cases of Justice Hassan B. Jallow and Chief Justice Ali Nawaz Chowhan, who were summarily dismissed without proper procedure, because they did not yield to the influence of Jammeh (News 24, 2015). Darboe (2021) also shares how judicial officers who upheld their duty to administer justice impartially often faced retaliation, as demonstrated by the experiences of Justice Mam Yassin Sey and Magistrate Ebrima Jaiteh. Their cases highlight the challenges faced by those who refuse to yield to political pressure.

During the transition to civilian rule, the APRC government in The Gambia not only interfered in individual civil and political cases but also operated with a sense of impunity, believing that they were insusceptible to criminal prosecution or civil litigation. One of the most egregious examples of interference was the execution of nine death row inmates in 2012, where proper legal procedures were disregarded, and the former President personally intervened, showing utter disregard for due process and legal safeguards. In a televised speech, Jammeh declared that he was no longer going to allow the Supreme Court to ‘overturn death sentences, because he was angry when the Supreme Court judges commuted the death sentence od the former CDS Lang Tombong Tamba, accused of the 2009 coup (News 24, 2015).

This culture of impunity was exemplified by the testimony of Borry Touray, who described how members of the July 22nd Movement, a group associated with the APRC, acted above the law. Touray recounted instances where party members assaulted individuals without consequence, and even manipulated law enforcement to avoid charges. In showcasing how APRC members were immune to the system, in an interview, Touray revealed a case where two individuals by the names of Sillah Manneh and Saikou Saidy Faye fought in public, according to Touray:

> They were brought before me at the Mansakonko Magistrates Court and I convicted them. When the news went viral that Sillah Manneh of the APRC was convicted, the APRC supporters mounted my court with APRC flags […] Surprisingly, the prosecutor in the case was victimised. July 22nd movement enjoyed absolute air of impunity… (The Point for Freedom and Democracy, 2021).

In another case, Tapha Dibba, a member of the July 22nd Movement, assaulted a man and then coerced the police to charge the victim instead. Despite confessing to the assault, Dibba was shielded from prosecution, showcasing the influence wielded by party members within the justice system (TRRC, 2022). Similarly, Lamin K. Mboge testified to the TRRC about facing repercussions for attempting to hold members of the movement accountable, leading to his suspension and termination from the judiciary (Cham, 2021).

In conclusion, the testimonies of Touray and Mboge reveal a system where equality and justice were eroded, traded with one's membership of political party. Being part of Jammeh's APRC served as a shield against prosecution for criminal behaviour. This erosion of rule of law shows how Jammeh was able to consolidate power despite his low performance and efficiency, painting a picture of corrupted justice system consumed by partisan interests.

Repression In the Police and Prison System

In addition to the court, the police service was another arsenal to inflict suffering. Unlike in a democratic setting where the police serve as the bedrock for maintaining law and order, in The Gambia, during Jammeh's 22-year authoritarian rule, the police served as an instrument for oppression. Smith (2016) describes how the period was:

> …an era when many autocrats have relied on the twin guises of the "rule of law" and "maintaining public order" to repress their people—leaning more on stacked courts instead of baton-wielding security forces—Jammeh has

> maintained a preference for brutality. As recently as last week, Gambian police fired live ammunition to disperse a crowd of protesters who bravely took to the streets to demand answers for the death of Sandeng and his two peers, all of whom are members of Gambia's main opposition movement, the United Democratic Party, (Smith, 2016)

The police, under Jammeh's regime, frequently exceeded their powers, detaining individuals beyond the constitutionally mandated 72-hour limit without trial. Testimonies reveal instances where even court orders for release were ignored, demonstrating the police's disregard for the rule of law. Moreover, denial of bail was systematically used to deprive individuals of legal representation and prolong their detention. Thus, the testimonies presented to the truth commission painted an ugly image of the police.

Lastly, we will further discuss how repression that was administered in the prison system. Prisons, according to UN, serve retributive, incapacitating, deterrent, and rehabilitative purposes, as outlined by the UN General Assembly's Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners (1990). Yet, Jammeh used the prison as a punishment for political opponents, and as an agent of fear for society. Leadership in the prison service played a crucial role, with David Colley's[14] appointment exemplifying loyalty over qualifications. Ethnic and nepotistic considerations dominated recruitment, leading to unqualified personnel and demotivation among staff (TRRC, 2022). Colley's tenure as Director General showcased blind obedience to Jammeh's orders, perpetuating mediocrity within the system. To minimise the cost of repression, Jammeh gave key positions to low educated individuals.

For instance, the procedures for admission and detention in Gambian prisons are governed by constitutional and statutory laws, including the Prisons Act, which outlines the legal requirements for admitting individuals into custody. The Constitution of the Gambia Prison Act (section 31) states that the admission typically requires presentation of a warrant or order from a court, indicating the

[14] David Colley is a Gambian who served as the longest director-general of Gambian prison service during Jammeh. He shared the same ethnicity as Jammeh. He was the most named accomplish of Jammeh. During his service, the prison became a Hell for inmates.

individual's status as a prisoner. Yet, by 1994, a new type of prisoners emerged – those brought in through executive order without proper warrants, and who were held without a defined period of detention, disregarding legal justification. In addition, as per the TRRC revelations, prisoners and detainees were subjected to widespread abuse and neglect, such as solitary confinement for extended periods, and torture, leading to paralysis, health issues, and death.

Prisoners and detainees were subjected to brutal flagellation and torture, both within and outside the prison confines, by senior officers who operated with impunity. Operations Commander Ebrima Jammeh, known as "Chief Torturer," along with other officers, meted out severe punishment on inmates, resulting in the death of several prisoners (Manneh, 2020). Yet, this cruelty was carried out under the guise of maintaining discipline, blatantly violating international human rights standards. The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture condemned the prolonged solitary confinement as a form of psychological torture, and such treatment violates fundamental principles of human rights (United Nations, 2020).

Despite the legal provisions and international standards, the Gambian prison system continues to subject individuals to inhumane and degrading conditions, exacerbating health issues and denying access to justice. The treatment of prisoners in accordance with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, also known as the Nelson Mandela Rules, emphasizes respect for the inherent dignity and value of all individuals, prohibiting any form of torture or inhumane treatment (United Nations, 2020). However, evidences from the Jammeh period presented before a commission reveal a stark deviation from these principles within The Gambia Prison Services. Former political prisoner Fatoumatta Jawara recounted her brutal experience:

> ..I was blindfolded and taken into the torture room. They took my scarf and strongly tied up my face to the point that I could hardly breathe. I was stretched on the table and they poured cold water on me […] They hit me repeatedly for an extended period with something that felt like a baton because it was hard. I couldn't see them but there could be about twenty

> people hitting me. They tortured me and took me out of the torture room to face the panel. (TRRC, 2022)

Moreover, the experiences of female prisoners reveal the harsh and often traumatic reality they endure. Young female inmates faced isolation and uncertainty over their future. Inadequate facilities forced them to spend nights in disused areas, exacerbating their vulnerability. Moreover, instances of arbitrary arrests and detentions of women for political reasons further highlight the injustices faced by female prisoners during Jammeh's regime. For instance, Sarata Jabbi Dibba, a journalist and a mother, who was falsely convicted for sedition and defamation, narrated her first night in prison:

> It was a very horrible night because the mattress was only for one person. It was a single mattress. So, I spent the night with my baby on that mattress. It was just a thin mattress and the bed net was not in a very good condition. It got some holes and it was not big enough to prevent the mosquitoes coming in. So, I did not sleep the whole of the night. I was fanning my baby. He did not sleep either because he was kind of moaning and I try to breastfeed him and I was very hungry. (TRRC, 2022)

Moreover, reports of rape, sexual harassment, and the exploitation of inmates and new female officers by prison authorities reveal the systemic failure to protect vulnerable women. For instance, female officers during a familiarization tour revealed there existed a pervasive culture of abuse within the prison system. Vulnerable female officers and inmates were coerced into sexual service by their superiors. However, the repercussions of imprisonment extend beyond the prison walls, affecting not only the incarcerated women but also their families, such as children, spouses, and relatives of victims. One of the witnesses, with initials PW, narrated her own personal experience on a familiarisation tour with the then director of the prison David Colley. Colley took her to a room of one the men "for a chat" (TRRC, 2022). She recounted: "When I entered the room, he locked the door and asked me to undress but I told him I did not come on the trip to have sex with any man, and I am a married woman," (TRRC, 2022). Due to her unwillingness, PW

became a target of abuse and was victimised throughout the trip for three days (TRRC, 2022).

By and large, Jammeh's regime was a series of a brutal and ugly scenes, where rivals were targeted, arrested, and tortured. The main institutions where Jammeh was able to formalise his repression were mainly the security apparatus and the judiciary, acting like an interlinked-chain. Where the intelligence service could not directly abduct a person without attracting international anger, such as Amnesty International, Jammeh would use the court with cooked evidence to - 'legally' - persecute his opponents, making it hard for them escape. Opposition figures, including politicians, lawyers, and journalists were victims of Jammeh's authoritarian regime. Thus, fear was a constant factor in Jammeh's reign, where cowards were intimidated about their own lives and the brave had their family threatened.

To come back to the question: *Did low resource endowment lead to more repression in the Jammeh regime?* We cannot say for sure that resource endowment was the only factor that caused the high repression in the Gambia. However, I can argue that by observing Jammeh's regime, repression was more evident compared to that of Suharto, which could be explained in two folds: when there is enough resources it is easier to co-opt through patronage or wealth distribution. Secondly, in authoritarian regimes, it is argued that when the people are economically satisfied, there would be lesser conflict the people and the state, which would directly impact the number of cases of repressions.

Hence, the topographical and economic features of The Gambia provide the framework for comprehending how the regime's approach to governance is shaped by its resource endowment. The Gambia - a semi-landlocked country in West Africa - is surrounded by Senegal on three sides and located in the drought-prone Sudano-Sahelian area. This geographical situation makes the Gambia more vulnerable to external pressures as it restricts its economic options. Additionally, the nation's reliance on groundnut farming, which Sallah (1990) characterized as being dependent on world market prices, highlights its precarious economic position even more.

Thus, this resource constraints has a significant impact on the Gambian government's capacity to handle fiscal issues, deliver essential services, and uphold social harmony. As observed in regimes with bigger resource endowments such as Indonesia, the government's ability to co-opt opposition parties through economic incentives or social welfare programs is visible.

Due to its lack of resource endowment as compared with Indonesia, meanwhile, the Gambia suffered economic retardation and periodical recession, leading the country into turmoil. Facing a conjunction of a reduction in export earnings and a decline in foreign assistance following the coup, The Gambia's economic recession exaggerated the government's financial difficulties and weakened its capacity to pacify the opposition via economic strategies. Facing dwindling resources and growing unrest, the Jammeh's regime was forced to use repression as its dominant strategy to quell opposition and maintain its grip on power

Moreover, this constraint was exaggerated because The Gambia, since independence, had relied on foreign aid, especially from the West, which made the regime's decision-making process complex when it faced sanctions from the major powers behind its economy. The Gambia's foreign policy has long been fixated on obtaining funds from overseas sources to assist in development initiatives and strengthen the legitimacy of the government. Thus, this when Western powers withdrew their financial support after the government changed from civilian to military rule in 1994, Jammeh's regime faced an uncertain trajectory, forcing it to redirect its diplomatic relations towards Libya and the Gulf nations like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the Suharto's regime, Jammeh's regime was susceptible to external pressures due to its dependency on external powers to sustain and consolidate power.

Therefore, this economic reality placed restrictions on the regime's ability to resolve disputes amicably and encourage the use of repression as a tactic for retaining power. Thus, resource endowment has a significant impact on the tactics used by authoritarian regimes, which in turn affects the outcomes of their governance and decision-making processes.

CHAPTER IV

CO-OPTATION AND RESOURCE ENDOWMENT IN INDONESIA

In this chapter, I examine the relationship between co-optation and resource endowment in Indonesia during the Suharto regime (1966-1998). Firstly, I examine the economy and resource endowment in Indonesia. I would briefly examine the economy of Indonesia between 1966-1998 and the economic boosters such as the oil boom impact and foreign investment (MNCs). Secondly, I examine how co-optation was used during this period and its relationship with the resource endowment. Finally, I conclude on the interplay between the high resource endowment and co-optation in Indonesia.

Interplay Between Resource Endowment and Co-optation in Indonesia

It has long been believed that a nation's resource endowment is a significant predictor of many dependent variables, which include the level of repression or co-optation in authoritarian regimes. According to Duff, McCamant, and Morales (1976) when people of a society get richer, they logically become much happier, and thus, this makes repression less viable for autocrats. Even though sometimes the wealth may not be evenly distributed, (take for example, in the Suharto regime, the people of Papua); however, the wealthier a society becomes, the more likely the poor masses would have access or be able to afford to share part of its wealth, at least to the extent that would lessen conflict. Dye and Zeigler (1988) discovered that the degree of equality increases with society's economic status. Thus, according to some studies, repression has a positive relation with economic of a state, the fewer the resources, the more the repression, vice versa. Low-income levels have been found by Banks (1985) to be a powerful predictor of insufficient levels of human freedom. That is, the poorer the country, the more repression because in

order to control society, we either do it using a ‘carrot’ or a ‘stick’. This assumption was also support by Mitchell and McCormick (1988), even though to a weaker degree, and Zimmermann (1980).

Overview of Indonesia’s Economy (1965-1998)

The period between 1966 and 1998 in Indonesia saw a significant economic transformation that shaped its historical trajectory – the GDP rose from $50 billion in 1966 to $200 billion by 1990s. The ascension of Suharto to power in the tumultuous years of mid-1960s, his championing of a central role for the Armed Forces in governance, and his economic stewardship, rescuing Indonesia from the chaos of Sukarno's era, all contributed to his dominance within the New Order (Indonesia Investments , 2024). His adept distribution of economic benefits among supporters and adversaries alike ensured a semblance of stability. The core of Indonesia's political economy during the Suharto New Order can be distilled into three key features: extensive state ownership and regulation, a reliance on external sources of state revenue, and a system of private entrepreneurship dominated by individuals with close ties to state officials (Liddle R. W., 1983).

The economic prudence exhibited by the Suharto regime stood in stark contrast to the tendencies observed in some other oil-exporting nations, where windfall revenues were often squandered on unsustainable development projects and excessive military acquisitions. Suharto's emphasis on economic development as a means to bolster national security, rather than excessive military spending, underscored a strategic shift in priorities (Pauker, 1981). The economic transformation under the New Order regime was a welcome departure from the tumultuous years preceding it. However, under Suharto's leadership, Indonesia embarked on a path of economic revitalization, leveraging foreign capital investments to stimulate export revenues from petroleum, timber, and minerals. The results were tangible, with real GDP growth averaging an impressive 7.5% annually, driving significant improvements in living standards across the country (Pauker, 1981). The graph below shows the GDP in Indonesia in actual values:



Figure 8: GDP in Indonesia

Source: Prepared by author

The sectors that recorded impressive source of wealth for the regime were the primary sector (agriculture, mining and quarrying), secondary sector (manufacturing, utility and construction), and tertiary (other services). Below shows the average contributions of these sectors:



Figure 9: Sectoral growth in Indonesia

Source: Prepared by author

Furthermore, industrialization was a calculated tool employed by the Suharto administration in Indonesia after the waning of the oil boom to reduce political opposition and increase state revenue. In the early stage, between 1960-1967 and 1978-1978, the primary sector was the leading source of revenue for the Indonesia's coffers, however. In the 1980s, Indonesia developmental trajectory shifted oil production to one that was more decentralized, focusing instead on secondary and tertiary sectors and, portraying a different narrative in the industrial development. This led to a great expansion into Indonesia's manufacturing industry between 1984 and 1996, which in turn, led to a substantial GDP growth. There was

an average growth rate of 17% in the manufacturing industry between 1985 and 1993. The labour-intensive industries also expanded the employment rate and lowered poverty rates by creating jobs for the unskilled population. However, despite this positive growth, the focus on labour-intensive manufacturing also led to a setback in funding for cutting-edge technology, which hindered the industry's ability to compete in the long run.

Oil Boom in 1970s

One of the greatest sources of wealth for the Suharto's regime is the oil production. In the early 1970s, in the face of economic challenges, Indonesia experienced two waves of oil price hikes, which brought Indonesia enormous windfall earnings, eliminating the balance of payment constraints that had impeded economic growth since independence and giving the central government access to previously unthinkable wealth (Arndt & Hill, 1988). Arndt and Hill (1988) describe this period as a miracle because it led to an economic growth that Indonesia never experienced in its economic trajectories, and maybe amongst the fastest in the world at that time. At this time, Indonesia's economy was solely at the mercy of the oil boom, as the economic landscape was profoundly intertwined with its oil reserves.

Arndt and Hill (1988) reveal that, Indonesia between 1972 and 1981, showed a great increase in oil exports, which significantly increased the government's revenue, as oil exports made up of 78% of the total export income and 70% of government revenue. This was so mainly because of the rise in oil prices, an upsurge in crude oil production and liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Furthermore, the $2.90 per barrel as in 1972 rose significantly to over $10.00 as in 1974, signalling a dramatic change in the international economic environment (McCawley, 2013). More importantly, the oil yield in Indonesia greatly expanded from 470,000 barrels per day (bpd) (as in 1966) to approximately 1.4 million bpd by early 1974 (McCawley, 2013). Therefore, this momentum, the influx of 'petro-dollars', significantly injected change in the Indonesian economy, with oil revenues

increasing over tenfold between 1970 and 1977. Below is the contribution of oil to GDP between 1970 and 1998:



Figure 10: Oil contribution on GDP, Indonesia

Source: Prepared by author

Foreign Aid and Investment

The Suharto's regime not only relied on oil production but also foreign aid and investment. It was bequeathed with the Western support, particularly the US, which was the complete opposite of Jammeh's regime and its sanctions from various Western powers including Gambia's greatest allies since independence, the US and the UK. During this time, Indonesia has the highest level of investment than any country in Southeast Asia, in which over 90% of the oil investment was from US-controlled businesses (Ghoshal, 1979). According to Fibiger (2023), Suharto was able to win "massive quantities of international aid in the late 1960s" because he used manipulative methods (emotional intelligence) on the West, in the name of fighting against communism, which secured him 'debt relief, international aid, and private investment'. Therefore, the US emphasis on bolstering the administrations in the Philippines and Indonesia has increased after the triumph of revolutionary regimes in Indo-China (Ghoshal, 1979). The main reason the US strongly supported

Indonesia at the time was to eliminate communism and flex its capitalist muscles in Southeast Asia, of which Indonesia was pivotal.

According to Ghoshal (2024), since 1965 "military aid and technical assistance has been flowing into Indonesia in increased quantities"; between 1963 and 1965 the country received $13.2 million from the US government, making Indonesia a key customer. This grant from the US did not retreat but increase over the years. Between 1971 and 75, it is stated that the military aid rose to $124.6 million (Ghoshal, 1979). Meanwhile, in 1976, Indonesia received "$21.4 million in military grant training aid for fiscal" year and $25.1 million in military sales credits. (Ghoshal, 1979, as cited in Pacific Research & World Empire Telegram 1976).

Additionally, in order to boost the economy, Indonesia needed a vibrant and trained economists for a better policy direction. Due to the mutual understanding between the two forces, the US took it upon itself to trained Indonesian economic officers. According to Ghoshal (1979), the US had trained about 250 Indonesian officers by 1958, 500 by 1962, and 4000 by 1965. Following 1965, this training only increased. These officers would come in handy during the Suharto regime. This one third of the Indonesian general staff in the Suharto regime received income from three main sources: Pertamina, the army's economic institutions, and the Caltex Oil Company[15] (Ghoshal, 1979).

Freeport

Likewise, in the West of Papua, US mining company, Freeport began operations, which violated human rights and committed gross environmental degradation. According to Rifai-Hassan (2009), the mine had a special relationship with the Suharto's New Order regime, to which it paid a relatively handsome amount of money in "the form of taxes, royalties, and stipends". Freeport strengthened the Suharto's grip on power; it created enormous wealth and power for Suharto's regime, but most importantly, for the US itself (Rifai-Hassan, 2009).

[15] An America company that would provide a vital income or resource for Suharto's regime.

According to Minister of Mines Soetaryo Sigit the contract between the Indonesian government and Freeport signalled to the world that Indonesia accommodated foreign investment, while another cabinet minister Mohammad Sadli claimed that the contract between Freeport and Jakarta was to leverage the '"unsubtle connection' between letting foreign companies in and securing international support" (Leith, 2002). He further elaborates the benefit of this symbiotic relationship for the Jakarta government:

> …With Freeport symbolizing the new-frontier image Indonesia wished to promote internationally, and with pressure from Washington, there followed a flood of technical expertise and foreign capital—$1,226 million by 1969. This inflow was not only crucial in keeping the regime afloat in the early years, but its continuation assisted Suharto in maintaining power for another three decades.

Moreover, Rifai-Hassan (2009) accounts that, according to report, "the company also paid the government US$3.8 billion in 1992-2004. Thus, Freeport made total contributions of US$4.4 billion between 1973 and 2005" (Rifai-Hassan, 2009). This has shown the prosperity of the Suharto regime, which was incomparable to the poor regime of Jammeh. Thus, from the utilitarian-rational approach point of view, leaders weigh the benefit and cost of every decision, and Suharto was no exception – thus, with his enormous resource, Suharto had a better strategy to win the opposition and quell dissent.

Co-optation and Resource Endowment

Slater (2010) states that Suharto's regime origins were deeply rooted in an heterogenous coalition of political allies such as the bureaucratic elites, army, student movements, religious parties, and rural elites. These allies were Suharto's strength against Sukarno's supporters. However, these groups had different expectations from the New Order. For instance, the bureaucratic elites and army needed a robust regime and not merely a remote democracy as used by Sukarno;

whereas the student organisations and other civil organisations wanted a more liberal government (Slater, 2010). For these demands, Suharto navigated through them by leveraging the established civilian institutions (Slater, 2010), but maintaining military dominance through the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Control (Kopkamtib) and the conversion of Golkar into the New Order's electoral vehicle (Suryadinata, 1989). Though Suharto involved civilians at the beginning of his reign, after the 1971 election, military dominance became ordinary to the eye, leading to Suharto's consolidation of despotic power (Slater, 2010).

That is, by October 1967, as soon as Suharto was appointed as the acting president, he started reshuffling the cabinet into militarised one. For instance, one member of the inner circle Malick was replaced with a leader from Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), Idham Chalid (Legge, 1968). Though Suharto still left some useful civilians in the cabinet, but redirected his guidance to his trusted military advisers of his personal staff (SPRI) (Legge, 1968). Despite the use of the SPRI, Suharto exhibited a balance between the military and the SPRI to avoid the alienation of the former (Crouch 1978). In doing that, he rewarded both groups equally to maintain a peaceful future.

According to Liddle (1978), the New Order was politically structured into two tiers. The first tier comprised the primary elite, mainly military officers divided into three groups: President Suharto and his closest officers, senior officials from the "Generation of 1945" in the Department of Defense and Security, and younger field officers (Liddle, 1978). These groups had shared interests in maintaining the political status quo but also have diverging priorities. Whereas, the second tier included a more diverse group of middle and upper-level officials, military officers in non-military roles, intellectuals, students, and politicians, particularly from Islamic factions (Liddle, 1978). Even though the second group did not set basic policy, they hold significant influence over the primary elite and contribute to the dynamics of day-to-day politics through their support or opposition.

Initially, Suharto consolidated power by balancing these various political and military factions, but growing protests and unrest in 1973-74, particularly over

a new marriage law, exposed rifts within his coalition (Slater, 2010). The Malari disaster in January 1974, which involved student protests and riots, further strained relations, leading to a reshuffling of key military figures and increased personalization of power (Slater, 2010). For this, Suharto's reliance on Golkar as a political vehicle increased, though the government remained under military influence (Suryadinata, 1989). These events marked a transition towards a more centralized and personalized autocracy, with Suharto leveraging institutional complexity to maintain control amidst growing factional tensions.

As a result, by mid-1974, repression in the Suharto's regime had waned significantly, vivid to the eye; however, there were still irregular spots of cases of selective repression, such as the Malari incident of 1974, Indonesia's occupation of East Timor in 1975, and the 'Tanjung Priok' massacre in 1984, but this was nothing compared to the Gambia where repression was a daily occurrence. Unlike the Gambian case, which was discussed in chapter three, Indonesia during Suharto's time in power shows that co-optation was used to legitimise and consolidate the regime, thanks to the country's resources such as the oil boom, Western support and foreign aid, an abundance of foreign investment and good agricultural output. As a result, the Suharto's government prioritized co-optation over repression because the regime had enough resources to ward off its opposition by giving them incentives and other benefits; also, it made it easier for the regime's party, Golkar, to be able to spend lavishly on buying the opposition and elites, as well as mobilizing voters. Consequently, since the government had enough money to fend off its opposition, and the cost of co-optation was lower compared with repression, so it was only rational for the regime to prioritize co-optation. Repression would have been expensive for the regime for three main reasons: firstly, repression may involve killings and all forms of inhumane abuses, which could in turn lead to societal disorder and regime instability. Secondly, the Suharto's regime, unlike that of Jammeh, was characterised by strong civil society, repression was not viable for regime stability because it could attract of the wrath of civil society organisations (CSOs).

Additionally, in the late 1970s, Suharto's regime faced a pivotal moment, prompting a shift in its strategy from coercion to patronage. Several factors

contributed to this transition. Initially, Suharto's seizure of power in the mid-1960s had been justified by the need to combat a perceived communist threat and economic instability (Mietzner, 2018). However, by the 1970s, these justifications had largely dissipated, leaving the regime in search of a new rationale to maintain its grip on power. Also, Suharto himself had aged and distanced himself from the military, fostering suspicion of potential challengers within its ranks. Recognizing that a regime reliant solely on military rule was less likely to endure, Suharto saw the value in broadening his civilian support base (Mietzner, 2018). This reason is also in line with the utilitarian-rational argument on cost and benefit.

This transition involved a strategic reorientation towards co-opting civilian elites through resource extraction and patronage distribution. While patronage had been integral to the regime's cohesion in its early years, it had primarily benefited military insiders and a select group of civilian cronies, notably ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs (Mietzner, 2018). However, as the regime evolved from a military-dominated entity to a more civilian-oriented polity, a more sophisticated approach to elite co-optation was necessary. For this, we ask the question: what factor dominantly influenced Suharto's shift in strategy?

It is narrated by Smith (2003), during the oil period, Suharto's regime enjoyed robust support from the army and Golkar, primarily due to their shared economic interests fuelled by oil revenues. That is to say, during this period, the Suharto's governmental revenue benefited greatly from higher oil prices in the 1970s thanks to "production sharing" agreements (essentially a form of profits tax) with foreign oil companies, of which Caltex was and is by far the most significant, and from contributions made to the government's coffers by Pertamina (Arndt & Hill, 1988). In their work, Arndt and Hill (1988) note that the amount of money received by the government from oil during the 1970s nearly doubled particularly between 1972–1973 and 1975–1976. As a result, these oil booms created an abundance of money for the government, in which the nation's infrastructural development and poverty reduction initiatives were funded (Indonesia Investments , 2024). This would also earn Suharto the nickname of 'the father of development' in Indonesia. Thus, as argued by Duff and McCamant (1976) when a society gets richer, they logically become much happier, and thus, repression is less viable for

autocrats. This could be said in the case of Indonesia, when the societal economic wellbeing increased, there were less dissent by day.

As argued by Seda (2005), Suharto's ability to remain in power was made possible by the crucial mechanism of patron-client connections found in Pertamina and other parts of Indonesia. Seda (2005, as cited from Robison 1986) added that, the majority of the state's income came from Pertamina, which also acted as the main and most concentrated source of supply and construction contracts. Thus, Pertamina was a vital source of income and a strategic point of power. The military's ability to keep control of this terminal and keep it from being absorbed by any regularized state apparatus was crucial to its autonomy and hegemony (Seda, 2005, as cited from Robison 1986). According Robison (1988), the company tax on oil climbed from Rp. 344 billion in 1973/74 to Rp. 8,627 billion in 1981/82 (from 35.6 to 70.6 percent of total revenue). This gave enough money to Suharto to fend off opposition, which was not the same for the Jammeh's regime.

The oil booms of the 1970s transformed Indonesia's fiscal landscape, increasing government revenue substantially. Therefore, the government's control over oil-derived income enabled it to finance large-scale development projects, presenting them as benevolent gifts to the people (Liddle R. W., 1983). In the macroeconomic landscape of 1980, Indonesia experienced a significant upturn under the stewardship of the Suharto regime. With foreign exchange reserves soaring to at least $7.2 billion, the country found itself in a position of financial strength, able to secure commercial loans internationally with favourable terms (Pauker, 1981). Furthermore, the decision made at the Bali meeting of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to increase the base price of Indonesia's primary oil grade, Minas crude, to $35 a barrel further bolstered the nation's economic prospects (Pauker, 1981). This marked a substantial increase from a decade earlier when the same oil sold for a mere $1.70 per barrel.

Following the oil booms, patronage politics formed pivotal pillar of Suharto's rule, manifested through alliances with various groups including Chinese Indonesian businesses, military elites, Golkar supporters, and the general population (Kristiana, 2020). Chinese Indonesian financiers (Cukong), played a

crucial role in financing the regime's economic agenda in exchange for preferential treatment and business opportunities (Robison, 1988). Meanwhile, military elites benefited from their dual roles in security and politics, wielding influence in both government and business spheres. Suharto's patronage extended to foundations and political parties, such as Yayasan Dharmais and Golkar (Kristiana, 2020), which served as vehicles for dispensing favours and securing loyalty. Through these channels, the regime cultivated a network of support among civilians, businessmen, and political elites, bolstering its grip on power.

The availability of substantial oil revenue in the early 1980s provided the regime with ample resources to expand its patronage network. Suharto leveraged these funds to build a vast network of foundations, effectively creating a private source of patronage that he controlled personally. By disbursing funds and favours, Suharto integrated a broader range of civilian actors into his regime, including previously marginalized groups like the Islamic NU (Mietzner, 2018). Promises of development funds and economic opportunities were used to sway allegiance and garner support for the regime, leading to increased electoral success for Suharto's ruling party, Golkar. In an interview with NU leader, Abdurrahman 'Gus Dur' Wahid, he revealed the symbiotic relation between N.U and the Suharto's regime, as he said that if Suharto's regime:

> …feels threatened, it can cut off everything. [Thus] I reached an agreement with the government. They agreed [that] they would give preference to NU people in making new appointments to the civil service [and that] NU would receive licenses for economic activities'. In return, Wahid withdrew NU support from PPP and supported Golkar in the 1987 elections, increasing the latter's vote share from 64.34 to 73.16 percent – its best result thus far. The deployment of the 'infrastructural mechanism' of revenue extraction and re-distribution, it seemed, produced better results than the coercive approaches of 1971 and 1977. (Mietzner, 2018, p. 89-90)

Moreover, Suharto sought to diversify and expand his support base by promoting civilian participation in Golkar leadership and cultivating indigenous Muslim entrepreneurs (Winters, 1996). This inclusive approach aimed to address

grievances among Muslim businessmen who felt side-lined by the regime's previous favouritism towards ethnic Chinese cronies. Thus, major economic contracts were awarded to indigenous entrepreneurs, incentivizing their support for the regime (Winters, 1996). Subsequently, large-scale distributive policies, funded by oil revenues, aimed to appease the populace and solidify regime support (Kristiana, 2020). Also, investments in agriculture and industry, coupled with infrastructure development and regional grants, sought to alleviate poverty and promote economic growth. Initiatives such as agricultural reform and industrial expansion propelled Indonesia towards self-sufficiency and diversified economic development (Kristiana, 2020).

Pertamina, Indonesia's state oil company, once epitomized national pride and military largesse, under Lt. Gen. Ibnu Sutowo's stewardship, it morphed into a financial behemoth, bankrolling the armed forces and fuelling Suharto's rise (Aspinall, 2007). However, revelations of mismanagement and corruption precipitated its downfall. Sutowo's abrupt dismissal in 1975 marked the end of an era, exposing the symbiotic relationship between Pertamina and the military elite (Aspinall, 2007). The economic fallout from Pertamina's collapse reverberated far and wide. Indonesia's foreign exchange reserves dwindled, necessitating stringent austerity measures to service its mounting debts. Suharto's credibility took a hit, challenging the integrity of the 1945 Generation and eroding public trust. This crisis would further lead to a crackdown in the end of 1980s until the 1990s, ending the era of co-optation as there were no enough funds to sustain the regime operations.

However, by 1986, the political power of these institutions diminished as economic growth and stability became contingent on private investment rather than oil income. This shift transformed the army and Golkar into a "swing vote" between the regime and Indonesia's urban middle class (Smith, 2003). The restructuring of the economy from oil dependence to investment-driven growth altered the regime's control over economic activity (Smith, 2003). For instance, through Pertamina, new various programmes were introduced such as the state-owned steel firm P.T. Krakatau and rice estates in South Sumatra (McCawley, 2013). While it gained access to significant revenues, its policy autonomy diminished, making it reliant on stable economic policies to maintain investor confidence. However, regulatory and

enforcement capacities did not improve, leading to minor currency crises and exacerbating rent-seeking behaviours among elite capitalists (Smith, 2003).

By the 1980s, as the regime shifted its focus towards patronage, coercion became less essential, particularly in electoral processes. For example, the disbandment of the coercive body, Kopkamtib, in 1988 signalled a significant reduced reliance on coercive tactics to maintain control (Mietzner, 2018). While coercion remained a tool in the regime's arsenal, elections increasingly became routine affairs characterized by the distribution of patronage rather than fear of reprisal. Thus, in the subsequent phase of regime maintenance, the regime sought to consolidate its legitimacy through socio-economic performance, cultivating dependence on the state for welfare and economic stability. Economic growth led to a reduction in poverty and the expansion of the middle class, which, rather than fostering demands for democratization, reinforced dependence on the authoritarian regime for economic patronage.

The regime's reliance on military support and foreign investment underscored its vulnerability to external influence. While economic growth appeared impressive on the surface, widening disparities and social unrest posed significant challenges to long-term stability. Suharto's authoritarian grip on power, sustained by military backing and foreign patronage, faced growing scrutiny both domestically and internationally. Besides, the flow of aid and advisers began prior to Suharto's coup, reflecting the US efforts to counter communist influence in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, president Suharto's efforts to diversify his cabinet with non-Javanese members aimed to mitigate regional tensions. However, longstanding issues, such as the legitimacy of leadership and corruption allegations, persisted, fueling dissent within Indonesian society. The case of Sawito Kartowibowo, a Javanese mystic who challenged Suharto's authority, further underscored public disillusionment with the regime (Grant, 1978). Despite facing criticism from unconventional quarters, Suharto's grip on power remained firm, although increasingly challenged by emerging voices of dissent.

In 1998, Suharto's downfall amidst a popular uprising occurred despite him presiding over a structurally robust state. With an expansive civil service of almost 4 million personnel and a formidable coercive apparatus, the political framework of the New Order seemed solid. However, Suharto's leadership faltered due to two critical decisions.

Initially, Suharto shifted the regime's narrative from one of forceful suppression of internal enemies to one promising economic prosperity. This paradigm shift left him vulnerable when the Asian Financial Crisis struck in 1997. Unlike regimes like that of Jammeh, which prioritized expanding coercive apparatus, Suharto maintained pre-coup military levels while focusing on economic growth. However, by 1997, the population had doubled, diluting the effectiveness of the military-to-population ratio. Thus, reverting to a predominantly repressive approach became less viable.

Analytically, Suharto's experience underscores the relationship between strong state capacity and short-term sustainability. His regime's economic success over three decades fortified its state apparatus, enabling it to expand civil services, fund coercion, dispense patronage, and improve public services (Mieztner, 2018). However, when economic growth faltered in 1997, the seemingly robust state proved powerless, highlighting the vulnerability of regimes reliant on economic performance for legitimacy.

As the economic crisis of 1997-98 unfolded, dual pressures mounted on Suharto. Internationally, financial institutions demanded an end to corruption within Suharto's inner circle. Domestically, mass protests erupted in response to the economic meltdown. The defection of the military and Golkar from the ruling coalition, triggered by the economic crisis, proved more powerful than Suharto's group of economic elites.

The regime's transition from resource-based to neoliberal reform-based development in the late 1980s set the stage for Suharto's vulnerability. While the oil boom years had initially provided economic autonomy, the move towards an open economy created political urgency. However, Suharto's political maneuvering focused on preserving his narrow coalition, pitting economic elites against the

military and Golkar, who favored economic stability and political order (Smith, 2003).

Throughout the crisis, Suharto's actions reflected a balancing act between appeasing international demands and maintaining his domestic coalition. Initially, the centralized authoritarian polity appeared capable of implementing IMF-mandated reforms. However, Suharto's reluctance to dissolve monopolies and lift fuel subsidies, crucial IMF demands, eroded investor confidence and exacerbated the crisis (Smith, 2003).

In conclusion, it is imperative to say that resource endowment is the only influencer of the decision-making process of authoritarian government. However, from the literature it has shown that resource endowment had a positive influence on Suharto's choice of strategy, between repression and co-optation. Suharto adopted repression primarily in a discriminative way; however, after the oil boom and great prosperity sparked, Suharto leaned more onto co-optation. This is in line with the argument made by Dahl (1972), he argues that when there is low cost of co-optation, governments adopt tolerance. In the Suharto case, it was easier to co-opt than to repress because Suharto has the resources to co-opt opposition.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

From the discussion of the two regimes, the research shows a thick relationship between the choice of strategy and resource endowment employed by autocrats - illustrating of how resource endowment can shape autocrats' strategies. In the case of Suharto, whose regime began with significant repression, his government gradually transitioned towards co-optation in the 1970s as a primary tool for consolidating power, notably during the oil boom. This was also pointed by Pauker (1981). Though, this shift cannot be completely attributed to the economic situation, we can chiefly attribute the co-optation process to the abundant resources available to the regime, including revenues from the oil boom, foreign aid, and investments.

At the beginning of his regime, Suharto relied mainly on repression to consolidate power, exemplified by the brutal measures taken during the 1965 coup and subsequent purges, which could also be attributed to the economic struggle at the time. Yet, by the mid-1970s, the oil boom brought substantial finance for the regime, which allowed Suharto to use economic incentives and patronage to secure loyalty, meaning the coercion was obscure. As a result, it enabled Suharto to integrate various elite groups and opposition figures into the regime by offering them economic benefits and political privileges. This approach not only mitigated potential threats but also fostered a sense of inclusion and support among the elites.

Unlike Suharto, in the case of Gambia, Jammeh's regime did not begin with significant repression during the first year of the military junta because the government used large loans which were used to initiate development in various regions in the country, earning Jammeh acceptance from the public. However, by 1996, after the West imposed sanction on the regime, the economy dwindled and doubts amongst military officers, civil servants and even the street vendor grew. This was followed by series of protests and coups in 1996, 2000, 2006, 2011, and 2014, which were championed by both military officers and civilians. Since the

Gambia is characterised by low resource endowment, the regime was vulnerable to external pressure. Consequently, the constraints on resources had a significant impact on the Gambian government's capacity to handle fiscal issues, deliver essential services, and uphold social harmony – forcing the regime to rely mainly on repression. Hence, authoritarian regimes with low resource endowment like the Gambia, in times of economic challenges or political unrest, tend to lean on repression as a tool to stifle opposition and preserve power, since it is more feasible than co-optation.

Moreover, Suharto regime's ability to distribute resources through patronage networks was instrumental in maintaining stability. The Golkar party, backed with substantial funding from oil revenues, could buy off opposition and mobilize voters. Suharto's control over state-owned enterprises like Pertamina also allowed him to channel resources strategically to secure loyalty and manage dissent. Pertamina's revenues were crucial in funding the regime's operations and ensuring that the military and other key sectors remained supportive.

Unlike Suharto who was able to tap into the revenue provided by Pertamina and other MNCs that generated revenue, the Jammeh regime was financially disabled. As a result, due to the lack of investments or enough resources to fund his party, the APRC, to lure oppositions, Jammeh used his coercive bodies to intimidate the populace into loyalty, making repression a viable strategy for the regime. Therefore, the economic reality placed restrictions on the regime's ability to resolve disputes amicably and encourage the use of repression as a tactic for retaining power.

However, the reliance on resource endowment for political stability also had its vulnerabilities. In case of Suharto, the eventual decline in oil revenues, followed by the economic crisis in the late 1990s, exposed the regime's overreliance on economic performance for legitimacy. Thus, when the economic crisis hit hard, the regime's patronage networks faltered, leading to increased dissent and ultimately contributing to Suharto's downfall. In contrast, Jammeh's reliance on repression led to an increased resentment amongst Gambians, especially those living abroad. When the Jammeh regime made the ultimate crackdown on electoral reform

protesters in 2014, leading to the death of Solo Sandeng, the whole of Gambia unanimously countered the regime with a stronger coalition, unifying all oppositions, which eventually led to the downfall of the Jammeh's regime in 2016.

In conclusion, the findings have portrayed a pattern of dynamism in authoritarian decision-making process, showing insights into how resource endowment affects the choices of autocrats. For instance, in the case of Indonesia, Suharto became repressive before the oil boom in the 1970s then made a visible shift after the oil boom to co-optation until the late 1990s when the economic crisis rose to climax. Similarly, Jammeh relied on economic performance to win the populace in order to legitimise his regime, but this lasted only a year or two before he eventual became a consistent repressor until his downfall in 2016. The study also reveals that lack of balance in the strategies employed by autocrats could lead to an eventual downfall, as seen in the cases of Suharto (relying more on co-optation) and Jammeh (relying more on repression) regimes. However, my argument is not conclusive but context dependent, reflective of the situations in The Gambia (1994-2016) and Indonesia (1965-1998). Therefore, there is a need for further examinations into the assumption that *resource endowment determined the priorities in the employment of co-optation or repression as a strategy in authoritarian regimes*.

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