

**Intolerant Groups in a Democratic State:  
Analyzing Political Entanglement between  
State and Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah  
(ANNAS) in Indonesia**

**A Thesis**

**Submitted to the Master's Program of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of  
Islamic Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree  
of**

**Master of Arts (M.A.)**



by:

**Yahya Fathur Rozy**

**01212210001**

UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA

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## ABSTRACT

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This thesis examines the relationship between the state and the Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah (ANNAS), a nationwide mass organization established in 2014 in Bandung, West Java. ANNAS aims to curb the growth of Shiite teachings in Indonesia, which it considers deviant from the true Islamic faith. Due to this objective, scholars and NGOs categorized the organization as intolerant. This research analyzes the informal relationship between the state and ANNAS, exploring how they collaborate to achieve common goals and benefits. Clientelism network theory dissects the underlying motives for this informal relationship. I limit the research focus to the activities of the ANNAS Central Board in Bandung, West Java, and ANNAS Chapter in Solo Raya, Central Java. This qualitative study relies on in-depth interviews as the primary data source, involving seven informants from the police, ANNAS Central Board Officer, ANNAS Chapter Officers in Solo, and member of Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (IJABI). The interviews were conducted over three months, from April to June 2024. The findings suggest that the political entanglement between the state and ANNAS is based on a clientelistic network, an informal relationship that enables them to realize their common interests or goals. In Indonesia's nascent democracy, such clientelistic networks can arise due to the lack of robust regulations to limit this type of relationship. The state-ANNAS relationship, woven within this clientelistic scheme, aims to achieve two mutual benefits: the pursuit of social control and the state's religious partisanship.

Keywords: *ANNAS, Intolerant Group, Clientelism Network, State, Shia*

## TRANSLITERATION GUIDE

### IJMES TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM FOR ARABIC, PERSIAN, AND TURKISH

#### CONSONANTS

A = Arabic, P = Persian, OT = Ottoman Turkish, MT = Modern Turkish

	A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT
ء	ʾ	ʾ	ʾ	—	ز	z	z	z	z	ك	k	k or g	k or ñ	k or n
ب	b	b	b	b or p	ژ	—	zh	j	j				or y	or y
پ	—	p	p	p	س	s	s	s	s				or ğ	or ğ
ت	t	t	t	t	ش	sh	sh	ş	ş	گ	—	g	g	g
ث	th	ṯ	ṯ	s	ص	ṣ	ṣ	ş	s	ل	l	l	l	l
ج	j	j	c	c	ض	ḍ	ẓ	ẓ	z	م	m	m	m	m
چ	—	ch	ç	ç	ط	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	t	ن	n	n	n	n
ح	ḥ	ḥ	ḥ	h	ظ	ẓ	ẓ	ẓ	z	ه	h	h	h <sup>1</sup>	h <sup>1</sup>
خ	kh	kh	h	h	ع	ʿ	ʿ	ʿ	—	و	w	v or u	v	v
د	d	d	d	d	غ	gh	gh	g or ğ	g or ğ	ي	y	y	y	y
ذ	dh	z	z	z	ف	f	f	f	f	ة	a <sup>2</sup>			
ر	r	r	r	r	ق	q	q	q	k	ال	a <sup>3</sup>			

<sup>1</sup> When h is not final. <sup>2</sup> In construct state: at. <sup>3</sup> For the article, al- and -l-.

#### VOWELS

	ARABIC AND PERSIAN		OTTOMAN AND MODERN TURKISH
<i>Long</i>	ا or آ ā و ū ي ī		ā ū ī
		}	words of Arabic and Persian origin only
<i>Doubled</i>	ئى iy (final form ī) ؤ ū (final form ū)		iy (final form ī) uvv
<i>Diphthongs</i>	او au or aw اي ai or ay		ev ey
<i>Short</i>	ا a و u ي i		a or e u or ü / o or ö ı or i

For Ottoman Turkish, authors may either transliterate or use the modern Turkish orthography.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

COVER PAGE .....	I
TITLE PAGE.....	I
STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICITY .....	II
ANTI-PLAGIARISM STATEMENT .....	III
THESIS ATTESTATION .....	IV
THESIS DEFENSE APPROVAL .....	V
ABSTRACT .....	VI
TRANSLITERATION GUIDE .....	VII
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	VIII
LIST OF FIGURES .....	X
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1    BACKGROUND & RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	1
1.2    STUDIES ON STATE INVOLVEMENT, INTOLERANT GROUPS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS IN INDONESIA: A LITERATURE REVIEWS.....	5
1.3    THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	8
1.4    RESEARCH METHOD & LIMITATION.....	10
1.5    RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE.....	11
1.6    THESIS OUTLINE .....	11
CHAPTER II THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND ISLAM: MINORITY GROUPS PROTECTION IN INDONESIA .....	13
2.1    INTRODUCTION .....	13
2.2    RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE IN INDONESIA: A HISTORICAL GLANCE .....	14
2.2.1    The Relationship between Islam and the State Before Reformasi Era (Pre-1998).....	14
2.2.2    After Reformasi Era (Post-1998).....	17
2.2.3    Contemporary Challenges .....	20
2.3    CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE: THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY.....	23
2.4    INTOLERANT RELIGIOUS GROUPS AND MINORITIES: THE ROLE OF ALIANSI NASIONAL ANTI SYIAH (ANNAS) .....	26
2.4.1    The Historical Context and Purposes of ANNAS Establishment.....	26
2.4.2    The Trajectories of ANNAS as Religious-Based Intolerant Organization in Indonesia.....	29

2.5	CONCLUSION.....	32
CHAPTER III THE AMBIGUITY OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND INTOLERANT GROUPS IN INDONESIA: A CLIENTELISTIC NETWORK .....		
34		
3.1	INTRODUCTION .....	34
3.2	FROM CONFRONTATION TO COLLABORATION: FUUI, ANNAS, AND THE STATE.....	35
3.3	THE ABSENCE OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK.....	48
3.4	CONCLUSION.....	50
CHAPTER IV RECIPROCAL DYNAMICS IN PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS: MUTUAL BENEFITS BETWEEN STATE AND ANNAS.....		
51		
4.1	INTRODUCTION .....	51
4.1.1	The Pursuit of Security Control.....	52
4.1.2	Religious Partisanship of the State .....	60
4.2	CONCLUSION.....	65
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION .....		
68		
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....		
70		
ATTACHMENTS.....		
78		

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: The author's selfie inside da'wa building of ANNAS in Bandung City.....	78
Figure 2: The moment after interview session with General Secretary of ANNAS Board in Bandung .....	78
Figure 3: The moment before conducting interview with police officers from Intel Division of Kapolrestabes Bandung.....	78
Figure 4: Online interview session with a member of IJABI Chapter of Bandung City...	79
Figure 5: The moment after conducting interview with a leader of Central Java Chapter of ANNAS .....	79

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Background & Research Questions

In 2014, hundreds of Muslims who are members of the Pembela Ahlus Sunnah (Defenders of Ahlus Sunna, PAS) West Java and the Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah (Anti-Shia National Alliance, ANNAS) succeeded in breaking up ‘Āshūrā commemoration activities held by Shia followers in Bandung City, West Java.<sup>1</sup> The event received official permission from the local police to be held until noon but due to strong pressure from the demonstration crowd, the event lasted only 08.00 am. The demand to disband the ‘Āshūrā event by Shia followers is based on the perception that Shiism is a heretical teaching that deviates from the straight and true teachings of Islam. According to ANNAS, all Shia followers in Indonesia have the same misguided ideological attitude, namely believing in the imperfection of the Qur’ān, cursing the companions of the Prophet Muhammad, allowing *muṭ’ah* marriages (temporary marriage), and planning to co-opt the country or carry out a massive revolution in the country as happened in Iran in 1979. They categorize Shia in Indonesia as Shia Imāmiyyah Ithnā ‘Ashariyyah. The Shiite sect is widely adhered to by Iranians and contains teachings that deviate from the mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs. The main teaching of Shia emphasizes the importance of the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, particularly the line of Imams descended from his son-in-law, Ali. According to General Leader of ANNAS, Athian Ali, it was these Shiite teachings and the focus on the divinely appointed Imams that inspired and helped drive the Iranian revolutionary movement in the late 1970s, which ultimately led to the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran. And therefore, it is considered to have deviated from the pure teachings of Islam as well as dangerous for state security of Indonesia.<sup>2</sup>

ANNAS was founded in Bandung in 2014 under the full support of the Mayor of Bandung, Dada Rosada, and the Governor of West Java, Ahmad Heryawan, who were in

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<sup>1</sup> Ngadiman Djojonegoro, “Ratusan Massa di Jabar Bubarkan Acara ‘Āshūrā Syiah,” News Publisher, *Hidayatullah.com* (blog), November 4, 2014, <https://hidayatullah.com/berita/nasional/2014/11/04/32605/ratusan-massa-di-jabar-bubarkan-acara-’Āshūrā-syiah.html>.

<sup>2</sup> Athian Ali M Da’i, Rekam Jejak Syiah di Indonesia, April 9, 2022, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s0mh8h0tlaI&t=1s>.

office at that time.<sup>3</sup> This organization often collaborates with the police and several state agencies to carry out its agenda. For example, ANNAS received funding assistance in building a da'wa building by the Bandung City government and was facilitated by the police to disperse the celebration of 'Āshūrā.<sup>4</sup> Most recently, one of the supports given by the state was the permission grant for inaugurating the da'wa building of the organization. The Mayor of Bandung, Yayan Mulyana, attended to inaugurate the building in mid-2022.<sup>5</sup>

According to several NGOs which are concerned with issues of tolerance, religious freedom, and minority rights, such as SETARA & AMAN,<sup>6</sup> they argue that the mayor's presence is clear evidence of the partiality of state's supports towards the organization.<sup>7</sup> If this statement is accurate, this act of support has violated the established rules stated in the article 5 (paragraph) of Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945). It clearly states, "The state guarantees the freedom of every citizen to practice their religion and to worship according to their own faith and beliefs." Given that Indonesia embraces a democratic system that respects the freedom of belief for all individuals, it then creates the question of why does the state tends to support intolerant groups that it's objective clearly violates minority rights?

Meanwhile, scholars have long argued that protecting minority groups from persecution by majority groups is a main component of liberal democracy. Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2004),<sup>8</sup> for instance, found that a country with a good quality of democracy must have political freedoms, equal rights, and well-functioning democratic state institutions. Civil and political rights are two main components in democratic countries. This is because the democratic state model itself must be centered on the

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<sup>3</sup> Sudirman Wamad, "Profil ANNAS, Gerakan Anti Syiah yang Lahir di Bandung," News Publisher, *Detik.com* (blog), September 2, 2022, <https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-6269621/profil-annas-gerakan-anti-syiah-yang-lahir-di-bandung>.

<sup>4</sup> "Pembubaran Paksa dan Pelarangan Peringatan Asyura adalah Pelanggaran Hukum dan HAM," News Publisher, *Liputan Islam* (blog), August 27, 2024, <https://liputanislam.com/tabayun/pembubaran-paksa-dan-pelarangan-peringatan-asyura-adalah-pelanggaran-hukum-dan-ham/>.

<sup>5</sup> Muhammad Hendartyo, "Hadiri Peresmian Gedung ANNAS, Wali Kota Bandung Disebut Intoleran," News Publisher, *Tempo* (blog), August 30, 2020, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1628351/hadiri-peresmian-gedung-annas-wali-kota-bandung-disebut-intoleran>.

<sup>6</sup> Nita Nurdiani, "Organisasi ANNAS Dilarang, Tapi Gedungnya Diresmikan Pemerintah: Ini Melukai Kemanusiaan Korban," September 9, 2022, <https://amanindonesia.org/2022/09/09/organisasi-annas-dilarang-tapi-gedungnya-diresmikan-pemerintah-ini-melukai-kemanusiaan-korban/>.

<sup>7</sup> Sudirman Wamad, "Wali Kota Bandung Dikecam Usai Resmikan Gedung Dakwah ANNAS," *Detik* (blog), August 31, 2022, <https://www.detik.com/jabar/berita/d-6265482/wali-kota-bandung-dikecam-usai-resmikan-gedung-dakwah-annas>.

<sup>8</sup> Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, "The Quality of Democracy: An Overview," *Journal of Democracy* 15, no. 4 (October 2004): 20–31, <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2004.0060>.

interests, sovereignty, and benefit of the people.<sup>9</sup> The religious rights of minority groups can be classified as a civil right. However, in democratic countries with a Muslim majority, like Indonesia and Malaysia, conflict between majority and minority that leads to religious intolerance act is unavoidable. In Malaysia, religious intolerance often occurs towards minority religious groups due to the state's defense of Islam and Malay Muslim dominance.<sup>10</sup> Meanwhile, in Indonesia, according to Hamayotsu (2013), two of contributing factors of growing religious intolerance towards minority groups are the presence of intolerant groups and conservative Muslim politicians in the state.<sup>11</sup> These phenomenon raise questions: why do intolerant groups maintain access to state resources, and what are the implications for religious pluralism and minority rights? Is there a perceived lack of robust legal regulations and enforcement mechanisms to prevent such occurrences of religious intolerance?

As Shia does not considered part of Islam by the majority of Muslim in Indonesia, the agenda for realizing protection for minority groups in Indonesia became increasingly difficult when the 1965 presidential decree demanded that Indonesian citizens must adhere to one of the six official religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. These six official religions indirectly shape the official religious identity of citizens. This "state demand" to adhere to one of the official religions is often followed by the state taking sides against orthodox religious groups<sup>12</sup> and persecution of

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<sup>9</sup> Renske Doorenspleet, "Where Are the People? A Call for People-Centred Concepts and Measurements of Democracy," *Government and Opposition* 50, no. 3 (July 2015): 469–94, <https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2015.10>.

<sup>10</sup> Dicky Sofjan, "Religious Diversity and Politico-Religious Intolerance in Indonesia and Malaysia," *The Review of Faith & International Affairs* 14, no. 4 (October 2016): 53–64, <https://doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2016.1248532>.

<sup>11</sup> Kikue Hamayotsu, "The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 43, no. 4 (November 2013): 658–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.780471>.

<sup>12</sup> Religious orthodoxy refers to the adherence to established and traditional beliefs, doctrines, and practices within a particular religion. It is often characterized by a commitment to maintaining what is considered the core and authoritative teachings and rituals of the faith, as opposed to heterodox or heretical beliefs, which deviate from these established norms. Orthodoxy serves as a benchmark for theological and doctrinal purity, ensuring continuity and consistency within the religious tradition. Orthodoxy in any religion often involves a combination of scriptural interpretation, theological principles, and ritual practices that have been accepted and institutionalized over time. The criteria for what constitutes orthodoxy can vary significantly between religions and even within different sects or denominations of the same religion. For instance, Christian orthodoxy is often associated with adherence to the Nicene Creed and the teachings of the early Church Fathers, while Jewish orthodoxy emphasizes the observance of Halakha (Jewish law) as interpreted by rabbinic authority. In the context of Islam, orthodoxy refers to the adherence to the fundamental beliefs and practices that are widely accepted by the majority of Muslims. Islamic orthodoxy is rooted in the Qur'ān, the ḥadīth (sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad), and the consensus (*ijmā'*) of scholars over centuries. It includes the Five Pillars of Islam, which are the basic acts of worship and practice: the declaration of faith

groups deemed deviant and heretical.<sup>13</sup> The existence of laws regulating citizens' adherence to certain belief systems raises the question of whether the state will tolerate those who choose to leave the established belief system. The supports of the state to ANNAS may serve as the evidence that the state is intolerance toward minority groups seems answered the above question.

Based on the puzzle and research objectives outlined earlier, I formulated three key questions to be answered in this research: *First*, how can the state establish and maintain a clientelist network with intolerant groups in general and with ANNAS in particular? *Second*, why does the state choose to form this clientelist network with ANNAS? *Third*, what specific benefits and advantages do the state and ANNAS each gain from their clientelist relationship and partnership?

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(shahada), prayer (salat), fasting during Ramadan (*sawm*), almsgiving (*zakāh*), and pilgrimage to Mecca (*hajj*). Islamic orthodoxy is typically associated with Sunni Islam, which is the largest branch of Islam. Sunni orthodoxy emphasizes adherence to the Qur'ān and ḥadīth, as interpreted by the four major Sunni schools of jurisprudence (*madhāhib*): Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi'iy, and Hanbali. These schools provide the framework for interpreting Islamic law (sharia) and ensuring consistency in religious practice. The development of Sunni orthodoxy was significantly influenced by early Islamic scholars such as Imam al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah, who worked to codify and defend the core tenets of the faith against various heterodox movements. Shia Islam, the second-largest branch of Islam, also has its own form of orthodoxy, which includes unique beliefs and practices such as the veneration of the Imams, who are considered the rightful successors to the Prophet Muhammad. Shia orthodoxy is based on the teachings of these Imams and includes additional religious texts and traditions that are not recognized by Sunni Muslims. Orthodox Islam also places significant emphasis on maintaining the purity of faith and practice. This includes the rejection of innovations (*bid'ah*) in religious practice, which are seen as deviations from the original teachings of Islam. The concept of bid'ah is crucial in Islamic orthodoxy as it helps to preserve the integrity and authenticity of the religion. Despite these general principles, there is considerable diversity within Islamic orthodoxy. Different cultural, historical, and social contexts have led to various interpretations and practices within Sunni and Shia communities. This diversity is reflected in the regional variations of Islamic practice and the different emphases placed on particular aspects of the faith. In summary, religious orthodoxy refers to the adherence to established and traditional beliefs and practices within a particular religion, serving as a benchmark for doctrinal purity and consistency. Islamic orthodoxy, primarily associated with Sunni Islam, is rooted in the Qur'ān, ḥadīth, and the consensus of scholars, emphasizing the Five Pillars of Islam and the rejection of religious innovations. Despite this, there is considerable diversity within Islamic orthodoxy, reflecting the varied cultural and historical contexts of Muslim communities. See: Moojan Momen, *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi'ism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985); Jonathan A. C. Brown, *Hadith: Muhammad's Legacy in the Medieval and Modern World*, Foundations of Islam (Oxford: Oneworld Publ, 2011); Alister E. McGrath, *Historical Theology: An Introduction to the History of Christian Thought*, 2. ed (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013); Jacob Neusner, *Judaism: The Basics*, Reprint (London: Routledge, 2007); Mohammad Hashim Kamali, *Shari'ah Law: An Introduction*, Reprinted (Oxford: Oneworld Publ, 2010); Robert W. Hefner, *Shari'a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011); Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Heart of Islam: Enduring Values for Humanity* (Pymble, NSW: PerfectBound, 2002); John L. Esposito, *What Everyone Needs to Know about Islam*, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

<sup>13</sup> Jeremy Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 3 (July 2014): 591–621, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417514000267>.

In this thesis, I argue that the State cultivates clientelism networks with intolerant groups, like ANNAS in the context of this research, to establish a symbiotic relationship. This relationship ultimately achieves two shared goals: the pursuit of enhanced security control and the promotion of religious partisanship within the political sphere.

## **1.2 Studies on State Involvement, Intolerant Groups, and Minority Rights in Indonesia: A Literature Review**

Several studies discussed state entanglement with intolerant groups in Indonesia. These researches explain various factors that contribute to, and the reciprocal advantages or mutual benefits derived from clientelism relationships between state and intolerant groups. Research conducted by Bakker (2016) entitled *Organized Violence and the State; Evolving Vigilantism in Indonesia*, focused on some local civil mass organizations in Jakarta, Minahasa, and East Kalimantan such as Komando Pertahanan Adat Dayak Kalimantan Timur (Dayak Customary Defence Command), Brigade Manguni (Manguni Brigade), and Froum Betawi Rempug (Betawi Brotherhood Forum).<sup>14</sup> Bakker tried to explore how these three mass organizations gain legitimacy from the local government and popular support from the community in carrying out vigilantism acts against groups deemed to pose a threat. According to Bakker, these three mass organizations play a discourse that combines identity, democracy, and willingness to carry out violence against their targets. The state is willing to collaborate with intolerant groups in order to comply with popular interests occurring within the local community. Suryana (2019) in his Ph. D thesis entitled *The State and Religious Violence in Indonesia; Minority Faith and Vigilantism*, conducted fieldwork research in West Java Province and East Java Province.<sup>15</sup> This study focused on two intolerant groups Gerakan Anti Maksiat (Anti-vice Movement, GAMAS) and Gabungan Inisiatif Barisan Anak Siliwangi (Joint Initiative of the Sundanese Sons of Siliwangi, GIBAS) both based in Kuningan Regency, West Java. These groups were found to hold intolerant views and engage in activities that marginalized minority

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<sup>14</sup> Laurens Bakker, "Organized Violence and the State: Evolving Vigilantism in Indonesia," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia* 172, no. 2–3 (January 1, 2016): 249–77, <https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17202001>.

<sup>15</sup> A'an Suryana, "State Officials' Entanglement with Vigilante Groups in Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a Communities in Indonesia," *Asian Studies Review* 43, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 475–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2019.1633273>; A'an Suryana, *The State and Religious Violence in Indonesia: Minority Faiths and Vigilantism*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429284724>.

communities in the region; Ahmadiyya and Shia. Additionally, the study examined several other intolerant groups located in Sampang, Madura, within East Java Province, further highlighting the challenges faced by minority populations across different parts of Indonesia. The focus of his research is to explore how the state responds to violence affecting religious minority groups in Indonesia; Ahmadiyya, & Shia. In his conclusion, he found that there was a complicated relationship between state security officials and local intolerant groups in both provinces in acts of persecution against religious minority groups. This complex relationship hampers officers' ability to prevent incidents of religious violence before they occur and to bring charges against perpetrators of violence. What state and intolerant groups got from this are mutual material and political interests.

Different from the above studies, another research conducted by Soedirgo (2018) titled *Informal Networks and Religious Intolerance; How Clientelism Incentives the Discrimination of Ahmadiyya in Indonesia* revealed that clientelism network could happened between state and minority groups in granting access to benefits and protection of citizenship.<sup>16</sup> In contrast to the two studies mentioned above, Soedirgo's research focuses on exploring how a religious minority group in Bandung City and Tasikmalaya Regency, namely Ahmadiyya, can access citizenship rights through non-formal state channels. If Bakker (2016)<sup>17</sup> and Suryana (2019)<sup>18</sup> focuses on how the state collaborates with intolerant groups to limit the religious rights of minorities, Jessica explains how a minority group collaborates with state officials through clientelist networks to access their citizenship rights. By comparing two districts in West Java, Bandung city and Tasikmalaya district, she shows that the Ahmadi's ability to exercise their rights and access protections was influenced by the structure of clientelist networks. In districts where politicians depended on the support of individuals with anti-Ahmadiyah views to gain political power, Ahmadi's faced more challenges in accessing the rights and protections afforded by their legal citizenship status.

The abovementioned research conducted by Bakker (2016), Suryana (2019), and Soedirgo (2018) show that the relationships between the state and intolerant groups exhibit

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<sup>16</sup> Jessica Soedirgo, "Informal Networks and Religious Intolerance: How Clientelism Incentivizes the Discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia," *Citizenship Studies* 22, no. 2 (February 17, 2018): 191–207, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2018.1445490>.

<sup>17</sup> Laurens Bakker, "Organized Violence and the State: Evolving Vigilantism in Indonesia," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land- En Volkenkunde / Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences of Southeast Asia* 172, no. 2–3 (January 1, 2016): 249–77, <https://doi.org/10.1163/22134379-17202001>.

<sup>18</sup> A'an Suryana, "State Officials' Entanglement with Vigilante Groups in Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a Communities in Indonesia," *Asian Studies Review* 43, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 475–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2019.1633273>.

diverse patterns and shared goals in the form of mutual benefit. In this thesis, I aim to explore potential variations or alternative ways of interaction that may occur between the state and intolerant groups, represented by ANNAS. This includes an examination of the complex dynamics at play, including the ways in which the state engages in or seeks to influence the activities and agenda of intolerant groups, as well as the strategies used by these groups to navigate and potentially exploit their relationships with the state actor.

Previous studies have also primarily focused on describing the movements and directions of ANNAS and its role in addressing Shia in Indonesia. The research entitled *Anti Shia National Alliance, and the Return of NU Followers after Entering Shia Group in Probolinggo*, written by Khalikin (2019), examines the role of ANNAS in encouraging Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) activists to return to the teachings of *ahl al-sunnah wa al-jamā'ah* after they had previously joined the Shia community in the Probolinggo region of Indonesia. The study investigates how ANNAS, a national-level organization, worked to persuade the NU followers to abandon their Shia affiliation and revert to the mainstream Sunni Islamic practices upheld by the NU.<sup>19</sup> Then, research conducted by Makhsun (2019) on *Anti-Shia Stigmatization and Propaganda: Descriptive Highlights of ANNAS Movement*, ANNAS movement has become a medium for campaigning against Shia Islam, depicting it as heretical and deviating from the true teachings of Islam. Makhsun further notes that the anti-Shia sentiment propagated by ANNAS has contributed to a broader climate of Islamic exclusivism, where certain Muslim groups are marginalized and their beliefs are deemed unorthodox or even blasphemous.<sup>20</sup> Research that places ANNAS as a complementary variable of a phenomenon of religious intolerance can be observed in the results of research conducted by Muchtar (2017) entitled *Shia in Tasikmalaya: Managing Harmony with Other Communities*, He conducted a case study related to the realization of harmonious life between adherents and non-adherents of Shia in Tasikmalaya, even though the establishment of ANNAS had previously been declared in that city.<sup>21</sup> Next, the article entitled *Anti Shi'ism in Indonesia: Genealogy, Development, and Method* written by Syarif, Zulkarnain, and Sofjan (2017) focuses on the discussion of the origin, development, and methods of the anti-Shi'ism movement that was born and developed in Indonesia, one of

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<sup>19</sup> Ahsanul Khalikin, "Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah (ANAS) dan Kembalinya Orang NU Pasca Masuk Syiah di Probolinggo," *Harmoni* 18, no. 2 (December 31, 2019): 91–102, <https://doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v18i2.300>.

<sup>20</sup> Ali Makhsun, "Stigmatisasi dan Propaganda Anti-Syiah: Sorotan Deskriptif Gerakan ANNAS," *Jurnal CMES* 12, no. 2 (December 12, 2019): 182, <https://doi.org/10.20961/cmcs.12.2.37894>.

<sup>21</sup> Ibnu Hasan Muchtar, "Syiah di Tasikmalaya: Pengelolaan Kerukunan dengan Komunitas Lain," *Harmoni* 16, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): 109–29, <https://doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v16i1.64>.

the phenomena he mentioned was the establishment of ANNAS. They also cover responses expressed by the Sunni majority in general and by several organizations and religious groups in particular when campaigning against Shi'a.<sup>22</sup> The last one is an article entitled *Anti-Shia Mass Mobilization in Indonesia's Democracy: Godly Alliance, Militant Groups, and the Politics of Exclusion* written by Amal (2020).<sup>23</sup> This research examines violence against religious minorities, especially Shia followers in the democracy of Indonesia, focusing its discussion on the case of the Milad Fatimah celebration held by the Ikatan Jamaah Ahlul Bait Indonesia (The all-Indonesia Assembly of Ahlul Bait Association, IJABI) in Bondowoso. ANNAS is one of the research variables.

From the above explanation, the existing studies on ANNAS have not yet thoroughly examined the specific relationship between ANNAS and the state in limiting and suppressing the religious rights and freedoms of Shia Muslim followers. This thesis aims to address this gap in research by exploring the dynamics in relationship between ANNAS, the state, and their collective impact on the religious rights of the Shia minority community in Indonesia. In doing so, it seeks to contribute to scholarly discussions on the complex interplay between the state and intolerant groups in Indonesia, and the consequences for marginalized religious minorities.

### 1.3 Theoretical Framework

This research will employ *clientelism theory* to investigate the pattern of informal relationships between the state and ANNAS. There is no single individual can be credited as the "inventor" of this theory. However, this theory has been shaped by a diverse array of scholars from different disciplines. Their collective contributions have established clientelism as a critical area of study in political science, providing insights into the interactions between politicians and voters in various socio-political contexts. Early scholars like Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson applied the concept of clientelism in their work, *City Politics* (1963) to investigate how many American cities in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century to examine political machines that operate through networks of patron-client relationships.<sup>24</sup> Another scholar who applied this concept is Oscar Lewis in his seminal

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<sup>22</sup> Dede Syarif, Iskandar Zulkarnain, and Dicky Sofjan, "Anti Shi'ism in Indonesia: Genealogy, Development, and Methods," *Harmoni* 16, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): 24–37, <https://doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v16i1.54>.

<sup>23</sup> M Khusna Amal, "Anti-Shia Mass Mobilization in Indonesia's Democracy: Godly Alliance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Exclusion," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 10, no. 1 (May 29, 2020): 25–48, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i1.25-48>.

<sup>24</sup> In *City Politics*, Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson said that clientelism plays a crucial role in their analysis of urban political dynamics. The book, published in 1963, explores the political machines that dominated many American cities during the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century. They examine how political machines operate through networks of patron-client relationships. The

book *The Children of Sanchez* (2011) in investigating how clientelism operates at the grassroots level, affecting the lives of the Mexican urban poor.<sup>25</sup>

Clientelism is a reciprocal relationship between actors, or a group of actors, who control unequal resources and involve mutually beneficial transactions that have political consequences.<sup>26</sup> Clientelism network will occur when there three actors that interplay each others; *patrons*, *clients*, and *brokers*.<sup>27</sup> A *patron* is a political actor, such as a politician, party leader, or influential figure, who controls resources and distributes them to clients in exchange for political support. The patron leverages their position and access to resources to maintain and expand their power. Patrons often operate within a hierarchical network and may use state resources, personal wealth, or influence over public services to fulfill their role.<sup>28</sup> While, a *client* is an individual or a group that receives material benefits or favors from a patron in return for political support. This support can take various forms, such as voting for the patron, attending rallies, or mobilizing others to support the patron. Clients are typically less powerful and depend on the patron for resources that they might not otherwise access through formal institutional channels.<sup>29</sup> And the last is a *broker*. It serves as an intermediary who facilitates the exchange between patrons and clients. Brokers often operate at the local level, possessing a deep understanding of the community's needs and the ability to mobilize support. They play a crucial role in maintaining the clientelistic network by ensuring that resources are effectively distributed to clients and that the clients deliver the expected political support to the patron.<sup>30</sup> Clientelism usually grows in new

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central premise is that political machines maintain power and control by distributing material benefits and favors to specific individuals or groups in exchange for political support, primarily votes, furthermore, see Edward C Benfield and James Q Wilson, *City Politics* (Harvard University Press, 1963).

<sup>25</sup> In *The Children of Sánchez*, Oscar Lewis explores the daily lives and struggles of the Sánchez family, revealing how clientelism permeates their social and political interaction. In *The Children of Sánchez*, Oscar Lewis provides a nuanced portrayal of how clientelism operates at the grassroots level, affecting the lives of the urban poor. The book illustrates the double-edged nature of clientelism: while it offers vital support and resources to marginalized families, it also perpetuates dependency and limits social advancement. Furthermore, see: Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sánchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family*, 2nd Vintage books ed (New York: Vintage Books, 2011).

<sup>26</sup> Soedirgo, "Informal Networks and Religious Intolerance."

<sup>27</sup> Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," *Comparative Politics* 4, no. 2 (January 1972): 149, <https://doi.org/10.2307/421508>.

<sup>28</sup> Allen Hicken, "Clientelism," *Annual Review of Political Science* 14, no. 1 (June 15, 2011): 289–310, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508>.

<sup>29</sup> Virginia Oliveros, "Making It Personal: Clientelism, Favors, and the Personalization of Public Administration in Argentina," *Comparative Politics* 48, no. 3 (April 1, 2016): 373–91, <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041516818254437>.

<sup>30</sup> Iskandar, Uddin B. Sore, and Ali Anas, "Broker's Position in Patronage Bonds as a Form of the Middle Class in Farming Communities in Rural South Sulawesi," *International Journal of*

democratic countries where the distribution of power depends on informal networks and exchanges of clientelism. Several scholars argue that this clientelism has implications for the consolidation of democracy.<sup>31</sup>

This thesis aims to argue that the state cultivates clientelism networks with intolerant groups, like ANNAS, to establish a symbiotic relationship. This relationship ultimately achieves two mutual goals: the pursuit of enhanced security control and the promotion of religious partisanship within the political sphere. The clientelism theory is used to analyze who among the state and ANNAS acts as one of the actors between patron, clients, or broker in order to pursue their mutual benefits.

#### **1.4 Research Method & Limitation**

This research is qualitative research which uses in-depth interview data as the primary source. I limit the research focus to the activities of the ANNAS Central Board in Bandung, West Java, and ANNAS Chapter in Solo Raya, Central Java. To analyze state involvement, the police are selected as the state representatives who often cooperate with ANNAS in restricting the religious rights of Shiite followers. I conducted in-depth interviews with a General Secretary of Central ANNAS Board located in Bandung City, a Coordinator of Central Java Chapter of ANNAS, a Leader of Jundullah ANNAS (one of autonomous organization of ANNAS), Three Police Officers from Intel Division of Kepolisian Resort Kota Besar Bandung (Bandung City Resort Police, Kapolrestabes Bandung), and a member of Regional Level of IJABI in Bandung. A total of seven people were interviewed. I conducted interviews over 3-month period in 2024 (April - June).

Interview data collected from Central ANNAS Board provides a valuable perspective on the national landscape of ANNAS movement. Meanwhile, the Central Java region, particularly the Solo area (Solo Raya), was selected as a representative sample for ANNAS at the regional level due to its high level of activity compared to other regions. In addition to ANNAS administrators, interviews were also conducted with the Kapolrestabes Bandung. These interviews contributed to my research data on the historical track record of ANNAS organization during its existence in Indonesia, its legal status according to

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*Asian and African Studies* 2, no. 2 (November 18, 2023): 27–32,  
<https://doi.org/10.32996/ijaas.2023.2.2.2>.

<sup>31</sup> Charles Fernandes Taylor, Jon Cw Pevehouse, and Scott Straus, “Perils of Pluralism: Electoral Violence and Incumbency in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Journal of Peace Research* 54, no. 3 (May 2017): 397–411, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316687801>; Ward Berenschot, “The Spatial Distribution of Riots: Patronage and the Instigation of Communal Violence in Gujarat, India,” *World Development* 39, no. 2 (February 2011): 221–30, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.11.029>; Allen Hicken, “Clientelism,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 14, no. 1 (June 15, 2011): 289–310, <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.031908.220508>.

Indonesian law, and as part of a state that often maintains cooperative relations with ANNAS. Furthermore, interviewing a representative of IJABI members in Bandung can enhance the validity and credibility of the data on ANNAS's work since its establishment.

This research also drew on secondary data, including several news articles about the activities of ANNAS organization published on their website and social media, as well as coverage in other news outlets. Additionally, I consulted a range of reference sources such as scientific journals, theses, dissertations, and other scholarly papers that discussed the work and initiatives of ANNAS in greater detail.

### **1.5 Research Significance**

The significance of this thesis lies in its introduction of a novel discussion on the established theory of clientelism. Traditionally, clientelism involves three actors: *patron*, *broker*, and *client*. However, this thesis demonstrates that these actors are not always present in every case. Specifically, it examines instances where the clientelism relationship involves only the patron and client, with no distinct broker. In such scenarios, the state itself assumes the broker's role of distributing resources to clients, such as ANNAS. Additionally, this thesis highlights that the clientelism network is not solely motivated by the exchange of electoral or material political support. It can also be driven by security interests and state partisanship towards particular religious teachings or beliefs.

### **1.6 Thesis Outline**

This thesis consists of 5 chapters. The first chapter introduces the background, research questions, literature reviews, theoretical framework, methodology, research significance, and thesis structure. In Chapter II, I examine the relationship between the state, civil society, and Islam, and how this influences the climate of religious intolerance in Indonesia. I analyze the root causes of religious intolerance that have existed since the pre-reform era, through the reform period, and up to the contemporary period. Additionally, I explain how civil society has significantly contributed to the growth of religious intolerance in Indonesia. I then discuss the role of ANNAS since its presence in Indonesia. In Chapter III, I describe the ambiguous attitude displayed by the state towards intolerant organizations, which oscillates between confrontational and collaborative approaches. This ambiguity arises from the lack of laws regulating state actors' behaviour. I use the state's relationship with FUUI and ANNAS to illustrate this situation. In Chapter IV, I delve into the motives behind the informal relationship between the state and ANNAS, and I also

explore the implications of my research findings on discussions around the theory of clientelism networks. Finally, Chapter V contains the conclusion of the thesis.

## CHAPTER II

### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND ISLAM: MINORITY GROUPS PROTECTION IN INDONESIA

#### 2.1 Introduction

When discussing religious intolerance in Indonesia, it is important to examine the complex relationship between the state and Islam in the country. As one of the largest Muslim-majority states in the world, Indonesia has grappled with significant tensions between the push for a more Islamist state and the need to maintain religious pluralism and tolerance. This tension is rooted in the historical and political development of the Indonesian state, which has sought to balance the demands of its diverse religious and ethnic groups while also navigating the influence of Islamic movements and organizations within the country. The state's role in managing this delicate balance has had a significant impact on the level of religious intolerance and the treatment of minority religious groups in Indonesia.

The desire to transform Indonesia into a strictly Islamist state, where Islamic principles are rigorously applied across all aspects of life, has on several occasions led to the perpetration of injustice and discrimination against minority religious groups in the country.<sup>32</sup> This push for an increasingly Islamized national identity has come at the cost of violating the rights and freedoms of religious minorities, undermining Indonesia's long-held tradition of religious pluralism and tolerance.<sup>33</sup> This religious Intolerance act towards minority groups in Indonesia can stem from two main sources: the state and within society itself.

Acts of intolerance by state actors may involve enacting discriminatory laws that harm minority religious groups, often done to gain electoral benefits by appeasing intolerant factions or to secure the trust of the Muslim majority. For example, the state has sometimes responded to calls for greater Islamization by allowing the enforcement of

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<sup>32</sup> Mohammad Ahyan Yusuf Sya'bani, "Culture of Religious Moderation Through the Actualization of Islamic Education Wasatiyyah to Improve Religious Reconnection and Tolerance in Indonesia:" (1st UMGESHIC International Seminar on Health, Social Science and Humanities (UMGESHIC-ISHSSH 2020), Gresik, Indonesia, 2021), <https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211020.075>.

<sup>33</sup> Hasse Jubba et al., "The Contestation between Conservative and Moderate Muslims in Promoting Islamic Moderatism in Indonesia," *Cogent Social Sciences* 8, no. 1 (December 31, 2022): 2116162, <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2022.2116162>; Amin Mudzakkir, "Konservatisme Islam Dan Intoleransi Keagamaan Di Tasikmalaya," *Harmoni* 16, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): 57–74, <https://doi.org/10.32488/harmoni.v16i1.56>.

Sharia-based local regulations, which can lead to the marginalization of religious minorities, such as Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and others, and the erosion of Indonesia's long-standing tradition of religious pluralism and tolerance.<sup>34</sup>

On the other hand, religious intolerance can also arise from within society, as conservative Muslim groups seek to impose their strict interpretation of Islam on the rest of the population. These groups often view religious pluralism and the practices of minority faiths as threats to their vision of an Islamist state, leading them to engage in acts of discrimination, harassment, and even violence against non-Muslim communities. The influence of these conservative factions within Indonesian society has placed significant pressure on the state to accommodate their demands, further compromising the rights and freedoms of religious minorities. This can take the form of attacks on places of worship, discrimination in employment and education, and the general stigmatization and marginalization of minority faiths. The inability or unwillingness of the state to adequately protect the rights of religious minorities and promote robust religious pluralism and tolerance has allowed these societal tensions to fester and deepen, further entrenching the disadvantaged position of non-Muslim communities in Indonesia. Addressing the issue of religious intolerance in Indonesia requires a multifaceted approach that addresses both the state's role and the dynamics within society.<sup>35</sup>

The complex interplay between the state, civil society, and Islam will be examined in the following sub-chapters to provide a comprehensive understanding of the drivers behind the growth of religious intolerance in Indonesia.

## **2.2 Religious Intolerance in Indonesia: A Social Biography Glance**

### **2.2.1 The Relationship between Islam and the State Before *Reformasi* Era (Pre-1998)**

The nature of the relationship between Islam and the state during Soekarno's era bore significant resemblance to the dynamics observed under the leadership of President

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<sup>34</sup> Al Khanif and Khoo Ying Hooi, "Challenges in Protecting Religious Minorities in Indonesia," in *Marginalisation and Human Rights in Southeast Asia*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2022), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003331858>.

<sup>35</sup> Budi Sirait, "Ancaman Diskriminasi Minoritas Dan Hilangnya Multikulturalisme Di Indonesia: Studi Kasus Penutupan GKI Yasmin Bogor," *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik* 10, no. 1 (April 30, 2019): 28, <https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.10.1.2019.28-39>; Kurniawan Netanyahu and Deri Susanto, "Sustainability of Interreligious Dialogue in Indonesia under the Phenomenon of Intolerance by Islamic Populists," *Dialog* 45, no. 2 (December 29, 2022): 248–57, <https://doi.org/10.47655/dialog.v45i2.664>.

Soeharto during the New Order period. Indeed, during the New Order (*Orde Baru*) era, under the leadership of Soeharto, the horizontal relations between religious communities generally tended to be harmonious.<sup>36</sup> Islam, as the predominant religion among Indonesian citizens, is often perceived as a congenial faith that generally does not exhibit discriminatory attitudes towards minority religious groups.<sup>37</sup> In the 1970s and 1980s, the prevailing Islamic discourse was shaped by progressive Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid and Mukti Ali. This progressive Islamic narrative, which aligned with the development and modernization agendas of President Soeharto's regime, received substantial support from his administration. These progressive Islamic ideas were not only disseminated through mass media and universities but also became the cornerstone of policy formulation for Indonesia's Ministry of Religion.<sup>38</sup>

The ostensibly "friendly" and "pro-government" visage of Islam in Indonesia is not an organic occurrence. Rather, it is a direct consequence of the policies instituted during Suharto's leadership.<sup>39</sup> Although conflicts or incidents of horizontal religious intolerance between religious communities were infrequent, the majority of conflicts at the time were between Islam (whether represented by Islamist parties or religious groups) and the state. This was a result of the repressive, authoritarian, and state-centric policies of the Soeharto government. Under the *Orde Baru* regime, Indonesia's focus was on economic development while suppressing political opponents, including mass and religious organizations. In such a political climate, the depoliticization of Islam occurred. Whether in the realm of political vehicles (parties) or social activities (manifested as mass organizations), depoliticization became one of Soeharto's strategies to consolidate his influence and power while weakening his political opponents and the broader influences of Islamic social activism. To achieve this, Soeharto sought to eliminate Islamic political parties and purge the political arena of Muslim politicians.<sup>40</sup>

The depoliticization of Islam reached its zenith when the government mandated the consolidation of all Islamic political parties into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United

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<sup>36</sup> Masykur Hakim, "Soeharto and The Politization of Indonesian Islam (1968-1998)," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 10, no. 2 (December 1, 2016): 159, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2016.10.2.159-180>.

<sup>37</sup> Martin Van Bruinessen, "What Happened to the Smiling Face of Indonesian Islam? Muslim Intellectualism and the Conservative Turn in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Singapore: Nanyang Technological University*, 2011, <https://hdl.handle.net/10356/94249>.

<sup>38</sup> Luci Karmiati, "Analisis Islam pada Masa Orde Baru 1996-1998," *Tanjak: Jurnal Sejarah dan Peradaban Islam* 3, no. 1 (2023): 77–85.

<sup>39</sup> François Raillon and Francois Raillon, "The New Order and Islam, or the Imbroglgio of Faith and Politics," *Indonesia* 57 (April 1993): 197, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351248>.

<sup>40</sup> Douglas E. Ramage, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013).

Development Party, PPP) in 1973 and required the adoption of Pancasila as the sole ideology (*Asas Tunggal*) for both political and mass organizations in 1985. This *Asas Tunggal* policy encountered significant resistance from Indonesian Muslims. The climax of this resistance was the Tanjung Priok riots in August 1984, in the Jakarta harbor area, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Muslims at the hands of Indonesian troops and the arrest of several prominent Muslim figures, including A.M. Fatwa and H.R. Darsono, the Lieutenant General (Ret.). Fatwa was a renowned Muslim preacher, while Darsono was a notable former commander of the Siliwangi Division in West Java. This period also saw a series of destabilizing events throughout 1984-1985, including bombings at Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta, the Borobudur Buddhist Temple in Yogyakarta, and the naval base in Cilandak, Jakarta. Muslim groups were accused of orchestrating the first two bombings, further intensifying the political and social unrest during this period.<sup>41</sup>

The Soeharto regime's depoliticization of Islam was also achieved through the spread of warnings about the latent dangers of Islamic extremist movements. One view is that the threat of religious extremism was used as a pretext to justify harsh security measures as the Communist threat waned. The military consistently warned of threats from the extreme left, meaning the Communists, or the extreme right, a euphemism for Islamic radicalism. There is also partial evidence that the state may have instigated radical Islamic movements in the 1970s and 1980s to cement political support. For example, it is believed that Ali Murtopo brought together former leaders of the West Java-based Darul Islam revolt, which had been crushed by the army in the 1960s and asked them to reactivate the movement. He reportedly told them they would be helping to stamp out Communism, but the real reason is thought to be Murtopo's desire to discredit Islamic political forces before the elections. In the next two years, hundreds of people were arrested and accused of belonging to an extremist sect known as Kommando Jihad. As implausible as this may sound, the habit of some New Order followers to believe the best way to strengthen their power is to 'engineer' political threats are well documented. These threats were most often conceived as either from the 'Communist left' or the 'Islamic right'.<sup>42</sup>

The evidence presented in the preceding explanation suggests that the appearance of moderate Islam in Indonesia during the Soeharto era was not a natural or organic phenomenon. Rather, it was the direct result of the policies and actions implemented by Soeharto and his New Order regime. Specifically, the Soeharto government pursued a

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<sup>41</sup> Hakim, "Soeharto and The Politization of Indonesian Islam (1968-1998)."

<sup>42</sup> Michael R J Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order, Third Edition* (London: Taylor & Francis Inc./Routledge, 2003), 130.

deliberate strategy of depoliticizing Islam and marginalizing its political influence within the country. At the same time, the regime actively promoted a more docile and acquiescent version of Islam that aligned with its broader development agenda. In other words, the "harmonious relationship between Islam and the state" that was observed during this period was primarily a consequence of the authoritarian state's ability to control and shape the public expression of religion, rather than a genuine spirit of mutual cooperation and accommodation between the two entities. The state's authoritarian grip and its systematic efforts to constrain the political influence of Islam were the key factors that gave rise to this seemingly harmonious dynamic, rather than any inherent compatibility or affinity between the state and the religion.

### **2.2.2 After Reformasi Era (Post-1998)**

The overthrow of the New Order regime under Suharto's leadership in 1998 marked the opening of Indonesia's democratic climate. With the advent of democracy, Indonesian citizens enjoyed greater freedom to publicly express their political beliefs and attitudes, which had previously been restricted for the sake of maintaining state stability. During this period, numerous political parties and mass organizations emerged, often grounded in religious doctrines as their ideological foundations. Examples include the formation of Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defender Fronts, FPI), a mass organization based on conservative Islamic understanding, and Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, PKS), which was inspired by the values and struggles of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. However, the advent of democracy brought with it a dual-edged consequence. While Indonesians experienced newfound democratic freedoms, they also faced horizontal conflicts, including a surge in acts of intolerance between the majority religious group (Islam) and various minorities, both external (Christians, Buddhists, Hindus, etc.) and internal (Ahmadiyya, Shia, etc.). This is proved by the occurrence of several expressions of hatred towards other religious groups in the form of bombings such as the Bali bombing case in 2002 and persecution of Islamic groups considered deviant such as Ahmadiyya.<sup>43</sup>

Facal (2020) concluded that one of the causes of the growth of religious intolerance in Indonesia was the presence of intolerant groups such as FPI right after Indonesia entered the reform period in 1998.<sup>44</sup> According to him, FPI, as a national-scale Islamist organization, often fueled tensions between Muslims and other religious communities.

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<sup>43</sup> Jacqueline Hicks, "Heresy and Authority: Understanding the Turn against Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.," n.d.

<sup>44</sup> Gabriel Facal, "Islamic Defenders Front Militia (Front Pembela Islam) and Its Impact on Growing Religious Intolerance in Indonesia," *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia* 8, no. 1 (May 2020): 7–20, <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2018.15>.

They openly express their intentions to commit violence such as carrying out anti-Semitic campaigns and accusing several Protestants and Catholics. FPI also carries out persecution and takes vigilant action against the Ahmadiyya minority group, such as calling for the disbandment of the Ahmadiyya and carrying out attacks on the Ahmadiyya mosque. Aan Suryana conducted extensive field research for his dissertation on some regional intolerant groups in West and East Java Provinces.<sup>45</sup> Those intolerant groups actively carry out persecution against Ahmadiyya and Shi'a, two religious beliefs that are considered deviant from Islam.<sup>46</sup> What gives these two organizations the freedom to persecute the Ahmadiyya and Shia religious minority groups is because of the entanglement relationship between them and the local police which is based on mutual material and political interest.

The rise in religious intolerance cases in the post-Soeharto era can be attributed to two main factors. *First*, religious hardliners gained access not only to new media but also to traditional means and institutions for religious and political mobilization, including state apparatus, which they used to foment antagonistic sentiments against perceived enemies of Islam while promoting a narrow and dogmatic interpretation of Islamic values. *Second*, the emergence of conservative Muslim politicians in state government institutions exacerbated these tensions. These politicians leveraged new media and state facilities to advance conservative religious agendas.<sup>47</sup>

*First*, the emergence of religious hardliners during the Era of Reformasi is driven by a vision to implement sharia law in Indonesia. This obsession with enforcing sharia law stems from the intersection of religiously-based sharia values with those of a modern democratic state.<sup>48</sup> Among the contentious issues that provoke conflicting attitudes between them are the status of non-Muslims, women's rights, "Muslim non-Conformists" or those deemed heretical, human rights, religious freedom, and tolerance.<sup>49</sup> The principle of a modern democratic state, which endeavors to separate religion from state affairs, is a focal concern for religious hardliners. The strategies employed by these groups to advance

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<sup>45</sup> A'an Suryana, "State Officials' Entanglement with Vigilante Groups in Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a Communities in Indonesia," *Asian Studies Review* 43, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 475–92, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2019.1633273>; A'an Suryana, *The State and Religious Violence in Indonesia: Minority Faiths and Vigilantism*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429284724>.

<sup>46</sup> Suryana, "State Officials' Entanglement with Vigilante Groups in Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a Communities in Indonesia."

<sup>47</sup> Kikue Hamayotsu, "The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia: Media Freedom and Religious Intolerance," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 43, no. 4 (November 2013): 658–77, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.780471>.

<sup>48</sup> Clark Lombardi, *State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of the Shari'a into Egyptian Constitutional Law* (BRILL, 2006), <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789047404729>.

<sup>49</sup> Martha C. Nussbaum, *The New Religious Intolerance: Overcoming the Politics of Fear in an Anxious Age* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012).

the vision of Sharia law enforcement in Indonesia are bifurcated into two distinct approaches: *firstly*, through conservative Islamic political parties striving to amend Article 29 of the Indonesian Constitution; *secondly*, through militant Muslim mass organizations, such as the FPI<sup>50</sup> and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Chapter of Hizbut Tahrir, HTI), which often voice their aspirations in mass demonstrations.<sup>51</sup> Although the latter garnered support from the Islamic public for the vision of implementing Sharia law in Indonesia, their efforts did not significantly impact the realization of their initial goals. The pursuit of Sharia implementation has proven to be more effective through political channels. A notable example is the involvement of traditional religious institutions within or closely aligned with the state, such as the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Ulema Council, MUI) and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Unlike during the Orde Baru era, the post-Soeharto MUI has wielded greater influence, issuing numerous anti-liberal and anti-minority fatwas.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has more aggressively endorsed ultra-conservative fatwas, proposing, and implementing discriminatory policies against non-Muslims, women, and cultural minorities.<sup>53</sup>

*Second*, the influence of religious hardliners, whether as part of mass organizations or as political actors in strategic state positions, has significantly contributed to the rise of religious intolerance cases. This influence has facilitated the emergence of conservative Muslim politicians who can access state resources to advance their agendas. An illustrative case is using state facilities to implement conservative populist Islamic policies. When Yudhoyono was elected President of Indonesia for the terms 2004-2009 and 2009-2014, he appointed Ali as Minister of Religion in 2009. Ali, a politician from the PPP (United Development Party) who was reappointed as General Chair in 2011, gained media attention for his controversial actions. He exploited the Ministry of Religion to promote conservative and discriminatory views, particularly against religious minorities like the Ahmadiyya community. Contrary to his promise to President Yudhoyono to foster tolerance and religious harmony, Ali's actions revealed the inability of the state to address sensitive issues of religious intolerance and violence. His handling of the Ahmadiyya issue, among other religious controversies, is particularly contentious. By calling for the banning of

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<sup>50</sup> Jajang Jahroni, "Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam (FPI) 1998-2003," *Studia Islamika* 11, no. 2 (2004): 197–266.

<sup>51</sup> Hamayotsu, "The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia."

<sup>52</sup> Tom Lindes and Helen Pausacker, "Religion, Law, and Intolerance in Indonesia," in *Religion, Law, and Intolerance in Indonesia* (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016).

<sup>53</sup> Virginia Matheson Hooker, Amin Saikal, and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, eds., *Islamic Perspectives on the New Millennium*, ISEAS Series on Islam (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004).

Ahmadiyya and engaging in other discriminatory acts, Ali sought to bolster his credibility and expand his support base within his party and NU community, the main constituency of PPP. For Ali and the PPP, positioning themselves as icons of conservatism, the Ahmadiyya issue provided a significant opportunity to attract potential conservative and radical Muslim voters in Indonesia.<sup>54</sup>

### 2.2.3 Contemporary Challenges

In contemporary era, especially under President Widodo, who has been in office since 2014, there have been numerous incidents of religious intolerance that have drawn significant domestic and international concern. This religious intolerance cases reflects the relationship between Jokowi administration as reigning government and Muslim actor, either as part of state or non-state organization. Jokowi's period could be marked by a complex interplay of political, social, and religious factors that have both fueled and mitigated religious intolerance in the country.

Jokowi's presidency began with a promise to uphold pluralism and protect religious minorities. His election was seen as a hopeful sign by many who were concerned about the rising tide of religious intolerance in Indonesia. However, the reality of governing a diverse and often polarized nation has proven challenging. One of the most notable incidents of religious intolerance during Jokowi's presidency occurred in 2016, involving Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, commonly known as Ahok, the then-Governor of Jakarta. Ahok, a Christian of Chinese descent, was accused of blasphemy for allegedly insulting the Quran. This accusation led to mass protests organized by Islamist groups, demanding his prosecution.<sup>55</sup>

The Ahok case highlighted several critical issues regarding religious intolerance in Indonesia. Firstly, it showcased the power of Islamist groups in mobilizing large sections of the population and influencing political outcomes. The protests against Ahok, spearheaded by groups like FPI, were among the largest in Indonesian history, illustrating the significant sway these groups hold over public opinion. Secondly, it underscored the role of social media in spreading and amplifying messages of intolerance. False information

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<sup>54</sup> Hamayotsu, "The Limits of Civil Society in Democratic Indonesia"; Kikue Hamayotsu, "Conservative Turn? Religion, State and Conflict in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 87, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 815–25, <https://doi.org/10.5509/2014874815>.

<sup>55</sup> Greg Fealy, "Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally," *Indonesia at Melbourne* (blog), July 12, 2016, <https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-mass-rally/>.

and inflammatory rhetoric about Ahok's comments spread rapidly online, fueling anger and resentment.<sup>56</sup>

Jokowi's response to the Ahok case was cautious. While he initially expressed support for Ahok, he later distanced himself, likely in response to the mounting public pressure and the potential political ramifications. Ahok was eventually convicted of blasphemy and sentenced to two years in prison, a verdict that many viewed as a capitulation to the demands of Islamist hardliners and a setback for religious tolerance in Indonesia. This incident exposed the fragility of religious pluralism in the country and the susceptibility of the legal system to public pressure and mob justice.<sup>57</sup>

Another significant aspect of religious intolerance during Jokowi's presidency has been the persecution of the Ahmadiyya and Shia communities. Both groups are considered heretical by mainstream Sunni Muslims and have faced ongoing discrimination and violence. In 2017, Jokowi's government issued a decree allowing the dissolution of organizations deemed to threaten national unity. This decree was used to ban HTI, an Islamist group advocating for the establishment of a caliphate. While this move was seen as an effort to curb radicalism, it also raised concerns about the potential for misuse of the law to suppress legitimate dissent and religious expression.<sup>58</sup>

The ban on HTI did little to alleviate the plight of the Ahmadiyya and Shia communities. Reports of attacks on Ahmadiyya mosques and homes, as well as harassment and discrimination against Shia followers, continued throughout Jokowi's presidency. In many cases, local authorities failed to provide adequate protection or took actions that implicitly supported the persecutors. For instance, in 2016, an Ahmadiyya mosque in Bangka Island was forced to close by local authorities following pressure from hardline groups. Such incidents reflect a broader pattern of local governments either being complicit in or failing to address acts of religious intolerance.<sup>59</sup>

The role of MUI has also been significant in shaping the landscape of religious intolerance under Jokowi. The MUI, which issues fatwas and provides religious guidance, has sometimes contributed to intolerance through its pronouncements. For example, the

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<sup>56</sup> Edward Aspinall and Ward Berenschot, *Democracy for Sale Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia* (USA: Cornell University Press, 2019).

<sup>57</sup> Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, "Indonesia in 2017: Jokowi's Supremacy and His Next Political Battles," in *Southeast Asian Affairs 2018*, ed. Malcolm Cook and Daljit Singh (ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute Singapore, 2018), 153–66, <https://doi.org/10.1355/9789814786843-011>; Charlotte Setijadi, "Singapore | 8 June 2017 Ahok's Downfall and the Rise of Islamist Populism in Indonesia," no. 2017 (2017).

<sup>58</sup> Melissa Crouch, "Constitutionalism, Islam and the Practice of Religious Deference: The Case of the Indonesian Constitutional Court," *Australian Journal of Asian Law* 16, no. 2 (2016).

<sup>59</sup> Elaine Pearson and Human Rights Watch (Organization), eds., *In Religion's Name: Abuses against Religious Minorities in Indonesia* (New York, N.Y.: Human Rights Watch, 2013).

MUI's 2005 fatwa declaring the Ahmadiyya sect deviant has been cited as a justification for various acts of discrimination and violence against the community. Although the MUI does not have legal authority, its influence on public opinion and policy is substantial, and its positions often reflect and reinforce conservative views within Indonesian society.<sup>60</sup>

Jokowi's efforts to address religious intolerance have included initiatives to promote interfaith dialogue and tolerance. The establishment of the Presidential Working Unit on the Implementation of the State Ideology of Pancasila (UKP-PIP) in 2017 aimed to reinforce the values of pluralism and unity. This unit was tasked with promoting Pancasila, Indonesia's state ideology that emphasizes unity in diversity, to counter radicalism and intolerance. Additionally, Jokowi's administration has supported various programs aimed at fostering interfaith understanding and cooperation.<sup>61</sup>

Despite these initiatives, challenges remain. One significant obstacle is the deep-seated conservative attitudes within Indonesian society, which are often resistant to top-down efforts to promote tolerance. Surveys have shown that a substantial portion of the population holds unfavorable views of religious minorities, indicating that changing public attitudes will require sustained and comprehensive efforts.<sup>62</sup> Furthermore, the political landscape in Indonesia, where religious identity can be a powerful tool for mobilization, means that politicians may be reluctant to take strong stands against intolerance if it risks alienating key constituencies.

The influence of Islamist groups on politics and society has not waned during Jokowi's presidency. Even though there was survey that say that radical sentiment from Islamist groups has decreased from 2010 to 2016,<sup>63</sup> but these groups continue to wield significant power, both through formal political channels and through grassroots mobilization. The ability of groups like the FPI to organize large-scale protests and sway public opinion underscores their enduring influence. This influence poses a challenge to

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<sup>60</sup> Moch. Nur Ichwan, "'Ulamā', State and Politics: Majelis Ulama Indonesia After Suharto," *Islamic Law and Society* 12, no. 1 (2005): 45–72, <https://doi.org/10.1163/1568519053123867>.

<sup>61</sup> "National Scene: Pancasila Unit Granted More Power," News Publisher, *Jakarta Post* (blog), July 18, 2017, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/07/18/national-scene-pancasila-unit-granted-more-power.html>.

<sup>62</sup> "Tolerant City Index 2018 by Setara Institute," 2018, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1SR3-7tWpb16QpyyIydHBnm8eLiqEPjHp/view>.

<sup>63</sup> Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi, "Explaining the 2016 Islamist Mobilisation in Indonesia: Religious Intolerance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Accommodation," *Asian Studies Review* 42, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 479–97, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2018.1473335>.

efforts to promote tolerance and pluralism, as political leaders may be wary of provoking backlash from these powerful groups.<sup>64</sup>

In conclusion, religious intolerance in Indonesia during Jokowi's presidency has been shaped by a complex interplay of political, social, and religious factors. While Jokowi has taken steps to promote tolerance and counter radicalism, these efforts have been met with significant challenges. The influence of Islamist groups, the role of social media in spreading intolerance, and the deep-seated conservative attitudes within society have all contributed to the persistence of religious intolerance. Moreover, the legal and political system's susceptibility to pressure from intolerant groups has often hindered efforts to protect religious minorities. Addressing these issues will require a multifaceted approach that includes legal reforms, educational initiatives, and efforts to strengthen the voices of moderate and tolerant civil society groups. Only through such comprehensive measures can Indonesia hope to build a more inclusive and tolerant society.

### **2.3 Civic Engagement and Religious Intolerance: The Role of Civil Society**

Referring to the three sections above, we can see that religious intolerance in Indonesia has become an increasingly prominent issue over the past few decades. The rise in incidents of religious intolerance can be attributed to a complex interplay of political, social, and economic factors. Among these, the role of civil society has been particularly contentious. While civil society organizations (CSOs) are traditionally viewed as agents of democratization and social harmony, some segments of civil society have inadvertently contributed to the escalation of religious intolerance.

Civil society in Indonesia encompasses a broad range of organizations, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), religious groups, community associations, and informal networks. These entities often serve as intermediaries between the state and the populace, advocating for various causes and providing social services. However, the diverse nature of civil society also means that not all organizations promote tolerance and inclusivity. Some groups, particularly those with religious or ideological agendas, have played a significant role in fostering religious intolerance.

One of the keyways in which civil society has contributed to religious intolerance is through the propagation of exclusive religious ideologies. Certain religious organizations and groups in Indonesia have promoted a narrow interpretation of Islam, which

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<sup>64</sup> Jason F. Isaacson and Colin Rubenstein, eds., "Islam and Politics in the New Indonesia by Greg Barton," in *Islam in Asia: Changing Political Realities*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203788189>.

marginalizes other religious communities and sects. For instance, MUI has issued fatwas and statements that have been interpreted as hostile towards religious minorities, including Christians, Ahmadiyya, and Shia.<sup>65</sup> These pronouncements often legitimize discriminatory practices and fuel social hostilities against these groups.<sup>66</sup>

Furthermore, some civil society organizations have been actively involved in mobilizing public sentiment against religious minorities. Groups such as FPI have organized mass protests, demonstrations, and even violent actions against religious minorities. These groups often frame their activities as defending Islam and moral values, resonating with a segment of the Muslim population that views religious diversity as a threat to social cohesion and Islamic purity. The FPI and similar groups have not only perpetuated intolerance but also pressured the state to adopt policies that restrict the rights of religious minorities.<sup>67</sup>

The role of civil society in increasing religious intolerance is also evident in the way certain organizations influence local politics. In many parts of Indonesia, local governments are susceptible to pressure from influential religious groups. These groups can sway public opinion and mobilize voters, making them powerful allies or adversaries for local politicians. Consequently, politicians often cater to the demands of these groups to secure electoral support, leading to the implementation of policies that discriminate against religious minorities. For example, local regulations that restrict the construction of churches or other non-Muslim places of worship are often enacted under pressure from religious groups, reflecting the power of civil society in shaping local governance.<sup>68</sup>

In addition to direct actions and political influence, civil society organizations also contribute to religious intolerance through the dissemination of biased information and hate speech. The advent of social media has amplified the reach and impact of these organizations, allowing them to spread their messages quickly and widely. Misinformation and inflammatory content targeting religious minorities can incite violence and deepen social divides. Studies have shown that hate speech and online incitement significantly correlate with incidents of religious violence in Indonesia. Civil society organizations that

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<sup>65</sup> Michael Buehler, *The Politics of Shari'a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing Indonesia*, 1st ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 9–29, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316417843>.

<sup>66</sup> Zulkifli, *The Struggle of the Shi'is in Indonesia*, Islam in Southeast Asia Series (Acton, A.C.T: ANU E Press, 2013), 234–37.

<sup>67</sup> Ian Douglas Wilson, *The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia: Coercive Capital, Authority and Street Politics*, First issued in paperback, Asia's Transformations 47 (New York: Routledge, 2017).

<sup>68</sup> Buehler, *The Politics of Shari'a Law*.

engage in such activities exploit the freedom of expression to promote intolerance and undermine social harmony.<sup>69</sup>

However, it is important to note that the relationship between civil society and religious intolerance is not monolithic. While some organizations exacerbate intolerance, others work tirelessly to promote religious tolerance and social cohesion. Numerous CSOs, such as the Wahid Foundation and the Setara Institute, advocate for religious freedom, human rights, and interfaith dialogue. These organizations counteract the narratives of intolerance by promoting understanding and cooperation among different religious communities. They conduct educational programs, provide legal assistance to victims of religious discrimination, and engage in public advocacy to influence policy and public opinion.

Despite these efforts, the impact of civil society organizations promoting tolerance is often overshadowed by the more visible and vocal groups advocating intolerance. This imbalance can be attributed to several factors, including the resources and networks available to intolerant groups, their ability to mobilize large numbers of supporters, and their alignment with certain political interests. Intolerant groups often have strong local roots and connections, making them more effective in influencing local politics and social dynamics.<sup>70</sup>

Moreover, the Indonesian state's response to religious intolerance has been inconsistent, further complicating the role of civil society. While the central government has expressed commitment to religious pluralism and tolerance, local authorities frequently fail to enforce these principles. In some cases, local officials are complicit in discriminatory practices or unwilling to confront powerful intolerant groups. This lack of enforcement and accountability creates an environment where intolerant civil society organizations can operate with impunity.<sup>71</sup>

The absence of a robust legal framework to address religious intolerance exacerbates the situation. Although Indonesia has laws protecting religious freedom, their implementation is often weak and uneven. Legal provisions that prohibit blasphemy and religious defamation are sometimes used to target religious minorities instead of protecting

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<sup>69</sup> Merlyna Lim, "Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia," *Critical Asian Studies* 49, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 3–6, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2017.1341188>.

<sup>70</sup> Martin Van Bruinessen, "Indonesian Muslims in a Globalising World: Westernisation, Arabisation, and Indigenising Responses," *RSIS*, no. 311 (2018): 1–23.

<sup>71</sup> Melissa Crouch, *Law and Religion in Indonesia*, 0 ed. (Routledge, 2013), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315889924>.

them. This legal ambiguity allows intolerant groups to manipulate the law to their advantage, perpetuating discrimination, and violence against religious minorities.<sup>72</sup>

In conclusion, while civil society is traditionally viewed as a force for democratization and social harmony, its role in Indonesia is complex and multifaceted. Certain segments of civil society have significantly contributed to the rise of religious intolerance through the promotion of exclusive ideologies, political mobilization, dissemination of biased information, and exploitation of legal ambiguities. These organizations have leveraged their influence to shape public opinion and local governance, often at the expense of religious minorities. However, it is also crucial to recognize the efforts of civil society organizations that strive to promote tolerance and protect human rights. The challenge lies in strengthening these positive forces and creating an environment where they can effectively counteract the narratives of intolerance. This requires a concerted effort from the state, civil society, and the broader public to uphold the principles of religious pluralism and social justice in Indonesia.

## **2.4 Intolerant Religious Groups and Minorities: The Role of Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah (ANNAS)**

### **2.4.1 The Historical Context and Purposes of ANNAS Establishment**

Aliansi Nasional Anti Syiah (The Alliance of Anti-Shia National Activists, ANNAS) is a mass organization officially established on April 20, 2014, in Bandung, West Java. The organization's founders were motivated by the rapid growth of the Shia community in Indonesia, which they perceived as increasingly bold and open in propagating Shia teachings. The founders of ANNAS believe that the rise of Shia teachings in Indonesia is closely tied to the success of Shia leaders in "deceiving" mainstream Muslims through *taqiyya*, a practice whereby Shia followers present themselves and their beliefs as part of a broader Islamic tradition deserving of tolerance. According to the official ANNAS website, prior to its founding, Shia followers had already begun to hold public religious events such as discussions, seminars, article publications, and 'Āshūrā commemorations, which further alarmed ANNAS and spurred its establishment.<sup>73</sup> In the Indonesian context, after the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998, which had a track record of restricting various activities of Shia groups, Shia began to confidently show themselves in the public space after the reform era.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> Pearson and Human Rights Watch (Organization), *In Religion's Name*.

<sup>73</sup> "Profil Dan Sejarah ANNAS," *ANNAS Indonesia* (blog), accessed January 20, 2024, <https://www.annasindonesia.com>.

<sup>74</sup> Umar Faruk Assegaf, "Aspects of Shi'ism in Contemporary Indonesia: A Quest for Social Recognition in the Post Soeharto Era (1998-2008)," in *Shiism in Southeast Asia Alid Piety*

ANNAS was not established spontaneously or abruptly; its formation was preceded by two years of complex organizational dynamics. The founders of ANNAS, comprising ulema and leaders of various Islamic organizations, were originally members of Forum Ulama Ummat Islam (Indonesian Ulema Forum, FUUI). During a meeting held on February 28, 2012, they agreed to issue a fatwa concerning Shia beliefs and convened a subsequent meeting, termed the "2nd Indonesian Ulema and Islamic Ummah Conference," with the sole agenda of formulating strategic steps to address what they perceived as the misdirection and insults propagated by Shia followers."<sup>75</sup>

The follow-up deliberation took place on April 22, 2012, at the Al-Fajr Mosque in Bandung, West Java. The event was inaugurated with speeches by the Mayor of Bandung, Dada Rosada, and the Governor of West Java, Ahmad Heryawan. The assembly was attended by approximately 200 Muslim scholars and figures from across Indonesia, including representatives from Java, Sumbawa, Madura, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Medan, Aceh, and other regions. The deliberation was divided into three commissions: the Strategic Commission, led by Nuruddin A. Rahman; the Tactical Commission, led by Luthfi Bashori; and the Socialization Commission, led by Muhammad Rizal Ismail. One of the key proposals from the Tactical Commission was the creation of an "anti-Shia guard post." After several internal meetings of the FUUI Management and Advisory Board, ANNAS was officially established and declared on April 20, 2014.<sup>76</sup>

The declaration event took place again at the Al-Fajr Mosque in Bandung, West Java, and was attended by tens of thousands of Muslims, ulema, *ḥabāib* (descendants of Prophet Muhammad), leaders of Islamic organizations, and heads of Islamic boarding schools from various regions across Indonesia. The event also saw the presence of Ahmad Hadadi, Regional Assistant III of the West Java Governor, who, in his speech on behalf of the Governor, expressed a full support from the West Java Regional Government for the establishment of ANNAS. The declaration concluded with the reading of the Declaration Text by the elected General Chair of ANNAS, Athian Ali Moh. Da'i, followed by the signing of the declaration by the Chairman of the Syuro Council, Chairman of the Expert Council, and Daily Chairman of ANNAS.<sup>77</sup>

The declaration includes the following points:

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*and Sectarian Constructions (Chiara Formichi and R. Michael Feener)* (Oxford University Press, 2015), 249.

<sup>75</sup> "Profil Dan Sejarah ANNAS."

<sup>76</sup> Wamad, "Profil ANNAS, Gerakan Anti Syiah yang Lahir di Bandung."

<sup>77</sup> Wamad.

- 1) Establishing ANNAS as a platform for preaching the principles of *amr ma'rūf nahy munkar* (enjoining good and forbidding evil).
- 2) Maximizing preventive, anticipatory, and proactive efforts to defend and protect the Islamic *ummah* from various attempts to mislead the faith and sharia by Shia groups in Indonesia.
- 3) Promoting *ukhuwwah Islāmiyyah* (Islamic brotherhood) with various organizations and da'wa movements in Indonesia to monitor, inhibit, and prevent the spread of Shia heresy.
- 4) Urging the state to immediately ban the dissemination of Shia beliefs and teachings and to revoke the permits of all organizations, foundations, and institutions associated with Shia teachings throughout Indonesia.<sup>78</sup>

To fulfill the mandate of the declaration, ANNAS undertook several initiatives to implement the outcomes of the post-declaration deliberations. *Firstly*, ANNAS focused on consolidating efforts among ulema, Islamic movement leaders, scholars, and activists, both individually and through relevant organizations and mass movements. *Secondly*, ANNAS sought to unify various Islamic mass organizations, movements, boarding schools, and *ta'lim* (Islamic teaching) councils across Indonesia, while also collaborating with international organizations and embassies that prioritize safeguarding the faith of the *ummah* from the perceived influence of Shia heresy. *Thirdly*, ANNAS established a network through *halaqah* (gatherings) and representatives throughout Indonesia to serve as forums for its activities, aimed at anticipating heretical Shia movements. *Lastly*, ANNAS engaged in proactive measures to counter Shia movements by promoting activities and initiatives formulated by its management, incorporating suggestions and input from the Syuro Council and ANNAS Expert Council.<sup>79</sup>

As an organization, ANNAS has meticulously formulated its vision and mission to guide its movements and agenda. The vision positions ANNAS as a strategic force for unifying and fostering brotherhood among Muslims to combat and prevent the spread of Shia teachings in Indonesia. The mission of ANNAS is articulated through five practical objectives aimed at realizing this vision. *Firstly*, it seeks to educate all elements of society, particularly Muslims, across Indonesia about the deviant nature of Shiite teachings. *Secondly*, it aims to heighten awareness and vigilance against the methods by which Shia teachings are disseminated in Indonesia, while encouraging Muslims influenced by these teachings to return to orthodox Islamic teachings based on the Qur'an and *ḥadīth* (prophetic

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<sup>78</sup> Wamad.

<sup>79</sup> "Profil Dan Sejarah ANNAS."

traditions). *Thirdly*, ANNAS endeavors to mobilize the collective strength of Muslim communities, along with various organizations and institutions, to resist Shia movements. *Fourthly*, it seeks to establish collaborations and act as a state partner to counter and act against the proponents of Shiite teachings throughout Indonesia. *Lastly*, it demands the state to disband all organizations affiliated with the propagation of Shia teachings in Indonesia.<sup>80</sup>

ANNAS operates as a national organization with branches in 34 provinces across Indonesia, referred to as *chapters*, which share the central vision, purposes, and commitments declared by the central board located in Bandung. To achieve its goals, ANNAS has established four subsidiary organizations: the Gerakan Pemuda ANNAS (ANNAS Youth Movement, GARDA ANNAS), Jundullah ANNAS (The Paramilitary Wing of ANNAS), Gerakan Muslimah ANNAS (The Women's Muslim Movement of ANNAS, GEMA ANNAS), and ANNAS Foundation.<sup>81</sup>

#### **2.4.2 The Trajectories of ANNAS as Religious-Based Intolerant Organization in Indonesia**

Religious-based intolerant groups in Indonesia have gained significant prominence in the country's sociopolitical landscape, mirroring broader global and regional trends. These groups routinely employ religious rhetoric to justify their actions and garner support, framing their intolerance as a defense of religious purity or community rights. One such prominent entity, as already mentioned above, is FPI, established in 1998, which has been implicated in numerous incidents of violence and intimidation targeting religious minorities and those perceived as immoral or blasphemous.<sup>82</sup> FPI has engaged in activities such as targeting bars, nightclubs, and gatherings of religious minorities, which it has justified as efforts to uphold Islamic values.<sup>83</sup>

Another prominent religious-based intolerant group is Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council, MMI) founded by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2000. MMI aims to implement Islamic law nationwide and has been associated with acts of terrorism and violence targeting non-Muslims and Muslims perceived as moderate. The group's extremist ideology and violent activities reflect a broader pattern of transnational jihadist influences

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<sup>80</sup> Wamad, "Profil ANNAS, Gerakan Anti Syiah yang Lahir di Bandung."

<sup>81</sup> Bambang Eko, Direct interview with the Leader of Solo Raya Jundullah chapter, Central Java., April 7, 2024.

<sup>82</sup> Wilson, *The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia*.

<sup>83</sup> Noorhaidi Hasan, "Faith and Politics: The Rise of the Laskar Jihad in the Era of Transition in Indonesia," *Indonesia* 73 (April 2002): 148, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3351472>.

permeating Indonesia, as evidenced by its ties to Al-Qaeda and other global jihadist networks.<sup>84</sup>

The Laskar Jihad, active from 2000 to 2002, was another significant group that promoted religious intolerance. Led by Ja'far Umar Thalib, the Laskar Jihad undertook violent campaigns targeting Christian communities in the Maluku Islands, resulting in extensive damage and casualties.<sup>85</sup> The group's dissolution in 2002 did not signify the conclusion of religious militancy, but rather underscored the dynamic and adaptive nature of such groups within the Indonesian context.

Religious intolerance is not limited to radical Islamist groups alone. Other faith-based militant organizations, such as the Laskar Kristus Christian militia, have also emerged in response to perceived Muslim aggression in regions like Poso and the Maluku Islands.<sup>86</sup> These groups frequently portray their actions as defensive measures to protect Christian communities from perceived Muslim aggression, but their activities ultimately perpetuate a cycle of violence and religious intolerance.<sup>87</sup>

The influence of these intolerant groups extends beyond direct acts of violence, as they also shape public discourse and policy. They frequently exert substantial pressure on local and national governments to adopt policies aligned with their religious ideologies, such as the implementation of sharia-based regulations in specific regions.<sup>88</sup> These groups also engage in extralegal actions, enforcing their interpretation of religious morality through coercion and aggression, which subverts the rule of law and the safeguarding of minority rights.<sup>89</sup>

Religious-based intolerant groups have leveraged social media and digital platforms to significantly expand their reach and influence. These platforms enable them to propagate propaganda, rally supporters, and coordinate their actions, thereby accelerating the widespread dissemination of their intolerant ideologies.<sup>90</sup> The utilization of social media

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<sup>84</sup> "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of The Ngruki Network in Indonesia," *International Crisis Group Indonesia*, 2002, 13.

<sup>85</sup> Hasan, "Faith and Politics," 148.

<sup>86</sup> Wilson, *The Politics of Protection Rackets in Post-New Order Indonesia*.

<sup>87</sup> Gerry Van Klinken, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia*, 0 ed. (Routledge, 2007), 1–5, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203965115>.

<sup>88</sup> Michael Buehler, "Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing Shari'a Politics in Two Indonesian Provinces," *Comparative Politics* 46, no. 1 (October 1, 2013): 70–71, <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041513807709347>.

<sup>89</sup> R. Michael Feener, *Shari'a and Social Engineering: The Implementation of Islamic Law in Contemporary Aceh, Indonesia*, 1. ed, Oxford Islamic Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), 138–41.

<sup>90</sup> Merlyna Lim, "Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004-2011," *Journal of Communication* 62, no. 2 (April 2012): 235–38, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2012.01628.x>.

platforms by these intolerant groups underscores the convergence of technology and religious intolerance, wherein digital technologies are employed to propagate divisive ideologies and exacerbate societal conflicts.

The underlying motivations for the formation and activities of religious-based intolerant groups are complex and multifaceted. Socioeconomic factors, such as economic inequalities and lack of opportunities, play a significant role, as these conditions can drive individuals to join these groups in search of a sense of purpose and community. Moreover, the political landscape, characterized by rivalries for power and resources, frequently interacts with religious motivations, as local elites sometimes lend support or co-opt these groups to strengthen their own positions and influence.<sup>91</sup>

In Indonesia, the debates on orthodoxy and deviance show are not as much as about religion or not religion, but more about defining what kind of religion is acceptable, and who holds the defining power.<sup>92</sup> ANNAS here is mass organization believing that Sunni Islam is the only true teaching of Islam. For that, any Islamic individual, community, or organization that did not adhere to Sunni Islam is considered deviant and heretical. Based on that perception, ANNAS frequently undertakes various actions to curtail the influence and activities of Shia groups in Indonesia, sometimes collaborating with other organizations and sometimes acting independently. One of ANNAS's principal accusations against Shia followers is the claim that they regard the first three caliphs—Abū Bakr, ‘Umar bin al-Khaṭṭāb, and ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affān—who succeeded Muhammad, the last prophet of Islam, as infidels (*kāfir*) for allegedly betraying ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, whom they believe should have been the rightful leader of the Muslim community following Muhammad's death. One example of persecution by ANNAS in collaboration with other groups was the attack on the *Milād Fāṭimah* event organized by IJABI in Bondowoso, East Java. This attack involved other mass organizations such as FPI, HTI, and NU. This alliance was possible to form because they had a "divine mission" that united them or what Khusna Amal called a "Godly Alliance".<sup>93</sup>

Religious climate that is shrouded in the narrative of the purity and single truth of Sunni religious orthodoxy that necessitates the formation of intolerant groups such as

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<sup>91</sup> Vedi R Hadiz, *Islamic Populism in Indonesia and the Middle East* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 7–9.

<sup>92</sup> Saskia Schäfer, "Renegotiating Indonesian Secularism through Debates on Ahmadiyya and Shia," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 41, no. 4–5 (May 2015): 8, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453714565502>.

<sup>93</sup> M Khusna Amal, "Anti-Shia Mass Mobilization in Indonesia's Democracy: Godly Alliance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Exclusion," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 10, no. 1 (May 29, 2020): 25–48, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i1.25-48>.

ANNAS. Sympathizers of this organization are still carrying out several acts of verbal persecution against Shia groups, such as the verbal attacks that occurred in Solo (2020)<sup>94</sup> and disbanding ‘Āshūrā Day commemoration events with the help of local governments in Bandung (2018).<sup>95</sup> Strangely, even though it has received criticism from several NGOs and several state institution regarding its intolerant acts and persecution toward Shia community, the organization is not/has not been given an ultimatum or punishment by the state and is still officially registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (one of the Indonesian ministries that records the official legality of *ormas*). ANNAS is still free to carry out organizational activities and often collaborates with police agencies to limit the activities of Shia groups. Every year, ANNAS also routinely submits requests to limit the activities of Shia groups to the police and these requests are well received by them.<sup>96</sup>

## 2.5 Conclusion

This chapter discusses the complex relationship between the state, civil society, and Islam in Indonesia which plays an important role in shaping the state's attitudes and approaches in handling cases of religious tolerance and intolerance. The relationship between these three agents can be traced back to the era before the 1998 reforms under the leadership of Soeharto's New Order. Since that time, the state actively sought to depoliticize Islam and promote a more moderate, development-oriented version of the faith. This approach, while suppressing political Islam, also created a veneer of religious harmony that masked underlying tensions. The fall of Suharto in 1998 and the subsequent democratization process unleashed these latent forces, leading to a resurgence of Islamic politics and the emergence of more conservative religious movements.

In the post-Reformasi period, Indonesia has witnessed a rise in religious intolerance, mainly directed at minority groups such as Ahmadiyya, Shia, and non-Muslim communities. This trend can be attributed to several factors, including the growing influence of conservative Islamic organizations, the politicization of religion, and the state's inconsistent approach to protecting minority rights.

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<sup>94</sup> B E, ANNAS's Organization Role and Agenda in Solo Araya, In person, April 7, 2024; Irwan Syambudi, "Merunut Penyerangan Kelompok Intoleran di Solo & Diskriminasi Syiah," *Tirto.ID* (blog), August 11, 2020, <https://tirto.id/merunut-penyserangan-kelompok-intoleran-di-solo-diskriminasi-syiah-fWY2>.

<sup>95</sup> Redaksi, "Alhamdulillah kegiatan, Perayaan Asyuro Syiah di Bandung dapat di BUBARKAN.," September 20, 2018, <https://www.annasindonesia.com/read/1651-alhamdulillah-kegiatan-perayaan-asyuro-syiah-di-bandung-dapat-di-bubarkan>.

<sup>96</sup> Da'i, Rekam Jejak Syiah di Indonesia.

Civil society in Indonesia plays a multifaceted role in shaping religious discourse and practices. While some organizations work tirelessly to promote interfaith dialogue and protect minority rights, others have contributed to the spread of intolerant ideologies. The influence of conservative Islamic groups on public opinion and policymaking has grown significantly in recent years, often at the expense of more moderate voices. This shift has been facilitated by the rise of social media, which has allowed for the rapid dissemination of both progressive and intolerant messages. The case of ANNAS exemplifies how civil society organizations can contribute to religious intolerance by promoting exclusivist ideologies and mobilizing against minority groups.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **THE AMBIGUITY OF POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND INTOLERANT GROUPS IN INDONESIA**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The chapter explains the reciprocal relationship between the central figure of ANNAS and Forum Ulama Ummat Indonesian (Indonesian Ulema Forum, FUUI), Athian Ali, and the state. Athian Ali is not the only initiator and chairman of Central ANNAS Board, but also one of the founders of FUUI in West Java, a nation scale organization. During his leadership at FUUI, the position of the organization toward the state was the opposite of its stance during his tenure at ANAS, where he tended to collaborate and build cooperative relationships. It demonstrates how clientelism networks allow for an ambiguous relationship between the state and the intolerant group, ANNAS, where they can sometimes collaborate and at other times confront each other, depending on the common goals they agree upon. This dynamic suggests a complex and nuanced interplay between the state and religious intolerant groups, where the relationship is not static but rather fluid, shifting based on mutual interests and political calculations. The ability of figures like Athian Ali to navigate these shifting alliances highlights the challenges faced by the government in consistently addressing the issue of religious intolerance.

After explaining the ambiguous relationship between the state and intolerant groups, I provide an explanation for the emergence of clientelism networks in a democratic country like Indonesia. I argue that this phenomenon is driven by the absence of a robust legal framework, which creates gaps that allow state and non-state actors to establish informal clientelistic relationships by exploiting existing legal loopholes. This lack of a strong institutional environment enables these actors to leverage personal ties and informal arrangements to gain political and economic advantages, rather than relying solely on formal rules and processes. Specifically, the lack of clear and enforceable regulations governing political and economic interactions has allowed certain individuals and groups to cultivate patron-client ties, where political and business elites provide favors and resources to their supporters in exchange for loyalty and political backing. This dynamic undermines the principles of democratic accountability and fair competition, as access to power and resources becomes dependent on personal connections rather than merit-based processes. Addressing this issue will require a concerted effort to strengthen Indonesia's

legal and institutional frameworks, ensuring that formal rules and procedures are the primary means of political and economic engagement.

### **3.2 From Confrontation to Collaboration: FUUI, ANNAS, and The State**

Athian Ali M. Da'i, a prominent ulema from West Java, serves as the head of two significant mass organizations: FUUI and ANNAS. Since their inception, he has continued to lead both organizations, adhering to a leadership style modeled after the Prophet Muhammad, where leadership transitions occur only upon the leader's death.<sup>97</sup>

Athian Ali M. Da'i asserts his independence from any mainstream religious mass organization in Indonesia, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, allowing him to provide unbiased and neutral perspectives on religious issues within the country. Since 2004, he has consistently conducted weekly Islamic recitations (*pengajian*) for hundreds to thousands of congregants at the Al-Fajr Mosque in Cijagra, Bandung, West Java. As the primary figure behind FUUI and ANNAS, Athian Ali M. Da'i plays a pivotal role in guiding the movements and activities of these organizations.<sup>98</sup>

#### **3.2.1 A Confrontational Role of FUUI Against the State**

As elucidated in Chapter II, the establishment of ANNAS originated from an initiative by the ulema affiliated with FUUI. Consequently, to understand the interactions and dynamics between ANNAS and the state, it is essential to examine the activities of FUUI, the parent organization. This connection is further reinforced by the fact that both FUUI and ANNAS continue to be led by the same individual, Athian Ali M Da'i.

FUUI is an organization that brings together ulema and Muslims to promote the enforcement of Islamic law and combat immorality and religious beliefs deemed heretical or deviant. Established on November 1, 2000, at the Al-Furqon Mosque of the Universitas Pendidikan Indonesia (UPI), its founding declaration was attended by 1.500 Muslim students from diverse campuses and backgrounds in Islamic mass organizations. Although

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<sup>97</sup> Novianti Siti Khadijah, "Perkembangan Forum Ulama Umat Islam (FUUI) di Jawa Barat pada tahun 2000 sampai 2012" (Bachelor Thesis, Bandung, UIN Sunan Gunung Djati, 2014), <https://digilib.uinsgd.ac.id/2906/>.

<sup>98</sup> The author had the opportunity to attend one of the regular weekly recitations (*pengajian*) held on June 1 2024, at that time the theme of the recitation delivered by Athian Ali was about the dangers of hypocrisy for a Muslim.

initially composed of ulema from West Java, over time, ulema other regions joined, transforming the FUUI from a regional forum into a national entity.<sup>99</sup>

The establishment of FUUI was a response to the deep concern and apprehension felt by Athian Ali M Da'I on the tragic interfaith conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, which unfolded between December 25, 1998, and December 20, 2001. The Poso conflict began as a minor clash between groups of youths but escalated into a religiously charged riot.<sup>100</sup> This religious conflict involved predominantly Muslim residents in the villages and predominantly Christian residents in the highland areas of Poso. Among the series of conflicts in Poso, the incident that most profoundly distressed Athian Ali was the tragedy on May 23, 2000, when hundreds of Muslims were suddenly attacked by Christians while performing the dawn (*ṣubḥ*) prayer in a mosque, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of people.<sup>101</sup>

Prompted by the Poso tragedy, FUUI was declared and led by Athian Ali. This forum formulated three essential steps for Muslims to follow. *First*, the comprehensive implementation of Islamic law. FUUI asserts that every Muslim is obligated to uphold Sharia law, and anyone who refuses or believes that Sharia is incompatible with reason, or the times is considered an infidel (*kāfir*). *Second*, the anticipation of immorality. FUUI maintains that those who claim to represent Islam but, insult it or propagate beliefs contrary to the Qur'ān and sunna are *kāfir*. Additionally, it is deemed obligatory for everyone to protect the faith of Muslims from any form of apostasy and to preach to non-Muslims. *Third*, fostering Islamic unity. FUUI aims for the Muslim community and religious scholars to unite and establish strong ties, eliminating any divisions or barriers between them. The three-step framework outlined by FUUI was then adopted as a guiding principle and ratified into concrete internal actions through deliberation.<sup>102</sup> These steps include: *first*, the consolidation of religious scholars, Islamic movement leaders, Muslim intellectuals, and activists. *Second*, addressing issues faced by the Muslim community through the dissemination of fatwas formulated by FUUI's Majelis Perumusan Fatwa (Fatwa

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<sup>99</sup> Siti Khadijah, "Perkembangan Forum Ulama Umat Islam (FUUI) di Jawa Barat pada tahun 2000 sampai 2012."

<sup>100</sup> Anik Farida, "Respon Organisasi Massa Islam terhadap Syiah di Bandung Jawa Barat," *Jurnal Penamas* 27, no. 2 (2014): 160–61.

<sup>101</sup> Hasrullah Hasrullah, *Dendam Konflik Poso* (Jakarta: Gramedia, 2019), 5.

<sup>102</sup> Mochammad Maola, "Arab Spring and The Emergence of Anti-Shia Movement in Indonesia," *Journal of Islamic Studies and Humanities* 5, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 125–26, <https://doi.org/10.21580/jish.v5i2.7481>.

Formulation Council). *Third*, fostering a broad and flexible collaboration between scholars and the Muslim community to actualize FUUI's fatwas.<sup>103</sup>

Regarding its tangible role in society, FUUI focuses on providing education (*tarbiyyah*) to the Muslim community. This educational initiative is led by FUUI's Divisi Dakwah (Dakwah Division), which concentrates on preventing apostasy caused by preachers of other religions, both intellectually (through religious study sessions) and through direct action in the field. Additionally, FUUI is dedicated to preventing the growth of Islamic sects deemed "deviant" or heretical. To this end, FUUI established Tim Investigasi Aliran Sesat (Heretical Sect Investigation Team, TIAS).<sup>104</sup> This concern for addressing and preventing heretical movements later led to the formation of ANNAS, a specialized offshoot of FUUI, specifically aimed at curbing the spread of Shia teachings in Indonesia. FUUI's concern over apostasy and the spread of heretical sects in Indonesia necessitates its continued vigilance and sensitivity towards religious issues, including government regulations related to these matters. Historically, FUUI has frequently questioned, opposed, and even pressured the government on regulations that conflict with its ideals and values.<sup>105</sup>

The surge in apostasy cases in West Java in 2005 prompted FUUI to stage mass demonstrations in front of the West Java Regional Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional Legislative Council, DPRD) building. These protests responded to the Surat Keputusan Bersama (Joint Decree, SKB) of the Minister of Religious Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs regarding religious life. FUUI demanded that the existing regulation not be revised, fearing that any amendments would lead to injustices in religious practice. Through its Divisi Anti Pemurtadan (Anti-Apostasy Division, DAP), FUUI urged the government not to revise or to abolish the Joint Decree No. 01/BER/mdn-mag/1969. This decree regulates the establishment of places of worship, stipulating that their construction must be based on genuine need and proportional to the population composition. FUUI was concerned that revising this decree would allow places of worship to be built regardless of the population composition, potentially leading to an increase in

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<sup>103</sup> Siti Khadijah, "Perkembangan Forum Ulama Umat Islam (FUUI) di Jawa Barat pada tahun 2000 sampai 2012."

<sup>104</sup> Agus Masrukhin et al., "Islamic Tradition: Islamic Mass Organization Responses To Shia's Eid Ghadir Tradition In Jakarta Bandung," in *Proceedings of the Proceedings of the 1st International Conference of Global Education and Society Science, ICOGESS 2019, 14 March, Medan, North Sumatera, Indonesia* (Proceedings of the 1st International Conference of Global Education and Society Science, ICOGESS 2019, 14 March, Medan, North Sumatera, Indonesia, Medan, Indonesia: EAI, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.14-3-2019.2291949>.

<sup>105</sup> Natalia Laskowska, "Apostasy as a Tool to Suppress Dissent," *Indonesian Perspective*, 2012, 74–84.

apostasy. Furthermore, FUUI expressed disappointment with the government for failing to enforce the Surat Keputusan Bersama of the three ministers by allowing the Ahmadiyya community to continue without disbandment. FUUI's actions protesting government policies continued in 2009 when the then-President issued Keputusan Presiden (Presidential Decree, Keppres) No. 69/2000, which permitted the entry of Zionist-affiliated organizations such as Freemasonry. In response, FUUI pressed the government to rescind this decree. Athian Ali urged Muslims to refrain from joining these organizations, emphasizing that doing so would be detrimental to the Muslim community.<sup>106</sup>

Recently, in 2023, the West Java Provincial Government's plan to erect a statue of Soekarno in Cikalongwetan, West Bandung Regency, faced strong opposition from FUUI. Representing FUUI, Athian Ali stated that the plan to construct the Soekarno statue had caused significant unrest among the predominantly Muslim population of West Java. Athian Ali argued that the creation of this statue lacks urgent necessity and could offend the sentiments of the majority Muslim community in West Java, particularly in Bandung.<sup>107</sup>

In conclusion, FUUI has consistently demonstrated its vigilance and sensitivity toward religious issues in Indonesia, particularly concerning state regulations that intersect with its ideals and values. The organization has historically challenged and pressured the state to align policies with its perspective on religious orthodoxy. The 2005 surge in apostasy cases in West Java exemplified FUUI's proactive stance, leading to mass demonstrations against potential revisions to the Joint Decree regulating the establishment of places of worship. FUUI's Anti-Apostasy Division emphasized maintaining the original decree to prevent perceived injustices in religious practice and avert an increase in apostasy.

FUUI's advocacy extended to opposing the state's failure to disband the Ahmadiyya community and resisting the entry of Zionist-affiliated organizations like Freemasonry, highlighting its broader concerns about preserving Islamic integrity in Indonesia. In 2023, FUUI's opposition to the construction of a Soekarno statue in the West Bandung Regency underscored its ongoing influence and responsiveness to the sentiments of the Muslim community in West Java. This opposition, articulated by Athian Ali, reflected FUUI's commitment to addressing issues it perceives as disruptive or unnecessary, thereby maintaining its critical stance towards state actions that conflict with its religious values.

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<sup>106</sup> "FUUI Desak Pemerintah Cabut Keppres No. 69.," *Pikiran-Rakyat*. (blog), March 2, 2009.

<sup>107</sup> Saputra Andrian, "FUUI Desak Pemprov Jabar Gagalkan Rencana Pembuatan Patung Soekarno," News Publisher, *Rejabar* (blog), August 24, 2023, <https://rejabar.republika.co.id/berita/rzui1y396/fuui-desak-pemprov-jabar-gagalkan-rencana-pembuatan-patung-soekarno?>

### 3.2.2 A Collaborative Role of ANNAS in Supporting the State

ANNAS is a national organization officially registered with the Kementerian Hukum dan Ham Republik Indonesia (Ministry of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia, Kemenkumham RI). Its central administration is in Bandung, West Java.

Currently, ANNAS has established regional administrations, referred to as *chapters*, in 34 provinces across Indonesia. The Central ANNAS Board and its chapters maintain regular coordination. Each year, the central leadership of ANNAS conducts a *mudhākarah* to review reports and evaluate the activities and agendas carried out by various ANNAS chapters nationwide. Following these *mudhākarah* sessions, they formulate Petunjuk Pelaksanaan (Implementation Guidelines, Juklak) and Petunjuk Teknis (Technical Guidelines, Juknis) to serve as a framework for countering the spread of Shia teachings in their respective regions.<sup>108</sup>

Unlike FUUI, which in its historical records often criticizes state policies, ANNAS tends to have a more harmonious relationship with the state, both at the central ANNAS administration level and at the regional chapter level. In the following two subsections, the author will elucidate the political dynamics between ANNAS Central and its Regional entities with the local government.

Administratively, the central administration of ANNAS is located in Bandung City, West Java. Administrative matters related to ANNAS activities are centralized in two locations: ANNAS Dakwah Building located at Martanegara street No. 30, Turangga, District of Lengkong, Bandung City, West Java 40264, and the Al-Fajr Mosque located at Cijagra street No. 39, Cijagra, District of Lengkong, Bandung City, West Java 40265. Prior to the inauguration of ANNAS Dakwah Building in 2022, all administrative activities, consolidation efforts, and organizational meetings were held at the Al-Fajr Mosque.<sup>109</sup>

Bandung City serves as the capital of West Java province. Demographically, Bandung is a heterogeneous city where its residents come from diverse primordial backgrounds. This diversity has been established for over a century, shaped by various ethnic groups residing in Bandung, including Javanese, Batak, Minangkabau, Minahasa, Ambonese, Chinese, Dutch, and Sundanese. The ethnic diversity in Bandung expanded with the establishment of secondary schools and universities by the Dutch colonial government in the early 20th century, attracting people from different ethnicities and regions to pursue education and eventually settle in Bandung. The diverse composition of

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<sup>108</sup> Tardjono Abdul Muadz, Direct Interview with General Secretary of Central ANNAS Board, Bandung, West Java, June 1, 2024., June 1, 2024.

<sup>109</sup> Muadz.

the population in Bandung not only serves as a potential attraction for outsiders but also harbors potential conflicts rooted in these diverse identities, including religious differences.<sup>110</sup>

Over the past decade, one of the social issues faced by Bandung City has been incidents of intolerance and radicalism. Several cases have been motivated by religious conflicts involving groups of the majority religious faith.<sup>111</sup> A 2015 study by the Setara Institute revealed that six out of the ten most intolerant cities in Indonesia are located in West Java, with Bandung City scoring an intolerance index of 4.16. Furthermore, the Desk of Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan (Freedom of Religion and Belief, KBB) of the Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia (National Human Rights Commission, Komnas HAM) reported that in both 2015 and 2016, West Java received the highest number of complaints regarding violations of the right to freedom of religion and belief.<sup>112</sup> According to a 2017 study by Komnas HAM, intolerance in West Java is driven by regional regulations that emphasize a particular religion, typically prioritizing the majority faith. These regulations are strongly suspected to substantially violate the right to freedom of religion and belief (KBB) and have the potential to foster discrimination in the name of religion. Additionally, there is significant pressure from intolerant groups that oppose the coexistence of certain religious groups or identities within a single community.<sup>113</sup> Based on the research by Komnas HAM also, most acts of violence and persecution against religious groups are repetitions of similar previous actions and are rarely spontaneous. This indicates a weak capacity of state officials in managing diversity, both in formulating preventive strategies and in responding to the risks of religious conflict.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Zulfiqri Sonis Rahmana, "Resolusi Konflik Sosial Keagamaan Di Kota Bandung," *Religious: Jurnal Studi Agama-Agama dan Lintas Budaya* 2, no. 2 (August 30, 2018): 105–6, <https://doi.org/10.15575/rjsalb.v2i2.3105>.

<sup>111</sup> Novie Indrawati Sagita, "Pelaksanaan Urusan Pemerintahan Umum dalam Membina Kerukunan Beragama oleh Pemerintah Kota Bandung," *Penamas* 31, no. 1 (June 30, 2018): 47–64, <https://doi.org/10.31330/penamas.v31i1.180>.

<sup>112</sup> Jayadi Damanik, "Ringkasan Eksekutif Penelitian Pelaksanaan Kewajiban Pemerintah Daerah dalam Perlindungan Hak atas Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan di Jawa Barat dan Aceh Singkil" (Desk KBB Komnas HAM dan HRWG, March 2017), [https://www.komnasham.go.id/files/20170324-ringkasan-eksekutif-penelitian-\\$47XZ.pdf](https://www.komnasham.go.id/files/20170324-ringkasan-eksekutif-penelitian-$47XZ.pdf).

<sup>113</sup> Damanik, 1–5.

<sup>114</sup> Damanik, 1.

Horizontal religious intolerance cases in Bandung primarily revolve around the construction and activities of places<sup>115</sup> and activities of worship.<sup>116</sup> For instance, in 2016, a conflict arose due to the establishment of the Batak Karo Protestant Church on Kawalayaan Street, Bandung, as nearby Muslims expressed unease about its presence. Earlier, on January 27, 2013, Islamic groups were found blocking the BNKP church in Bandung to prevent it from holding Sunday Mass.<sup>117</sup> Additionally, in 2016, Islamic groups organized mass protests demanding the state ban Christmas activities.<sup>118</sup> Moreover, other minority groups have also faced acts of intolerance, such as the Shia and Ahmadiyya communities. For instance, during the Jalsah Salanah in September 2018, the annual meeting of the Ahmadiyya community, several mobs claiming to be local residents opposed the event. Strangely, the police escorted these opposing groups. In the same month, the Shia *‘Āshūrā* event became the target of rejection by ANNAS in Bandung. The police and local authorities complied with the demands of these groups. During this rejection, there were acts of persecution against several Shia followers, but to this day, legal proceedings have stalled.<sup>119</sup>

Regarding ANNAS itself, when it was first declared as an official organization registered with the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of the Republic of Indonesia in 2014, several state officials attended to offer their blessing and support for its establishment. Among the officials present was Ahmad Hadadi, Regional Assistant III of the West Java Governor, who, in his speech on behalf of the Governor, expressed the West Java Regional Government's full support for the establishment of ANNAS. Since its official declaration, ANNAS has consistently maintained communication with various levels of the Indonesian government, from the central/national level to provincial and local governments.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>115</sup> Anik Farida, "Pendirian Rumah Ibadat Pasca PBM Nomor 9 & 8 Tahun 2006 Dan Kerukunan Umat Beragama: Kasus Pendirian Gereja Di Kota Bandung, Jawa Barat" 16, no. 2 (2017): 375–76.

<sup>116</sup> Azka Fatina Bakti, "Resolusi Konflik dalam Pendirian Rumah Ibadah Gereja Bethel Indonesia di Kelurahan Kebonlega Kecamatan Bojongloa Kidul Kota Bandung," *Jurnal Caraka Prabhu* 2, no. 2 (June 1, 2018): 120–41, <https://doi.org/10.36859/jcp.v2i2.384>.

<sup>117</sup> Muhammad Prayoga, "Tolerating Religious Intolerance: The State and The Revival of Islamic Fundamentalism in Indonesia" (Korea, KDI School of Public Policy and Management, 2013).

<sup>118</sup> Irfan L Sarhindi, "Symbolic Violence in Indonesian Society: Does Islamic Radicalisation Lead to Religious Intolerance?" *Journal of Southeast Asian Human Right* 1, no. 1 (June 1, 2017): 56–79.

<sup>119</sup> Rio Tuasikal, "Keberagaman Jabar Dinilai 'Stagnan dan Memburuk,'" News Publisher, *VOA Indonesia* (blog), December 16, 2018, <https://www.voaindonesia.com/a/keberagaman-jabar-dinilai-stagnan-dan-memburuk-/4702756.html>.

<sup>120</sup> Muadz, Direct Interview with General Secretary of Central ANNAS Board, Bandung, West Java, June 1, 2024.

Athian Ali claims that each year, ANNAS sends a letter to the Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia (Headquarters of the Indonesian National Police, MABES POLRI) to request a ban on all activities organized by Shia followers in Indonesia. In addition to its communication with the police, ANNAS also engages with the Central Board of MUI, Komisi 8 Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (Commission 8 of the House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia, Komisi 8 DPR RI), and the Kementerian Koordinator Bidang Politik, Hukum, dan Keamanan Republik Indonesia (Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Menkopolkam RI) to articulate ANNAS's goals and objectives and to encourage cooperation with its activities.<sup>121</sup>

In 2014, we declared the establishment of ANNAS, bringing together 200 ulema. Additionally, a representative from the Governor of West Java attended since the Governor could not be present. The representative conveyed the Governor's full support for the declaration of ANNAS. Following this, we initiated communication with the Central Board of MUI. We also had a hearing with Commission 8 of the House of Representatives (DPR RI) and engaged with the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Menkopolkam) and the Headquarters of the Indonesian National Police (MABES POLRI). We undertook all these efforts because, from a theological perspective, Shia beliefs are considered very dangerous.<sup>122</sup>

ANNAS's endeavours to foster communication with various state actors stem from their awareness and historical insights that restricting or curtailing Shia teachings in Indonesia would be more effectively achieved with state involvement. Athian Ali articulated two primary reasons why the state should assist ANNAS in restraining Shia teachings: *firstly*, Shia doctrines provoke unrest and turmoil within society, and *secondly*, Shia beliefs and doctrines have the potential to sow political upheaval in nations where they are present. Below, the author will expound on each rationale.<sup>123</sup>

*Firstly*, Shia teachings and doctrines provoke unrest and turmoil in society. Athian Ali cited the "Syiah Sampang" tragedy as a prime example of the dangers posed by Shia beliefs when they take root within Indonesian communities. The Syiah Sampang tragedy refers to an incident on August 26, 2012, where Sunni residents attacked a Ketupat Eid celebration held by Shia residents in Nagkrenang Hamlet, Omben District, Sampang

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<sup>121</sup> Da'i, Rekam Jejak Syiah di Indonesia.

<sup>122</sup> Da'i.

<sup>123</sup> Da'i.

Regency, Madura.<sup>124</sup> The outnumbered Shia community was assaulted with rocks and sharp weapons, resulting in one fatality, four critically injured individuals, and dozens of homes set ablaze. The indiscriminate attack by Sunni residents of Sampang was triggered by the proselytizing activities of Tajul Muluk, a Shia leader in Sampang, who was accused of blasphemy. A year earlier, on December 29, 2011, there was also an attack on Tajul Muluk's Islamic boarding school, allegedly for spreading Shia teachings in the vicinity. Hundreds of Sunni residents surrounding the school forcefully entered the premises, setting fire to prayer rooms and houses without mercy. In addition to arson, they wielded sharp weapons to vandalize homes and expel residents from spreading Shia doctrines. Due to these Shia proselytization activities, Tajul Muluk was reported and convicted of blasphemy, triggering riots in Sampang, Madura. On July 12, 2012, the Sampang District Court sentenced Tajul Muluk to two years in prison for blasphemy, which was later increased to four years following an appeal by the East Java High Court in Surabaya on September 21, 2012. Tajul Muluk attempted to file a cassation appeal, but his efforts were unsuccessful. The Supreme Court based its decision on the fatwa issued by the Sampang Regency Council of MUI on January 1, 2012, and a letter from the Sampang chapter of NU declaring Shia teachings as deviant and misleading. Moreover, these teachings were deemed blasphemous and capable of causing unrest in society.<sup>125</sup>

The dissemination of Shia teachings by one of its leaders, Tajul Muluk, resulted in the "Bloody Sampang" incident. The unrest stemmed from the public declaration by Tajul Muluk, openly rejecting the Quran as the holy book and cursing Abū Bakr, 'Umar, and 'Uthmān. This declaration was widely heard and deeply unsettling to the community, leading to an unforeseen outbreak of violence in Sampang. Subsequently, legal proceedings were initiated against him in the Sampang court, where he was found guilty under Article 156A of the Indonesian Penal Code. Initially sentenced to two years, Tajul Muluk appealed the decision. The East Java High Court ruled that two years was insufficient, increasing the sentence to four years. Dissatisfied, he further appealed to the Supreme Court, which upheld the High Court's

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<sup>124</sup> Abd Aziz and Matnin Matnin, "Jurnalists in Social-Economic Policy Review on Sunni-Shia Conflict in Kabupaten Sampang," *Kabilah: Journal of Social Community* 3, no. 2 (December 1, 2018): 223–40, <https://doi.org/10.35127/kbl.v3i2.3411>; Dini Mawuntyas, "Kronologi Penyerangan Warga Syiah di Sampang," News Publisher, *Tempo* (blog), August 27, 2012, <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/425697/kronologi-penyerangan-warga-syiah-di-sampang>.

<sup>125</sup> Yasin Nurfalah, "Pendidikan Damai Alternatif Pendidikan Korban Konflik Komunitas Syi'ah Sampang Madura," *Jurnal Pemikiran Keislaman* 30, no. 1 (January 31, 2019): 85–114, <https://doi.org/10.33367/tribakti.v30i1.663>; Nour Zattullah, "Konflik Sunni-Syiah di Sampang Ditinjau dari Teori Segitiga Konflik Johan Galtung" 9 (2021); "Alasan MA Tetap Menghukum Tokoh Syiah Madura yang Menodai Agama Islam," News Publisher, *Detiknews* (blog), May 21, 2013, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-2251476/alasan-ma-tetap-menghukum-tokoh-syiah-madura-yang-menodai-agama-islam>.

decision. Thus, it was legally established that his actions constituted blasphemy, as his beliefs demeaned the sanctity of Islam's holy book and cursed revered figures among Muslims. As Muslims, it is not only a matter of religious sensitivity but also a commitment to upholding the laws of our country, which the legal process has conclusively demonstrated.<sup>126</sup>

*Secondly*, Shia beliefs and teachings can potentially cause political turmoil in a country where Shia teachings exist. Athian Ali cites the Iranian Revolution as an example of how Shia teachings can pose dangers to the governance of a nation. Despite Shia having several sects or variations,<sup>127</sup> he believes that Shia practices in Indonesia generally align with those in Iran.

If the Shī'ah Zaydiyyah, it has been agreed upon by the scholars that their beliefs do not deviate from the principles of creed. Perhaps that's what the Ministry of Religious Affairs meant. Maybe that's all they understood. Whereas the Shī'ah Zaydiyyah used to exist in North Yemen. But now, it no longer exists. Especially in Indonesia. Shia followers in Indonesia refer to Iran, such as Shī'ah Imāmiyyah and Ithnā 'Asyariyyah. ANNAS has been standing for 8 years, and praise be to Allah, we can contribute to maintaining harmony. Thus, the existence of ANNAS helps the state. The state should be grateful for our presence (ANNAS). Because if we look at the Middle Eastern

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<sup>126</sup> Da'i, *Rekam Jejak Syiah di Indonesia*.

<sup>127</sup> Generally, Shia Islam is divided into three major branches: Twelver Shia (Shī'ah Ithnā 'Asyariyyah), Ismaili Shia (Shī'ah Ismā'īliyyah), and Zaydi Shia (Sy'īah Zaydiyyah). Twelver Shia, also known as Shī'ah Imāmiyyah, bases its beliefs on twelve Imams, who are considered the rightful religious and political leaders of the Muslim community following the death of Prophet Muhammad. Those who do not acknowledge these twelve Imams are deemed infidels or apostates from Islam. The twelve Imams are: 'Aliyy bin Abiy Ṭālib (600–661), known as *Amīr al-Mu'minīn*; Ḥasan bin 'Aliyy (625–669), known as Ḥasan al-Mujtabā'; Ḥusayn bin 'Aliyy (626–680), known as Ḥusayn al-Syāhid; 'Aliyy bin Ḥusayn (658–713), known as 'Aliyy Zayn al-'Ābidīn; Muhammad bin 'Aliyy (676–743), known as Muhammad al-Bāqir; Ja'far bin Muhammad (703–765), known as Ja'far al-Ṣādiq; Mūsā bin Ja'far (745–799), known as Mūsā al-Kadhīm; 'Aliyy bin Mūsā (765–818), known as 'Aliyy al-Riḍā; Muhammad bin 'Aliyy (810–835), known as Muhammad al-Jawwād atau Muhammad al-Taḥiq; 'Aliyy bin Muhammad (827–868), known as 'Aliyy al-Hādī; Ḥasan bin 'Aliyy (846–874), known as Ḥasan al-'Asyariyy; and Muhammad bin Ḥasan (868—), known as Muhammad al-Mahdiy, the twelfth *imām*. In contrast, Ismaili Shia recognizes only seven Imams, believing that the seventh Imam is Ismail ibn Ja'far, hence the name Ismaili Shia. The Zaydi Shia, named after Zayd ibn 'Ali, the fifth Imam and the son of the fourth Imam 'Ali Zayn al-'Ābidīn, is considered by Abū Zahra to be the closest to Sunni Islam. Zaydi Shia rejects the notion that only Imams are entitled to inherit the leadership of the prophets; rather, anyone who possesses the qualities of an Imam is entitled to succeed Prophet Muhammad's leadership, see: Ilzam Hubby Dzikrillah Alfani, "Takwil Al-Qur'an Syi'ah Isma'iliyah: Studi Penakwilan pada Kisah Nabi Isa As," *Jurnal Penelitian Ilmu Ushuluddin* 3, no. 2 (April 30, 2023): 198–209, <https://doi.org/10.15575/jpiu.24629>; Aisyah Rahadianti Ratna Kemalasari, "Syiah Isma'iliyah dan Syiah Itsna 'Asyariah (Pengertian, Konsep Imamah dan Ajaran Lainnya)," 2022; Hasnah Nasution, "Pemikiran Kalam Syi'ah Imamiyah," *Analytica Islamica* 4, no. 1 (2015): 27–53; Aminun P. Omolu, "Syi'ah Zaidiyah: Konsep Imamah dan ajaran-Ajaran Lainnya," *Hunafa: Jurnal Studia Islamika* 9, no. 2 (December 15, 2012): 207, <https://doi.org/10.24239/jsi.v9i2.52.207-218>.

countries, the existence of this teaching has devastated several countries, such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and so on. Wherever there is Shia, there will surely be conflict.<sup>128</sup>

Several state actors intensively collaborating with ANNAS include the Bandung City Government, Kapolrestabes Bandung, and Kepala Kepolisian Sektor (the Chiefs of Police Sectors, Kapolsek) in various districts within both the city (kota) and regency (kabupaten) of Bandung. When the ANNAS Building was inaugurated in 2022, Yana Mulyana, then the Mayor of Bandung, participated in the inauguration of the new Islamic propagation building owned by ANNAS. In addition to attending the inauguration, the Bandung City Government also assisted in funding the construction of this building based on the premise that it would serve as a center for Islamic propagation benefiting the Muslim community in Bandung city.<sup>129</sup>

The Bandung City Government, al-ḥamd li Allāh, supports and endorses the construction of ANNAS da'wa building. They also provided financial support for its construction. The building was erected on waqf land donated by an individual. The mayor stated that the presence of the ANNAS propagation building could have a positive impact on the Muslim community in Bandung City. He also attended the building's inauguration, al-ḥamd li Allāh.<sup>130</sup>

Other support came from the Bandung Metropolitan Police Chief (Kapolrestabes Bandung). Athian Ali stated that during his attendance at the inauguration of ANNAS's new da'wa building, the Chief of the Bandung Metropolitan Police was among the attendees who most fervently exclaimed "Allāh Akbar".<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, the relationship between the Bandung Metropolitan Police Chief and ANNAS is also maintained to monitor several Shia activities in Bandung. It is not uncommon that when the intelligence unit receives information that Shia communities at various points in Bandung are planning activities, the police intelligence unit promptly informs the Central ANNAS Board.

We also maintain good relations with police intelligence, sir. Many police intelligence officers sympathize with the activities carried out by ANNAS. Because ANNAS' intention is not only to safeguard the community's creed but also to maintain societal harmony. Typically, when the Shia community in Bandung plans an event, the surrounding populace becomes anxious, and some even report to us. When reports about Shia activities come in, we

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<sup>128</sup> Da'i, Rekam Jejak Syiah di Indonesia.

<sup>129</sup> Muadz, Direct Interview with General Secretary of Central ANNAS Board, Bandung, West Java, June 1, 2024.

<sup>130</sup> Muadz.

<sup>131</sup> Da'i, Rekam Jejak Syiah di Indonesia.

immediately deploy Jundullah to the field, later assisted by Police Intelligence. Often, intelligence colleagues themselves leak information about Shia follower activities to us.

One intelligence personnel from Mabespolri Bandung stated that Shia beliefs cause concern among many Muslims in Bandung because they are believed to deviate from the teachings of Islamic law.<sup>132</sup> The intelligence personnel admitted to being assisted by ANNAS's presence, particularly through its affiliate organization Jundullah, in maintaining public order and community comfort.<sup>133</sup>

Currently, in the city of Bandung, there are four areas with a significant number of Shia followers: Gegerkalong Village, Kiaracandong District, Regol District, and Buahbatu District. Especially in the upcoming days, they will be celebrating 'Āshūrā at several locations in these areas. Several years ago, there were riots initiated by ANNAS members, but fortunately, Kapolrestabes, Bandung Komando Distrik Militer (Military District Command, Kodim), Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik Bandung (Bandung Agency for National Unity and Politics, Kesbangpol Bandung), and Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama Bandung (Bandung Forum for Religious Harmony, FKUB Bandung) were able to resolve these conflicts. To prevent similar incidents, ANNAS regularly sends letters requesting restrictions on Shia activities and anticipates their activities to every Kapolsek in districts with a significant Shia presence. These letters are well-received by Kapolsek, who promptly secure these Shia celebrations. Typically, Jundullah ANNAS also assists in ensuring security.<sup>134</sup>

Due to ANNAS being a national-level organization, it is imperative to observe the dynamics of relationships between ANNAS chapters in various regions to understand the broader picture of their interactions. Given the time constraints and limited access to sources, the author can only select one ANNAS chapter as a representative sample for the study. Ultimately, the choice fell on the Solo Raya chapter for examination. This decision was based on a statement by an activist from Jundullah Solo Raya, asserting that Solo Raya is the most active ANNAS chapter and serves as a model for other ANNAS chapters

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<sup>132</sup> Before conducting an official interview in a room at the police intelligence headquarters, the author was invited to converse in the waiting room. The author was asked about his religious ideology, specifically whether he identified with the Shia or Sunni group. After disclosing his affiliation to one of the intelligence members, the member felt comfortable enough to share some of the intelligence's positions regarding the presence of Shia followers in Bandung.

<sup>133</sup> Muadz, *The History and Activities of ANNAS*.

<sup>134</sup> Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (2nd officer), June 4, 2024., n.d.

throughout Indonesia. Moreover, historically, movements of intolerance and radicalism in the name of Islam have deeply rooted in the city of Solo.<sup>135</sup>

Some Islamist groups in Solo are instigators of religious intolerance and extremism, both at the national and local levels. The rise of Islamic radicalism in Solo began in the mid-New Order era and continued into the early 21st century.<sup>136</sup> One example is several individuals or groups affiliated with Pondok Pesantren Al-Mukmin Ngruki. Leaders of Ngruki Islamic boarding school have been found to aspire to establish an Islamic state and reject democracy and Pancasila as Indonesia's state ideology. Solo is also known for moral policing of places deemed as "sinful," such as hotels and bars. Typically, these moral policing initiatives originate from the Front Pemuda Surakarta (Front Pemuda Islam Surakarta).<sup>137</sup>

In addition, there are two groups actively engaged in restricting and opposing various activities carried out by Shia Muslims in Solo. These groups are Dewan Syariah Kota Solo (the Solo City Sharia Council, DSKS) and ANNAS. Both organizations were led by the same leader, Muinuddinillah Basri, who passed away in 2021 due to Covid-19. Despite his absence, these organizations remain active in conducting anti-Shia campaigns. A notable case involved a book discussion at IAIN Surakarta, where ANNAS & DSKS deemed the author to be Shia and staged a demonstration outside the campus to protest the author's presence. They consider Shia beliefs to be heretical both doctrinally and ideologically, leading them to vigorously protest its presence.

After the previous leader's passing, ANNAS is now led by Tengku Azhar, a prominent preacher in the Solo area. Like his predecessor, he is also actively involved in DSKS. ANNAS Solo chapter oversees several cities within the Residency of Solo, including Surakarta City, Karanganyar Regency, Sragen Regency, Wonogiri Regency, Sukoharjo Regency, Klaten Regency, and Boyolali Regency. According to Tengku Azhar, the police, particularly the City Police Chief, maintain a positive relationship with ANNAS and collaborate to restrict the religious activities of Shia groups, particularly those in Surakarta City.<sup>138</sup> The relationship between ANNAS and the local police has grown closer following the assault on "Shia-related activities" at Habib Segaf's house in 2020, which

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<sup>135</sup> Eko, Direct interview with the Leader of Solo Raya Jundullah chapter, Central Java.

<sup>136</sup> Muhammad Wildan, "Mapping Radical Islamism in Solo: A Study of the Proliferation of Radical Islamism," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 46, no. 1 (2008): 36.

<sup>137</sup> Muhammad Wildan, "Youth Radical Islamism in Solo as Manifested by Front Pemuda Islam," *Socio Politica: Jurnal Ilmiah Jurusan Sosiologi* 8, no. 1 (November 27, 2018): 92–95, <https://doi.org/10.15575/socio-politica.v8i1.3478>.

<sup>138</sup> Tengku Azhar, Direct interview with the Leader of Central Java ANNAS Chapter, April 15, 2024, n.d.

caused unrest among residents and led to subsequent riots. Learning from this incident, the police are intensifying monitoring of all activities involving Shia groups.<sup>139</sup>

### 3.3 The Absence of Legal Framework

From above explanation, I conclude that the ambiguity of political relationship between the state, FUUI, and ANNAS is a consequence of the lack of a robust legal framework in Indonesia. Without this legal infrastructure, the state can freely shape its arrangements with non-state organizations, such as FUUI and ANNAS, to pursue certain objectives outside formal channels. This allows the state to circumvent established legal procedures and oversight, potentially enabling it to advance its own agenda at the expense of transparent and accountable governance.

The absence of robust legal frameworks is a critical factor in the persistence of clientelism. Weak legal institutions and a lack of enforcement mechanisms in democratic countries allow clientelistic practices to flourish. This legal vacuum enables political actors to engage in informal exchanges without fear of legal repercussions, perpetuating a culture of patronage and corruption of without strong, independent judicial systems and the effective rule of law, political elites can exploit legal loopholes and ambiguities to consolidate their power through clientelistic networks. These informal patron-client relationships undermine the principles of democratic accountability and equitable access to public resources, instead prioritizing the private interests of those with political influence.<sup>140</sup> In many developing democracies, legal systems are often underdeveloped or compromised by political interests. This lack of robust legal infrastructure means there are few effective checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power and the formation of clientelism networks. Political actors can strategically manipulate these weak legal frameworks to their advantage, ensuring that their clientelistic exchanges and patronage-based practices remain hidden from public scrutiny and legal accountability. Without strong, independent judicial systems and the rule of law, these informal patron-client

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<sup>139</sup> Irwan Syambudi, "Merunut Penyerangan Kelompok Intoleran di Solo & Diskriminasi Syiah," *Tirto.ID* (blog), August 11, 2020, <https://tirto.id/merunut-penyerangan-kelompok-intoleran-di-solo-diskriminasi-syiah-fWY2>.

<sup>140</sup> Rene Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," *Comparative Politics* 4, no. 2 (January 1972): 156–58, <https://doi.org/10.2307/421508>.

relationships are able to flourish, undermining principles of democratic governance and equitable access to public resources.<sup>141</sup>

Examining specific cases of clientelism in different democratic contexts highlights the role of absent or weak legal frameworks. In Latin America, for instance, political parties often form alliances with local business elites and social organizations to secure electoral support. This type of clientelistic relationship, where patrons exchange material benefits for political loyalty, thrives in the absence of stringent legal regulations and enforcement. The lack of robust institutional safeguards enables these clientelistic networks to become deeply entrenched in the political fabric, undermining the principles of democratic representation and accountability.<sup>142</sup>

In Southeast Asia, clientelistic networks between the state and religious organizations are common, with political actors leveraging religious influence to mobilize voters. The weak legal frameworks in these countries fail to regulate the interactions between political and religious actors, enabling clientelistic practices to continue unchecked. These clientelistic relationships are characterized by exchanging material benefits, such as funding or political support, for religious endorsement and the mobilization of religious followers. The lack of robust institutional safeguards and oversight allows these mutually beneficial arrangements to become deeply embedded in the political landscape, undermining the principles of democratic representation and accountability.<sup>143</sup>

In Indonesia, clientelism has been a recurrent and persistent theme in the history. During Soekarno's Old Order era, clientelism grew based on political parties, which began to function as a channel for the distribution of various resources to the bureaucracy. In Suharto's New Order era, clientelism transformed into a more centralized form of patronage, where the state held a monopoly on the distribution of resources to the grassroots level. When the New Order regime ended, clientelism evolved into a system of patronage democracy. Based on this historical explanation, scholars such as Aspinall and Berenschot<sup>144</sup> dismiss the arguments that characterize clientelism solely as a symbol of the weakness of political parties. Rather, clientelism grew and was strengthened by a complex

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<sup>141</sup> Judith Chubb, *Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities*, 1st ed. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

<sup>142</sup> Javier Auyero, "'From the Client's Point(s) of View': How Poor People Perceive and Evaluate Political Clientelism," *Springer* 24, no. 2 (1999), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3108473>.

<sup>143</sup> John T Sidel, *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in Philippines* (USA: Stanford University Press, 1999).

<sup>144</sup> Aspinall and Berenschot, *Democracy for Sale Elections, Clientelism, and the State in Indonesia*.

set of factors, including slow economic development, widespread poverty, the availability of a mass population that was easily reached by politicians, the stagnation of middle-class development, and the absence of the rule of law. Clientelism might be reduced when the economy experiences growth and political patronage is gradually recognized as an expensive and inefficient political method, leading politicians to deliberately avoid such practices.<sup>145</sup>

### 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter discusses the ambiguity of state political relationship, which is exemplified by the activities and roles of the FUUI and ANNAS by Athian Ali M. Da'i. Athian Ali's leadership and strategic manoeuvring between confrontation and collaboration with the state highlight the fluidity and adaptability of clientelistic networks in Indonesia's democratic landscape.

Athian Ali's dual roles in FUUI and ANNAS showcase a shifting dynamic. At FUUI, he adopts a confrontational stance against the state, actively criticizing state policies that conflict with FUUI's interpretation of Islamic orthodoxy. In contrast, ANNAS represents a more collaborative approach. ANNAS maintains a harmonious relationship with the state. Its administrative structure exemplifies its systematic coordination and commitment to countering the spread of Shia teachings. ANNAS's engagement with various state actors, including Bandung City Local Government, Kapolrestabes Bandung, Kapolsek, and MUI, reflects its strategic alignment with state interests to achieve its objectives.

The emergence of clientelism networks in Indonesia is attributed to the absence of a robust legal framework, allowing state and non-state actors to exploit legal loopholes and establish informal relationships. This phenomenon undermines democratic accountability and fair competition, as access to power and resources becomes contingent on personal connections rather than merit-based processes. The state's ambiguous attitude between confronting and coordinating with intolerant groups is the result of the absence of a robust legal framework in a nascent democratic country.

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<sup>145</sup> Robertus Robet, "Democracy for Sale: Elections, Clientelism and the State in Indonesia," by Edward Aspinall & Ward Berenschot," *Asian Studies Review* 43, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 578, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357823.2019.1636476>.

## CHAPTER IV

### RECIPROCAL DYNAMICS IN PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS: MUTUAL BENEFITS BETWEEN STATE AND ANNAS

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to describe the mutual benefits that the state and ANNAS obtain by establishing clientelism networks. As explained in CHAPTER II, in a clientelism network, the patron is typically a politician or state figure who controls the allocation of resources, while the clients are local communities or organizations that offer political support in exchange for these resources. Meanwhile, a broker is an intermediary who facilitates the exchange between patrons and clients. The state can leverage its control over resources to maintain the loyalty of religious-intolerant groups, the broker becomes the mediator, while the clients can mobilize their followers to provide electoral support or quell dissent. This symbiotic relationship allows the state to consolidate its power by co-opting influential religious-intolerant groups, while the client groups secure access to state resources and political influence. The perpetuation of this clientelistic dynamic serves to reinforce the dominance of both the state and the intolerant groups, creating a self-sustaining cycle of patronage and dependence.<sup>146</sup> This mutually beneficial arrangement helps to reinforce the power of both the state and the intolerant groups, perpetuating a system of political patronage. Patrons, who are typically politicians or state figures, possess greater social and political resources compared to their clients, who are local communities or organizations. This power imbalance allows the patrons to control the allocation of resources and maintain the loyalty of the client groups, while the client groups can offer political support and mobilize their followers in exchange for access to these resources and political influence.<sup>147</sup>

However, based on my findings while researching the clientelistic relationship between ANNAS and the state, it appears that the patron, which in this context is the state, does not always possess more resources than the client. Sometimes it is the client who has

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<sup>146</sup> Carolyn M. Warner, "Democracy, the Rational Patron, and the Rational Client," *International Studies Review* 10, no. 1 (March 2008): 143–46, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2008.00765.x>.

<sup>147</sup> Luigi Graziano, "A Conceptual Framework for The Study of Clientelistic Behavior," *European Journal of Political Research* 4, no. 2 (June 1976): 149–74, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1976.tb00526.x>.

greater resources than the patron himself. Here, I have identified two key reasons for the formation of a clientelistic network that evolves into a symbiotic mutualism between these two actors: the pursuit of security control by the state and the religious partisanship of the state. The state may seek to bolster its grip on power and maintain social order by forging an alliance with a client organization like ANNAS that can leverage its own resources and influence within religious communities. Conversely, the client may use this relationship to gain access to state resources and legitimacy, creating a mutually beneficial arrangement despite the imbalance of formal power between the two parties.

#### **4.1.1 The Pursuit of Security Control**

Based on information from Kapolrestabes Bandung, there are four areas in Bandung City which are inhabited by many Shia followers, including Gegerkalong Village, Kiaracandong District, Regol District, and Buahbatu District. In 2017, there was a large riot initiated by ANNAS members to break up the 'Āshūra event held in Kiaracandong district which resulted in several Shia followers receiving minor injuries.

In 2017, I forget the exact date, there was quite a big riot in Kiaracandong district when the 'Āshūra event was held. Yes, it was ANNAS members who initiated the riot because Shiites are considered deviant by them. We missed out because we were late securing the time for the event. In any case, at every annual Āshūra event, there is almost certainly chaos between Shia followers and ANNAS members.<sup>148</sup>

The policemen from intelligence division reported that Athian Ali, an influential ulema in Bandung, intervened to reject the Āshūra event in 2017 when there was a commotion between ANNAS and Shiite followers. To prevent a similar disruption, they coordinated with ANNAS to limit the duration of Shia activities in Bandung, as the Sunni community felt uneasy about the event, such as during the 2019 Ashūra commemoration. According to the General Central of Central ANNAS Board, the event was successfully suppressed, though there was still some chaos between the local community and the Shia followers involved.

Ustādh Athian is an influential ulema in Bandung, sir, so he has influence on the Bandung Muslim community. Well, in 2019, he was also present to protest the Āshūra celebration in the Gegerkalong area. Yes, the implementation is different every year, there are those that usually organize it per district, or the

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<sup>148</sup> Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (2nd officer), June 4, 2024.

implementation is combined, like what happened in 2019 in Gegerkalong district, at that time we immediately limited it. The time to hold the Āshūra is because the local community is a bit uncomfortable, and we want to avoid the risk of chaos like in previous years. At that time, the Jundullah ANNAS troops helped the police to bring order. But yes, there was still chaos between the community and the Shia followers who were holding an event, but it was successfully suppressed.<sup>149</sup>

The emergence of chaos between the surrounding Sunni community and Shia followers was caused by the unclear position of the police, which seemed less than firm. On the one hand, coordinating with ANNAS, which is supported by most of the Sunni community in the area, to limit the holding of events, but on the other hand, it also must act as a state that needs to secure events. In previous research, Hicks discussed violence against minority groups, namely Ahmadiyya (2014). He argued that the violence occurred because state officials – such as those from the military, police, and bureaucracy – failed to take a tough stance against vigilante groups perpetrating the violence.<sup>150</sup> ANNAS and Ahmadiyya cases, based on what's been stated by Hicks, have the same resonance, namely the absence of a firm stance in favor of the state towards minority groups.

ANNAS routinely sends letters requesting restrictions on Shia activities, motivated by a desire to avoid anger among the Muslims of Bandung City towards this agenda. The letters are especially sent to the Kapolrestabes and Kapolsek around the time of the Āshūra event when Shia activities are held.

Yes, they (ANNAS), since they were founded in 2014, almost every year send letters requesting restrictions on Shia activities to us (Kapolrestabes) and to Kapolsek whose areas have many Shia followers, they want their activities to be limited so that there are no mass raids. They are always willing to deploy Jundullah to the field.<sup>151</sup>

According to the General Secretary of the Central ANNAS Board, the police felt assisted by ANNAS in monitoring Shia activities. Policemen from the intelligence division often reported Shiite activity plans to ANNAS. After receiving this information, ANNAS would immediately deploy their Jundullah paramilitary forces to areas where Shiite religious activities, such as the Āshūra commemoration, were believed to be taking place.

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<sup>149</sup> Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (1st officer), June 4, 2024.

<sup>150</sup> Jacqueline Hicks, "Heresy and Authority: Understanding the Turn against Ahmadiyah in Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 22, no. 3 (September 2014): 332, <https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2014.0216>.

<sup>151</sup> Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (1st officer), June 4, 2024.

The Jundullah would typically arrive at these locations and ensure there were Shiite activities will occur.

The policemen from intel divisions often secretly tells us plans for Shia activities, for example, when they wanted to hold the 2019 'Āshūra in Gegerkalong, they reported it to us. Many of the intelligence officers sympathize with ANNAS because our aim is good, we want to regulate society, which means help the police's jobs.<sup>152</sup>

Clientelism network theory focuses on the informal relationships between patrons and clients. In this case, the state maintains informal ties with ANNAS as clients, such as leaking information about plans to organize Shia activities. This was ostensibly done to prevent horizontal religious conflict and maintain social security. The clientelistic relationship between ANNAS and the state shares similar motivations to those of some intolerant groups, like GAMAS and GIBAS, which collaborate with security officials in Kuningan Regency, as stated in Suryana's work (2019).<sup>153</sup> These include mutual social, political, and economic interests such as social control, political access, and support for winning elections. This reflects the Indonesian state's tendency to prioritize the interests of the religious majority over the rights of minorities, even when such actions conflict with international human rights norms. The state often prioritizes maintaining social order and preventing potential unrest, even at the expense of protecting religious freedoms.<sup>154</sup> Additionally, based on the relationship patterns between ANNAS and the state, the state also serves as a broker that distributes access to state facilities in the form of permits or patronage. In some research, brokers serve as intermediaries between civil society and state power, facilitating cooperation, negotiation, and bargaining between the two. In this case, the state acts as a broker, distributing access to state facilities through permits or patronage.

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<sup>152</sup> Muadz, Direct Interview with General Secretary of Central ANNAS Board, Bandung, West Java, June 1, 2024.

<sup>153</sup> Suryana, "State Officials' Entanglement with Vigilante Groups in Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a Communities in Indonesia"; A'an Suryana, *The State and Religious Violence in Indonesia: Minority Faiths and Vigilantism*, 1st ed. (Routledge, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429284724>.

<sup>154</sup> Masdar Hilmy, "Treating Religious Minority (Un)Justly: Problems and Challenges of Regulating Freedom of Religion in Indonesia," in *Proceedings of 1st International Conference of Law and Justice - Good Governance and Human Rights in Muslim Countries: Experiences and Challenges (ICLJ 2017)* (1st International Conference of Law and Justice - Good Governance and Human Rights in Muslim Countries: Experiences and Challenges (ICLJ 2017), Serpong, Indonesia: Atlantis Press, 2018), <https://doi.org/10.2991/iclj-17.2018.38>; Rizky Widian, Putu Agung Nara Indra Prima Satya, and Sylvia Yazid, "Religion in Indonesia's Elections: An Implementation of a Populist Strategy?," *Politics and Religion* 16, no. 2 (June 2023): 351–73, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048321000195>.

If we look back regarding the state's involvement in regulating religious diversity in realizing social security, Indonesia's history has been shaped by the interplay between state power and religious ideologies. Successive regimes have sought to manage religious diversity through a range of policies, from accommodation to co-option. The New Order government under Suharto, for example, reinforced legal centralism to curb the influence of Islamic interests in certain regions like Aceh.<sup>155</sup> However, in the post-New Order era, the central government appeared more willing to grant greater local autonomy over religious affairs, likely as a means to overcome the legacy of violent conflict. At the same time, the state has also actively partnered with conservative religious groups to consolidate its authority and maintain social order.<sup>156</sup> Beyond the state's formal policies, clientelistic networks have emerged between authorities and intolerant religious groups, providing them with resources and influence in exchange for political support and social control.<sup>157</sup>

In the context of ANNAS, no political motive has been found in the form of ANNAS electoral support for the state. This is due to Athian Ali's role, which is sometimes involved in criticizing state policies and on the other hand coordinating with the local government. According to the Secretary General of ANNAS, Athian Ali does not place his total loyalty to all forms of state policy, which in this context is the Bandung City government.

We don't have any transactions with the police and the state while we want to create security and social order. Yes, our main mission is da'wa, so if the state needs to be criticized, we will criticize it. Ustādh Athian Ali also often criticizes state policies if he feels they are detrimental to the interests and endanger the faith of the people, such as the protest against the construction of a statue of Jesus yesterday. Yes, let's just be objective. Ustādh Athian Ali does not want to be too loyal to the Bandung City Government.<sup>158</sup>

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<sup>155</sup> Arskal Salim, "Dynamic Legal Pluralism in Indonesia: Contested Legal Orders in Contemporary Aceh," *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 42, no. 61 (January 2010): 1–29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07329113.2010.10756640>.

<sup>156</sup> Megan Brankley Abbas, "Indonesia. Islamisation and Its Opponents in Java: A Political, Social, Cultural, and Religious History, c. 1930 to the Present. By M.C. Ricklefs. Singapore: NUS Press, 2012. Pp. 576. Maps, Bibliography, Index.," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 45, no. 2 (June 2014): 290–92, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463414000162>.

<sup>157</sup> Maksimus Regus, Marianus Tapung, and Marianus S. Jelahun, "Beyond the Right to Have Freedom: Religion and Belief in the Context of COVID-19 Health Emergency Regulation in Indonesia," *Journal of Human Rights and Social Work* 7, no. 3 (August 20, 2022): 277–84, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s41134-022-00215-2>; Danielle N. Lussier and Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf, "Neutralizing the Sacred Space: Pre-Election Messages in a Typical Indonesian City," *Politics and Religion*, May 17, 2024, 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048324000117>.

<sup>158</sup> Muadz, Direct Interview with General Secretary of Central ANNAS Board, Bandung, West Java, June 1, 2024.

Mutual benefits in the clientelism relationship between patron and client here actually have various variations. The client does not necessarily have to support the patron electorally who has provided the client with access to the state.<sup>159</sup> In this context, ANNAS benefits from access to information and legitimacy from the state to carry out its activities, while the state benefits from ANNAS which has helped to realize security control.

The intelligence officer stated that the country benefited greatly from the presence of ANNAS. He explained that if there were an official law banning Shiaism, and the police were tasked with overseeing its disbandment, the police would be happy to do so. According to him, officially prohibiting Shia teachings in Indonesia would reduce the chaos and unrest that have existed, consequently alleviating the burden on the police.

Yes, we are actually helped by this ANNAS, Sir. Indirectly, they also monitor the safety of the community so that there are no accidents there. Between Sunni and Shia followers. Because yes, if there are Shiites, there will be a lot of people who get upset. In fact, we are ready if Kesbangpol<sup>160</sup> has instructions to disband the Shiites.<sup>161</sup>

The statement made by intelligence officer here seems to indicate that the state outsourced the task of policing religious differences and security control to non-state actors with informal ways through clientelistic networks. Through this process, ANNAS has emerged as a de facto enforcer of religious orthodoxy, with the tacit backing of the state apparatus. This dynamic reflects the state's strategic use of clientelistic networks to delegate the management of religious tensions to non-state actors, effectively absolving itself of direct responsibility for the resulting violations of civil liberties.

The attitude shown by the state as above is a form of taking advantage of two different camps, namely between ANNAS and Shia followers. Previously, Hilmy (2015) had found a similar pattern when conducting research on cases of persecution of Shia followers in Sampang, Madura, East Java. Hilmy said that the state and religious leaders took political and economic advantage from the Sunni Islam group's persecution of Shia

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<sup>159</sup> Graziano, "A Conceptual Framework for The Study of Clientelistic Behavior," 149–74; Luis Roniger, "Modern Patron-Client Relations and Historical Clientelism. Some Clues from Ancient Republican Rome," *European Journal of Sociology* 24, no. 1 (May 1983): 63–95, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975600003969>.

<sup>160</sup> Kesbangpol stands for Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Politik (National and Political Unity Body of State). Its job is supports national unity and political affairs.

<sup>161</sup> Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (3rd officer), June 4, 2024., n.d.

followers through cultural and symbolic hegemony.<sup>162</sup> Different from the case of Shia Sampang, the state in the context of this research took advantage in the form of social security because of the hegemony of ANNAS group's Sunni teaching over Shia followers.

Such condition also happens when comes to ANNAS Chapter in Solo, Central Java. The police have assisted ANNAS in collecting data about the Shia community, including names, locations, and planned activities. Once such information is obtained, ANNAS coordinates with the Kepolisian Resort Surakarta (Surakarta Resort Polive, Kapolres Surakarta) and Kepolisian Sektor Pasar Kliwon (Sector Police of Pasar Kliwon District, Kapolsek Pasar Kliwon) to devise strategies to restrict or shut down Shia events.

In fact, police officers from either Kapolres or Kapolsek have often coordinated with us, especially Kapolsek Pasar Kliwon who happens to be near the house of Segaf bin Jufri, who has always been one of the leaders of the Solo Raya Shiites. Especially since there was a rampage in 2018 when 'Āshūrā was held there, we have become more intense in contact with the police to maintain public order.<sup>163</sup>

In August 2020, there was a similar attack by local residents on Segaf bin Jufri's house. The crowd mistakenly believed the event was part of Shia activities, but it was actually a Midodareni event, a celebration to welcome a wedding. The crowd surrounding the house, estimated to be 50-100 people, prompted police intervention. However, Kapolsek Pasar Kliwon and the Head Kapolres Surakarta were unable to secure the residents' protest. Tragically, approximately three people became victims of the mob's rampage when they tried to leave Segaf bin Jufri's house.<sup>164</sup>

Mas'ud Izzul Mujahid, the current coordinator of the Solo Raya Chapter of ANNAS, conducted an independent investigation into the incident and reported it to the Kapolsek Pasar Kliwon and they warmly received the report. According to him, the Midodareni event had not received permission from the local leader in Pasar Kliwon area, which led to a normal response from residents. Mujahid emphasized that the state must listen to the aspirations of the majority of Muslims, who view the Shia sect as heretical and deviant. He urged the police to firmly take action against all Shia activities to ensure the security and protection of citizens and Muslims from these beliefs. Based on this report, the Head of

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<sup>162</sup> Masdar Hilmy, "The Political Economy of Sunni-Shi'ah Conflict in Sampang Madura," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 53, no. 1 (June 15, 2015): 48, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2015.531.27-51>.

<sup>163</sup> Azhar, Direct interview with the Leader of Central Java ANNAS Chapter, April 15, 2024.

<sup>164</sup> Syambudi, "Merunut Penyerangan Kelompok Intoleran di Solo & Diskriminasi Syiah."

Pasar Kliwon Police, AKP Adis Gani Gatra, promised not to grant permission for 'Āshūrā events to prevent social unrest and the anger of those unwilling to participate.<sup>165</sup>

During the attack on Segaf bin Jufri's house, it wasn't even us who started it, but it was initiated by the residents themselves. We helped the police to investigate the incident led by Ustādh Mas'ud and yes, it turned out to be true, this activity did not have permission from the local leader. Finally, we submitted the report to the police and thank God the police were able to accept our input well and promised not to allow these activities anymore to respect most Muslims and to avoid any more trouble like before. There was even a Surakarta police intelligence officer who personally asked me to just make peace with the Shia group so that the situation would be calmer, so I said that was impossible. I told the police that if the Shiites claim to be part of Islam, if ANNAS and I will fight them. We will stop offering resistance if the Shiites admit that Shiites are their own religion and not part of Islam. So far, they claim to still be part of one Islamic school of thought but insult the Prophet's friends, insult the Prophet's wife and so on, so we will continue to fight against them.<sup>166</sup>

The relationship between the state, in this context the police and Solo Raya Chapter of ANNAS, as explained above, could be said to be triggered by alleged concerns over potential social unrest, as the Shia community is perceived as a threat to the Sunni majority.<sup>167</sup> The state's willingness to side with intolerant groups against religious minorities, driven by narrow political and religious considerations, has only perpetuated a climate of intolerance and undermined the fabric of Indonesia's pluralistic democracy. Jeremy Menchick's work on "godly alliances" provides further insight into the dynamics of these clientelistic networks, where the state, Islamist organizations, and militant groups converge in the name of religion to target minority groups like the Shia and Ahmadis. This is because religious partisanship and clientelism allow these actors to consolidate political power and marginalize dissenting voices. Their shared aim is to assert religious orthodoxy and ideological homogeneity, which is antithetical to Indonesia's founding principles of diversity and tolerance.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> "Insiden Penyerangan Solo hingga Provokasi Aliran Syiah," News Publisher, *ANNAS Indonesia* (blog), August 15, 2020, <https://www.annasindonesia.com/read/2856-insiden-penyerangan-solo-hingga-provokasi-aliran-syiah>.

<sup>166</sup> Azhar, Direct interview with the Leader of Central Java ANNAS Chapter, April 15, 2024.

<sup>167</sup> Salim, "Dynamic Legal Pluralism in Indonesia"; Henri Chambert-Loir, "Islamic Law in 17th Century Aceh," *Archipel*, no. 94 (December 6, 2017): 51–96, <https://doi.org/10.4000/archipel.444>.

<sup>168</sup> Pradnya Nindita Putri, "Ahmadiyya Community In Indonesia's Contemporary Discourse: State's Indecisive Protection to the Freedom of Religion and Belief," *International Journal of Social Service and Research* 3, no. 6 (June 25, 2023): 1442–51,

That was evident in the case of Sampang, Madura, where social unrest had occurred previously. The local government acted upon the demands of the Sunni community to address the presence of the Shia minority in the area. The state ultimately relocated the Shia residents to a distant city, effectively banishing them from their hometown due to pressure from the intolerant Sunni group.<sup>169</sup> This demonstrates how the state's alliance with religious intolerant groups can enable the marginalization of religious minorities, contradicting the founding principles of Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution which guarantee freedom of religion. The state's willingness to take actions against the Shia agenda, in this context, stems from its partisanship in certain interpretations of religious orthodoxy and its stance that the Shia are a deviant sect that should be banned from Indonesia. This desire to maintain social harmony and avoid public unrest is a result of the lack of a formal legal framework empowering the state to take direct action against religious minorities like the Shia. Consequently, the state has resorted to cooperating with intolerant groups, who then take it upon themselves to persecute these communities under the guise of upholding orthodoxy.<sup>170</sup>

This also reflects the Indonesian state's tendency to privilege majoritarian religious interests over minority rights, even when such actions conflict with international human rights norms. This is because the state often prioritizes maintaining social order and preventing potential unrest, even at the expense of protecting religious freedoms.<sup>171</sup> As the state hesitates to enforce the law against powerful religious groups such as Sunni majority Muslims, minority communities are left vulnerable to intolerance and discrimination.<sup>172</sup> The state's inability to maintain neutrality among religious factions is a key factor in the

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<https://doi.org/10.46799/ijssr.v3i6.406>; Alexander R Arifianto, "Practicing What It Preaches? Understanding the Contradictions between Pluralist Theology and Religious Intolerance within Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 55, no. 2 (December 15, 2017): 241–64, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2017.552.241-264>.

<sup>169</sup> Mukhsin Achmad, "The Construction of Discrimination Against the Shi'a Community in Sampang, Madura: A Religious Structural Violence Perspective," *Asy-Syir'ah: Jurnal Ilmu Syari'ah Dan Hukum* 55, no. 1 (June 30, 2021): 241–241, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajish.v55i1.634>; Muhammad Wakhid Musthofa and Mohamad Yusup, "A Solution to the Sunni and Shia Conflict in Sampang Madura Using a Dynamic Game Theory," *Dialogia* 19, no. 2 (December 1, 2021): 402–29, <https://doi.org/10.21154/dialogia.v19i2.3026>; Muhammad Aziz Khoiri and Leila Chamankhah, "Survival Mechanism of The Shia Community Post-Shia-Sunni Sampang Conflict in 2012," *Al-Mada: Jurnal Agama, Sosial, Dan Budaya* 4, no. 2 (September 6, 2021): 240–51, <https://doi.org/10.31538/almada.v4i2.1248>.

<sup>170</sup> Mohd Faizal Musa and Beng Hui Tan, "State-Backed Discrimination against Shia Muslims in Malaysia," *Critical Asian Studies* 49, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 308–29, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14672715.2017.1335848>.

<sup>171</sup> Hilmy, "Treating Religious Minority (Un)Justly"; Widian, Satya, and Yazid, "Religion in Indonesia's Elections."

<sup>172</sup> Hilmy, "Treating Religious Minority (Un)Justly"; Sirait, "ANCAMAN DISKRIMINASI MINORITAS DAN HILANGNYA MULTIKULTURALISME DI INDONESIA."

persistence of clientelistic networks. The state often aligns itself with dominant religious interests to preempt potential social unrest. This dynamic is exemplified by the state's response to demands for the restriction of Shia activities, even though such actions contravene constitutional guarantees of religious freedom.

From the relationship pattern observed between the Central ANNAS Board in Bandung, the Solo Chapter of ANNAS, and the state, I identified a patron-client dynamic that does not necessarily place the patron as the party with greater resources. In pursuit of the shared goal of ensuring social security, the patron and client maintain an interdependent relationship. While the state has access to state infrastructure, it relies on ANNAS, an organization representing the sympathies of most Sunni Indonesians, to suppress mass actions against Shia activities. The state appears to outsource the task of maintaining social security to ANNAS through the pattern of majority ideological hegemony, as the state lacks the legal authority or legitimacy to directly act against the Shiites, whom it deems a deviant organization, to uphold public security and prevent horizontal religious conflict. Conversely, ANNAS benefits from the state's legitimacy and support for its endeavors, which allows the organization to further its influence and agenda within Indonesian society. In this relationship pattern, the state and ANNAS do not have a third party involved in distributing resources as a broker; instead, the state itself acts as the main contractor playing its role as a broker.

#### **4.1.2 Religious Partisanship of the State**

Apart from the motive to create social security in society, religious partisanship was another factor underlying the clientelistic relationship between the state and ANNAS. According to a direct statement from an intelligence officer, he believed that Shia was a heretical sect, causing unease among the majority of Muslims in Bandung.

You (Author) are also Sunni, right, Sir? Me, too. And I think you also believe that the Shiites are heretics. Yes, because of this error, many Muslims, especially those in the city of Bandung, are worried. Yes, we can understand such an attitude. People who believe in the truth of their religion will by default defend what they believe in. Because Shia teachings are considered heretical, it is natural for them to resist.<sup>173</sup>

According to the General Secretary of the Central ANNAS Board, several members of the Bandung City Police Department regularly attend the weekly Quranic recitation and

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<sup>173</sup> Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (3rd officer), June 4, 2024.

study sessions (*pengajian*) held by the influential Islamic preacher Athian Ali. While they do not always attend, some police officers frequently participate in *pengajian* led by Athian Ali. However, the General Secretary was hesitant to provide more specific details about the positions or ranks of the police officers considered devoted congregants of Athian Ali.<sup>174</sup>

Religious partisanship expressed by the police could further develop into a clientelism network factor, leading to political attitudes based on religious teachings and identity. Previous examples demonstrate how such clientelism networks can determine the political direction and policies of the state. In Indonesia, a clear example occurred during the large-scale demonstrations 411 and 212, where protesters demanded the imprisonment of Ahok for allegedly insulting Qur'ān, Surah Al-Mā'idah verse 51. At the time, the country's representative body, the MUI, indirectly held religious preferences, enabling Islamist groups like FPI and HTI to join the mass actions.<sup>175</sup> At the local level the state of Indonesia has also established clientelism networks with intolerant religious groups, demonstrating its partisanship towards certain religious factions. For example, the persecution of minority group such as Ahmadiyya, has been driven by the state's alliance with more intolerant Islamic groups.<sup>176</sup> Additionally, the state has formed alliances with intolerant groups that have enabled persecution of Shia Muslims. For example, as what is just explained above, the state in Indonesia has turned a blind eye to the pressure and intimidation that Shia communities face from hardline Sunni groups such as what happen in Sampang, Madura.<sup>177</sup>

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<sup>174</sup> Muadz, Direct Interview with General Secretary of Central ANNAS Board, Bandung, West Java, June 1, 2024.

<sup>175</sup> Irwan Harjanto, "Coping, Identity, and Programmatic Politics in a Javanese Village Head Election: The Case of Temon Kulon, Yogyakarta," *PCD Journal* 7, no. 2 (December 12, 2019): 25, <https://doi.org/10.22146/pcd.52510>; Syaairal Fahmy Dalimunthe et al., "Politics of Identity and the Case of Ahok's Religion Blasphemy in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Election," *E-Journal of Cultural Studies*, June 9, 2020, 15, <https://doi.org/10.24843/cs.2020.v13.i01.p03>; Ari Alfiatul Rochmah, "Islamism and the Emergence of Islamic Populism the Role of Da'wah Media in Mass Mobilization on 'Bela Islam' Action: Case Studies of Dakwah Syariah Radio (Rds Fm) Solo," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial Indonesia (JISI)* 1, no. 1 (June 2, 2020): 1–8, <https://doi.org/10.15408/jisi.v1i1.17105>; M Khusna Amal, "Anti-Shia Mass Mobilization in Indonesia's Democracy: Godly Alliance, Militant Groups and the Politics of Exclusion," *Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies* 10, no. 1 (May 29, 2020): 25–48, <https://doi.org/10.18326/ijims.v10i1.25-48>.

<sup>176</sup> Putri, "Ahmadiyya Community In Indonesia's Contemporary Discourse," 1442–51; Hilmy, "Treating Religious Minority (Un)Justly"; Erni Budiwanti, "Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jama'Ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and Its Persecution," *SSRN Electronic Journal*, 2009, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1645144>.

<sup>177</sup> Hary Widyantoro, "Undemocratic Response Towards 'Deviant' Judgement and Fatwa: Sunni-Shiite Conflict in Sampang, Madura, East Java," *Mazahib* 16, no. 1 (June 30, 2017): 18, <https://doi.org/10.21093/mj.v16i1.768>; Novita Maulida Ikmal, "Sunni-Syiah Conflict in Sampang, Madura: The Politics of Identity," *Jurnal Studi Sosial Dan Politik* 5, no. 1 (June 29, 2021): 1–8, <https://doi.org/10.19109/jssp.v5i1.5611>.

Scholarship suggests that the expression of identity, particularly religion, can be found deeply embedded in both political competition and public policy formulation at the national and local levels in Indonesia. Religious identity has become a powerful tool for political mobilization, shaping the dynamics of electoral campaigns and the development of state programs and initiatives. This intertwining of religion and politics for significantly impacting the country's democratic landscape.<sup>178</sup> For example, research indicates that while at the national level, Indonesian democracy is secularizing, with secular politicians and political parties dominating the competition, at the local level, the influence of religious identity in politics remains pervasive.<sup>179</sup> This dynamic has had detrimental impacts on Indonesia's democratic development, as the state's partisan embrace of religious conservatism has undermined the rights and freedoms of religious minorities, and entrenched clientelist relationships that prioritize narrow political interests over the public good.<sup>180</sup> As such, the phenomenon of religious partisanship and its ties to clientelism networks between the state and intolerant groups merits further scholarly examination to better understand its implications for Indonesia's democratic future.<sup>181</sup>

The effects of religious partisanship by the state, in the context of this research, can be seen in cases of demolition and applications for permission to establish Islamic boarding schools. Fajruddin, one of the activists of the Bandung City IJABI, once sent a letter reporting the demolition of a Shia Islamic boarding school to Kapolrestabes Bandung in 2018, but until now the police have not responded to the report.<sup>182</sup> When I confirmed the case to the police, they knew nothing about the report.<sup>183</sup> The demolition of the Islamic boarding school was initiated by ANNAS sympathizers who felt disturbed by the Islamic boarding school's activities which were considered to be spreading Shiite teachings in the surrounding environment. Fajruddin admitted that he had asked for clarity several times regarding the continuation of the legal process but had not found any progress at all. Apart from that, Fajruddin also encountered problems when he wanted to officially register his

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<sup>178</sup> Djayadi Hanan, "Identity Politics in the 2019 Indonesian General Election s: Its Significance and Limitation," *JWP (Jurnal Wacana Politik)* 5, no. 1 (March 4, 2020): 15, <https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v5i1.27710>.

<sup>179</sup> Hanan, 15.

<sup>180</sup> Widian, Satya, and Yazid, "Religion in Indonesia's Elections," 351–73.

<sup>181</sup> Dalimunthe et al., "Politics of Identity and the Case of Ahok's Religion Blasphemy in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Election"; Hanan, "IDENTITY POLITICS IN THE 2019 INDONESIAN GENERAL ELECTIONS"; Harjanto, "Coping, Identity, and Programmatic Politics in a Javanese Village Head Election."

<sup>182</sup> Fajruddin, Online interview with IJABI chapter Bandung, West Java, April 6, 2024.

<sup>183</sup> Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (1st officer), June 4, 2024.; Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (2nd officer), June 4, 2024.; Direct interview with Intel Division of Bandung City Resort Police, West Java (3rd officer), June 4, 2024.

Islamic boarding school so that it would be included in the list of Islamic boarding schools registered with the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia. Again, he encountered obstacles when he wanted to ask for a letter of recommendation from the Bandung City MUI. This problem arose when Fajruddin discovered that one of the Bandung City MUI administrators was Athian Ali. Until now, the Islamic boarding school he started has not been officially registered with the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia.

MUI, both nationally and locally, has often been the principal actor in limiting the rights of minority religious groups, especially since *Reformasi*. The fatwas and pronouncements issued by MUI against minority religious groups like the Ahmadiyya and Shia have served to legitimize and embolden actions by the state and society that restrict the freedoms and rights of these minority communities.<sup>184</sup> These religious decrees have provided a veneer of religious and legal justification for the state to enact discriminatory policies and enable societal intolerance towards these minority groups, effectively marginalizing them within Indonesian society. The influence of the MUI's intolerant rulings has consequently undermined the principles of equality and religious freedom that are foundational to Indonesia's pluralistic democracy.<sup>185</sup> For example, the 2005 joint decree by state ministries to ban the Ahmadiyya teachings was directly influenced by MUI's fatwa declaring the group as heretical.<sup>186</sup> This fatwa gave the state a religious justification to restrict the rights and activities of the Ahmadiyya community, effectively marginalizing them within Indonesian society. Besides that, the relocation of the Shia community in Sampang, Madura, due to pressure from mass organizations and Islamic leaders, has indicated how the state has been influenced by religious elites in handling the cases of minority religious groups. The state's acquiescence to the demands of intolerant groups to persecute the Shia minority demonstrates how religious partisanship can lead the state to prioritize the interests of certain factions over the equal protection of all citizens' rights and freedoms.<sup>187</sup> Concerning the Ahok case, MUI played an important role in delivering a fatwa that Ahok's statement about Qur'anic verses was considered blasphemous. This fatwa later

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<sup>184</sup> Syafiq Hasyim, "The Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI) and Religious Freedom," *Irasec's Discussion Papers*, no. 12 (2011): 3, [www.irasec.com](http://www.irasec.com).

<sup>185</sup> Putri, "Ahmadiyya Community In Indonesia's Contemporary Discourse"; Arifianto, "Practicing What It Preaches?"; Jeremy Menchik, "Productive Intolerance: Godly Nationalism in Indonesia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 3 (July 2014): 591–621, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0010417514000267>.

<sup>186</sup> Syafiq Hasyim, *The Shariatization of Indonesia: The Politics of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI)*, Studies in Islamic Law and Society, vol. 52 (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2023), 402.

<sup>187</sup> Widyantoro, "Undemocratic Response Towards 'Deviant' Judgement and Fatwa."

stimulated and legitimized massive demonstrations against Ahok, who was the former governor of Jakarta, ultimately leading to his conviction and imprisonment for blasphemy. The MUI's involvement in this high-profile case demonstrates how religious authorities can leverage their influence to shape public opinion and political outcomes, even in a secular democracy like Indonesia.<sup>188</sup>

Religious partisanship at the Solo Raya ANNAS Chapter, much like the situation at the Central ANNAS Board in Bandung, centered around the support of police for Sunni religious beliefs, which were also held by ANNAS and the majority of Solo Raya Muslims. According to Tengku Azhar, the police's response to ANNAS's complaints about Shia activities in Pasar Kliwon regency, Solo, was a show of sympathy towards ANNAS's efforts, which he believed contributed to the safety of the local community.

Yes, the police are on the side of those of us who are predominantly Muslim. The hearings we hold during the police are always well received, both by Kapolsek Pasar Kliwon. Yes, the proof is that after the 2020 case, they promised not to allow 'Āshūrā celebrations to avoid riots and loss of life. It was a good step, and the police were firm in their stance. We appreciate the decision.<sup>189</sup>

Religious partisanship between the state and intolerant groups like ANNAS has fostered damaging clientelistic ties that undermine the rights and freedoms of religious minorities in Indonesia. This clientelistic network, informally built between the police and ANNAS, implies the selective application of law and order, favoring intolerant groups over vulnerable religious minority communities. This situation not only threatens to erode the core democratic principles of equality, pluralism, and the rule of law in Indonesia, but also perpetuates a climate of intolerance that is antithetical to the country's founding principles of diversity and tolerance. The state's willingness to side with intolerant groups against religious minorities, driven by narrow political and religious considerations, has only exacerbated the marginalization of dissenting voices and undermined the fabric of Indonesia's pluralistic democracy.

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<sup>188</sup> Bani Syarif Maula, "Religious Freedom in Indonesia: Between Upholding Constitutional Provisions and Complying with Social Considerations," *Journal of Indonesian Islam* 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2013): 383, <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2013.7.2.383-403>; Mun'im Sirry, "Fatwas and Their Controversy: The Case of the Council of Indonesian Ulama (MUI)," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 44, no. 1 (February 2013): 100–117, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022463412000641>.

<sup>189</sup> Azhar, Direct interview with the Leader of Central Java ANNAS Chapter, April 15, 2024.

## 4.2 Conclusion

This chapter discusses the intricate and reciprocal dynamics between the state and ANNAS that reflect a complex interplay of mutual benefits, despite the apparent imbalance of power and resources. This clientelistic relationship transcends the typical patron-client dynamic, whereby the state, although ostensibly the patron, often finds itself reliant on the resources and influence wielded by ANNAS, the client. This relationship is principally driven by two core motivations: the pursuit of security control by the state and the underlying religious partisanship that permeates state policies and actions.

The state's pursuit of security control manifests in its strategic alliance with ANNAS to maintain social order and mitigate potential unrest. This is particularly evident in regions with significant Shia populations, where ANNAS acts as an enforcer of religious orthodoxy, often resorting to violence to disrupt Shia activities. The 2017 riot in Kiaracandong district, initiated by ANNAS members against Shia followers during the 'Āshūra event, exemplifies the state's tacit approval of such actions to avoid direct involvement in religious conflicts. This strategic outsourcing of social control to ANNAS underscores the state's dependence on the organization's ability to mobilize and influence local Sunni communities, thereby ensuring public order without overtly contravening constitutional guarantees of religious freedom.

The relationship is further complicated by the state's religious partisanship, which aligns with Sunni orthodoxy and marginalizes minority sects like the Shia. This partisanship is not merely a passive alignment but is actively reinforced through the state's informal alliances with organizations like ANNAS. The state's actions in Sampang, Madura, where Shia residents were relocated due to pressure from intolerant Sunni groups, highlight this dynamic. The state's endorsement of Sunni orthodoxy, often at the expense of minority rights, illustrates a deliberate strategy to maintain social harmony by appeasing the dominant religious group, even when such actions conflict with the principles of Pancasila and the Indonesian Constitution.

The mutual benefits derived from this clientelistic relationship are multifaceted. For the state, ANNAS serves as a crucial partner in maintaining social security, effectively acting as an informal arm of the state's security apparatus. This relationship allows the state to leverage ANNAS's influence and resources to suppress dissent and manage religious tensions, thereby ensuring a semblance of stability. Conversely, ANNAS gains legitimacy and support from the state, enabling it to further its agenda within Indonesian society. The

organization's ability to operate with impunity, backed by the state's tacit approval, enhances its influence, and consolidates its position within the Sunni community.

The role of religious partisanship is also evident in the close relationships between police officers and ANNAS leaders. The regular attendance of Bandung City Police officers at Athian Ali's Quranic recitation sessions exemplifies the deep-seated religious affinities that underpin the clientelistic network. This affiliation not only fosters a climate of mutual support but also ensures that ANNAS's activities receive favorable treatment from law enforcement agencies. The selective application of law and order, favoring intolerant groups over vulnerable minority communities, further entrenches the power of these clientelistic networks, undermining the principles of equality and pluralism that are foundational to Indonesia's democracy.

The state's strategy of outsourcing the management of religious tensions to non-state actors like ANNAS also reflects a broader pattern of privileging majoritarian interests over minority rights. This approach not only absolves the state of direct responsibility for the resulting violations of civil liberties but also perpetuates a climate of intolerance. The collaboration between ANNAS and local law enforcement agencies in Solo, Central Java, to monitor and restrict Shia activities exemplifies this dynamic. The police's willingness to act on ANNAS's reports and coordinate strategies to prevent Shia events underscores the state's tacit endorsement of religious intolerance in the name of maintaining social order.

This clientelistic relationship, characterized by mutual dependency and reinforced by religious partisanship, poses significant challenges to the principles of democracy and human rights in Indonesia. The state's alignment with intolerant groups not only marginalizes religious minorities but also erodes the rule of law and undermines the pluralistic fabric of Indonesian society. The selective enforcement of laws and the tacit approval of violence against minority communities reflect a broader failure of the state to uphold its constitutional obligations to protect religious freedoms and ensure equal treatment for all citizens.

To sum, the clientelistic network between the state and ANNAS, driven by the pursuit of security control and religious partisanship, exemplifies a complex interplay of mutual benefits and dependencies. This relationship, while ensuring short-term social stability, poses significant long-term risks to the democratic principles and human rights frameworks that underpin Indonesian society. The state's strategic use of non-state actors to manage religious tensions, coupled with its alignment with majoritarian religious interests, perpetuates a climate of intolerance and discrimination. Addressing these challenges requires a fundamental rethinking of the state's approach to managing religious

diversity and a renewed commitment to upholding the principles of equality and pluralism enshrined in Indonesia's Constitution.

From the relationship pattern observed between the Central ANNAS Board in Bandung, the Solo Chapter of ANNAS, and the state, I identified a patron-client dynamic that does not necessarily place the patron as the party with greater resources. In pursuit of the shared goal of ensuring social security, the patron and client maintain an interdependent relationship. While the state has access to state infrastructure, it relies on ANNAS, an organization representing the sympathies of most Sunni Indonesians, to suppress mass actions against Shia activities. The state appears to outsource the task of maintaining social security to ANNAS through the pattern of majority ideological hegemony, as the state lacks the legal authority or legitimacy to directly act against the Shiites, whom it deems a deviant organization, in order to uphold public security and prevent horizontal religious conflict. Conversely, ANNAS benefits from the state's legitimacy and support for its endeavors, which allows the organization to further its influence and agenda within Indonesian society. In this relationship pattern, the state and ANNAS do not have a third party involved in distributing resources as a broker; instead, the state itself acts as the main contractor playing its role as a broker.

## CHAPTER V CONCLUSION

This thesis examines the clientelism networks between intolerant groups and the state in a country with a weak democratic system. In such contexts, clientelism networks are used to distribute state resources through informal relationships with non-state actors, achieving mutual benefits. The focus of this research is how the Indonesian state establishes a clientelism network with ANNAS, a mass organization that opposes the existence of Shiites in Indonesia. By examining the state's relationship with the Central ANNAS Board in Bandung and the ANNAS Chapter in Solo, the results indicate that the clientelism network between the two parties was driven by the state's pursuit of social control and religious partisanship.

In a democratic system, the absence of robust legal frameworks can enable clientelism networks to develop between state actors and non-state entities, such as ANNAS. This lack of a strong legal infrastructure results in limited checks and balances, allowing political actors to exploit these weaknesses to conceal their clientelistic exchanges and patronage-based practices from public scrutiny and legal accountability. Without a strong, independent judiciary and the rule of law, these informal patron-client relationships can thrive, undermining democratic principles and equitable access to public resources. This creates an environment where powerful individuals and groups can manipulate the system for their own benefit, often at the expense of the broader public interest. The lack of effective legal mechanisms to ensure transparency and accountability allows these practices to become entrenched, further eroding the integrity of democratic institutions and the fair distribution of public goods. The ones who feel the loss from these clientelistic relationships are the Shia followers, whose right to religious freedom is seized and violated on the grounds of security and the state actors' partiality towards certain religious ideologies.

Since the post-Reformasi period, Indonesia has experienced a rise in religious intolerance, particularly targeting minority groups such as Ahmadiyya, Shia, and non-Muslim communities. This trend can be attributed to several factors, including the growing influence of conservative Islamic organizations, the politicization of religion, and the state's inconsistent approach to protecting minority rights. The case of ANNAS demonstrates how civil society organizations can contribute to religious intolerance by promoting exclusivist ideologies and mobilizing against minority groups. The state's role in addressing religious intolerance has been complex and often contradictory. While successive governments have

professed a commitment to Indonesia's pluralistic tradition, embodied in the state ideology of Pancasila, their actions have not always aligned with this rhetoric. Local and national authorities have sometimes succumbed to pressure from intolerant groups, leading to discriminatory policies and a failure to protect vulnerable minorities. The case of Ahok, the former governor of Jakarta who was imprisoned on blasphemy charges, highlights the challenges faced by religious minorities in Indonesia's political landscape.

Finally, this thesis contributes to the discussion surrounding clientelism network theory. Based on what I found from the research, the relationship between the Central ANNAS Board in Bandung, the Solo Chapter of ANNAS, and the state exhibits a patron-client dynamic, where the patron does not necessarily have greater resources. Both parties pursue the shared goal of ensuring social security, maintaining an interdependent relationship. While the state has access to state infrastructure, it relies on ANNAS, an organization representing the sympathies of most Sunni Indonesians, to suppress mass actions against Shia activities. The state appears to outsource the task of maintaining social security to ANNAS, as the state lacks the legal authority or legitimacy to directly act against the Shiites, whom it deems a deviant organization, in order to uphold public security and prevent religious conflicts. Conversely, ANNAS benefits from the state's legitimacy and support, which allows it to further its influence and agenda within Indonesian society. In this relationship, the state acts as the main contractor, playing the role of a broker without involving a third party in distributing resources.

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## ATTACHMENTS



*Figure 1: The author's selfie inside da'wa building of ANNAS in Bandung City*



*Figure 2: The moment after interview session with General Secretary of ANNAS Board in Bandung*



*Figure 3: The moment before conducting interview with police officers from Intel Division of Kapolrestabes Bandung*



*Figure 4: Online interview session with a member of IJABI Chapter of Bandung City*



*Figure 5: The moment after conducting interview with a leader of Central Java Chapter of ANNAS*