

Examining Patron-Client Dynamics: The US Alliances and Disproportionalities toward South Korea and The Philippines in Cold War Era

A Thesis

**Submitted to the Master's Study Program of Political Science at the Faculty of
Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts (M.A.)



By:

Nizar Lukman

02212210008

UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA

DEPOK

2024

Examining Patron-Client Dynamics: The US Alliances and Disproportionalities toward South Korea and The Philippines in Cold War Era

A Thesis

**Submitted to the Master's Study Program of Political Science at the Faculty of
Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts (M.A.)



By:

Nizar Lukman

02212210008

UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA

DEPOK

2024

ABSTRACT

Nizar Lukman

02212210008

Nizar.lukman@uiii.ac.id

MA in Political Science

Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia

This study attempts to explore the contribution of the US as a patron country in alliance relations to the economic development of its client countries. One form of this contribution is the provision of foreign assistance that can be used as capital to develop the economy of the client country. However, the question is why in its allocation there are often uneven dynamics among its client countries so this study attempts to explore what causes the US to provide a large amount of foreign assistance to some of its client countries while others do not, this can be the main reason why some US alliance countries have good economic development while others have poor development by analyzing the case of South Korea which tends to receive a more significant amount of aid while the Philippines with a smaller amount. The two main factors that will be studied are *the level of threat* and *the level of alliance cohesion* which exhibit patron-client dynamics in alliance relations can explain the phenomenon. Those two main variables can determine differences in foreign assistance allocation; the main method is process tracing, part of Qualitative which seeks to find causal mechanisms with a time sequence. The results of this study indicate that the US allocates more foreign assistance to client countries when the level of threat and the level of alliance cohesion are high, while if one of the factors is low then the allocation of assistance is also low. This research is expected to contribute to international relations, especially for those trying to see how security can influence the political economy.

Keywords: *Patron-Client Relation, US-South Korea Alliance, US-Philippines alliance, Threat perception, Alliance Cohesion, Foreign Assistance, and Economic Development.*

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to all parties who have contributed to the completion of this thesis, for their continuous support, encouragement, and guidance. Their involvement was very valuable and made me strong and enthusiastic in completing this article. I feel very grateful for their presence in my efforts to complete my academic journey.

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude " الحمد لله رب العالمين " to Allah SWT, the Lord of the universe who has given me the opportunity, so many favors and given permission which allows me to complete this writing.

I am deeply thankful to my family, Mama (Silvia Said) and Abi (Lukman Abdullah) whose endless love and support, belief and sacrifices have made me always strong and enthusiastic to undertake this difficult academic journey, don't forget all of my siblings (Rifkan, Firda, Nana, and Salman) who have also supported me a lot. And also the person who has been most instrumental and influential in my life journey, my future wife (Mursyidah), thank you for all the support, sacrifices, and trust that has kept me going until this point.

Furthermore, I would like to express my deepest gratitude and appreciation to my supervisors, Mr. M. Rifqi Muna, Ph.D and Mrs. Nia Deliana, Ph.D whose guidance, patience, and unwavering support have been invaluable throughout this journey. Your insightful feedback and encouragement have been instrumental in shaping this work, and I am truly appreciative of your mentorship I would also like to thank all the political science lecturers in the social sciences faculty, especially Mr. Philips Vermonte as the Dean, Mr. Sirojuddin Arif as my Examiner, Mr. Afrimadona, Mr. Faisal, Mr. Djayadi Hanan, Mr. A'an Suryana, Mr. Ridwan, Mr. Gde, Mr. Farish and others for their insight and the valuable knowledge that has been imparted to me during my academic journey, I am truly grateful to have been taught and involved with great people like them.

My heartfelt appreciation goes to my colleagues and friends at UIII, especially Eka Hermansyah, someone who contributed the most and helped me a lot during my studies, to other friends also such as Fadiah, Dita, Roona, Mbak Aning, Bang Mashur, Ka Syifa, Ja'far, Fahri, Bang Yudi, Mas Fazrul, Wulan, Hamad, Mas Bobby, Mas Fahmi and all the class of 2022 friends, you all mean a lot and have made me able to survive this far, My other close friends, Abdul Ajis, Fitri, Iin, Anisa, Rully, Lina, Uphy, Risty, and Eddy, thank you for your support, input, friendship, and understanding which was so strong during the ups and downs of the process of pursuing this master's degree. Don't forget to mention the US Embassy who provided a lot of data sources that I needed to complete this article.

I realize that reaching this point by completing my thesis was not done alone but with support and collective efforts from various parties. I am fortunate and grateful to be surrounded by a supportive and nurturing environment so I could finally complete this thesis well.

Thank you all for your invaluable contributions and support.

Sincerely,

Nizar Lukman

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE PAGE.....	i
STATEMENT OF AUTHENTICITY.....	ii
ANTI-PLAGIARISM STATEMENT	iii
THESIS ATTESTATION	iv
THESIS DEFENSE APPROVAL	v
ABSTRACT	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
LIST OF TABLES	x
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xi
CHAPTER I	
INTRODUCTION	
Problem Statement.....	1
Research Question	7
Objective of Study	7
Significance of Study	7
CHAPTER II	
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION	
Literature Review	9
Theoretical Framework.....	14
<i>Dependent Development Theory</i>	18
<i>The Economy Theory of Alliance</i>	20
Argument and Assumption.....	21
CHAPTER III	
RESEARCH DESIGN	
Research Method and Case Selection.....	25
CHAPTER IV	
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS	
Findings	29
A. Patron-Client Dynamics and Development in South Korea	29

a. <i>Syng-man Rhee Era (1948-1960)</i>	30
b. <i>Yeun Bo-Seon Era (1960-1962)</i>	33
c. <i>Park Chung Hee Era (1962-1979)</i>	33
d. <i>Choi Kyu-ha Era (1979-1980)</i>	37
e. <i>Chun Doo-hwan Era (1980-1988)</i>	38
f. <i>Roh Tae-Woo Era (1988-1993)</i>	41
B. Patron-Client Dynamics and Development in the Philippines	42
a. <i>Elpidio Quirino Era (1948-1953)</i>	43
b. <i>Ramon Magsaysay Era (1953-1957)</i>	45
c. <i>Carlos P. Garcia Era (1957-1961)</i>	46
d. <i>Diosdado Macapagal Era (1961-1965)</i>	48
e. <i>Ferdinand Marcos Era (1965-1986)</i>	49
f. <i>Corazon Aquino Era (1986-1991)</i>	53
Discussion and Analysis	55
CHAPTER V	
CONCLUSIONS	67
Limitations.....	69
REFERENCES	70

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. U.S. Aid Aid Distribution to Client Countries, 1946–1980	4
Table 2. US Threat Perception in South Korea and The Philipines in the Cold War	22
Table 3. U.S. Aid Aid Distribution to Client Countries, 1946–1980	26
Table 4. Periodization of the research scope	27
Table 5. US distribution in the Marcos Era	52
Table 6. Scheme of Threat and Cohesion Interconnected in the South Korea Case	57
Table 7. Scheme of Threat and Cohesion Interconnected in the Philippines Case	60

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Theoretical Framework for Explaining Variation in Alliance on Disporptionality Outcome	24
Figure 2. The Variation of South Korea Case	30
Figure 3. The Variation of The Philipines Case	43
Figure 4. US Resource Assistance Distribution	56
Figure 5. South Korea in the Perspective of Dependent Development	64

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

After the end of World War II, there was an ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union as part of the Cold War. The US swiftly embraced various countries as strategic partners in alliances on many continents. In Europe, the US established the multinational defense pact NATO. Meanwhile, it pursued more bilateral relations in Asia, particularly in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Taiwan, and several other countries (Cha, 2009). The US formed alliances with many countries to make its position quite influential, to spread its hegemony, and to maintain peace and security in the regions (Albert, 2016).

The role of the US in alliance relations has been underplayed in the economic development of the client countries. However, if we look further, we can perceive the role of the US in the development process of the client countries, although not as a whole, yet the spillover effect is quite influential (Glassman & Choi, 2014).

From the perspective of alliance theory, Snyder (1990) states that establishing an alliance not only brings benefits to security but also to non-security aspects, allowing for greater economic cooperation and increased prosperity. How can alliances be related to economic cooperation? This is explained by Uk Heo & Min Ye (2017), who state that the existence of a US alliance and the presence of its troops promotes investment, trade, and economic growth in client countries. The deployment of these troops focuses primarily on creating security and stability but also indirectly creates better economic development in client countries. Additionally, alliance countries trade more with their partners than non-alliance countries because of concerns about security externalities that arise through two-way economic exchanges in the trade process (Long, 2006). More importantly, in alliance relations, especially asymmetric alliances, there is a patron-client role in which the patron should provide economic and military assistance to its client in countering threats or developing the domestic economy (Gagliano, 2019).

According to Biermann (2024), patron-client relations are an asymmetric and enduring partnership of the allocation of obligations between patron and client, who are involved in the values of togetherness and mutual respect accompanied by the exchange of resources, which often creates dependency. In short, patronage is also related to the patron, which provides support from patrons to clients in cooperative relationships, especially in asymmetric alliance relationships.

In its alliances, the US provided not only military and security protection but also assistance in the form of international philanthropy (aid) for, investment in, and technology transfers to, its client countries. Thus, it is not surprising that the role of the US has been immense in developing its partner countries (D. Kim, 2012).

However, in the asymmetric alliances of the US, there are often issues of disproportional shares of the burden sharing and aid among allied countries. The disproportionality of burden sharing includes how the ally contributes to overcoming challenges and common adversaries. Specifically in defense financing, there are countries that have to allocate more funds for defense in maintaining sovereignty and protecting their alliances, based on their GNP and military capabilities. In this case, the US with its higher economic and military capability, covers much of the cost, and some countries contribute quite little, in what is known as the free rider phenomenon. For example South Korea and the Philippines, in the early Cold War, had more limited economic and military capacity and so contributed less. Besides that, another issue is the disproportionality of aid allocated by the US as a patron to the client countries. This inequality occurs as the US provides some of its client countries with large amounts of aid while others receive smaller amounts (Olson & Zwckhause, 1966; Blankenship, 2023). The share of aid is usually influenced by how the US perceives its client countries, whether they will bring benefits or be advantageous to the US' interests and what role the client plays in the sustainability of the alliance.

This practice can be seen in the case of Korea and the Philippines, which both have asymmetric alliances with the US, with dissimilar power levels. The US, with adequate military and economic capacity, serves as a patron country, providing security guarantees and also economic assistance. In contrast, South Korea and the Philippines are

client countries that benefit from these security guarantees, economic aid, and also investment (Gagliano, 2019).

The alliance between the United States and South Korea began with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, which came into force in 1953, just after the Korean War. This agreement symbolizes defense and security (Albert, 2016). This alliance was formed to minimize security problems and conflicts on the Korean Peninsula. The existence of this alliance authorizes the United States to provide a security umbrella for South Korea (Leeds, 2018). With the formation of the coalition between the US and South Korea, US forces can be legally stationed in South Korea, using land and various facilities available, while the US is obliged to support the progress of South Korea by providing foreign assistance both economically and militarily in the form of grants, loans, investments, etc. (D. Kim, 2012).

According to Dole & Workman (2021) and Kwon (2017), the involvement of the United States in an alliance with South Korea in the early Cold War period, including all forms of economic and military assistance, as well as support in the process of industrialization, turned South Korea into a highly developed economy and an emerging Asian donor, with a GDP of US\$610.17 billion, GDP per capita of \$13,403 and economic growth of 7.89 percent by 1996 (World Bank, 2022). Whereas at the start of South Korean independence in the 1950s-1960s, the country had quite worrying development progress and security problems, and its economic development was inferior due to colonialization and wars (Dole & Workman, 2021; Kwon, 2017).

The US-Philippines alliance, meanwhile, began in 1951 with the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty, it laid a strong foundation for a patent security relationship after the end of WWII, strong people-to-people ties and economic cooperation that took the relationship further from bilateral, regional to global (US Department of State, 2023). This includes not only security cooperation but also building a strong and resilient architecture designed to meet challenges that might threaten the interests of both countries. It also routinely conducts joint planning and enhances interoperability. This alliance also gives the US a foothold to further increase stability and peace in an increasingly volatile region (Albert, 2016). The economic relationship between the two

countries is very close. The US, as a significant power, has long supported high-quality investment, good job opportunities, and sustainable economic growth in the Philippines. There is no doubt about the aid provided by the United States to the Philippines since its independence, especially in economic security cooperation (Polls, 2023).

However, economic growth and rapid industrialization such as in South Korea did not occur in the Philippines until the end of the Cold War. The Philippines was still a developing country with a 1996 GDP of only \$94.65 billion, a GDP per capita of \$1,334, and an economic growth of 5.86 percent (World Bank, 2022). This is probably caused by US involvement, which may be different in the sense of foreign assistance allocation and other policies toward both countries, such as the following data presented by Kang (2002) that the US share of aid toward South Korea is many times greater than that of the Philippines.

Table 1. US Aid Allocation to Client Countries, 1946-1980 (in million US dollars)

Amount of Resource Aid	Country	Foreign Assistance 1947-1980
Higher Number	South Korea	25,784.2
Lower Number	Philippines	4,980.6

Sources: David Kang (2002).

According to Kang (2002) and Lee (2019) With such disproportionate levels of US involvement in economic and military assistance, it is not surprising that South Korea has grown faster than the Philippines despite different domestic conditions or policies. So, the number, ratio, and quantity of external assistance are significant because they provide more significant opportunities to increase economic growth. As already known, both countries are very dependent on foreign aid, so the difference in numbers will greatly influence the development of the two countries.

This, then, raises the question of what causes the disproportionality. Even though the two countries both have close relations with the US, Kang (2002) and Lee (2019) argue that the disproportionality of US foreign assistance occurs because of the difference

in threat perception, or geopolitical conditions in which South Korea has a higher threat level compared to the Philippines.

However, it seems that the explanation of threat perception alone is not enough to explain the phenomenon because, in the case of South Korea, there was a decrease in the amount of US foreign assistance from 1970 to the end of the Cold War in 1991 (D. Kim, 2012). The amount has certainly decreased dramatically, even though if reviewed again, according to Lee's (2018; 2019) view, the threat level in South Korea during the Cold War was categorized as a high level of threat with high durability and high severity (Lee, 2018;2019).

Specifically, the 1970s were a period when North Korea, led by Kim Il-sung, initiated a severe nuclear program because of the desire to compete with South Korea's economic improvement and also to continue to protect the country more effectively (Reyero, 2023; Wakefield, 2010). Therefore, this threat is undoubtedly categorized as a high threat perception, so the foreign assistance provided by the US should also be high, but why, in this period and onward, did US foreign assistance decrease drastically?

Moreover, in the Philippine case, when a new threat occurred with the emergence of the South China Sea dispute, this threat could be categorized as a high level of threat at the end of the Cold War, when China aggressively claimed the entire South China Sea area, especially by enacting new maritime laws on territorial seas and additional zones that disturbed the sovereignty of some countries in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines as a client of the US (Koga, 2022). This threat also threatened US hegemony, including disrupting US surveillance bases and trade routes in the Asian region, causing increased tension in US-China relations (National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, 1992). However, during that escalation of the tension with the China claim, even though the Philippines was a US ally, the US did not show any real action against China, and provided foreign assistance to the Philippines only in a very small proportion, especially when compared to previous times (Soh, 1995).

These events proved that threat perception alone was not enough to explain the cause of the disproportionality of US foreign assistance to its client countries. So it is

necessary to look at other variables or other necessary conditions to explain the patron-client dynamics as the variance that occurs that implicates the allocation of foreign assistance by the US.

The variable that needs to be considered in this research is the level of alliance cohesion (LAC), which simply means how far countries are committed and also the durability of the relationship, especially in dealing with common challenges (Kih, 2019; Troutman, 2020). The level of alliance cohesion is very important to explain patron-client dynamics, especially in an asymmetric alliance, so it is possible to explain why there is disproportionality and dynamics in US foreign assistance to its client countries.

The author agreed with Kang and Lee's earlier argument that the contribution or involvement of the US has been substantial in the development process of the two countries. Still, the different allocation could be one of the reasons why the two countries have different economic development outputs, so in this study, I will focus on why there is a disproportional share of foreign aid between the two countries, even though they are strategic allies of the US, and what the impact of the differing US contributions has been on the development of the two countries.

Therefore, this study aims to strengthen or clarify that other factors or variables affect the output of the alliance's success in creating incentives for the client countries, ultimately creating economic development for the recipient country. It also tries to explain why there are disproportionalities of US foreign assistance toward both countries. This can be referred to as gap-spotting and theory-building, which will bring variables and necessary conditions to explain the US' different policies based on the economic alliance perspective (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011).

Research Question

Based on the explanation of the problem and puzzle above, this research aims to answer the question:

1. Why, in similar patron-client relationships, did the US allocate higher amounts of foreign assistance to South Korea than to the Philippines?
2. How do patron-client dynamics between the US and its allies explain the disproportionality and changes in US foreign assistance allocated to South Korea and the Philippines, and what is its impact on the development processes of the two countries?

Objectives of Study

This study aims:

1. To demonstrate the cause of why there are disparities in US foreign assistance allocations to the two countries under patron-client relations (in the asymmetric alliance), which could be one of the factors leading to the different economic development processes between South Korea and the Philippines.
2. To elaborate on the patron-client dynamics that could explain the disproportionalities and changes in US foreign assistance allocated to South Korea and the Philippines, as well as the impact of the US' different involvement in providing that foreign assistance and policies toward the development of South Korea and the Philippines.

Significance of Study

The results of this case study will make a significant contribution to theory-building by completing the existing theory gap using a generalization in the examination of the extent to which US alliances have contributed to the economic development process of the two countries amid threat perceptions. It will be beneficial in predicting the US allocation of foreign assistance toward the client countries in international turmoil in the current

situation, such as Ukraine in the Ukraine-Russia war, and also South Korea in a new era of conflict with North Korea with more advanced weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, this study will also help review other aspects or nuances that affect differences in the allocation of foreign assistance in patron-client relationships. To what extent does the alliance's existence create favorable conditions that will affect the economic development of the countries with different quantities and capital accumulation that could lead to different outputs. Lastly, it will significantly contribute to seeing how distinct fields can influence each other.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

Literature Review

The differences in the US treatment of and allocation to these two countries, according to Lee (2018;2019), is caused by geopolitical issues, which include different external threats or perceptions of threats that are closely related to the national interests of the US itself, which also feels threatened and wants to maintain its sovereignty, which in turn affects the economic development of the two client countries. Kang (2002) also argues that the US has become a pivotal ally that provides South Korea and the Philippines with aid funds for their economic development. However, the inequality of US involvement could cause economic growth differences between these two countries based on different threat perceptions.

This leads to the contribution of the US in the process of economic development of client countries, as has been elaborated in previous studies, as has inequality in the US treatment of client countries, such as research by James Lee (2018 & 2019), Stangarone (2013), and David C. Kang (2002) who saw vastly different US contributions through providing aid and capital to South Korea and the Philippines. Lee (2018;2019) and Strangrone (2013) explain that the US contributed to South Korea's high threat level through several things apart from the aid allocated, especially in supporting state-led capitalism and industrialism, land reform, bolstering South Korean development under bureaucratic guidance, including preserving the Japanese colonial legacy, and becoming a close trading partner and providing investment that continued to increase over time, which is essential in the process of South Korea's progress, especially after the Korean War.

This is quite different from the Philippines, with a lower threat level, in which the Philippines, as a former US colony, still has a lingering legacy of colonialism. It assumes that the Philippines became a colonial creation that withered and was reorganized and plundered by the national oligarchy that was born. The US did not do the same to the Philippines by encouraging state-led capitalism and industrialism. In the Philippines, the

role of the US is also huge with the provision of funds for the Philippine government, especially in rehabilitative financial cooperation. Also, the National Development Council aid funds, instead of supporting industrialization, emphasize the development of the primary sector. The US is obliged to increase the Philippines' GNP through production and agricultural processes. The problem is that the aid program affects patronage patterns and corruption within the Philippine government because of the discretion in the use of funds, and with that, they also support various US programs. This is one of the reasons why it is so difficult for the Philippines to create progress (Lee, 2019).

The gap in research on alliance cohesion mainly discusses its impact or tendency toward security relations, not many have discussed its relationship with the political economy approach, especially in client states. As in the research of Troutmant (2020) and Jiyun Kih (2019), who assume that alliance cohesion usually only has an impact on the closeness of relations in the security and military aspects or on capability building, not many have discussed how the level of cohesion of this alliance will affect the political economy of both patron and client countries comprehensively, which relates to how the alliance will contribute to each party's progress and impact the patron-client relationship.

Patron-client relations, according to Nicols (2014), are a very important type of relationship defined as a bond between two parties that involves instrumental closeness that divides countries with higher economic conditions into patrons who can use their role and influence to provide influence or benefits for a lower-status country as a client who, in return, offers support and various personal services to the patron. This is very important for the Philippines and South Korea, for which the US, as a patron, provides a lot of assistance and policies toward the progress of the Philippines and the Philippines is obliged to provide full support to the US (Scott, 1973). On the other hand, South Korea, according to Kim (1993), was very dependent on the relations it had with the US in the beginning, but the difference was the change in relations, which, with various phenomena that occurred, made South Korea able to have a greater role, such that in the late 80s, the relationship was no longer a patron-client relationship but a partner relationship.

These studies are critical and will significantly help my research with the information presented. Still, these previous studies also have gaps in explaining US

contributions. Disproportionality occurs because they only focus on threat perception without considering the level of cohesion in alliance relations, which is also important as a factor that causes US concern in contributing to economic development and the quantity of assistance provided to the client countries, so this research will attempt to fill the gap in existing studies by presenting other perspectives, especially the level of alliance cohesion that will be combined with threat perception, to show more comprehensive results.

This study tries to observe the patron-client relationship in the alliances built by the US that have contributed to the economic development of client countries through various policies, especially military aid and economic assistance, and why there is inequality. This study is necessary because the relationship between alliances and economic development is often debated. After all, according to some experts, military partnerships do not have a significant impact on the economic development of both patron and client countries. Still, some other experts consider that military alliances significantly influence a country's economic development, both patron and client countries.

Andrew G Long (2006), in his article, cites the opinion of Gowa and Mansfield (1993) that military alliances affect trade, where the argument is based on a realist approach that alliance countries do more trade with their partners than non-alliance countries because of concerns about security externalities that arise through two-way economic exchanges in the trade process. (Long, 2006).

According to Gowa & Mansfield (2004) and Bryan Rooney, et al (2022), military alliances are implicitly believed to enforce trade cooperation by creating incentives for allied countries to value the profits earned by their trading partners as the prosperity earned from trade increases the incomes of allied countries as a potential military power of the alliance. US alliances are associated with higher levels of trade and investment in allied countries. However, it is essential to remember that it is not necessarily the case that countries involved in such alliances will only trade with allied countries. The critical point is how higher levels of bilateral trade and investment with allied countries will increase US trade and investment in those client countries, ultimately increasing economic prosperity and even focusing development on the allied countries.

No less significantly, Uk Heo & Min Ye (2019), in "U.S. Military Deployment and Host-Nation Economic Growth", raise the argument of Jones & Kane (2012), which says that the presence of US troops, especially in alliance partner countries, affects investment, trade, political development, and economic growth. US troops, particularly in an alliance, bring significant benefits to the host country or client country if US troops are deployed within its borders, which will create increased security and strengthen stability in the region. This is an indirect impact generated by the existence of the US alliance with host countries, in which the increase in security and the creation of stability brings additional impacts, such as increased domestic and foreign direct investment, in addition to growing trade with the US and other countries because of the creation of security earlier.

In this regard, it is also necessary to elaborate on the article by Richar Doner, Richi and Dan Slater (2005) arguing that countries will only develop when they have a systemic vulnerability (insecurity) where political leaders face a minimal political environment. This can be achieved when there are threats that can threaten the common good or threats that can cause unrest. There is national insecurity that creates an increase in the need for foreign exchange and war equipment, and finally, there are budget constraints due to foreign scarcity.

In more detail, the conditions of systemic vulnerability give rise to the emergence of developing countries because of the existence of external coalition commitments, the scarcity of resources, and finally, the existence of severe threats. These conditions make it difficult for rulers to maximize their performance and stay in power, so they try to put aside their interests, optimize their patronage, and create a better bureaucracy, affecting the development process.

The literature is enough to explain why South Korea became a developed country because of systemic vulnerability, especially the severe threat from North Korea's nukes, which requires its political elites to struggle to maximize the process of progress and industrialization to balance the power of North Korea. External threats force leaders to create strong institutions to foster growth and implement wealth-sharing mechanisms for popular sectors. However, the gap that I find is that this paper does not discuss the role of the US in providing economic assistance or paying for security to benefit South Korea

since the threat perception by the US was important in bolstering South Korea's economic development, regardless of the domestic structure that has been explained.

Thus, this study aims to complement the literature by focusing on the US alliance with South Korea and how it overcomes joint threats so that both countries can achieve adequate economic development conditions by displaying more nuance and also by exploring how the level of cohesion (resilient relations) in alliances are essential to create stability in security and investment confusion, which will also have an impact on economic development.

Previous studies have not implicitly explained US alliances' contribution to advancing the economic development of client countries, which generates disproportionality and dynamics, especially in South Korea and the Philippines. My research will attempt to fill the gap and explain the critical variables of how the US contributes to the development of the two client countries, especially in alliance relations. This study will focus more comprehensively on the role of the US by highlighting its perspective as the patron of alliance relations. On the other hand, this research will also combine the views or approaches of previous studies that explain the disproportional foreign assistance allocation caused by threat perception with the level of alliance cohesion so it will show more comprehensive results and can contribute to theory-building.

Theoretical Framework

Before exploring further, several vital concepts in this study must be presented. First, the patron-client relationship is defined as a hierarchical partnership or so-called asymmetrical power dependency, both formal and informal, based on a good relationship between the patron (who provides sponsor protection) and the client as the recipient of that support and protection (Nicols, 2014). In international relations, the patron-client relationship is changing, and the focus is not only on security but also on further relationships regarding how to support economic development, including cooperative resource exchange partnerships (Showmaker & Spanier, 1884). Both parties always

maintain values and principles to support each other, which helps them to avoid conflict in their relationships.

When they interact in exchange for financial support, protection, systematic support, etc. (Biermann & Harsch, 2017), patron-client relationships are usually triggered by the resource needs of clients lacking economic and military resources. However, it is also essential to know that a patron is interested in the resources provided to clients (Hicken, 2011).

Patron-client is one of the terms in alliance relations, especially in asymmetric alliances. In this case, the US, as the patron, should provide military and economic support, for example, to client countries, in this case South Korea and the Philippines. The reason is then called the dynamics of patron-client relations. This is related to the interests of the US with regard to its clients in considering threats or opportunities for profitable cooperation. The patron-client dynamics here can be seen clearly when the US provides different allocations of resources to each client country, such as when South Korea gets a more significant amount of support while the Philippines receives less. This dynamic is assumed to occur because of the alliance's perception of threat and resilience relations, which is why US concerns change and also influence the conditions of domestic state clients in producing policies that accept or reject US involvement (Biermann, 2024).

Foreign assistance is assistance given from one country to another in the form of gifts, grants, or loans which can be used as capital to improve the domestic economy of the recipient country (Kenton, 2023). In this study, foreign assistance refers to US support as the patron for client countries and one that can affect their development, including through:

- *Military Assistance*: defense funding,
- *Economic Assistance*: foreign capital (foreign direct investment (FDI), foreign loan, grants and development aid).

Since this study focuses more on the economic trajectories, it will explore the impact or support of the patron to the client in the amount of financial assistance (foreign

capital inflows from the US to South Korea and the Philippines), which can have an impact on the economic development of the client country.

Economic assistance could be the primary source of foreign capital inflows, which are considered a catalyst for economic development. They are a significant source of technology transfer and exchange of foreign earnings from patrons in more developed countries to clients in developing countries (Mowlaei, 2018). It is essential to analyze the extent to which the alliance between these countries can provide capital, which impacts development. Still, the two countries, namely South Korea and the Philippines, have very significant differences in the economic results of their development, even though they have the same provision provided by the US as a strategic partner in the alliance (Lee, 2012).

Second, threat perception or level of threat (LoT) is relevant since this is also important in explaining the phenomenon. Threat perception is defined as the patron's suspicion or estimate in the alliance of the possibility of decreasing his or her sphere of influence through the enemy's aggressive actions against the client. In simple terms, the enemy's actions threaten to carry out military attacks or spread hegemony over his clients, which results in the enemy having control over his clients. Threat perception also relates to the type of threat posed to the client by the adversary and the likelihood of the adversary's quick victory over the client in the event of war (Young Le, 2021). Two factors determine the level of threat perception: how durable the threat is and the severity of the threat to patrons and clients (Lee, 2019).

The existence of this security threat can be the cause of a disproportional share of aid because the higher the level of threat, the more likely the country is to get more attention and support from the patron, including in the sense of protection and foreign assistance. On the other hand, this threat also stimulates the desire to accelerate the process of development and industrialization to balance and prevent a detrimental war. Meanwhile, in the Philippines, security threats occurred more internally until the end of the Cold War, especially the CPP and separatist movement of the Bangsamoro, who demand independence. However, in the Philippines' case, the emergence of the South China Sea dispute was categorized as a high threat level of threat, so this is a gap that

needs to be explored more to explain the variance by analyzing the threat level with necessary conditions for the allocation outcomes (Kang, 2002, Young Lee, 2021).

The classification of levels of threat has also been explained in the "International Relations Research Institute California" (1976), which divides threats into two categories, namely domestic (internal) and international (external) threats. The domestic system is conceptualized as the internal behavior of all states without any penetration by external actors or spillover into the international system, so the threats that emerge at this level are categorized as small or medium.

On the other hand, international conflict involves two or more countries, so international turmoil is always considered more influential and dangerous at the middle to upper-class level because it involves more than one country, which is likely to bring greater threats, especially to poverty. In contrast, it is also quite impactful at the domestic level, but when a considerable international conflict arises, domestic tensions will become lower and vice versa (Simon, 1976).

The third is the level of alliance cohesion (LAC), which refers to how committed and effective the alliance is in coordinating its goals and strategies, especially external goals, such as prevention and defense. This is also related to whether their interactions within the alliance are durable or not, following the attitudinal and behavioral dimensions (Holsti et al, 1985).

According to Walts (1997), alliance cohesion denotes an enduring alliance in relation to its effectiveness in deterring and surviving external threats. This effectiveness can be seen from the level of cohesion, especially in shared threads and interests (benefits) that can determine the level of cohesion.

Many factors, including threat perception, governmental change, and perception of order, cause alliance cohesion. The main focus here is governmental change, which involves political leadership as a critical factor that influences the attitude component of alliance cohesion, which causes changes in the alliance's cohesion level and the perception of order, which considers domestic political factors and interests. Considering political leaders (regimes) is very important in explaining alliance cohesion because it

will lead to the enduring level of the alliance depending on the approach of the leaders of the two countries, who will prioritize each other's interests and that, therefore, in different leadership eras, will present various levels of cohesion (Kih, 2019).

Because the level of alliance cohesion is dynamic, several areas help determine it, including formal treaties, dedication, burden sharing, consultative mechanisms, military integration and the interactions of countries (Lee, 2023). These factors will determine whether there is a high or low level of alliance cohesion, in which a high level of cohesion in the alliance is more likely to maintain mutual resilience relations and will try to solve all forms of joint challenges faced by either crises or threats by using effective instruments to preserve the national security of the two or more countries involved in the alliance, and especially in asymmetric alliances.

Patron countries will provide economic and military assistance to client countries as a form of support and commitment. The more cohesive an alliance is, the more benefits it will typically bring, such as higher degrees of institutionalization, domestic support, dominant leadership, and ideological solidarity (Walt, 1997). Meanwhile, a low level of cohesion in the alliance will result in an indifferent attitude between the two parties. The relationship is non-resilient, which makes it possible to build relationships with other parties because they can no longer rely on each other. This also causes the patron-client relationship in an asymmetric alliance to become unstable, and concern for each other is significantly reduced (Kih, 2019; Troutman, 2020).

This is a fundamental concept in this study because it will examine how the level of alliance cohesion in the US-South Korea and US-Philippines alliance causes differences in US involvement in the development process of the two countries and also the disproportionality of resource allocation by the US in the two countries. Several aspects will be examined in depth, especially the political leaders of the two client countries, whether the leaders tend to be resilient and have enduring partnerships with the US or perhaps the opposite, but the study will also look at domestic political factors related to the interests of each country in the alliance in seeing profitable opportunities or avoiding losses in a way that will significantly affect the level of alliance cohesion and lead to disproportionalities.

Dependency Development Theory

The first theory is closely related to the US contribution to the development process of its two client countries, namely the dependent development theory, first developed by Peter Evans during the Cold War. Initially, this was related to the dependency principle related to imperialism, which affects the internal social structure of small countries (Evans, 1979). The basic idea is formed by combining multinational, state, and local capital for capital accumulation, which increases the complexity of the internal productive structure, called dependent because of the effect of dependence on capital from core countries. The role of foreign capital inflow as FDI becomes crucial, which ultimately presents a different orientation from various existing perspectives on dependencies and industrialization processes. Dependent development is also known as capital accumulation in small countries (periphery), including a substantial degree of industrialization and a more complex internal division of labor that increases productivity (Evans, 1979; Gerrefi & Evans, 1981).

The critical point of this theory concerns foreign direct investment, where core countries usually build manufacturing operations in small countries to provide access to broader capital and technology to produce more advanced domestic goods and services that can increase economic growth (Naseemulla, 2022). Dependent development emphasizes that developing countries, even with adequate capacity and authority, still need to form mutually beneficial relationships with companies or large countries through localizing industrial processes for advanced products (Evans, 1979; Gerrefi & Evans, 1981).

Clark and Bahry (1983) also argue that it depends on development because the extraordinarily rapid economic growth in various countries during the Cold War was influenced by external dominators (patron/core countries). Economic growth also caused transformations in domestic structures, which caused multiple countries to rise. As in East Asia, with intensive technology investment from core (patron) countries and multinationals through state facilities and coordination with domestic capital, it has created extraordinary performance in several countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (Cumings, 1984).

This is visible in US relations with South Korea and the Philippines, where the US provides foreign capital (including FDI) to these two countries as its clients. In dependency development, this capital is referred to as a driver of progress and structural change. Foreign capital and various kinds of assistance provided by the US, including its policies, have a significant influence on the development process of the two countries, such as substantial security-based assistance by the US and the provision of access to markets that provide South Korea and also the Philippines with security-related opportunities and thus more autonomy (Naseemulla, 2022).

Additionally, as explained by Long (2006), the establishment of the US Alliance with South Korea and the Philippines explicitly links the alliance agreement with economic cooperation, where the US as a patron country is not only obliged to provide security guarantees in the form of a security umbrella, it is also obliged to provide development assistance along with investment and cooperation in trade, so this will undoubtedly create changes in economic conditions along with security policies.

This is very meaningful or instrumental in the context of the alliance when the progress or strategy carried out by South Korea is greatly assisted by the United States, especially in the aspect of economic development with the security umbrella that creates favorable conditions, which ultimately create conditions of stability that can create economic growth.

Thus, based on this theory, this research will explain from the perspective of how foreign assistance such as foreign capital influences the development process of these two countries, including transforming the structure of domestic capability and trying to elaborate why inequality occurs based on the US perspective (security- and interests-based) and the local structure of both countries.

The Economic Theory of Alliances

To explain the phenomenon of different proportional foreign assistance from the US toward South Korea and the Philippines, I will use the economic theory of alliances approach. Before digging deeper, we need to know what an alliance is. According to Walt (1985), in “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, with his famous

balance of threat theory, an alliance is an attempt by a country to join forces with another country to counteract a common threat. A safe strategy is to join forces with parties interested in the common threat. Walt gives the term balancing, namely, if the country does not do balancing, then the country has a risk of suffering the impact of other countries' threats. Then, according to Gagliano (2019), an alliance is an arrangement between countries that binds them for security purposes; some are established between countries with the same level of power, called a symmetric alliance, and can also be between countries with unbalanced power, called an asymmetric alliance.

The economic theory of alliances explains that the formation of an alliance is not only necessarily related to security issues but also a reciprocal relationship in economic progress, especially in an asymmetric alliance. In this concept, the patron country is obliged to provide security guarantees and economic assistance, including investment in the development process of the client country. At the same time, the patron country has the right to place its military bases (military installation) in the client countries (Olson & Zwckhause, 1966).

However, this approach considers that there are often disproportionate shares of the burden and share of aid among allied countries. The disproportionality includes overcoming challenges (burdens). Some countries have to allocate more funds for defense in maintaining sovereignty and protecting their alliances based on their GNP and military capabilities and some must allocate less, causing disproportionality of burden (role). Besides that, what is more important in this study is the disproportionality of aid (foreign assistance) provided by the patron to the client but with an uneven amount (Blankenship, 2023).

Thus, this can be used as a clear point of view to analyze the case that occurred in South Korea and the Philippines, according to the initial analysis that can be digested based on the views of Olson & Zwckhause (1966) and Blankenship (2023) that there is a disproportionate share of the aid (foreign assistance) that could lead to a difference of the US contribution to the development processes of both countries.

Therefore, this study will attempt to explain why there are differences in the pattern and involvement of the US and show the dynamics of the patron-client relationship, which causes the output of foreign assistance allocated by the US to lead to different economic outcomes. This condition may be why some US alliance countries become successful and some are still developing countries.

Argument and Assumption

In this study, I argue that the existence of patron-client relations in asymmetric alliances between the US and various countries will positively impact economic development with its multiple contributions in providing foreign assistance and various kinds of support. Still, the problem is that the US has different contributions to each of its clients, thus the result will be also different. In addition to explaining US contributions to the economic development of its client countries, this study will try to explain why there is disproportionality and dynamics in the US contribution to foreign assistance that led to different economic output.

My argument will focus on two variables: The level of threat (insecurity) and the level of cohesion in alliance (resilience/durability) that occurs. These two variables still have a fairly close relationship, where the level of threat can create alliance cohesion but other factors can also cause cohesion in the alliance.

In observing the two countries as clients of the US alliance, the basis for the difference in the output of the two countries can be analyzed from the difference in threat levels (external factors). South Korea's threat is more complex with the nuclear power and communist threat of North Korea, which makes the US-South Korea alliance work more conductively and significantly. With this level of threat, the US will distribute greater foreign assistance to South Korea, especially when compared to the Philippines, whose main threats are domestic, such as separatist movements and a domestic communist party with lower severity; thus, it is not surprising that the US provides a smaller allocation (Gagliano, 2019).

From this level of threat, by considering the durability and severity based on the views of James Lee (2019), it can be determined that South Korea has a more dangerous

and urgent threat (high level of threat) compared to the Philippines, in which the main problem is at the domestic level. This could be the reason why US assistance is more focused on South Korea compared to the Philippines and could also be the reason why South Korea has had better economic progress compared to the Philippines.

Table 2. US Threat Perception in South Korea and the Philippines in the Cold War

CASE	THREAT DURABILITY	THREAT SEVERITY	DEVELOPMENTAL STATE
SOUTH KOREA	High	High	Yes
THE PHILIPPINES	Low	Low	No

Source: James Lee (2019)


However, the level of threat alone is not enough to explain this. Considering the conditions of alliance cohesion is also crucial because this aspect also appears quite different in the patron-client relationship between the allied countries. Alliance cohesion between countries, in particular, can explain the detailed conditions of why the US allocation experiences unequal dynamics (Baili, 2021). The level of cohesion can affect how the US threatens the client state, including providing foreign assistance.

In the case of South Korea and the Philippines, there are dynamics in alliance cohesion levels between alliances that depict patron-client dynamics, especially between the US and South Korea. South Korea tends to have strong relations with the US, but during the Park era, there was a breakdown in relations between the two countries; this could be the beginning of why there were dynamics in the US allocation of foreign assistance. Meanwhile, in the Philippines during the Cold War, the commitment of its leaders was firm to the US, so the allocation of foreign assistance provided by the US was mostly stable until the end of the Cold War, when the agreement of the military base was abandoned and the cohesion level began to erode (Shin, 1994).

This is the initial difference between South Korea and the Philippines in the context of the different contributions of the US as a patron to their economic development and the creation of disproportionalities in resource allocation that are influenced by the

level of threat and level of alliance cohesion. This can be said to be a very significant difference in conditions in which the US, in an asymmetric alliance with the two countries, has different interests and concerns that lead to different policies toward them, including in the amount of resource allocation in which these disproportionalities (inequality) could be the reason why South Korea and the Philippines have different economic development, particularly from the US contribution.

Figure 1. Theoretical Framework for Explaining Variation in Alliances on Disproportional Outcomes



Following this logic, my assumption regarding the US contribution to the disproportionality of foreign assistance is as follows:

Hypothesis: *A high level of threat with the condition of a low level of alliance cohesion leads to low foreign assistance allocation from the patron to the client countries in alliance relations.*

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

Research Method and Case Selection

To answer the research question above, I will use qualitative methods that interpret phenomena by exploring various empirical studies using robust approaches or theories to analyze these phenomena (Gerring, 2017). More specifically, this is a Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis (CFPA) that tries to identify various factors, actors, and conditions that can influence a country's foreign policy. In this case, the main focus is on external factors in which foreign policy is indeed a product of the international system or a form of reaction to external conditions and the actors involved in it (Lantis & Beasley, 2017). Thus, the main unit of analysis of this study is US foreign policy, especially in the allocation of foreign assistance to its client countries, which in this case is based on external factors, how the US perceives its client countries, particularly South Korea and the Philippines, which can bring benefits or influence the US's national interests positively.

I will use case studies, an intensive study of a unit with the primary aim of generalizing to a more extensive set of units by relying on evidence of covariance. Therefore, this method can also be understood as a way of defining cases that is usually used to investigate a phenomenon in real life by exploring a phenomenon, process or event bound by time or activities where information gathering is carried out using various procedures. The main focus is to explain why and how certain conditions arise (in a series of events) (Gerring, 2004;2007; Ryan, 2012).

This method is essential to apply in this study to explain why the level of US foreign assistance in the military and economy changes and what the impact is on the economic development of its client countries, especially South Korea and the Philippines, which had differences in their financial capacity at the end of the Cold War. The main focus of this research is on the Cold War period to obtain relevant information at a time when the US was very intensively involved in the development process of client countries by providing various forms of assistance so that it will explicitly explore the inequality in

the independent variables that most likely have the potential to produce different outcomes of our allocation (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003).

I will use process tracing based on multi-case-study causal inference as the explanatory projection to explain the causal inference (cause and effect relationship between variables), namely independent and dependent, to test alternative explanations or other aspects that have an essential influence so that it is helpful in theory-building. Process tracing can be used to explain causal inference by interrogating or exploring historical narratives that are fragmented into smaller, detailed periods based on crucial events that occurred. From this, the study was then able to analyze how the sequence of events produced varied outcomes in the cases to be generalized (Beach & Pederson, 2013). This research is explanatory and will look for causal factors to explain the phenomenon by focusing on cases to explain how the US contributes to the economic development of its client countries and why there is disproportional aid from the US to its client countries by observing the sequence of the events (Pierson, 2000).

Table 3. US Aid Allocations to Client Countries, 1946–1980 (in million US dollars)

<i>AMOUNT OF RESOURCE AID</i>	<i>COUNTRY</i>	<i>FOREIGN ASSISTANCE 1946-1980</i>
HIGH	Israel	34,165.1
	Taiwan	11,064.2
	South Korea	25,784.2
LOW	Philippines	4,980.2
	Thailand	4,631.3
	Colombia	2,908.3

Sources: David Kang (2002).

The case selection is based on the fact that some countries in patron-client relations with the US receive a large amount of assistance and some countries receive a small amount of aid (Kang, 2002). The cases of South Korea and the Philippines are the most relevant examples and important as representatives of the disproportionality of resource allocation carried out by the US, in which South Korea is a unit that represents countries with a more significant level of resources from the US, such as Israel, Taiwan,

etc., in most cases resulting better economic development. In contrast, the Philippines as a unit represents countries with a smaller level of foreign assistance, such as Thailand, Colombia, etc.

South Korea and the Philippines are significant because they are both countries that have close ties with the US in the imperial sense. South Korea is a country affected by American imperialism, especially after WWII when Japan was defeated by the US and the US occupied the southern part of Korea and even helped in the formation of the Republic of Korea. This closeness increased when the Korean War occurred and an alliance was established in 1953, while the Philippines is a US colony that after World War II was given independence and then in 1951 an alliance was formed that made their attachment even greater (Snyder, 2008); Robinson et al, 2001).

While other cases are less representative, such as Taiwan, Israel, Thailand, and Columbia, the cases of South Korea and the Philippines are particularly useful in explaining the phenomenon that occurred because they have similarities and uniqueness. It is interesting to explore more deeply to determine the extent of the US contribution in providing incentives to the client countries. There must have been some critical variables that caused the disproportionality. Thus from this, it is hoped that the cases from these two countries can produce internal and external validity, which results in generalizations of phenomena that occur in various parts of the world, especially in the US contribution to the client countries' development.

Table 4. Periodization of the research scope

Period	South Korean Regimes	Philippine Regimes
<i>Cold War era</i>	Rhee Syng-Man (1948-1960)	Elpidio Quirino (1948-1953)
	Yun Bo-Seon (1960-1962)	Ramon Magsaysay (1953-1957)
	Park Chung-Hee (1963-1979)	Carlos P. Garcia (1957-1961)
	Choi Kyu-Ha (1979-1980)	Diosdado Macapagal (1961-1965)
	Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988)	Ferdinand Marcos (1981-1986)
	Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1993)	Corazon Aquino (1986-1992)

To explain the differing situations of these countries, I will explore the period of the Cold War by observing the regimes of different leaders and critical events, this regime-based and critical event review will test the hypothesis by analyzing the existing threats and how the US perceived them, also reviewing alliance cohesion on how the dynamics of the relationship in the US alliance will be able to provide a significant explanation because the existence of a cohesive relationship increases the probability of more foreign assistance that benefits the client countries and could contribute to economic development.

In the data collection process, I will use secondary data with documentation techniques to collect from previous studies, documentation, journals, books, newspapers, and various other sources that can support this research. In addition, I will use primary data from the US Embassy in Jakarta. The data is called “US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook]” and is the primary outcome of US foreign policy as the unit of analysis. Thus, this data will be used to explore the dynamics and disproportionality of patron-client dynamics in alliance relations as the primary research question. Several resources have studied this, especially the case of South Korea and the Philippines' development under US contributions. Nevertheless, research focusing on military alliances that have an impact on economic growth is relatively scarce, so I am sure that this research will bring new nuances in science, especially IR, in seeing how the security aspect, namely alliances, can affect the economic development of a country and how the disproportionality of resource allocation has a huge impact as well.

Finally, in data analysis, since I use process tracing, I will analyze using narrative analysis, which involves crucial data that is not only related to the context of the study but also related to space, time, place, and precise and reliable characteristics. This analysis is qualitative, which can reveal various narratives from the subject being studied (Ricks & Liu, 2018). In this case, South Korea and the Philippines can be explained explicitly. This analysis allows researchers to connect every event that is interrelated or causal in a way that will significantly support the drawing of conclusions in answering the question of why there are differences in allocations provided by the US to the two countries being studied.

CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION


Findings

US foreign policy in the context of foreign assistance allocation to its client countries is primarily based on its interests. The main thing that influences this policy from external factors is the extent to which the US sees the benefits of its client countries, such that the greater the benefit the client country brings, the greater the amount of assistance it will receive from the US. That is the reason why it is so volatile. In this case, the author perceives two main things that underlie the amount of foreign assistance provided by the US, namely threat perception and alliance cohesion. These two factors influence US involvement and the allocation of foreign assistance, which in the end can influence the dynamics of economic development for client countries.

A. Patron-Client Dynamics, Foreign Assistance and Development in South Korea

In the South Korean case, the development process is very complex, involving many factors both internal and external. The findings in this study show variations in South Korea's development process by involving the US as a patron country in the alliance relations it has built. This will explain why the US contribution to South Korea is so large and the nature of the impact of this assistance on South Korea's progress since the end of World War II, as shown in the figure.

Figure 2. The Variation of South Korea Case



Source: US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook}, 2019.

This figure shows the dynamics of US foreign assistance allocation to South Korea. Detailed explanation as follows:

a. Syng-man Rhee Era (1948-1960)

Syng-man Rhee was the first president of South Korea, from 1948-1960. He was elected with US support as an experiment to protect the democratic government in South Korea. This event began strategic relations between the US and South Korea and showed how the US instated various policies that could benefit South Korea, including the US aid program first formalized during the Rhee period that year. The Rhee government also tried to maximize foreign aid receipts from the US, and with ties to the US, South Korea also received multilateral assistance of US\$457 million (National Intelligence Estimate, 1967; D. Kim, 2012).

At the beginning of his leadership, particularly before the formation of the US-South Korea alliance, South Korea's position was considered less strategic for US interests in the region before the Korean War occurred. Moreover, during Rhee's tenure, there was still a desire to carry out Korean reunification by initiating the "Sunshine Policy", which was entirely opposed by the US. Hence, the US was reluctant to provide

much assistance to South Korea then. That is why from 1948 to 1950 the funds were only short-term assistance to handle reconstruction and humanitarian issues, even though the Economy Cooperation Administration (ECA) had been formed, during Rhee's time, it only focused on importing commodities (D. Kim, 2012). Still, it was a very vulnerable condition for communist influence, making it essential for the US to protect South Korea (Troutman, 2020).

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, caused by a massive North Korean and communist invasion, made the US aware that South Korea was a very vital country that needed to be protected and given assistance so it could escape the post-conflict downturn to avoid the influence of communism spread by China and the Soviet Union at that time, which made the US try to continue to support South Korea (Rob York, 2019). It made South Korea dependent on the US, and eventually President Rhee accepted all forms of US contributions in resolving the war dispute with North Korea, including handing over control of South Korea's military operational mission to the US, led by General MacArthur, to carry out efforts to win the war effectively (Park, 2000; The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2022).

The Korean War was a terrible event for South Korea, so this event later became the beginning of closer relations between the US and South Korea. When the war ended in July 1953 with the agreement of an armistice between the US, China, and North Korea (Park, 1983), South Korea and the US began a strategic alliance in the same year. The formation of this alliance shows that the two countries have a strong commitment to, or resilient relationship with, each other, especially in facing threats from Communist China and the Soviet Union and also the aggressiveness of North Korea, which is trying to invade South Korea (Cumings, 2002).

Then the committed alliance made the US provide a massive amount of economic aid to South Korea to assist the reconstruction process, oppose the communist threat, and also support South Korea's economic progress, from 1953 to 1960. The funds provided by the US reached \$8.86 billion in military assistance and \$27.6 billion in economic

assistance and were the primary capital to support economic progress (US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook], 2019; Park, 1983).¹

After the disarmament agreement took place, South Korea focused on rebuilding the country and securing the border to fight communist aggression. In addition to providing foreign assistance, the US also became South Korea's largest trading partner. The US-South Korea Agreement on free trade and favorable trade policies, which began in Rhee's tenure, encouraged economic cooperation and allowed South Korea to access goods and services in the US market, providing crucial revenue for exports that generated economic growth. US involvement is vital because it absorbs most of South Korea's exports. This allows South Korea to use its political and military relations with the US for economic development (Rienner, 2012).

Additionally, after the mutual defense agreement was signed between the two countries, the US had the authority to place military troops and military bases in South Korea as a client country. The presence of US troops creates security stability and affects the amount of FDI it provides to its client countries (security is a critical element in determining investment decisions). The troops in South Korea from 1954-1996 numbered 30,000-60,000, with 15 US military bases in Korea through the agreement, which provided monitoring and security that enabled the development of the South Korean economy from the domestic level (Uk Heo & Min Ye, 2017).

However, regardless of the implications of the alliance with South Korea in that period, the US had challenges in normalizing South Korea's relations with Japan because, when Rhee was in charge, he was very reluctant to cooperate with Japan because of the colonial experience, which left a deeply negative impression, so US efforts to mediate between them were complicated (Lee, 2014).

¹ All foreign assistance data in this study's findings and discussion (particularly without further sources) is sourced from US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook], '(Fiscal year 2019)', 2019 <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html>.

b. Yeun Bo Seon Era (1960-1962)

Yoen was elected president by the National Assembly in August 1960. Even though his tenure lasted only three years, his commitment to an alliance with the US was strong because Yoen upheld anti-communist ideology with his democratic party and was very pro-American. During that time, domestic political upheaval was quite complex, marked by a military revolution and a coup carried out by Park and his military government (Kim, 2011).

Apart from that, the durable relationship with the US as a patron during the Yoen era was the last period where the US provided large amounts of aid, especially economic assistance, before finally initiating a self-reliance policy that attempted to make South Korea more independent during Park's leadership, and this policy caused a significant reduction in aid. US Resources Assistance during the Yoen era in 1960-1962 reached \$5.26 billion in military assistance and \$6 billion in economic assistance, with a high communist threat and also a high threat from North Korea leading to a high level of commitment as well at this time in terms of a long-lasting alliance. In the end, Yoen was overthrown in the military coup by Revolution Committee member Park Chung He in 1962 (Cha, 1997).

c. Park Chung He Era (1962-1979)

Park Chung became president of South Korea after carrying out a military coup on his predecessor. The US had to take rational action to generate the best decisions for its client countries, including supporting Park's military leadership to end the domestic turmoil at that time. Apart from the support the US had provided during the Park Chung He era, there was a very complex dynamic of commitment with the US, which affected the level of alliance cohesion (Khaled, 2007).

During Park Chung He's tenure, South Korea entered a worsening stage of the Cold War, so the role of the US was vital. In this period, there was a shift in threats from open warfare to reconnaissance, subversion, and infiltration carried out by agents sent by North Korea. One of the missions was to assassinate President Park (Kriesberg, 2015).

This period also emphasized the anti-communist policies initiated during the Rhee era and implemented firmly during the Park era (National Intelligence Estimate, 1967).

Park's leadership period was the most interesting and important period because it showed the dynamics of the relationship that occurred in patron-client relations with the US and how the process of economic development occurred quickly, especially during the Vietnam War (Carter, 2008). The Vietnam War became one of the most critical events in South Korea's economic and industrial progress. When the war began in the early 1960s, South Korea contributed greatly, starting by facilitating goods and services for the army in South Vietnam and also by sending troops to help the US in South Vietnam. In this event, there was a sharing of knowledge and technological transfer from the US to South Korea through the strategy of joint ventures and educational exchange programs (Koojaroenprasit, 2012).

The US began to embrace entrepreneurs from South Korea for involvement as suppliers of weapons and airplanes that supported the US in the Vietnam War. This was part of the US military offshore procurement (OSP)², which began a significant transfer of technology and knowledge between the US and South Korea. This explains the development of Chaebols, such as Hyundai and Samsung, which previously only focused on the textile or other small industries. But in this period, they started to develop the military and defense sector, through which they learned a lot about technological advancement and began to develop other sectors, such as manufacturing in electronics, transportation, semiconductors, etc. (Glassman, 2014).

During the War, Hyundai was awarded a contract to deliver goods to the US military in Vietnam. From the benefits obtained from the US, the chaebol could finally develop engineering skills under the supervision of the US Army Corps of Engineers, and this was the critical point when Hyundai began to expand its industry to construction operations and became a robust heavy industry player, (tech and knowledge transfer),

² Military offshore procurement is defined as the process of exchanging military goods and services in the form of weapons or war equipment from suppliers outside the country of origin, and in this case, South Korea became the supplier of some of the US weapons in the Vietnam war (Block, 2008; Cumings, 2010).

related to the Chaebol's relationship with the US military (Cuming, 2010; Glassman, 2014).

Experience and capital accumulation through cooperation with the US military allowed Hyundai (Chaebol) run more infrastructure projects in South Korea, and by 1970, it had even expanded to shipbuilding. Eventually, South Korea became one of the largest shipbuilding countries in the world. This was one of the beginnings of the progress of industrialization with US involvement (Cumings, 2005). In the 1980s, South Korea's technological development and industrialization advanced the United States developed more legal provisions to develop industries in the military and other sectors (Kim, 1990).

Most importantly, at this moment, the US was eager to consolidate *State-Led Development* (capitalism and industrialism), which allowed South Korea to become more independent in managing its industrial development to be able to balance the communist threat and North Korean aggressiveness, so it is not surprising that since then, South Korea has finally been able to create adequate weapons products and continue in larger industries ranging from electronics to shipping (Lee, 2018). US resource assistance and military procurement also helped increase South Korea's growth through engagement in Chaebol during this period (Kim, 1990).

Moreover, during Park's tenure there was also normalization of South Korea's relations with Japan, which created such effective economic cooperation between the two countries that it resulted in the rapid economic growth of South Korea with the support of Japan and US trade and aid support. The relationship established with Japan, opened up great opportunities for South Korea to advance as a country because, in addition to the US, Japan has become a supplier of FDI and technology transfer to South Korea. (Strangrone, 2013; Han, 2016).

South Korea's participation in and contributions to the Vietnam War by providing various forms of support and naturalizing relations with Japan ultimately increased the commitment of the US-South Korea alliance, or led to an increase in cohesion levels from 1963 to 1969 (Kim, 2012; Shin, 2017). Thus, the US also strengthened the military capacity of South Korea, intending to overcome the communist threat and aggressiveness

of North Korea, by providing support for the military budget through assistance that reached \$12.2 billion and economic assistance that reached \$11.8 billion (Kim, 2012).

Nonetheless, during Park's era, there was also a decline in the cohesiveness level with the US that began with the five-year economic development plans, through which South Korea began to initiate "self-reliance" and become more autonomous both in national defense and economics to avoid foreign economic control, and with this, Park limited incoming resources, so the US gradually reduces direct assistance (Han, 2016). Still, South Korea needed technical assistance to develop its economy. This incident did not create much tension or rift in the South Korea-US relationship.

A more significant challenge occurred with the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine, which was established in 1969, was a relatively low point in the level of alliance cohesion of the US and South Korea. When President Nixon was elected US president, he said the US' client countries, including South Korea, must be able to maintain their security and defense without depending on the US as a patron (J. Haa, 1980; Zenji, 2020). This was based on considerations of the US elite, who said the country's financial aid and military support to South Korea was too much, so the amount had to be reduced. During the Nixon era, the US tried to carry out a grand strategy by opening cooperation with two big countries that were its rivals, namely China and the Soviet Union, to have a vital role globally and also to reduce global tensions (Butwell, 1971; D. Kim, 2012).

This certainly made Park insecure about his country's security status. He then perceived that the alliance commitment with the US had experienced a setback and indirectly also created a low level of alliance cohesion between the two countries as South Korea received less economic assistance than in previous times. The US commitment to alliance cohesion was eroded, and a lack of trust in the alliance emerged, triggering Park to be more aggressively self-reliant (Mangum, 2017).

Nevertheless, during that period, the level of threat faced by South Korea was very high, especially with the existence of North Korea, which carried out intensified provocations and caused South Korea to try to increase its military capacity. Furthermore, in this period, there was also a second assassination attempt on President Park Chung He

(Tran, 2010). The 1970s was the period when North Korea, led by Kim Il Sung, initiated a severe nuclear program out of the desire to compete with South Korea's economic improvement and also to continue to protect itself more effectively.

The nuclear development was done with the support of the Soviet Union. North Korea began weapons proliferation in 1962 and intensified on a larger scale in the 1970s (Columbia Law School, 2023). With the global nuclear non-proliferation agreement, North Korea perceived this opportunity as a moment to carry out nuclear deterrence. Efforts were made by joining the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974. In the following year, North Korea successfully designed a nuclear reactor, which became the beginning of the creation of more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction in later periods (Wakefield, 2010).

This episode is very unique and interesting because, with this big threat but with diminishing US commitment, South Korea had to survive to overcome the threat from North Korea. Because of the reduction in commitment, US assistance from 1970 to 1979 varied, with military assistance still being high, given the threat of North Korea, reaching \$15.5 billion, while economic assistance dropped drastically to only \$4.98 billion. For this reason, South Korea during the Park era became increasingly motivated to reduce its dependence on the US. South Korea then launched a nuclear program to strengthen its defense capabilities (Ko, 2006).

d. Choi Kyu-ha Era (1979-1980)

Choi was a diplomat and politician with the same role as Ho Chong. He served as president of the National Conference for Unification after the death of Park Chung Hee, who was killed in 1979. He also served relatively briefly, from 1979 to 1980 (Wickam, 1999).

During his leadership, he faced instability and a dangerous situation in prosecuting democracy management by Park supporting elites who wanted the authoritarian system to continue. The US government supported Choi's leadership at that time, in line with the possibility of North Korean aggression. Choi tended to liberalize South Korea, which made its relations with the US even closer. This marked a higher level of cohesion

because the US was committed to taking various actions to protect its client, including from opposition (Gon, 2012). During Choi's leadership period, he embraced the presence of the US, including the army, which became very effective, and he had a close relationship with the South Korean army. Even though in a short period, the US believed it had a significant influence in relations in the alliance as a result of the close ties that existed between the two countries, especially in their military alliance relations, it is not surprising that the US was still a reliable ally of South Korea (Mangum, 2017).

Because of this high level of cohesion, the US supported the Choi government and helped restore the country's political progress. However, with the continued restrictions on economic and military assistance from the US carried out by Congress, continuing the policy that had been implemented by Park previously, the US did not provide too much assistance during Choi's term of office, where military assistance was only \$673 million. In comparison, economic assistance was \$202.4 million. This is also due to South Korea's rapid economic progress through industrialization, which made it increasingly economically independent, even though it still faced internal and external challenges. Therefore, the US was committed to responding to the treaty obligations created between the two countries by providing protection or containing threats to South Korea (Wickam, 1999).

e. *Chun Doo Hwan Era (1980-1988)*

The arrival of Chun Doo Hwan as leader of South Korea was unexpected, coming after he successfully carried out a coup. Also, there were many domestic feuds under his rule. During his tenure, the commitment to the US was quite dynamic. Chun tended to continue Park's policy of reducing dependence on the US and reducing US involvement in South Korean domestic politics. This policy tried to degrade the patron-client relations in the US-South Korea alliance. Chun is said to have lacked an understanding of the broader context of the longstanding US-South Korea alliance (Mangum, 2017).

Then, the complexity of emerging threats became increasingly worrying, it was no longer the threat of Communism, as that started to decrease as a result of policies introduced by the US government such as *détente* and the Nixon Doctrine, which aimed

to reduce tensions among countries involved in the Cold War (Cheong, 2010). However, the threat from North Korea remained increasingly unsettling. It continued its aggressiveness by carrying out the Rangoon bombing, which aimed to destroy the South Korean government. It also made an assassination attempt on President Doo Hwan in 1983, which caused 21 fatalities, including several cabinet members (Roblin, 2021).

Then, in 1987, North Korean agents planted a bomb on Korean Air Flight 858, causing 115 deaths (Tsuyoshi, 2022). North Korea's aggressiveness was seen in several other events at the time, such as military confrontations in which skirmishes and attacks on South Korean and US forces occurred pretty frequently, and the most dangerous and worrying was nuclear development, which was increasingly becoming a priority at the end of the Cold War (Columbia Law School, 2023).

This incident shows that although Cold War tensions had begun to decline, the threat from North Korea was still very high. Thus, even though there were differences in vision at the beginning of his leadership, US commitment to South Korea during Chun's time increased and the durability of US-South Korea mutual security. The threat was high because of North Korea, as mentioned before (Wickam, 1999). Hence, the focus on security became a priority. Chun wanted to continue his economic independence from the US, but he believed that the US brought high value to its alliance with South Korea and its role in defense in East Asia. Thus, South Korea would continue to seek US assistance in strengthening its diplomatic front against North Korea in dealing with North Korea's diplomatic attacks, including not being involved in unification proposals with North Korea (Mangum, 2017).

One of the efforts made by the US and South Korea to minimize the threat of North Korea's nuclear development has been to carry out an extended deterrence policy, which began in the Chun era. This strategy also aims to prevent large-scale warfare between the two Koreas. It increases defense, with the commitment of the alliance between the US and South Korea to maintain regional security stability (Saunders, 2019). However, with this strategy, the alliance between the US and South Korea is still limited in dealing with the aggressive attitude of North Korea or has not been able to prevent

North Korea in its nuclear and missile development programs (Bandow & Carpenter, 1992).

With the escalation of North Korea's aggressiveness at that time, the US continued to provide substantial military assistance. However, economic assistance was no longer as significant as before because South Korean president Chun continued to be self-reliant, thus significantly limiting US aid allocation because of its drastic economic development and capabilities. South Korea's economic growth reached 13.95 percent in 1987 (Macrotrends, 2024), so there was no longer a need for US grants anymore, especially during the Chun period (Wickam, 1999).

Despite this increased economic capability, South Korea was still a weaker ally in the Chun era than the US, so patron-client relations of asymmetric alliances still occurred. South Korea still depended on the US alliance to maintain security stability, especially in overcoming the nuclear crisis in North Korea (National Foreign Assessment Center, 2007). The military assistance provided by the US to South Korea from 1980-1988 was \$2.5 billion, while economic assistance was only \$74.1 million.

The US also pressured the Chun government to uphold democracy, so Chun gradually began to liberalize. In this way, the US supported South Korea's security, economic, and political development without resorting to direct intervention, as Chun desired (Cheong, 2010). In short, during Chun's time, the US made efforts to help South Korea reach the peak of the democratization movement. The US warned the Chun government not to use military force to suppress the movement toward a democratic regime. So it is clear that the US had a very crucial role in the transition to South Korean democracy (D. Kim, 2012).

f. *Roh Tae-Woo Era (1988-1993)*

After successfully transitioning to democracy, Chun agreed to hold fair and open general elections. In 1987, Roh Tae Woo, the leader of the Democratic Justice party, was elected through direct election after South Korea was transformed into a democratic country, and Roh became president of South Korea until 1993 (Cho, 2010). This moment was a very

critical period for the democratic transition in South Korea, which was supported by the US, showing that at that moment, the patron-client relationship in alliance relations showed that the US as a patron had a massive influence on Korean politics and the economy. But after implementing democracy, US political influence in South Korea decreased, and what took place was a change in the exchange situation between security and autonomy (Park, 2010; Dohe Kim, 2012)

The Roh regime was welcomed by the US, especially at the beginning of democratization in South Korea and the Cold War victory. The relationship between the US and South Korea was getting closer with the strengthening of ties to continue in cooperation (Cho, 2010).

Even with high cohesion in the alliance, South Korea still had economic independence because it had become an advanced industrial country, so at this point, South Korea did not need economic assistance from the US as its partner anymore. At that time, South Korea was no longer a recipient of assistance but became a donor of aid to countries in regions such as Asia and Africa (Dole, 2021). However, the high alliance cohesion during this period showed a commitment that the two countries would be more serious about protecting each other. Even though the Cold War had ended, the threat of North Korean aggression was increasingly high, coupled with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hence, the cohesion that was formed was greater, much influenced by the threat perception that made the US increasingly aggressive in protecting its partners, including by maintaining the extended deterrence policy, which was initiated during the Chun era as a countermeasure against North Korean nuclear threats in the post-Cold War era (Roehrig, 2017).

Thus, the assistance provided by the US is currently quite limited, despite the high cohesiveness of the alliance and also the high North Korean threat, in which military assistance provided by the US only amounted to \$11.4 million and economic assistance was \$737,052, as the US offered democracy endowment funds during its initial transition to becoming a democratic country. This amount is minimal compared to the initial formation of the alliance between the two countries, which was influenced by South Korea's already solid economic capability (B.C. Koh, 1999). The event showed another


variance that influenced the amount of US foreign assistance, rather than threat or cohesion level. It was the factor of “self-sufficiency” that led to client countries, in this case South Korea in the Roh era, no longer needing the US foreign assistance allocation.

Therefore, due to this increase in capability, it can be said that South Korea became less dependent on the US because the risk of entrapment in South Korea during the Roh era was greater than the fear of abandonment, and here begins a new point in the transition to equal partner, no longer just a straight asymmetric alliance. South Korea has contributed significantly to burden sharing on defense since 1991 in alliance relations, which has caused South Korea's position in the alliance to become increasingly pivotal and influential (Kim, 2012).

B. Patron-Client Dynamics, Foreign Assistance and Development in the Philippines

The alliance commitment between the Philippines and the US was formed in 1951. Still, the relationship between the two countries has been going on for a very long time, with the US being one of the Philippines' former colonizers, so it is not surprising that many values and legacies have been left behind in its client country (Abinales, 2017). Just like South Korea, US-Philippines relations also experience dynamics, especially in the occurrence of the level of alliance cohesion and threat perception.

Figure 3. The Variation of The Philippines Case



Sources: US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook], 2019.

This figure shows that the foreign assistance provided by the US to the Philippines also fluctuated but not as significantly as in South Korea. The explanation of the figure in the dynamics of foreign assistance is as follows:

a. Elpidio Quirino Era (1948-1953)

Elpidio Quirino was a prominent politician and activist who served as president of the Philippines from 1948 to 1953, a period that was quite important in the closeness of relations between the two countries. The Quirino era was in the early stages of the Cold War, so the US was embracing countries that were considered to have a strategic position as partners in overcoming the Communist threat at that time, so the Philippines became necessary for the US security agenda as it tried to expand the Cold War balancing strategy in the Asia region (Kabir, 2017).

Even though, at that time, the most significant communist threat came from the international level, what the Philippines faced was more of an internal threat. There was the Huk Rebellion, which was one of the biggest threats in the Philippines at the start of the Cold War. Huk was originally a movement to oppose Japanese colonialism founded

in 1942 during the occupation. Later, motivated by the social injustices in the post-Cold War Philippines, the Huk began to absorb communist ideologies that were very threatening, and they changed their name to the People's Army Liberation (PAL) (Mitchell, 1969). There was a belief that Huk was influenced by the international communist movement initiated by China. No wonder the movement was considered a significant threat to the US and the stability of the Philippine government (Lee, 2019).

Therefore, strategic cooperation with the US was needed at the beginning of Quirino's leadership to protect against threats and also improve the political conditions of the Philippines (Kabir, 2017). During the Quirino period, the Philippines also accepted the US' economic reform requirements, so the US wanted to increase its foreign assistance to the Philippines (Lande, 2001). But the problem is that the Quirino presidency created the Philippine Council on Aid (PHICUSA), which perpetuated clientelism rather than creating an effective and autonomous bureaucracy. This made the Philippines' dependence on the US even more significant (Kabir, 2017).

Quirino, who had been very close to the US for a long time, certainly had a relationship dominated by resilience and high commitment to the US. This is proven by how he continued the military assistance agreement that was previously agreed upon. With his closeness and commitment, the US facilitated economic and military assistance. During the Quirino era, the Philippines received the most significant reconstruction aid of all time, which was provided to prevent the Philippines from being affected by the communist resurgence and to overcome the Huk Rebellion, which was the concern at the time. With the difficulty of facing the Huk Rebellion and the many losses that had been produced, the Philippine government finally collaborated with the US to defeat the group (Bacho, 19870).

Another critical point under Quirino's leadership was forming a formal alliance between the two countries with a mutual defense treaty in which the Philippines received protection assistance from the US, its patron, while also receiving economic assistance funds to develop its economy. The total US resource allocation provided by the US to the Philippines during Quirino's time was \$851 million in military assistance and \$7.1 billion in economic assistance, which aimed at rehabilitation, economic development, and also

countering the threat of Huk, which coincided with the early stages of the spread of communism. The provision was also motivated by the military base agreement in 1947 and the formal alliance between the two countries in 1951 (Abinales, 1992).

Just like South Korea, in the Philippines, the US was able to place its military bases even before the alliance was formed. The presence of military bases created economic activity and employment opportunities around the country. US military bases, which were placed at several points in the Philippines, including Clark Air Base, which is one of the largest US air bases in Asia, brought benefits to the Philippines in a system in which the US served as a security umbrella for the Philippines and provided security, especially from Chinese and Soviet Union threats regarding the spread of communism (Berry, 1990; Gagliano, 2019). Apart from that, the military base also brought economic benefits. The US was, and still is, obliged to pay rent to the Philippine government every year for the use of its bases' land. The impact of the US military presence in the Philippines is estimated to be approximately \$1.2 billion annually. This amount is said to be 3 percent of the Philippine GNP because the military base is one of the institutions that absorbs much local labor. The workforce absorption has almost reached 80,000. There are many people in the Philippines whose livelihoods depend on military bases or installations owned by the US (Albert, 2016).

b. *Ramon Magsaysay Era (1953-1957)*

Ramon Magsaysay was a former bus line manager who served as president of the Philippines from 1953 to 1957. He was a prominent president, staunchly anticommunist, and had close ties to the US as a country, like his predecessor. His becoming president cannot be separated from the role of the US at that time (Cullater, 1993).

During his leadership period, the threat of the Huk Rebellion remained. Therefore, with the collaboration between the Philippine government and the US, the Huk Rebellion was finally successfully suppressed, in part by leveraging intelligence from Huk informants and succeeding in arresting its leader. Afterward, the movement was no longer considered a significant threat to the US or Philippine governments, even though future

challenges still existed with the emergence of the local communist movement and separatist groups that threatened Philippine sovereignty (Bacho, 1987).

During his tenure, Magsaysay was able to carry out various strategies, by exploiting US concerns about communism, to obtain large amounts of aid from the US. Because of its closeness to the US, the Philippines was even called America's puppet because of its high loyalty and commitment to the US. It tried to maintain close relations with the US as its strategic partner, so the US had complete control over the country, including in the formulation of domestic policies. Magsaysay is also noted for his involvement in the early stages of the US intervention in Vietnam and for granting permission to US intelligence agencies to operate at military bases in the Philippines, such as Clark Air Base (Kabir, 2017).

Magsaysay's closeness and commitment as a leader of the Philippines showed a stable alliance relationship and high cohesiveness. He exemplified a pattern of loyalty that was important for US foreign policy. Some experts even say that the best relations between the US and the Philippines occurred during Magsaysay's leadership (H, W Brand, 2013). The US considered him an ideal leader who needed to be emulated by other client countries. However, as a consequence, the Philippines' burgeoning position in the alliance became weaker because it had a high level of dependency. On the other hand, as a result of this closeness or commitment, the US provided quite ample foreign assistance, some \$473.7 million in military aid and \$1.48 billion in economic assistance, which was used to strengthen the country's internal affairs, including developing the economy so that it could avoid a communist resurgence and face internal threats (Prescott, 2012).

c. Carlos P. Garcia Era (1957-1961)

Garcia was vice president under Magsaysay and served as president of the Philippines after he died in 1957. In his era, the influence of the spread of communism resulted in the emergence of a communist movement in the Philippines that created chaos and opposed the Philippine government, so the US initiated an anti-communist movement in the country (Morris, 1994).

During his leadership, Garcia struggled with internal challenges, including high levels of corruption, the release of social affairs, and the emergence of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) or the New People's Army, which attempted to fight the Philippine government and destroy the Philippines' relations with the US. There was also the issue of much anti-American sentiment during his time, but Garcia still tried to always show his loyalty, especially by campaigning for the anti-communist movement. The Philippines continued to follow America's path in regional and international politics (Kabir, 2017). Garcia also upheld good relations with the US and was highly committed. He negotiated the transfer of unused US military base areas to be controlled by the Philippines. He also negotiated rental fees for military bases used by the US, but his demands were often unmet. (Kennedy Library, 2022).

The US response was unexpected, especially in requesting more assistance to make the Philippines more democratic and more resistant to communism because the problem that the Philippines was expecting at that time was the domestic threat of communism, which was vulnerable to occurring in rural areas. Still, the US saw no reason for that, because the threat of the Huk Rebellion had been successfully eliminated several years before (Bacho, 1987).

Despite this, the US tried to overcome the CCP threat by providing adequate military assistance during Garcia's leadership. The level of cohesion between the two countries during Garcia's time could be categorized as high, but the threats faced were not too significant. Hence, the assistance that the US had committed to was also quite limited, with military assistance of only \$654 million and economic assistance of \$1.37 billion. This assistance aimed to help the economic development of the Philippines and also containment of communist threads, including internal communist groups in the Philippines (Ligot, 1994). This fund was pretty stable compared to the previous government, which also had almost the same level of cohesiveness.

d. Diosdado Macapagal Era (1961-1965)

Diosdado Macapagal was president of the Philippines from 1961 to 1965 and followed the tradition of maintaining good relations with the US, siding with it and firmly rejecting communist influence. His leadership coincided with the heating up of the Vietnam War, so during that period, relations with the US improved significantly (Lande, 2001).

The Johnson administration sought support from America's allies, including the Philippines, to get involved in the war in Vietnam. However, Macapagal was initially unable to persuade the Philippine Congress to send troops to Vietnam. This shows that the Philippine leadership did not share the same fears as the US regarding Vietnam's domino effect on the Philippines. However, not long afterwards, the Philippines sent troops to assist the US in Vietnam at the end of Macapagal's reign. Relations between the US and the Philippines during the Macapagal era were considered unique because of the US military presence in the Philippines, and military bases were essential in these relations. Even though it was the same as previous conditions in the Philippines, this commitment appears to be higher with this source of protection, which can impact military and economic relations (Madison Jr, 1996).

Macapagal realized and admitted that the assistance the US provided was beneficial in accelerating social prosperity in his country. Apart from that, he also revealed that the US had a role in developing the experience of democracy and democratic capitalism in the Philippines, which aimed to be influential in the economic development of the Philippines (Madison Jr, 1996). However, unlike South Korea, in the Philippines, the US did not encourage state-led development. This is the basic reason why the Philippines' development was constrained. Its self-reliance remained weak and it was too dependent on the US (Lee, 2019).

The high cohesiveness during the Macapagal period was marked by US efforts to provide more comprehensive market access to the Philippines. The Philippines also supported the US in the Cuban missile crisis that occurred in 1962. This event was very worrying, so alliance commitment was significant in maintaining common security and, at the same time, mutual ideals and interests (Lande, 2001).

With the closeness at that time, the US also provided foreign assistance of \$806 million in military assistance and \$1.05 billion in economic assistance, which Macapagal attempted to use to initiate various modernization processes in various projects. This assistance was also used to weaken internal threats, especially local communist movements, by collaborating with US agencies to support large-scale social and economic rehabilitation in various regions of the Philippines (Nepomuceno, 2022).

e. Ferdinand Marcos Era (1965-1986)

Ferdinand Marcos was the president of the Philippines with the longest term of office, occupying the position for 21 years in three consecutive terms from 1965 to 1986. He led the country with an authoritarian regime with dictatorship. He even implemented martial law in 1972 to 1981 in response to the resurgent communist movement from local and separatist groups in the country (Hawes, 1986).

The alliance with the US during the Marcos administration was very close (high cohesiveness) because the US was an essential partner in determining policy in the Philippines. During Marcos' leadership, the US always urged him to uphold democracy, just as was done with Chon do Hwan in South Korea, so the US hoped that democracy would create more peaceful change and stability (Kessler, 1986).

During this time, the role of military bases became increasingly important. There was much improvement in their quality because the US tried to help its allies maintain anti-communist vigilance by increasing assistance to the military to increase its ability to defeat communists during the Cold War. The US also strongly supported the Marcos government, where Marcos' commitment to the US was very high (Hawes, 1986). The support was for increasing autonomy and military assistance so that the Philippines could survive threats or crises that occurred during the Marcos government.

Marcos' unyielding anti-communist stance supported his long-lasting tenure in power. He supported the US in the Korean War, urged the Philippines to get involved in the war, and finally sent troops, in return for which he received incentives for assistance from the US. He was also very aggressive in trying to fight communists in Asia. With this closeness after Magsaysay, Marcos was now also considered an ideal leader for the US,

who wanted to maintain influence in the region. (McCann & Lovell, 2020). It is not surprising that during these three periods, he always received support from the US, and with this assistance, he was able to carry out improvements in infrastructure development (Boner, 1987).

Maintaining relations with the Philippines, especially Marcos, was not easy for the US because the internal conflict was very complex. The establishment of high cohesiveness in the alliance in the Marcos regime was due to a shift in the US tendency to choose allies based on high commitment and loyalty to anti-communist and authoritarian order rather than visible authoritarian principles (Bello, 1998; McCann & Lovell, 2020).

The Nixon Doctrine of the early 1970s also had an impact on the Philippines because the US had agreed to provide fewer naval facilities to the Philippines, which was also due to its attention at that time to Vietnam. Of course, this resulted in disappointment in the Philippine government, but the dependence of the Philippine military was still very high in the US, so the US as a patron was still committed to providing full security guarantees for the Philippines (Butwel, 1971).

As previously stated, in the US-Philippines alliance, one of the most important factors is the placement and operation of military bases, so during the Marcos era, negotiations about military bases were often carried out, and these negotiations tended to benefit both parties. Military bases were considered a symbol of strong commitment in the relationship between the two parties. Although the countries had divergent interests in some respects, their commitment to their alliance remained strong during Marcos' leadership. For example, the negotiations resulted in an agreement in 1978 in which the US agreed to provide the Philippines with military assistance of \$500 million for five years. This was a form of commitment built between the two countries, especially when Marcos implemented martial law, which put him in even greater need of support and assistance from the US to ensure the conduciveness of this strategy (Hawes, 1986; McCann & Lovell, 2020).

He implemented martial law in 1972 in response to chaotic conditions in the Philippines, especially with threats from the CPP and Mindanao Muslim separatist groups. The CPP was one of the communist movements that was quite worrying at the domestic level in the Philippines. This movement became increasingly worried about the presence of the New People's Army's weapons (Fisher, 1988). Moreover, the MNLF and MILF were separatist groups that opposed the Philippine government under the leadership of Nour Misuari. In their rebellion, the MNLF and MILF demanded that the Philippine government give them the right to run an autonomous region for the Bangsamoro. These rebels were enough to make the Philippine government worry because of their many acts of armed violence (Juergensmeyer, 2022).

The implementation of martial law was to counter these movements. The US also increased military assistance to \$300 million per year. This, of course, was used to buy weapons and other combat equipment, including combat transportation (Reyes, 2018). US perception of these rebel groups can be categorized as quite worrying, but the threat was domestic, exceptionally durable, and of low severity. However, the US was still trying to help the Philippine government communicate through direct negotiations or by intimidating separatist groups (Lee 2019). With American assistance, the Philippine government reacted by using quick and firm military defense to overcome the rebellion. The role of the US was also vital in controlling conflict situations. Apart from assisting the Philippine government through military and economic assistance, the US also offered monetary assistance to the separatist groups so that they could carry out peaceful negotiations and comply with applicable regulations (Malan Solomon 2012).

With US funding and support, Marcos was able to retain his core supporters, allowing him to maintain his power. The alliance with the US was the leading external resource possessed by the Marcos government, so it maintained a solid commitment to keep the relationship strong. In turn, the US continued to support the Marcos government to secure its military bases despite the many violations that occurred against humanitarian and democratic values. US aid to the Marcos government almost doubled, primarily after the implementation of martial law. However, new problems emerged in the 1980s, including increasingly complex issues such as armed rebellion, economic recession, and

rampant corruption, ultimately weakening the Marcos government. Finally, Marcos was obligated to step down in 1986, and the Philippines succeeded in transitioning to a democratic country (Kabir, 2017).

With Marcos' closeness to the US, the US also provided relatively large amounts of foreign assistance to the Marcos government. Since he served as president for a long time, it will be divided into three stages.

Table 5. US Foreign Assistance Allocation in the Marcos Era

US Foreign Assistance	Military assistance	Economic Assistance
Pre-Martial Law (1965-1971)	\$881 million	\$945 million
Martial Law (1972-1981)	\$1.5 billion	\$3.4 billion
End of his tenure (1982-1986)	\$406 million	\$3.1 billion
Total	\$2.8 billion	\$7.4 billion

Sources: US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook}, 2019.

There has been a problem in the relationship between US contributions and Philippine development in most of the regimes in the Philippines particularly in the Marcos era. The US, through ECA, mostly provides dominant financial assistance directly to the government, so the aid program is often misused by the people in power in the Philippines, and cases of corruption or misuse of the budget frequently occur (Kabir, 2017; Lee, 2019).

Moreover, the lack of encouragement for state-led development led to espionage toward patronage through existing agencies such as the Rehabilitation Finance Cooperation group and the National Development Council. Rather than supporting industrialization, their mission emphasized primary sector development. This is enshrined as a mutual security agency that stipulates that the US must increase the GNP of the Philippines through agricultural production and processes (Fisher, 1999). This shows the most crucial differentiator of South Korea, apart from the lack of strong technology transfer to the Philippines, which resulted in the Philippines continuing to depend on the US.

f. Corazon Aquino Era (1986-1991)

Corazon Aquino was president of the Philippines after the country transitioned to democracy in 1986, and during her leadership, she faced various political challenges. Her tendencies were very different from those of Marcos and his predecessors. Initially, she wanted to reduce the US presence in the country because she represented a strong coalition that believed that the US had aided and supported the corrupt Marcos dictatorship. Moreover, the people and politicians in the Philippines thought that the US was maintaining postcolonial sway in the Philippines and influencing its domestic and foreign policies. This caused commitment to and relations with the US to fluctuate (Rivera, 2002).

In the Corazon administration, the issues of the CCP and Mindanao separatist groups still existed and were increasingly complex. Many events occurred and brought a lot of losses, including casualties resulting from the insurgency of the CPP in the Philippines during Corazon's tenure, so the US response to the threat of the CPP was to intervene by strengthening and adding personnel to Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base as the military base of the US (Abinales, 2002). This shows the difference in approach between the US and the Aquino government, in which the US, in dealing with those rebel groups, suggested using violence to resolve the chaos, while Aquino insisted on using reconciliation through more peaceful discussions. This led to differences in interests and perspectives within the alliance becoming increasingly contrasted (Kabir, 2017).

After the riots of 1986, the Philippine elite demanded large side payments to maintain the military base agreement. This was also done to compensate for maintaining a weak alliance. The alienation of relations increased because the US was seen as not paying the basic rent as it was supposed to, so the base only benefited the patron country because the Philippines did not face any real external threats. Plus, at that time, the conditions of the Cold War were in decline, so the US demands to pay compensation were getting bigger. The Philippines also proposed that the compensation be replaced by payment of the Philippine debt, and the US rejected this proposal because it was considered unreasonable. The US also stated that it would move its military base because the US was not willing to pay more for the base (Kabir, 2017).

In response to the estrangement of the relationship, the US provided various forms support and assistance during Aquino's leadership, including the Multinational Assistance Initiative (MAI), a program to help the Philippines' economic recovery (Bauzon 1990). The US provided benefits for Aquino through the closeness of the relationship, providing a significant increase in economic assistance for the Philippines. US military installations and troops also brought many benefits to the Philippines by creating jobs and other benefits. Coupled with the threat of the separatist movement and the CPP, the Philippines still needed the US as its backup (Mendoza, 2022).

Nevertheless, alliance relations between the US and the Philippines also experienced a significant decline, especially after plans not to extend military bases meant that joint military exercises were no longer held in Philippine territory by the end of Aquino's tenure. The Philippine government refused to extend the military base agreement, so relations between the US and the Philippines became very strained and had weak commitment, even though the alliance was not formally terminated throughout the 1990s, so the US as a patron at that time reduced the amount of economic and military assistance by almost 60 percent from 1992 and onward. For example, when a natural disaster that occurred in the Philippines made the US reluctant to continue using Clark Air Force Base, US aid, including a planned investment of \$567 million, was reduced to \$219 million (Lande, 2001; Gagliano, 2019).

The incident shows the low level of alliance cohesion during the Aquino era, and the total foreign assistance provided by the US only reached \$873 million in military assistance but was still relatively high in economic assistance of \$4.4 billion due to rampant separatist movement and CPP threat, as well as the US effort to create a resilient relationship with the Philippine government again. In the process, the US always tried to support the Aquino government while improving its image (Kesler, 1986).


It is also clear that most Philippine leaders until Marcos remained overtly loyal to US foreign policy goals, while after him, leaders such as Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada tended to oppose the US presence in the Philippines, which resulted in a drastic decline in foreign assistance allocation, especially after Aquino's leadership, particularly in the Fidel V Ramos administration, regardless of the emergence of the South China Sea

dispute, which was quite worrying for both countries, with China's aggressiveness disrupting Philippine sovereignty and threatening US hegemony (Koga, 2002). The US allocated a low amount of economic assistance from 1992 to 1998, of only \$519 million, and military assistance of only \$93 million, which is a minuscule number for the eight years compared to the previous period. The US involvement in countering China at that time was also not very visible due to the low level of alliance cohesion and the absence of a military base that had previously supported resilient relations from an alliance perspective (Castro, 2003).

Discussion and Analysis

The results of this study show that the basic difference in US contributions lies in the allocation of US foreign assistance. From 1947 to 1970 South Korea received a total of \$80.4 billion with the allocation of economic assistance totaling \$52.1 billion and military assistance totaling \$28.3 billion, while the Philippines' total assistance in the same years only amounted to \$16.5 billion, which was divided into economic assistance of \$11.7 billion and military assistance of \$4.7 billion, which is a different number and one of the causal factors that produced different economic conditions in these client countries.

Figure 4. US Foreign Assistance Allocation



Source: *US Overseas Loans & Grants [Greenbook]*, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports.html>

The disproportionality and dynamics of the allocation of US foreign assistance to South Korea and the Philippines in the figure below shows the condition changes from 1947 to 1970 and 1971 to 1991, especially regarding economic assistance, which South Korea received much more of than the Philippines. However, in the next period, 1971 to 1991, South Korea received only \$4.4 billion in assistance while the Philippines received a more significant amount, some \$11.1 billion. This event shows that threat perception alone is not enough to explain the variance that occurs in the allocation of foreign assistance by the US, as patron-client dynamics matter. Because the threats that occur in South Korea are static or remain at a high level of threat, this proves that the level of cohesiveness in the alliance also affects the extent to which the US as a patron country will be involved in protecting or providing support for its client countries.

The following is a more in-depth discussion of the disproportionality and variations that occur in the South Korean case.

Table 6. Scheme of Threats and Cohesion Related to the South Korea Case

Period	South Korea's Regimes	Level of Threat	Level of Alliance Cohesion	Foreign Assistance Allocation	
				Military Assistance	Economic Assistance
Cold war era	Rhee Syng-Man (1948-1960)	High	High	Very High	Very High
	Yun Bo-Seon (1960-1962)	High	High	High proportion	High
	Park Chung-Hee (1963-1979)	High	Low	High	Low
	Choi Kyu-Ha (1979-1980)	High	High	Low	Low
	Chun Doo-hwan 1980-1988	High	Low to High	Average	Very Low
	Roh Tae-Woo 1988-1993	High	High	Very Low	Very Low

The South Korean case shows a very unique change in that the allocation of funds by the US tended to change gradually, especially with regard to economic assistance. With a high threat perception, the threat faced by South Korea has come from external sources and is of high durability and high severity, causing South Korea to receive a lot of US attention at first (Kang, 2002; Lee, 2018, 2019).

Then, a series of events in the country showed that threat perception and cohesion levels in alliances were critical in determining the allocation of patron support to clients so that US allocations to South Korea experienced dynamics (Kih, 2019; Lee, 2023). The moment of the formation of the South Korea-US alliance during Rhee's leadership showed that the commitment of the two countries was very high, and it led to a high level of cohesiveness. At the same time, the level of threat was very high with the massive danger from communists and the aggressiveness of North Korea making the allocation of foreign assistance provided by the US very high until 1960 (National Intelligence Estimate, 1967; D. Kim, 2012; Rob York, 2019).

Then, during Park Chung He's time, patron-client relations were more complex because there were fluctuations in commitment between the two countries. When Park started a policy of self-reliance, it made him limit US involvement, causing a slight rift in relations, but on the other hand, their commitment became high. Because South Korea participated in the Vietnam War, the US is still providing various forms of foreign assistance, including the transfer of technology, especially in increasing military capability and bolstering state-led development of South Korea.

Then, the estrangement of relations between the two countries reached its peak, precisely during the time of US president Richard Nixon, who implemented the Nixon Doctrine, which was the beginning of the cohesiveness level in the alliance becoming very low. At this point, it reached a crucial juncture, the moment that economic assistance to South Korea dropped drastically even though the threat level was very high, mainly because of the proliferation of North Korean nuclear weapons, which was growing and, of course, very threatening. Because of the reduced allocation, South Korea became more motivated to rely less on the US. It could also be more independent, especially in developing its economy and military industry. This point answers the question in the puzzle about why threat perception alone is not enough to explain the allocation of resources from patron to client because it is also necessary to consider commitment or cohesiveness levels, especially in alliance relationships (Kim, 2012; Han, 2016; Shin, 2017; Zenji, 2020).

Furthermore, during the Choi Kyu-Ha era, the commitment of South Korea and the US increased. In a reasonably short duration, he embraced the greater US presence, including the army, which became remarkably effective and had a close relationship with the South Korean army. At that moment the threat level was still very high, given North Korea's various forms of aggression, but what is unique is that the amount of US foreign assistance allocation did not increase, even though the Nixon Doctrine was no longer in effect. This is clearly because Choi continued the principles that Park had echoed, focusing on self-reliance, and also, the country already had great development. Thus, at that moment, the contribution was limited even though the commitment was outstanding and accompanied by a high threat level (Wickam, 1999; Mangum, 2017; Gon, 2012).

Then, during Chun Doo Hwan's time, the relationship that existed within the alliance experienced a dynamic where Chun wanted to reduce US involvement and intervention in South Korea in the early days of his leadership because of the high level of threat from North Korea, which was increasingly aggressive, coupled with development. The nuclear threat caused the alliance's commitment to become high again. South Korea no longer expected the allocation of economic resources from the US, apart from Chun continuing the self-reliance principle initiated by Park. This was also because South Korea's economic conditions were adequate with rapid industrialization, so South Korea needed a US security umbrella that would stem the threat from an increasingly aggressive North Korea. So it is unsurprising that economic and military allocation became very low in the Chun period (Mangum, 2017; Cheong, 2010; D. Kim, 2012).

At the end of the Cold War, when Roh Tae Wo led South Korea, the threats faced by the country were slightly reduced because communism had been defeated. Still, North Korea was increasingly aggressive in carrying out various actions that threatened South Korea and the US as its partner, so even in this era, the threat level faced by South Korea was still very high. The US commitment to South Korea at this time was very high, with the main aim of stemming the threat of North Korean aggression, especially with its nuclear proliferation. Just like in Chun's time, President Roh also did not expect any more foreign assistance from the US as his patron because South Korea, with its economic development, had transformed into a donor country and was no longer a recipient. South Korea had carried out burden sharing in the alliance, and the beginning of an equal partnership between the two countries caused a minimal allocation despite a level of cohesion and threat perception in the alliance. This is clearly illustrated by how changes in state capability to meet suitable needs. Economic or military resources depended again on the US as a patron country (Park, 2010; Cho, 2010; D. Kim, 2012; Dole, 2021).

The variety of events that occurred in South Korea is exciting because it shows the gradual shift of US allocation and how patron-client changes due to geopolitical, bilateral relations and state capability occur in South Korea, so it can be said that the hypothesis about threat perception and cohesion level is quite visible.

Next is a more in-depth discussion of the disproportionality and variations that occurred in the Philippines:

Table 7. Scheme of Threat and Cohesion Connected to the Philippines Case

Period	The Philippines' Regimes	Level of Threat	Cohesion Level	Foreign Assistance Amount	
				Military Assistance	Economic Assistance
Cold War	Elpidio Quirino 1948-1953	Medium	High	Average	Very High
	Ramon Magsaysay 1953-1957	Low	High	Average	Average
	Carlos P. Gracia 1957-1961	Low	High	Average	Average
	Diosdado Macapagal 1961-1965	Low	High	Average	Average
	Ferdinand Marcos (1965-1986)	Low	High	Average	High
	Corazon Aquino (1986-1992)	Low	Fluctuating (tending to be low)	Average	High

In the case of the Philippines, the US allocation of foreign assistance has tended to be static, meaning that the assistance has been largely the same in each period except at the moment when the alliance was first established. During the implementation of martial law and at the end of the Cold War, there was not much variation in the US allocation. This foreign assistance level was because the threat level and alliance cohesion level in the Philippines tended to be the same from one period to another. In the early days of Quirino's leadership, Huk appeared as a threat, which was quite worrying because Huk emerged after World War II. When the communists were intensively spreading their

influence, even though Huk was a domestic threat, the severity level was not too high. It could be categorized as a medium threat because the US was quite worried about its existence then, so it distributed substantial aid during Quirino's leadership compared to subsequent leadership periods. Then, during the Magsaysay, Gracia, and Macapagal periods, the pattern was almost the same causing the foreign assistance obtained to be only average (Lande, 2001; Kabir: Abinales; 2017; Madison Jr., 1996; Prescott, 2012)

Meanwhile, when Marcos led the Philippines, there were still a few allocation dynamics that emerged in which threats that were quite complex due to the resurgence of the CPP and separatist groups, which caused him to have to enforce martial law for more than ten years to stem this threat. Hence, he also needed more US involvement, which indirectly also shows that the level of cohesion is very high so that in that period, the economic assistance provided by the US was more significant than in previous periods (Kaesslerr, 1986; Hawes, 1986; Bello, 1998; McCann & Lovel, 2020).

At the end of the Cold War, when Aquino led the Philippines, a variant was created with a fluctuating commitment in US-Philippines relations. This was because, during his leadership, Aquino tended to have tensions with the US because he was seen as supporting corrupt leaders and dictators like Marcos, so a low level of cohesion occurred. Then, the US also tried to strengthen relations with Aquino as the leader of the Philippines in various ways, including by rearranging funds for military bases and increasing economic assistance, not forgetting that the US also contributed to handling the CPP and separatist groups that were threatening the sovereignty of their country.

Finally, the US committed to the Philippines' return to reasonable terms. Still, it did not last long, especially after the 1991 Military Based Agreement was not extended at the end of Aquino's leadership, so the US had to withdraw its troops from the Philippines. This became the lowest point in the level of cohesion in US-Philippines relations. The effects of this were long-lasting because joint military exercises and various other defense programs that functioned to defend the Philippines were no longer held. The deterioration of this relationship continued throughout the 1990s until the US contribution to foreign assistance decreased drastically until 2002 when the terrorist threat emerged with the 9/11 incident. It is also important to mention the variation in the post-

Aquino period, particularly during the Videl V Ramos administration, at the moment of the emergence of the South China Sea dispute, which was quite worrying for both countries, with this threat being categorized as high, US assistance and even US involvement in protecting the Philippines was very low as a result of a drastic decline in the cohesion of the alliance, with the military base not being extended, which created special tensions between the two countries. (Rivera, 2002; Koga, 2002; Kabir, 2017; Gagliano, 2019; Mendoza, 2022).

The dynamics in the Philippines tended to be simpler because the threat was not too high. On average, the leaders tended to be close with the US government, so it is not surprising that there was not much change in the pattern of relations except at the end of the Cold War, which caused great tension between the ally countries and led to a significant reduction in foreign assistance by the US to the Philippines, even with the high threat level of the emergence of the South China Sea dispute.

These findings show that the phenomenon in South Korea illustrated patron-client dynamics, which made foreign assistance initially very high but in the end caused it to experience a very drastic decline. In the case of the Philippines, the assistance was stable, but these various events, it also showed patron-client dynamics. US foreign assistance, which was initially stable, ultimately decreased drastically at the end of the Cold War.

Based on these findings, I argue that threat perception and alliance cohesion have a close relationship in illustrating the patron-client dynamics, in which threat perception is truly the main factor determining the amount of US foreign assistance allocation to its client countries. The level of alliance cohesion is a necessary condition that needs to exist to determine the dynamics of changes in the amount internally, as influenced by the commitment between the two countries in the alliance and also influenced by aid demand from the client country.

The results of this study show that high threat but low cohesion will result in less resource allocation, as happened in South Korea in the Park era and also in the Philippines at the end of the Cold War era. On the other hand, high cohesion unaccompanied by high threat means that patrons will also be reluctant to provide foreign assistance in massive

amounts, as happened in the Philippines during the Cold War. However, even though US foreign assistance allocated to the Philippines was not that large, cohesion in the Philippines tended to be stable during the Cold War compared to South Korea, with a large amount of resources and assistance at the beginning of the Cold War period, but this fell drastically from the Park Chung era onward.

These factors then explain why, in particular, as shown in Figure 4, the economic assistance provided by the US to its client countries experienced unique changes because, in the 1947-1970 period, US economic assistance was much higher than the Philippines, with the dynamics of allocation each year being influenced by the level of threat and also the level of cohesion in the alliance that occurred, but from 1971 to 1991 South Korea received less economic assistance while the Philippines received a larger amount.

This is the main reason threat perception cannot stand alone to explain the variance in the allocation of foreign assistance carried out by the US. Alliance cohesion must also be taken into account as the necessary condition to show patron-client dynamics, which is vital and has succeeded in showing results that have answered this research question. By showing the critical point that occurred in the case of South Korea, the crucial moment was during the Park Chung He era with the existence of the Nixon Doctrine, which started the decline in assistance. In contrast, in the Philippines, there was an increase in the implementation of martial law during the Marcos era and at the moment of improving relations with Aquino even though, in the end, the Aquino government became reluctant to make relations worse and causing US involvement to decrease drastically throughout the 1990s, even though there was a high level of threat with the South China Sea dispute.

The impact of US disproportionalities in foreign assistance and involvement in my findings directly shows why South Korea became a more developed country than the Philippines, especially in the sense of US contribution. My analysis of the South Korean case shows that the combination of the three aspects of dependency development as presented by Evans (1979; 1981) accelerated and achieved harmony resulting in the economic improvement seen today.

Figure 5. South Korea from the Perspective of Dependent Development



With the existence of high US foreign assistance, particularly during the early period of the Cold War, as an external factor, according to Kang (2002), foreign capital from the US was influential for South Korea's development because it provided more significant opportunities for South Korea as a state to increase its economic growth through investment in critical sectors, one of which was heavy industry, by coordinating or cooperating with Chaebol as local capital. This combination shows how the involvement of three aspects of development, namely multinationalism (externalities, in this case resources from the US), South Korea (the state), and Chaebol (local capital) interacted and created extraordinary economic development for South Korea (Evans, 1979;1981), so these three things could not have run alone and had to go hand in hand to make South Korea's financial success what it is today (E.M. Kim et al., 2013).

In addition, what is essential in the aspect of state is state-led development (capitalism and industrialism), which is government involvement in economic planning and ownership of companies, subsidizing production or regulating competition, as well as a monetary system in which the South Korean government has significant control over capital and industry in the country, usually driven by local companies and also external assistance, which is based on the connection between the state and the market (Baker, 2023; Ook Lee, 2021; Mizobata, 2023). A strong state-led economy can also mobilize and focus resources by providing subsidized capital from public revenue, foreign loans for development purposes, seeking information on business opportunities and foreign

markets, using trade policies to reach out to industries and develop new technologies, recruiting adequate firms as foreign capital providers, and developing local firms by cooperating with local financiers and creating openings that tend to promote exports (Voivodas, 1974; Clark & Roy, 1997; Hahm & Heo 2008).

South Korea had this factor in its state system supported by the US for security during the Cold War from the threat of communism and North Korea, so South Korea could finally be more independent in developing its economy. South Korea even has special institutions such as the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) to allocate foreign capital (E.M. Kim, et al, 2013). As Eun Kim & Jinkyung (2013) stated, the more autonomous the South Korean government was, the more it was able to limit US guidance so that South Korea could implement its economic development goals and modernize through state-reliant industrialization policies that were carried out in the Park Chung He era, to become a prosperous country today (Jung-eun, 1988).

This condition resulted in South Korea having achieved self-sufficiency, from the middle of Park Chung He's time onward, so this explains why when South Korea was facing a high level of threat and also a high level of cohesion during Tae's leadership (1987-1993), the US did not provide meaningful economic assistance to South Korea even though it still expected the US to protect it from these threats.

Whereas in the case of the Philippines, the amount of assistance provided by the US was much less, coupled with the absence of state-led development (capitalism and industrialization) supported by the US (Lee, 2019), which caused the Philippines to continue to depend on support and assistance from the US because the Philippines had not been able to manage aid funds optimally. Beyond that, the problem faced by the Philippines was that the aid program was often misused by the Philippine elite, causing cases of corruption or budget abuse to occur frequently. The other thing is that the local capital owned by the Philippines was not as robust as that owned by South Korea (Broad, 1998). So dependent development was not well implemented in the case of the Philippines, becoming the reason why the Philippines remains a developing country. Furthermore, even if the US assisted the Philippines with the same amount of assistance

as South Korea, not accompanied by state-led development, the Philippines would remain less developed (Evan, 1979; 1981).

One of the reasons why the US contribution to the Philippines' development was not so successful was also because the US was unwilling to invest substantial resources in the Philippines. Unlike South Korea, the US did not promote state-led development in the Philippines (Lee, 2018; 2019). The US saw the Philippines as being subject to a low threat level, divergent interests, frequent tensions, and having a less strategic role, making the Philippines less of a priority for the US than South Korea (Kabir, 2017). So it is unsurprising that from the perspective of US contributions, the Philippines has struggled to become a developed country because of these things.

The case of the Philippines is very unique because it has a high level of threat with the South China Sea dispute but alliance cohesion was low after the abundance of military base agreements at the end of the Cold War made US foreign assistance and involvement significantly lower, which did not have a positive impact on the economic development of the Philippines. This condition is different from South Korea, which has had a high level of threat and has also been accompanied by a high level of cohesion since the end of the Korean War, which has resulted in a high allocation of foreign assistance and various other involvements in South Korea, as mentioned before. This positively impacted South Korea's economic development, which helped it become an advanced industrial and developed country, so at the end of the Cold War, it no longer needed US assistance.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The results of this study show that the level of threat determines the amount of funds the patron country will distribute to its client country. Still, the level of alliance cohesion is a necessary condition that determines the dynamics of this allocation, which will experience an increase or decrease. In the case of South Korea and the Philippines, the US contribution to assisting the two countries' economic development is quite different, especially in the amount of assistance provided. This is because the perception of threat in South Korea is very high, causing the US to contribute very high levels of foreign assistance. Still, there are conditions when the threat is high. Still, the level of cohesion is low, causing the allocation of US foreign assistance to decrease. This shows that threat perception is not an essential factor in determining the level of foreign assistance. So to make foreign assistance allocation reach its maximum point, the level of threat and alliance cohesion must be high. Meanwhile, in the case of the Philippines, with a low threat level and cohesion tending to be stable during the Cold War, the US resource allocation also tended to be static even though conditions experienced slight changes.

The critical juncture in the case of South Korea, which caused a drastic decline in US allocation, occurred during the leadership of Park Chung Hee and was caused by the existence of the self-reliance principle and the Nixon Doctrine. Economically independent due to rapid industrialization, the US allocation decreased gradually and significantly after Park's presidency. Meanwhile, in the case of the Philippines, a critical juncture emerged in the martial law period during the Marcos era and the final period of Aquino's leadership. During the Marcos era, the need for foreign assistance was very great, resulting in a high level of cohesiveness. Even though the condition of the Philippines at that time was still categorized as a low level of threat, the US had a huge involvement through its help. In contrast, during the Aquino era, when the military base agreement was no longer in place, US-Philippines relations became the worst. After that moment, the US limited its involvement in the Philippines throughout the 1990s, which caused its contribution to foreign assistance to drop drastically.

After elaborating on the disproportionality and dynamics in foreign assistance, an important point that needs to be conveyed is that the foreign assistance provided by the US to its client countries is critical in their progress. Still, the author is sure the allocations were different, especially from the beginning of the Cold War until the end. Park Chung Hee in South Korea and the early days of Marcos in the Philippines were some of the factors that caused these countries to have different economic outcomes. However, other factors are also essential to consider, namely the differences in the application of state-led development, which is also very crucial because South Korea has succeeded in becoming a developing country using this concept, where aid funds obtained from the US and other forms of foreign aid have been successfully processed and managed correctly.

In contrast, the Philippines did not carry out state-led development, causing it to be so dependent on the US that its economic development was limited because it was not able to process the aid funds provided to develop its economy. Instead what happened was misappropriation of funds, including corruption and espionage. Elites carried out espionage to benefit themselves. So I argue that if the Philippines were given a foreign assistance allocation as large as South Korea's, it is not certain that it would have succeeded in becoming a prosperous country. The main reason is that no state-led development is being carried out. On the other hand, in the case of South Korea, if the US allocation were not as much as was given, especially in the late Park Chung Hee period, it is not certain that it would have been able to succeed in becoming a developed country like today, because even though it had state-led development, with the unavailability of capital, the development of the country through this method would have also been unattainable. So the conclusion is that the allocation of foreign assistance (Capital) provided by the US and the state-led development principle are two essential things that have led to South Korea's economic progress.

The study results show that in the case of South Korea, the changing of the US allocation was affected by the high level of threat. Then, the shift in alliance cohesion led to self-sufficiency that brought about South Korea's independence and caused it not to need US aid any longer, particularly from 1980 and onward. In the case of the Philippines, the US contribution tended to be stable until the end of the Cold War, and the military

agreement was dissolved which created US tensions and less allocation toward the Philippines during the 1990s, regardless of the emergence of the South China Sea dispute as major threat. This shows that US foreign aid is allocated to its client countries primarily based on its interests, how it sees threats that might disrupt its hegemony efforts, and how it considers client countries will benefit and develop a commitment to the alliance. So his action was to maintain the client situation so that he could continue to bring and provide benefits to fulfill his national interests. In the case of South Korea, it was to maintain its hegemony and stem communist influence during the Cold War.

Limitations

This study is dominated by documentation research without conducting interviews with reliable sources, such as US intelligence agencies. This is difficult to do given the limited resources I have, although I am confident in the sources of information and previous studies that I use, but this kind of research would be more developed if it used more varied data-collection techniques so that it produced a more comprehensive output.

REFERENCES

- Abinales, P N. (2017). Philippines-US Relation. American History, Oxford University Press, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.013.404>
- Abinales, P. N. (1992). Jose Maria Sison and the Philippine Revolution: A Critique of an Interface.” *Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies* 8.1
- Abinales, P.N. (2002). American Rule and the Formation of Filipino “Colonial Nationalism”. *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 4, https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/tak/39/4/39_KJ00000434097/_pdf
- Albert, Eleanor. (2016). The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance. Council on Foreign Affairs. Accessed on [The U.S.-Philippines Defense Alliance | Council on Foreign Relations \(cfr.org\)](https://www.cfr.org/philippines/the-u-s-philippines-defense-alliance/p123456)
- Bauzon, K. E. (1990). The Multilateral Assistance Initiative and Democratization in the Philippines. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 12(2), 120–133. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42707613>
- Beach, Derek & Pedersen, Rasmus Brun. (2013). Process-Tracing Methods Foundations and Guidelines. University of Michigan Press: The United States of America.
- Berry, W. E. (1990). The Effects of the U.S. Military Bases on the Philippine Economy. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 11(4), 306–333. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798077>
- Biermann, R. (2024). Conceptualizing patron-client relations in secessionist conflict. A research agenda. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 1–19. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2024.2318467>
- Blankenship, B. (2024). Managing the Dilemmas of Alliance Burden Sharing. *The Washington Quarterly*, 47(1), 41–61. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2024.2323898>
- Broad, R. (1998). *Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippines*. University of California Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pnnv9>
- Butwell, R. (1971). The Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia. *Current History*, 61(364), 321–367. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45312575>

- Carter J M. (2008). *Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State-building 1954–1968*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Castro, R. C. D. (2003). The Revitalized Philippine-U.S. Security Relations: *A Ghost from the Cold War or an Alliance for the 21st Century?* *Asian Survey*, 43(6), 971–988. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2003.43.6.971>
- Cha, V. (1997). Realism, Liberalism, and the Durability of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance. *Asian Survey*, 37(7), 609–622. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645511>
- Chae-Sung Chun. (2000). Theoretical Approaches to Alliance: Implications on the R.O.K.-U.S. Alliance. *JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND AREA STUDIES* 71 Volume 7, Number 2, pp. 71- 88.
- Chaibong, Hahm. 2008. SOUTH KOREA’S PROGRESSIVES AND THE U.S.-ROK ALLIANCE. *Dynamic Forces on the Korean Peninsula: Strategic & Economic Implications*, <https://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/14.Hahm.pdf>
- Cho, Y. C. (2010). Collective identity formation on the Korean Peninsula: United States’ different North Korea policies, Kim Dae-Jung’s Sunshine Policy, and United States–South Korea–North Korea relations. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 10(1), 93–128. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26159527>
- Clark, C., & Bahry, D. (1983). Dependent Development: A Socialist Variant. *International Studies Quarterly*, 27(3), 271–293. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2600684>
- Cohen, R. (1978). Threat Perception in International Crisis. *Political Science Quarterly*, 93(1), 93–107. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2149052>
- Cullather, Nick. (1993). America's Boy? Ramon Magsaysay and the Illusion of Influence. *Pacific Historical Review* (1993) 62 (3): 305–338. University California Press, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3640933>
- Cumings B, 2005 *Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (Norton, New York)
- Cumings B, 2010 *Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT)
- Cumings, Bruce. (1981). *The Origins of the Korean War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Deloria, Juniele. (2021). Why The Philippines Remains A "Developing" Nation For So Long? (The Filipinos' Never-ending Struggles with Oppressive Cycles). Researchgate, at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/352991735>.
- Dole, D., Lewis-Workman, S., Trinidad, D. D., & Yao, X. (2021). The Rise of Asian Aid Donors: Recipient-to-Donor Transition and Implications for International Aid Regime. *Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies*, 13(1), 58-80. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0974910121989462>
- Doner, R. F., Ritchie, B. K., & Slater, D. (2005). Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective. *International Organization*, 59(2), 327–361. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877907>
- Fisher, Richard. (1988). A Strategy for Defeating Communist Insurgents in the Philippines. The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/strategy-defeating-communist-insurgents-the-philippines#>
- Fisher, Richard. (1999). Rebuilding the U.S.-Philippine Alliance. Heritage Foundation, http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1999/pdf/bg1255.pdf.
- Gagliano, Joseph A. (2019). Alliance Decision-Making in the South China Sea: Between Allied and Alone. Routledge: 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN.
- Gereffi, G., & Evans, P. (1981). Transnational Corporations, Dependent Development, and State Policy in the Semiperiphery: A Comparison of Brazil and Mexico. *Latin American Research Review*, 16(3), 31–64. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2502914>
- Gerring, J. (2004). What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? *The American Political Science Review*, 98(2), 341–354. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4145316>
- Gerring, John. (2017). Qualitative Methods.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 15-36.
- Glassman, Jim & Choi Young-Jin. (2014). The Chaebol and the US military-industrial complex: Cold War Geopolitical Economy and South Korean Industrialization.

- Environment and Planning, volume 46, pages 1160– 1180
doi:10.1068/a130025p
- Gowa, J. (1994). *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade*. Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv173f0s6>
- Gowa, Joanne & Edward D. Mansfield. (2004). 'Alliances, Imperfect Markets, and Major Power Trade', *International Organization* 58(4): 775-805.
- Hahn and Uk Heo. (2008). U.S. and Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in East Asia: A Comparative Analysis Sung Deuk. *The Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 0190-292X © 2008 Policy Studies Organization Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350.
- Hahn, B. H. (1983). THE KOREAN-AMERICAN ALLIANCE: ITS EVOLUTION, TRANSITION, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS. *Asian Perspective*, 7(2), 175–209. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43738007>
- Hawes, G. (1986). United States Support for the Marcos Administration and the Pressures that Made for Change. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 8(1), 18–36. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25797880>
- Heo, U., & Ye, M. (2019). U.S. Military Deployment and Host-Nation Economic Growth. *Armed Forces & Society*, 45(2), 234–267. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48609063>
- Hwang, J. T. (2016). The Chun Doo-Hwan Authoritarian Regime's Securitisation of Water: The Case of the Peace Dam, South Korea. *Scottish Geographical Journal*, 132(3–4), 234–245. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14702541.2016.1178799>
- Im, H. B. (2006). The US's role in Korean democracy and security since the Cold War era. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 6(2), 157–187. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26156543>
- International Relations Research Institute School of International Relations University of Southern California. (1976). Further Analysis Of Threat Levels In The Domestic And International System. Ttvää Technical Report #35 Threat Recognition And Analysis Project.

- Jiyun Kih (2019): Capability building and alliance cohesion: comparing the US-Japan and US-Philippines alliances, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, DOI: 10.1080/10357718.2019.1685935
- Kabir, Muhammad S. (2017). *Asymmetric Alliances And Side Payments: Alliance Politics Between Unequal Powers*. ProQuest LLC (2017).
- Kang, David C. (2002). *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and The Philippines*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics: ISBN: 9780521004084.
- Kang, David. C. (2003). International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War. *International Studies Quarterly*, 47(3), 301–324. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3693588>
- Kessler, R. J. (1986). Marcos and the Americans. *Foreign Policy*, 63, 40–57. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1148755>
- Kih, J. (2019). Capability building and alliance cohesion: comparing the US-Japan and US-Philippines alliances. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 74(4), 355–376. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1685935>
- Kim DoHee. (2012). *The Evolution Of Rok – U.S. Relations: A Multi-Method Analysis*. The University Of Wisconsin – Milwaukee, Proquest Llc (2012).
- Kim H-D. (1990). *Korea and the United States: The Evolving Transpacific Alliance in the 1960s*. Research Center for Peace and Unification in Korea, Seoul.
- Kim, Eun Mee. (2013). From Development to development cooperation: foreign aid, country ownership, and the developmental state in South Korea. *The Pacific Review*, 2013 Vol. 26, No. 3, 313–336, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2012.759263>
- Kim, J. (1993). From Patron-Client to Partners: The Changing South Korean—American Relationship. *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 2(3), 303–325. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23612841>
- Kim, Jun-Kyung and Kim, KS. (2012). *Impact of foreign aid on Korea's development*. Seoul: KDI School of Public Policy and Management.

- Kenton, Will. (2023). What Is Foreign Aid? Forms of Aid, Statistics, and Examples. Investopedia, Statista, on <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/foreign-aid.asp#>
- Ko, S. K. (1972). South Korean-Japanese Relations since the 1965 Normalization Pacts. *Modern Asian Studies*, 6(1), 49–61. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/311986>
- Koga, K. (2022). Four Phases of South China Sea Disputes 1990–2020. In: Managing Great Power Politics. Global Political Transitions. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-2611-2_3
- Koh, B.C. (1999). Seoul Domestic Policy and the Korean-American Alliance. The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, https://aparc.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/seoul_domestic_policy_and_the_korean_american_alliance
- Koojaroenprasit, Sauwaluck. (2012). The Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on Economic Growth: A Case Study of South Korea. *International Journal of Business and Social Science* Vol. 3 No. 21.
- Korea Institute of Public Administration. (2008). Korean Public Administration, 1948-2008, Edited by Korea Institute of Public Administration. Pajubookcity: Bobmunsa.
- Kriesberg, Louis. (2015). Escalations and De-escalations in the Cold War, 1945–1968', *Realizing Peace: A Constructive Conflict Approach* (, Oxford Academic, 19 Mar. 2015), <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190228668.003.0002>, accessed 16 June 2024.
- Kwon, Hyeong-ki. (2021). Transition I: Liberalization in the Chun Doo-hwan Administration', *Changes by Competition: The Evolution of the South Korean Developmental State*. Oxford Academic, <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198866060.003.0005>.
- Kwon, P.B. (2017). Beyond Patron and Client: Historicizing the Dialectics of US-ROK Relations amid Park Chung Hee's Independent Defense Industry Development in South Korea, 1968–1979. *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies* 30(2), 185-216. <https://doi.org/10.1353/seo.2017.0009>.

- Landé, C. H. (2001). The Philippines and the United States. *Philippine Studies*, 49(4), 518–539. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42633497>
- Lantis, J., & Beasley, R. (2017, May 24). Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Retrieved 12 Jul. 2024, from <https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-398>
- Lee, D. S. (2007). Democratization and the US—South Korean Alliance. *Journal of East Asian Studies*, 7(3), 469–499. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23418707>
- Lee, Dae-Keun. (2012). Impact of Foreign Aid on Korea's Development. Knowledge Sharing Programme. Government Publications Registration Number 11-1051000-000246-01 ISBN 978-89-93695-81-6 94320
- Lee, James. (2018). *The Wages of Containment: Foreign Aid, American Grand Strategy, and the Origins of the Developmental State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University. <http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cz30pw359>
- Lee, James. (2019). US grand strategy and the origins of the developmental state. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 43(5), 737–761, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1579713>
- Lee, Jung Ha. (1980). *The Impact Of The Nixon Doctrine On South Korea: A Critical Analysis Of U.S.-South Korean Relations, 1969-1976*. The Catholic University of America ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 1980. 8012121, <https://www.proquest.com/openview/53cd7758ec4659c2ded81aae78438735/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y>
- Lee, Manseok. (2023). *The Political-Economic Explanation for the US–South Korea Alliance's Cohesion*. University of California, Berkeley.
- Lee, S., Prins, B., & Wiegand, K. E. (2021). The US-South Korea alliance: How the patron benefits from the protégé. *International Area Studies Review*, 24(2), 97-117. <https://doi.org/10.1177/22338659211018325>
- Ligot, Jacinto C. (1994). *Communist Insurgency In The Philipines*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California. <https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA283972.pdf>

- Long, A. G., & Leeds, B. A. (2006). Trading for Security: Military Alliances and Economic Agreements. *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(4), 433–451. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27640352>
- Madison, Julian C. (1996). The United States and the Philippines, 1961-1965: Was There a "Special Relationship?"—university of Washington. <https://www.proquest.com/openview/a388a66701c44e978b3e9faa53ad9771/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y>
- Mahoney, J. (2001). Path-Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative Perspective. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 36(1), 111–141.
- Malan, C., & Solomon, H. (2012). Between Conflict and Compromise in the Philippines. *Indian Journal of Asian Affairs*, 25(1/2), 59–82. <Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/41950521>
- Mangum, Anela M. (2017). Unintended Negligence: US-South Korea Relation at the End of Carter Administration. Department of History of Vanderbilt University, <https://ir.vanderbilt.edu/bitstream/handle/1803/8414/MangumHHT2017.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- McCann, Michael W., and George I. Lovell. (2020). The Cold War Era: Global Empire, the Rise of Marcos, and Civil Rights. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Scholarship Online, <https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226680071.003.0006>.
- Mendoza, Diana J. (2022). The Philippines-US Development Partnership The Philippines-US Development Partnership. ASIA PACIFIC BULLETIN ASIA PACIFIC BULLETIN, <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/the-philippines-us-development-partnership>
- Mitchell, Edward John. (1969). *The Huk Rebellion in the Philippines: An Econometric Study*, RAND Corporation, RM-5757-ARPA, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/RM5757.html
- Mizobata, S. (2022). Why is State-Led Capitalism Stable? Reconsidering Comfortable Authoritarianism. In: Haba, K., Canavero, A., Mizobata, S. (eds) 100 Years of World Wars and Post-War Regional Collaboration. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9970-2_23

- Morris, S. J. (1994). The Soviet Union and the Philippine Communist Movement. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 27(1), 77–93. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45301887>
- Mowlaei, M. (2018). The impact of foreign capital inflows on economic growth in selected African countries. *African Journal of Economic and Management Studies*, Vol. 9 No. 4, pp. 523-536. <https://doi.org/10.1108/AJEMS-01-2018-0021>
- Naseemullah, A. (2022). Dependent development in the twenty-first century. *Third World Quarterly*, 43(9), 2225–2243. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2022.2089104>
- National Foreign Assessment Center. (2007). South Korea: Politics Under Chun Doo Hwan. An Intelligence Assessment, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP03T02547R000100110001-9.pdf>
- Nepomuceno, Tyrone Jann. (2014). Cold War Narrative Of Dependency: Revisiting Philippine Collaboration With America And Diosdado Macapagal’s Neo-Realist Response. *Scientia - The International Journal on the Liberal Arts*. Academia.edu
- Olson, M., & Zeckhauser, R. (1966). An Economic Theory of Alliances. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 48(3), 266–279. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1927082>
- Park, H.-K. (1983). American Involvement in the Korean War. *The History Teacher*, 16(2), 249–263. <https://doi.org/10.2307/493313>
- Park, T.-G. (2000). U.S. Policy Change toward South Korea in the 1940s and the 1950s. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 7(2), 89–104. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43111427>
- Park, Won Gon. (2012). The U.S. Carter Administration and Korea in the 12/12 Incident: Concession of Moral Diplomacy. *Korean Social Sciences Review* | Vol. 2, No. 2, 2012: 253-281, https://space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/79841/1/08_Park%20Won%20Gon_OK.pdf
- Pierson, P. (2000). Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2), 251–267

- Prescott, James R. (2012). Philippine-American relations during the Magsaysay period, 1946–1957. Northern Illinois University ProQuest Dissertations & Theses 3540591, <https://www.proquest.com/openview/ae9917367fb1bb2366a78815166a9ca8/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750>
- Reyes, P. L. (2018). Claiming History: Memoirs of the Struggle against Ferdinand Marcos’s Martial Law Regime in the Philippines. *Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia*, 33(2), 457–498. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26538540>
- Ricks, Jacob & Liu, Amy. (2018). Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide. PS: Political Science & Politics. 51. 1-5. 10.1017/S1049096518000975.
- Rienner, Lynne. (2012). Excerpt: The US-South Korea Alliance. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/excerpt-us-south-korea-alliance>.
- Rivera, T. C. (2002). Transition Pathways and Democratic Consolidation in Post-Marcos Philippines. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 24(3), 466–483. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25798611>
- Robinson, L., Johnston, P. B., & Oak, G. S. (2016). U.S.-Philippine Relations in Historical Perspective. In *U.S. Special Operations Forces in the Philippines, 2001–2014* (pp. 9–16). RAND Corporation. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt1cd0md9.9>
- Roblin, Sebastien. (2021). The Rangoon Bombing: North Korea’s 1983 Attempt to Destroy South Korea’s Government. The National Interest, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/rangoon-bombing-north-korea%E2%80%99s-1983-attempt-destroy-south-korea%E2%80%99s-government-190689>
- Roehrig, T. (2017). The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella over South Korea: Nuclear Weapons and Extended Deterrence. *Political Science Quarterly*, 132(4), 651–684. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45175870>
- Rooney, Bryan, Grant Johnson, Tobias Sytsma, and Miranda Priebe. (2022). *Does the U.S. Economy Benefit from U.S. Alliances and Forward Military Presence?* RAND Corporation, RR-A739-5. As of January 3, 2024: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA739-5.html.

- Ryan, C. (2012), "Cross-Case Analysis – Introduction", Hyde, K.F., Ryan, C. and Woodside, A.G. (Ed.) Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 497-499. [https://doi.org/10.1108/S1871-3173\(2012\)0000006030](https://doi.org/10.1108/S1871-3173(2012)0000006030)
- Scott, James C. "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia." *The American Political Science Review* 66, no. 1 (1972): 91–113. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1959280>.
- Seth, Michael J. (2017). South Korea's Economic Development, 1948–1996. Asian History. Oxford Research Encyclopedias. on: <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.271>
- Shin, Kwang-Yeong. (2017). The trajectory of anti-communism in South Korea. *Asian Journal of German and European Studies* (2017) 2:3 DOI 10.1186/s40856-017-0015-4.
- Shin, W. (1994). Geopolitical Determinants Of Political Economy: The Cold War And South Korean Political Economy. *Asian Perspective*, 18(2), 119–140. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704049>
- Simon Herbert A. (1976). Birth of an Organization: The Economic Cooperation Administration Author(s): Herbert A. Simon Source: Public Administration Review, Autumn, 1953, Vol. 13, No. 4 Wiley on behalf of the American Society, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/973005>
- Snyder, Glenn H. (1990). ALLIANCE THEORY: A NEOREALIST FIRST CUT. *Journal of International Affairs*, Spring/Summer 1990, Vol. 44, No. 1, Theory, Values And Practice In International Relations: Essays In Honor Of William T.R. Fox (Spring/Summer 1990), pp. 103-123.
- Snyder, S. (2008). THE FUTURE OF U.S.-ROK RELATIONS: THE U.S. APPROACH. *Asian Perspective*, 32(2), 93–113. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42704632>
- Soh, F. (1995, February 24). Better to engage China than to isolate or confront it: US admiral. *The Straits Times*.
- Steinberg, David I. (1985). Foreign Aid And The Development Of The Republic Of Korea: The Effectiveness Of Concessional Assistance Aid. u.s. Agency for International Development, Special Study No. 42.

- Stephen M. Spring, Walt. (1985). *Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power*. International Security Vol.9 No.4 MIT Press.
- Stephen M. Spring, Walt. (1987). *The Origins of Alliances*. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York.
- Sungjoo, Han. (1980). South Korea and the United States: The Alliance Survives. *Asian Survey*, Nov. 1980, Vol. 20, No. 11 (Nov. 1980), pp. 1075-1086 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2643910>.
- The John F Kennedy President Library. (2010). President Carlos P. Garcia: President of The Republic of the Philipines. John F Kennedy Foundation, <https://jfk.artifacts.archives.gov/people/767/president-carlos-p-garcia?ctx=501f88781a826c7199d4f4244e206f8d2fe95cd5&idx=292>
- The John F Kennedy President Library. (2013). The Cold War. John F Kennedy Foundation, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war>
- The National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. (1992, February 25). *Administrative Law: Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone*. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383846.htm
- The White House. (2021). FACT SHEET: United States – Republic of Korea Partnership. The White House. 1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW Washington, DC 20500. on: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/21/fact-sheet-united-states-republic-of-korea-partnership/>.
- Thomas, George, (2005). "The Qualitative Foundations of Political Science Methodology," *Perspectives on Politics* 3.
- Tran, Mark. (2010). North and South Korea: A history of violence. *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/20/korea-assassination-attempts-clashes-standoffs>

- Troutman, Noelle. (2020). Alliance Cohesion: Connecting the Disconnect in Alliance Reliability. Political Science Department, Theses, Dissertations, and Student Scholarship. 54. <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/poliscitheses/54>
- Tsuyoshi, Masuda. (2020). Plane Bombing Reveals North Korea's Kidnapping Program. NHK world Japan. <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/id/news/backstories/2159/>
- US Department of State. (2023). U.S. Relations With the Philippines. Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, Bureau East Asian and Pacific Affairs. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-the-philippines/>
- Voivodas, C. (1974). Exports, Foreign Capital Inflow, and South Korean Growth. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 22(3), 480–484. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1152633>
- Wakefield, Bryce. (2010). Revisiting History: North Korea and Nuclear Weapons. Wilson Center, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/revisiting-history-north-korea-and-nuclear-weapons>
- Wickham, Jhon A. (1999). Korea On The Brink From the “12/12 Incident” to the Kwangju Uprising, 1979-1980. National Defense University Press Washington D.C, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/104704/1999-12_Korea_Brink.pdf
- Woo, Jung-eun (1988). State Power, Finance, And Industrialization Of Korea. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
- Woo, Seongji. (2009). The Park Chung-hee Administration amid Inter-Korean Reconciliation in the Détente Period: Changes in the Threat Perception, Regime Characteristics, and the Allocation of Power.
- Work, C. (2019). [Review of *The Evolution of the South Korea-United States Alliance*, by U. Heo & T. Roehrig]. *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, 26(4), 433–436. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26872233>
- World Bank. (2024). Philippines Foreign Direct Investment 1970-2024. Macrotrends LLC. Accessed on [Philippines Foreign Direct Investment 1970-2024 | MacroTrends](https://www.macrotrends.net/1000000/philippines-foreign-direct-investment-1970-2024)

- World Bank. (2024). South Korea Foreign Direct Investment 1970-2024. Macrotrends LLC. Accessed on [South Korea Foreign Direct Investment 1970-2024 | MacroTrends](#)
- Yin, R.K. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd edn).Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Yoon, S. (1996). South Korea’s Kim Young Sam Government: Political Agendas. *Asian Survey*, 36(5), 511–522. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645497>
- York, Rob. (2019). How Does Syngman Rhee’s Friendship With America Still Matter Today? National security For insiders By insiders, [How Does Syngman Rhee’s Friendship with America Still Matter Today? - War on the Rocks](#)
- Zenji, Vanessa. (2020). No More Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: The Nixon Doctrine, South Korea, and the Vietnam War. Master's thesis, Chapman University, 2020. <https://doi.org/10.36837/chapman.000189>

CURRICULUM VITAE

A. Personal Information

Name : Nizar Lukman
Place of Birth/ D.O.B : Waingapu, 22 Agustus 1997
Student ID : 02212210008
Home Address : Jl Sultan Agung RT 017 RW 009 Kamalaputi Kota
Waingapu, Sumba Timu, NTT
Name of Father : Lukman Abdullah
Name of Mother : Silvia Said

B. Educational Background

a. Formal Education

- i. SD Inpres Waingapu 2
- ii. Mts N Kamalaputi
- iii. SMA N 2 Waingapu
- iv. Universitas Mataram
- v. Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia

C. Professional Background

1. Astra Sedaya Finance (Relationship Officer) 2019-2020.
2. Bank Mandiri (Sales Generalis Konsumtif) 2021.

D. List of Awards and Achievement

1. Awardee of Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia Scholarship 2022 (MA in Political Science).
2. Community Engagement Grand (Based on International Collaboration) 2023.

E. Organizational Background

1. The President of the Association of Social Science Students (ASSIST), Indonesian International Islamic University (UIII), 2023-2024.
2. The International Relations Student Association administrator (HRD) 2017.
3. The administrator of the Student Association of Taekwondo Community at the University of Mataram 2016-2017.

F. Publication

1. Journal Articles

- a. N. Lukman. (2020). "Analisis Pengaruh Kebijakan Extended Deterrence Dalam Aliansi Amerika Serikat-Korea Selatan Terhadap Stabilitas Keamanan Di Asia Timur". IJGD: Indonesian Journal of Global Discourse Vol. 2 Ed.1.

- b. N. Lukman. (2024). "*Tunisian Democracy at a Crossroads: A Comparative Analysis of Beji Caid Essebsi and Kais Saied Regimes*" Jurnal Politik Universitas Indonesia (published on July 2024)
- c. Thesis, Examining Patron-Client Dynamics: The US Alliances and Disproportionalities Toward South Korea and The Philippines in the Cold War Era. Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia.

Depok, July 24, 2024



Nizar Lukman