

**THE DYNAMICS OF MAJORITY-MUSLIM COUNTRIES'
FOREIGN POLICY ON THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDONESIA
AND MALAYSIA UNDER THE MEGAWATI
SOEKARNOPUTRI AND MAHATHIR MOHAMAD
ADMINISTRATIONS (2001-2004)**

A Thesis

**Submitted to the Political Science Master's Study Program at the
Faculty of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of**

Master of Arts (M.A.)



by:

Fahmi Syahirul Alim

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UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

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The foreign policy dynamics of Islamic-majority countries have been debated in the field of foreign policy studies, especially since the emergence of the Global War on Terror policy after the 9/11 attacks, with a shift in foreign policy analysis that examined more domestic influences, both sociopolitical conditions and the identity and leadership of a country. By using the theory of national role conception and the idiosyncratic approach by looking at the personality of the country's leader, this study argues that the foreign policies of Indonesia and Malaysia in responding to the Global War on Terror were more influenced by domestic political conditions. However, with different institutions, Indonesia is more influenced by civil society, so it projected itself as a bridge builder of Islam and the West and Islam and Democracy. Meanwhile, Malaysia's response was more due to the power of political parties. The role projected was "defender of the faith" by always wanting to play a role in protecting the interests of the Muslim world as a developing country, and indigenous issues to fulfil domestic political interests. By employing an idiosyncratic approach, the characters and personalities of the two leaders of this country certainly strengthen these two different roles.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Muslim Majority Countries, National Role Conception, Leadership, Political Party, Civil Society, Global War on Terror

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LIST OF ABBREVIATION

ABIM	: Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia
AMED	: Asia Middle East Dialogue
APEC	: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEM	: Asia Europe Meeting
BBC	: British Broadcasting Corporation
BIMP-EAGA	: Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-the Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area
CDCC	: Center for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilization
CNN	: Cable News Network
Densus 88	: Detasemen Khusus 88
DNA	: Deoxyribo Nucleic Acid
D8	: Eight Developing Countries
DPC	: Dewan Pimpinan Cabang
DPR RI	: Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia
FDI	: Foreign Direct Investment
FEALAC	: Forum of East Asia-Latin America Cooperation
FPDA	: Five Power Defence Arrangements
FPI	: Front Pembela Islam
G77	: Group of Seventy-Seven
GNP	: Gross National Product
GPII	: Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia
Gus Dur	: Abdurrahman Wahid
HTI	: Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia
ICIP	: International Centre for Islam and Pluralism
ICMI	: Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia
IIUM	: International Islamic University Malaysia
IMTGT	: Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle
IORA	: Indian Ocean Rim Association

IR	: International Relations
ISA	: Internal Security Act
JI	: Jamaah Islamiyah
JIL	: Jaringan Islam Liberal
JIMM	: Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah
KMM	: Kumpulan Militia Malaysia
KPK	: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi
KUHP	: Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana
LKIS	: Lembaga Kajian Islam dan Sosial
MPR RI	: Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia
MUI	: Majelis Ulama Indonesia
NAM	: Non-Aligned Movement
NGO	: Non-Governmental Organization
NRC	: National Role Conception
NU	: Nahdlatul Ulama
OIC	: Organization of the Islamic Conference
P3M	: Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat
PAS	: Partai Islam Se-Malaysia
PBNU	: Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama
PDI	: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia
PDIP	: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan
PDS	: Partai Damai Sejahtera
PSAP	: Pusat Studi Agama dan Perdamaian
RM	: Ringgit Malaysia
SBY	: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
UMNO	: United Malays National Organization
US	: United States
VOA	: Voice of America
WTC	: World Trade Center

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem Statement

Research on the topic of religion in international relations, especially in the study of foreign policy, received little attention before the 9/11 attack (Haynes, 2013). In this context, religion is often considered to have a vital role in producing and influencing individual and group values, factors that have the potential to impact the formulation and implementation of individual and group policies (Haynes, 2021). However, the debate on this scholarship continues and keeps growing. For instance, some scholars, according to Ansori (2016), such as Shaffer (2006a) and Cornell (2006), contend that religion does not shape foreign policy. For example, in Islamic countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, religion is not the only influence in foreign policy decision-making. Some scholars argue that foreign policy is generally subject to pragmatism based on domestic needs and national interests. These countries often need to find a balance between their official ideology and foreign policy (Cornell, 2006; Flanagan, 2009; Piscatori, 1983; Shaffer, 2002, 2006b).

According to some scholars, Iranian president Ahmadinejad's radical foreign policy toward the West developed because of Iran's realist nature and pragmatism in pursuing political power and increasing the country's economic power. Iran often uses religious rhetoric to balance its domestic aspirations and real interests (Flanagan, 2009; Shaffer, 2002, 2006) (Anshori, 2016).

The debate about religion and foreign policy was at its peak specifically when terrorist attacks were perpetrated in the name of Islam and the United States campaigned for a global war on terror. This is the nature of the US as a global power with global interests that define the international agenda, thereby encouraging many other countries, especially Muslim countries, to adjust their foreign policies and comply with the US agenda (Sukma, 2004).

In the context of the Global War on Terror, apart from the Middle East, according to Wangke (2002), Southeast Asia has received special attention from the United States in the global campaign against terrorism because several groups suspected of having ties to Al-Qaeda are operating in Southeast Asia and it has been the site of terrorist attacks such as the Bali Bombings in Indonesia. Therefore, Southeast Asia was positioned by the US as the second frontline region after the Middle East. This circumstance made ASEAN countries realize that security stability in the area had been disrupted and could even threaten citizens, economic stability, and tourism in the region. These phenomena raised concerns among ASEAN members, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, as Muslim-majority countries, that the global war on terrorism for some countries was turning into a war on Islam (Chow, 2005).

In this regard, I found several variations in the outcomes of the foreign policies of Muslim-majority countries in response to the global on terror, especially when looking at Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia. According to Esposito (2008), several Muslim countries in this region are different from the Middle East, because of their multi-religious, multi-ethnic societies that have a history and heritage of religious pluralism, politics and tolerance. Therefore, the uniqueness of Islam in Southeast Asia is one of the impetuses for comparing these two Muslim countries.

According to Khalid (2011), the 9/11 attack and the global impact of the war on terror (the invasion of Afghanistan and later Iraq by the Bush administration) resulted in Malaysia taking a firm and reluctant stance toward the US. On the other hand, the phenomenon of Islamophobia has brought Malaysia and the international Muslim community closer together. According to Khalid (2011), Islam remains a major factor in Malaysia's close relationship with the Muslim world during the reign of Mahathir Mohamad.

On the other hand, in the post-9/11 international context, where perceptions of Islam were largely negative, Indonesia had unique attributes as the largest Muslim-majority country and the third-largest democracy in the world, thus having

particular values to promote moderate Islam. According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar (2010), the international community, especially Western countries, viewed Indonesia as an alternative face of Islam amid rising religious extremism and terrorism.

Given the differences in foreign policy nuances of the Muslim-majority countries above, this study aims to explore and provide an alternative approach using a role-conception framework and idiosyncrasy analysis to determine why they have different foreign policies in responding to the global war on terror. This study specifically aims to examine the role conception enacted by Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia as an alternative to Muslim countries in the Middle East in responding to the global war on terror after 9/11.

1.2 Research Question

As shown in the puzzle, this study aims to analyze the foreign policies of several Muslim-majority countries that have differences in responding to the global war on terror, especially in Southeast Asia. The study seeks to answer:

Why do the foreign policies of Indonesia and Malaysia, as two Islamic-majority countries, have differences in responding to the global war on terror? What are the significant factors that make their national roles and conceptions different?

1.3 Objective of Study

This study aims to show the causal arguments in the comparative descriptive analysis of why Indonesia and Malaysia's foreign policies have different roles in addressing the global war on terror.

1.4 Significance of Study

The results of conducting comparative foreign policy research between Indonesia and Malaysia will be significant in developing role theory in comparative value for use in comparable cases examining the relationship between Islam, democracy and foreign policy, especially in responding to the global war on terror

for several Muslim-majority countries. Apart from that, this study will benefit the Muslim world in the practice of democracy and foreign policy.

1.5 Literature Review

Scholars view the definition of foreign policy not as the action itself but as the underlying vision, in other words, the specific conception that a state has regarding its place in the world, its national interest, and the fundamental principles that allow it to defend them (Morin & Paquin, 2018). Therefore, most studies that explore the foreign policy of Muslim-majority countries cannot be separated from studying Islam as the majority religion and its impact on foreign policy. This is understandable because leaders, governments, and communities in Muslim countries have various interpretations of Islamic values. In this literature review, I explore the study of the dynamics of Islam and foreign policy in Indonesia and then try to compare and contrast with the literature that discusses Islam and foreign policy in Malaysia.

Rizal Sukma's work (2003) states that Islam influenced Indonesian politics during President Soekarno and Megawati's eras. In fact, according to Sukma, in the context of foreign policy, Islam is not the main factor but only a secondary factor. According to Sukma (2003), one of the causes is the problem of dual identity. On the one hand, Islam is the religion adhered to by the majority of Indonesian people, but on the other hand, Indonesia also has cultural diversity and religious ethnicity.

However, Rizal Sukma's work focuses more on the political dynamics that occurred in Indonesia from the independence era to the Reform era and have not explored and compared much of the foreign policy in other Muslim countries, especially during the global war on terror. Several Muslim countries are trapped in a dilemma of whether to support the US agenda or defend domestic interests.

Other research states that in the post-Suharto era, in general, the role of Islam has increased in contemporary Indonesian foreign policy. The aspirations of Islamic elements and Muslim groups are increasingly being included and accommodated in the country's foreign policy. This accommodation was carried out on the basis that

their aspirations did not fundamentally conflict with Pancasila as the state philosophy, the 1945 Constitution, the principles of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy, as well as the country's vital national interests, especially those related to territorial integrity (Ansori, 2016).

Unfortunately, this research also does not focus on explicitly explaining the dynamics of Muslim countries in facing the global war against terrorism; this research explores more about how Muslim groups influence the Indonesian government in the case of the Iranian nuclear program and Kosovo's independence.

In this regard, research that looks more closely at the issue of the global war on terror refers to Fanani (2012), who stated that moderate Islam emerged in Indonesian foreign policy to respond to a global war on terror. He argues that the position of Islam in foreign policy is a new phenomenon in the SBY era; it was contrasted with the Soeharto regime (1966-1989) because Islam was marginalized, mainly when playing a role in domestic politics, although Soeharto was more accommodative in the period 1990-1997 as he sought alternative back-up for the regime besides the military. In this regard, Islamic factors that influenced SBY's foreign policy were dominated by moderate groups and democratization tendencies, such as Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah (Fanani, 2012).

Furthermore, other research results state that using a constructivist approach, there is a legitimation process, which shows that Islamic identity can also be an opportunity for foreign policy leaders to act by examining the Megawati administration to respond to the war on terrorism. At a theoretical level, this research has confirmed the usefulness of the constructivist concepts of "legitimacy" and "framing" as valuable tools for analyzing the construction of religious identity in foreign policy in countries that do not recognize Islam as an official state, such as Indonesia (Salim, 2017). However, the two studies above have not provided a critical view and causal argument for the emergence of moderate Islam itself amid the global war against terrorism campaigned by the US.

In this regard, a study by Umar (2016) examines the emergence of moderate Islam, which is considered “moderate” and “tolerant” and is inherently in line with the democratization process in Indonesia. However, he provides a more critical perspective that “Moderate Islam” also contains political and discursive constructions. Using a genealogical approach, Umar (2016) argues that the articulation of Islam in Indonesian foreign policy is influenced by the ideological foundations of each political regime and the hegemonic discourse operating in international politics. Hence, in the Islamic discourse in Indonesian foreign policy, it is always carried out by different political regimes, namely (1) Islam as a religious identity, (2) moderate Islam from below, and (3) , moderate Islam as part of the global war on terror. In addition, Umar's (2016) research above is in line with Allies' (2016) view that Indonesia's foreign policy has been penetrated by a democratic transition, which has influenced other parts of the political and public policy-making process in the country because it has become the object of political debate in civil society.

The two studies above served as a stepping stone for my own assertion that in the issue of foreign policy, Indonesia, as a Muslim country in responding to the war on terror, is in the process of democratization, so the term moderate emerges from below and, therefore, does so with the strength of civil society. Because it is labeled as the largest majority-Muslim democratic country and has a solid Islamic civil society in the process of consolidating democracy (Hefner, 2002), several scholars such as Fortuna Anwar (2010) Karim (2018, 2023) say Indonesia plays a role as a bridge builder. Nonetheless, those studies are more focused on Indonesia under the SBY administration.

It has been debated whether Indonesian foreign policy is directly influenced by Islam or is whether it occupies a secondary or or more distant level of influence after the Reform era. In Malaysia, several researchers argue that Islam influences the Malaysian political landscape, including foreign policy. One of the reasons is that it is also the official religion in the Malaysian constitution (Dian, 2017). According to Nair (1997), although Malaysia is peripheral to the heart of Islam in

the Middle East, its people's identity is more strongly Islamic. Because Islamic identity in society is profound, Islamic identity is used as a tool for legitimation and mobilization for both domestic political interests and foreign policy, especially by ruling parties such as the UMNO and the Mahathir Mohamad regime. However, this study still needs to cover how Malaysia responded to global terror at the end of Mahathir's term of office, which allowed Mahathir Mohamad and the UMNO take advantage of the situation.

To examine why Islamic identity is strong among Muslims in Malaysia, research conducted by Means (1969) can help explain. He found that Muslims in Malaysia were under a lot of pressure and changes in both attitudes and behavior patterns. As Malaysian economic growth is modern, Malays are becoming westernized, modernized and increasingly secure. However, due to state enforcement of religious obligations and the virtual impossibility for a Malay to leave his religion without violent legal and social punishment, these modern Malay elites are forced to cover up their secular attitudes and values through ritualistic identification with Islam. Hence, it can be seen that the government in Malaysia is obsessed with upholding religion in its people.

However, although some of the research above states that Islam is powerful in people's identities and that the regime wields it, another argument from Delfolie (2012) states that Malaysia's foreign policy is outside its ideological dimension, for instance, when the Malaysian government criticizes Western countries that are considered unfair to the Muslim world. In this case, political and economic goals motivate the big idea of broad Malaysian pan-Islamic solidarity in the Muslim world. This is implicitly based on a consistent approach to Islamic practice with the "conservative modernity" doctrine developed by Malay leaders such as Mahathir Mohamad.

In this case, the argument above is in line with the history of the dynamics of Malaysian foreign policy-making. Nonetheless, according to C. Ott (1972), foreign policy-making in Malaysia is a process dominated by elites with minimal domestic

input and pressure, tends to be personal, not institutional due to being characterized by more “charismatic” leadership.

Several scholars contend that Islam in Malaysia is only an essential factor in Malaysian politics, especially considering the electoral political competition between the UMNO, which supports the Mahathir regime, and the PAS. This Islamist party supports Sharia ideas and the Malay Islamic state. In this regard, Wilson (1998) points out that Malaysia is well represented at international conferences on Islamic finance, and the idea of financing seems to be used as an instrument of foreign policy to demonstrate the country's Islamic credibility to the Muslim world.

Nonetheless, Bank Islam Malaysia remains on the fringes of the Malaysian banking system. Bakar (2005) also states more precisely that Mahathir was very clever in utilizing Islam in the war against terrorism for his political gain. By taking an independent stance in the war, he not only enhanced his image as a “defender of Islam” and “leader” in the Muslim world but also caused his opposition, including the PAS, to lose the opportunity to criticize the US in the global war on terrorism.

On the other hand, another scholar, Kee Bang (2006), noted the positive side of strong legitimacy in domestic politics, and because of Mahathir’s growing confidence, especially when he managed to get through the 1997 financial crisis, he had the confidence to criticize Western powers with his rhetoric. His speeches increasingly touched on Islam, the backwardness of Muslims, the misunderstanding of Islam, and Western aggression against the Muslim world, especially in response to the Global War on Terror. For example, Mahathir's famous speech before the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in October 2003 in Kuala Lumpur called on Muslim countries to unite and realize the challenges and threats facing them. In this case, Kee Bang (2006) concluded that Mahathir wanted to project Malaysia to become a Muslim leader for other Muslim countries.

Eventually, from the comparative literature on Malaysia and Indonesia above, it can be seen that one of the characteristics that differentiates the two foreign

policies above is the process of political democratization and Islamization. Indonesia experienced a political conjuncture in 1998 that gave birth to democratization in all fields, the overthrow of the New Order regime and the rise of civil society.

However, on the contrary, Malaysia managed to emerge from the economic crisis, thereby gaining solid political legitimacy from its people and continuing the Islamization agenda under Mahathir's leadership. According to Pepinsky (2013), in a case study of regime durability, Malaysia is one of the countries used as a case study for authoritarian regimes in a long-lasting Muslim-majority country that saw Mahathir's leadership with the UMNO from 1981 to 2003. In contrast to Indonesia, according to research by Kai He (2008), since the downfall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has begun its journey toward democracy.

However, from the literature studies above, no one has examined and compared the perspective of domestic institutional dynamics that led to foreign policy under Mahathir Mohamad as a defender of faith in responding to the Global War on Terror. At the same time, the Indonesian government under Megawati Soekarno wants to act as a bridge builder, which will be studied from the history and dynamics of domestic politics.

In addition, no previous research has analyzed the impact of President Megawati Soekarnoputri and Prime Minister Mahathir's different characteristics and leadership styles on their responses to the Global War on Terror. Therefore, this work aims to fill a gap that has never been researched.

Apart from that, from some of the existing literature, it is rare to explore and compare Indonesia and Malaysia in responding to the Global War on Terror in the era of Mahathir Mohamad and Megawati Soekarnoputri. In this case, the literature is still dominated by the era of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Ahmad Badawi, and Najib Rajab because there are many programs to renew the image of Islam. For instance, moderate Islam image on SBY, Islam Hadari on Ahmad Badawi, and Islam Wasatiyah on Najib Rajab. Even recently, both countries present

the same image of Islam Wasatiyah. However, they have different ways and characteristics of interpretation and the actors who promote those values at the domestic and international levels.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

In a broad sense, Morin and Paquin (2018) reflect that all studies on foreign policy in recent decades define foreign policy as “a set of actions or rules governing the actions of independent political authorities applied in the international environment”. However, both recognize several other scholars who underline that foreign policy is not just action or reaction but the underlying vision, specifically the concept that a country stands for in the world, which consists of national interests and the core principles it holds as a nation, such as the US policy to contain communism during the Cold War or Beijing's “one China” policy concerning Taiwan.

Therefore, the theory I use to analyze the foreign policies of the two majority-Muslim countries is national role conception because it can analyze a country's history and commitment based on domestic dynamics and international expectations so that their roles adjust to these dynamics in response to the Global War on Terror. In addition, to enrich the argument, I will analyze the foreign policies of these two Muslim-majority countries using a lens of idiosyncrasy by examining the character, personality, and history of the two countries' leaders.

2.1 National Role Conception Theory

National role conception (NRC) theory was developed from sociology and psychology, which Holsti first proposed in 1970. He pointed out that:

"National Role Conception is the general foreign policy behavior of governments. It includes patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions, and commitments toward other states. From the observer's point of view, these patterns or typical decisions can be called national roles. A national role conception includes the policymakers' definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state. Of the functions, if any, their state should perform continually in the international or subordinate regional systems. It is their “image” of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment.”

Therefore, using the broad concept of role theory raised by Holsti (1970), this research will focus on examining the causes of the patterns and commitments that give rise to the different national roles of the two majority-Muslim countries in responding to the Global War on Terror by examining their domestic situations. Cantir and Kaarbo (2012) state that in examining domestic sources, NRC encourages us to examine elite-mass relations, which are mainly unmentioned in the role theory literature. Both promote this scholarship to incorporate knowledge from the broader foreign policy literature on government-opposition relations, foreign policy in multiparty coalitions, and bureaucratic politics to accurately investigate how a state or government chooses its national role conception.

In addition to highlighting internal dynamics, Morin and Paquin (2018) define national roles as a set of shared expectations relating to how a state behaves as a function of its position on the international stage. In short, the state can be a leader or a mediator, which has been practiced in international relations for years. (Walker 2011; Brummer and Thies 2015; Beners and Harsnisch 2015; Chelooti 2015; Cantir and Kaarbo 2016; Morin and Paquin 2018). Therefore, in understanding NRC, a pattern must be understood of how certain countries take specific roles in responding to global issues.

However, Morin and Paquin (2018) note that objective conditions do not determine the distribution of roles, so specific roles are subjective rather than material facts. Therefore, they argue that endogenous aspects of national role conceptions can hinder communication with different actors who sometimes share cultural differences. For example, Confucianism is the foundation of China's worldview and the collective memory of China, so these values will only be understood by China.

The role that China presents makes it difficult for Western countries to understand China's foreign policy in certain circumstances. Therefore, modifying the role of national conceptions often comes from internal aspects rather than external pressures. In this context, actors or leaders always have the scope to interpret their roles according to their interests. Therefore, according to Morin and

Paquin (2018), although the more active a state is, the more likely it is to have multiple roles, some of those roles may be conflicting.

Therefore, a recent study in role theory introduced the concept of role conflict. In this case, role conflict will arise when others do not agree on behavioral expectations (Biddle in Karim, 2023). Moreover, according to Karim (2023), in the international system, various roles can be enacted by states, and the number of roles they have can determine their respective interests. Therefore, he argues that since different roles can coexist at the same time, they may conflict with each other. Ultimately, contradictions among state roles will lead to role conflict.

“For example, in the case of Indonesia, the notion of role conflict provides a nuanced understanding of how the enactment of certain role conception might be hindered by the enactment of other roles, particularly between a recently enacted role conception and a historical one. For instance, Indonesia's post-authoritarian role conception as an advocate of democracy and human rights norms may be in conflict with its historical role as a voice for developing countries. This is because the latter role might be operationalizing through solidarity with other developing countries that may not adhere to democracy and human rights norms” (Karim, 2023)

Another example of role conflict can also be seen in Malaysia. On the one hand, Malaysia is one of the founding countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and was very active in its establishment to protect the interests of Islam, especially on the Palestinian issue. Still, on the other hand, it plays a pro-Western role by belonging to the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with the United Kingdom, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia.

However, Karim (2023) believes role conflict between the two role conceptions above does not necessarily transform Indonesia's identity as a developing country. Likewise, even though Malaysia has a pragmatic role by taking refuge in Western powers, its identity as an Islamic country will always be preserved, especially as Islam is Malaysia's official religion. In this case, Karim (2023) presents role conflict, which always shows the existence of contestation and negotiation in domestic discourse in each country. In short, role conflict embodies the domestic dynamics of a country regarding how the government positions itself

in the international arena or, in this case, responds to global events that have an impact on their domestic conditions.

Therefore, Brummer (2014) states that the role theory literature in foreign policy analysis and international relations (IR) has recognized the possibility of role competition. However, he underlined that the emergence of conflict between these roles requires a good understanding of domestic politics. He also uses Thies' (2010) argument that role conflict occurs when an individual finds himself in two or more positions that require the implementation of conflicting roles.

In this case, another example, Barnett (1993), argues that the theory of the role of a "sovereign state" versus "pan-Arabism" was one of the causes of conflict in the Middle East that emerged before 1967. Therefore, Brummer (2014) encourages domestic political studies within a country to be used as a source of contestation in the role enacted by a government. Apart from that, according to Karim (2018), a recent study regarding role theory shows that one of the factors that can explain the concept of the role of the state is treating historical experience (Beneš and Harnisch 2015).

In this case, according to Karim (2018), historical experience can be an essential factor for a country in developing its current role conception because historical experience is usually a means of legitimation to justify or support the foreign policy agenda of leaders. In this context, Karim (2018) points out that the superiority of national role conceptions based on the historical perspective is usually more stable and continues to be upheld by leaders, while newer role conceptions can easily be challenged and reduced, especially if the concept is not in accordance with the national role conception based on historical experience.

From various definitions and several developing perspectives of role theory, this paper will focus on and be limited to examining historical experiences and domestic political processes in which role conflicts occur, thus encouraging different roles in two Muslim-majority countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, namely

the role of bridge builders and the role of defender of faith in responding to the Global War on Terror.

This study takes the concept of the defender of faith role because, according to Holsti (1970), it is a role taken by governments in view of their foreign policy objectives and their commitment to defending their value systems. Countries that embrace the conception of the national role as defender of the faith are considered to have a special responsibility to ensure and protect the values or ideology of certain countries that have something in common with their country.

In this case, I categorize Malaysia as a Muslim-majority country that takes the role of defender of faith when responding to the war on terror by examining the country's attitudes and responses, especially from the speeches of its leader, Mahathir Mohamad, who is vocal and sharply criticizes the agenda. This is because the agenda has cornered Islam and caused suffering in Islamic countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, which we consider to protect terrorists. Although, in fact, from various literature and reliable sources, Malaysia's foreign policy is pragmatic and concerned with national interests because domestic political interests encourage them to play the role of defender of the faith. The cause of this role conflict will be explored in the Chapter IV results and discussion.

Meanwhile, the bridge builder role, according to Holsti (1970), is a conception of the national role that often appears in a vague form and implies various forms of diplomatic interposition in dealing with conflict issues. The themes in this role usually imply a communication function, namely acting as a "translator" or messenger or liaison between people who differ in culture, religion, and race. I categorize Indonesia as a Muslim-majority country that takes on the role of bridge builder because in responding to the Global War on Terror, instead of diametrically opposing and sharply criticizing, Indonesia takes a position in the middle, partly by promoting interfaith dialogue and empowering civil society groups. The factors that encourage Indonesia to play this role will be discussed in Chapter IV, Results and Discussion.

2.2 Idiosyncrasy in Foreign Policy

This study aims to examine in depth what causes the foreign policies of the two Muslim-majority countries to have different outcomes in response to the global war on terrorism. In this case, I prefer what Klaus (2020) encourages, which is to look more at domestic politics and use a comparative approach (Klaus, 2020). In this ever-changing field of foreign policy research, Klaus (2020) offers two ways to analyze foreign policy by using two big pictures to examine the decision-making process. The first big picture is to focus on analyzing a country's leaders in terms of their psychological state, political beliefs, attitudes or character, whether rational or irrational and, of course, political identity. The second big picture is to look at domestic political conditions, the political system, the media, public opinion, pressure groups, and the ruling regime, whether democratic or authoritarian.

In this respect, the first big picture in question is the individual or leader of a country, so foreign policy is determined by the decisions they make. This is because, according to Breuning (2007), in addition to studying domestic political institutions, public opinion, and the political system, it is also necessary to research and understand a leader's character, perception, motivation, and personality. In addition, because this paper also uses role theory, the leader has the function of defining their national role conception on the basis of their cultural background (Morin and Paquin, 2018).

The leader factor has always been inseparable in analyzing foreign policy, so it is included in the five classic variables of Rosenau (1976), which impact foreign policy, namely idiosyncrasy, role, bureaucratic, national, and systemic. By using an idiosyncratic approach that is related to the personality and figure of a leader in responding and making decisions, according to Columbus and Wolfe (1990), we can examine and compare several personalities, such as calm leaders vs. leaders who are hasty in making decisions. In addition, it can also compare leaders who are pragmatic with leaders who hold strongly to ideology. However, in this case both note that individual factors or leaders of a country in foreign policy are more likely to be dominant in pragmatic decision-making.

According to Breuning (2007), apart from studying internal domestic dynamics, which focus on the state and its institutions, such as the relationship between the executive and legislature, bureaucracy and domestic constituents, such as ethnic public opinion, and pressure groups, as well as the country's national historical and cultural conditions, the analysis at the individual level is also needed to analyze leaders as decision-makers in an effort to open the "black box" of foreign policy, where this helps us in analyzing the motivations of decision-makers focusing on the nature of the issue, political beliefs, and their character.

Meanwhile, to assess leaders, Hudson and Day (2020) offer eight variables for the characteristics of leaders in foreign policy: first, when the leader faces few obstacles in governing a country, meaning that domestic affairs are considered to have been handled; second, when a leader pays great attention to foreign policy; third, when a crisis occurs; fourth, when decision-making is carried out in uncertainty and lack of information, it means that he needs a definite and ambiguous decision; fifth, when a leader needs a track record in dealing with foreign policy issues; sixth, when a leader has adequate knowledge of international issues; seventh, when a leader has a "hands-on" leadership style, it means he wants to move alone and appear dominant; eighth, when specific group dynamics apply around the leadership, such as advisors or ministers who are close to foreign affairs.

On the other hand, Morin and Paquin (2018) argue that three main factors can make leaders dominant in foreign policy or, even vice versa, make leaders insignificant in the foreign policy process. The first is the institutions' capacity and political support to influence foreign policy. The second is the existence of specific individual interests, motivations, and leadership styles that can significantly impact foreign policy. The third is the political opportunities for decision-makers to play and influence foreign policy in response to a particular issue. In this case, due to the crisis, the nature and character of a leader will obviously influence foreign policy.

Whereas Jerold Post (2003) offers several components in analyzing foreign leaders using anamnesis methodology, the first is psycho-biography, which explores the leader's life from the context of significant events that occurred in the

nation and the world at that time. Secondly, anamnesis concerns the deep personality of an individual on a daily basis, for example, the balance between the leader's work and personal life, such as health, intellectual capacity, and knowledge. Third is anamnesis of the beliefs held by the leader in politics, ideology, issues of state security, and the nature of power. Fourth, the leader's style should be analyzed by examining several skills, such as public speaking, negotiating, and lobbying (Hudson and Day, 2020).

However, to examine more comprehensively the possible personality orientations of leaders, this study uses several categories offered by Herman (2003). The first is *expansionistic* leadership, namely leaders who are ready to face obstacles, are open to information but have a vision of expanding power and influencing other people. Second, *evangelical* leaders, with no boundaries, are open to information but have the vision to persuade others to accept their message and join in their struggle. Third, *incremental* leaders, who like to challenge obstacles, are open to information and have a vision of maintaining maneuverability and flexibility while avoiding obstacles that continually try to limit both. Fourth, *charismatic* leaders who like to challenge boundaries are open to information and have a vision of achieving an agenda by involving other people in the process and persuading them to act in accordance with their beliefs and interests. Fifth, a *directive* is a leader who likes to challenge obstacles, is close to information, and has a vision focused on directing policy personally along a path that is consistent with his views while continuing to work according to the norms and rules that exist in his current position. Sixth, a *consultative* leader respects boundaries, is close to information, and has a vision of monitoring that essential people will support him or not actively oppose him, seeing what someone wants to do in a difficult situation. Seventh, a *reactive* leader is one who respects constraints, is open to information, focuses on assessing what might happen in the current situation based on the nature of the problem, and considers what is permitted by constituents who are essential to him. Eighth, *accommodative* leaders respect boundaries, are open to information, have a vision of reconciling differences and building consensus, empower others, and share accountability in the process (Hudson and Day, 2020).

With various explanations of idiosyncrasy theory, which sees the importance of studying the determination of a leader's figure in influencing foreign policy, this study argues that leaders who fall into the accommodative and consultative categories due to limited experience and interest in foreign affairs will push the country more toward the role of bridge builder, so it will listen a lot and try to act in vague areas. Meanwhile, leaders who fall into the charismatic and directive categories, plus have long experience in governing, have oratorical skills and have an interest in and dominance in foreign policy, will push the state into the role of defender of the faith. A further explanation of the character and background of this leadership will appear in Chapter IV, Results and Discussion.

2.3 Argument and Hypotheses

Understanding the policy-making process in foreign policy is known primarily to explore the differences between states and individuals and the international system. This is known as the concept of level of analysis, which is divided into three levels, namely individual level of analysis, state level of analysis and system level of analysis. In Putnam's (1988) view, both the domestic and international levels are interrelated and simultaneous in two-level games. In short, what happens in international politics impacts domestic politics. Vice versa, the pressures and outcomes of domestic politics will inevitably have an impact on foreign policy and international politics.

The system level of analysis examines the relative capabilities, such as power and wealth, of each country that affect their opportunities to act on the global stage. However, Putnam (1988) emphasizes that it is better to study the determinants of foreign policy and that international relations that look at domestic dynamics should emphasize the political processes that include political parties, social classes, interest groups or civil society (both economic and political), members of parliament, and public opinion.

Therefore, since this study focuses on foreign policy, it is limited to two levels of analysis, namely the individual level and the state level. Thus, this research will

be limited to examining institutions within the state, such as political parties and civil society as pressure groups as a reference in the framework of state-level analysis, while the characteristics of the leaders of the two countries as an individual-level analysis that adds weight to the variation of roles in the two Muslim-majority countries in responding to the Global War on Terror.

According to Sartori (2004), political parties are significant in a democratic system because elections encourage the transformation of government from responsible and constitutional to responsive. Therefore, in this case, the party becomes a vital facilitator for the community to channel their aspirations and complaints to the government. Consequently, it can be concluded that parties with their dynamics, of both decline and progress, have been relevant for hundreds of years and are still an essential pillar in the democratic system in the world because, according to Sartori (2004), first, parties are not factions. Second, a party is part of a whole; third, parties are channels of expression. In other words, from the three characteristics of the party developed by Sartori (2004: 20) above, a political party is an institution or organization that has a system and is manifested from the diversity of society to translate diverse mass preferences into public policy and as a means to gain legitimacy to govern through elections.

In the context of foreign policy, Peterson (1981) argues by drawing on Appleton's hypothesis that gaining the most votes for the next election is still the goal of rational party leaders and that they will always position themselves as the party that comes closest to the median voter's opinion on the issue at hand in foreign affairs. Creating and maintaining the electoral and legislative support necessary to remain in office is vital to successfully implementing these policies. Hence, according to Paterson (1981), parties do not hesitate to trade some policy objectives for electoral and legislative support. So when external pressures or events at the international level require a response but may interfere with vote share, the party will take the least risk of losing legislative votes and its electoral probability.

This is precisely what happened in Malaysia's domestic political dynamics because PAS, as an Islamic party that used the Global War on Terror policy after

9/11 to attract sympathy from Muslim voters, forced UMNO as the government party to adjust its policies and encouraged Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to be very critical of the US and act as a defender and protector of the interests of the Muslim world so as not to lose votes in the election.

In contrast, in Indonesia, after the Reform era began in 1998 with the opening of the democratic faucet after the authoritarian regime, many pressure groups grew. This is in accordance with the third wave of democracy after the Cold War where, according to Carothers and Barndt (2000), civil society became a mantra for everyone from presidents to political scientists because the global trend toward democracy opened up space for civil society in countries that were implementing democratic consolidation. In addition, globalization and the information revolution provided new tools to connect and empower people. In short, civil society became a crucial element in bringing down authoritarian regimes after the end of the Cold War. Eva Bellin (2012) also found that the strength of dictatorial regimes in the Middle East was due to the absence of a robust civil society.

In the context of foreign policy, according to Breuning (2007), specifically in determining foreign policy in democracies, the government or ruler can be suppressed by interest groups, the media, and public opinion. However, Breuning (2007) adds that civil society has ample opportunities and can express its opinion formally, even if it differs from the government.

In addition, Moravcsik (1997) argues that a country's political dynamics in the foreign policy-making process are placed in a domestic order that cannot be separated from civil society. Each individual and community group is a rational actor in a country that seeks a decent life and ideal prosperity. Therefore, in a democratic state, the interests of civil society are paramount. In this case, the state is not the leading actor but a representative institution that consistently accommodates and reconstructs the interests of society. This civil society will consistently pressure or provide input to decision-makers so that their policies are in accordance with the interests of society (Moravcsik, 1997).

Therefore, in Indonesia, groups of Islamic organizations that have moderate voices and played a role in consolidating democracy in 1998, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, are empowered by the government to provide input and even be involved in Indonesia's foreign policy agenda in responding to the Global War on Terror.

In this case, when analyzing foreign policy, it is recommended that the approach be comparative and look more at domestic political dynamics, especially in the context of democracy. In this study, I argue that political parties and civil society have a tangible impact on the role of Muslim countries in responding to the Global War on Terror because of the historical context and identity of Islam in internal political dynamics.

Therefore, based on the national role conception theory above, this study argues that Muslim-majority countries that have political experience in consolidating the democratization process have strong civil societies, and the personalities of leaders are accommodative and consultative and tend to be bridge-builders to respond to the global war on terror in their national role conception. On the other hand, Muslim-majority countries have the political experience to have maintained a competitive regime in the democratic system and have strong political parties, and the personality of the leader is charismatic and directive. Their national role conception tends to be defenders of the faith.

In order to build this hypothesis, I present a causal mechanism that shows the differences in domestic institutions and leader types that produce variations in the foreign policy roles of the two Muslim-majority countries, Indonesia and Malaysia, in responding to the Global War on Terror.

Political System	Domestic Institutions	Type of Leader	Foreign policy/NRC
Democratic country	Strong civil society	Accommodative & consultative	Bridge builder
Democratic country	Strong political Party	Charismatic & directive	Defender of faith

Figure 1: Causal Graph that shows the causes of variations in the foreign policies of Indonesia and Malaysia in response to the Global War on Terror, made by the author.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

3.1 Research Methodology

This study employs a qualitative method. A qualitative approach is a process of research and understanding based on a methodology that investigates social phenomena and human problems. In this approach, the researcher describes the phenomenon, examines words, reports detailed respondents' views, and conducts studies in natural situations (Creswell, 1998). To enrich the data and examine causal explanations, this research will analyze it from a comparative analysis perspective, namely identifying differences and similarities and connecting them with other differences and similarities (Maxxwell, 2004).

3.2 Case Selection, Data Collection, and Analysis Plan

For this case selection, I prefer to use the qualitative comparative method with the method of difference that emerged by Mill (1971). By utilizing Mill's method of difference, this research argues that Muslim-majority countries have similarities in several things, such as both use the democratic system. For example, they choose the leader of the government and the members of parliament by election. And both countries have agendas of promoting moderate Islam and are developing countries. However, the foreign policy of the two countries and their national role in the international arena in responding to the global war on terror are different.

Method of different frameworks	Indonesia	Malaysia
Overall similarities	(+) Muslim-majority country (+) Developing country (+) Democratic country (+) Promotes moderate Islam	(+)Muslim-majority country (+) Developing country (+) Democratic country (+) Promotes moderate Islam
X	- Strong civil society - Accommodative and consultative leadership	- Strong political party - Charismatic and directive leadership
Y	(-) Bridge builder	(-) Defender of faith

Figure 2: Method of different frameworks in this research, made by the author.

As for the analysis plans, as was mentioned in the literature review above in researching foreign policy, it must be recognized that there has been a shift toward a more focused examination of domestic politics and decision-making processes, especially when there is a push for research using comparative methods. (Kaarbo, 2015), (Bummer, 2020). Therefore, when talking about domestic politics, we cannot be separated from policymakers in the government of a country, be they state leaders, the state apparatus, political parties, or non-state leaders such as religious leaders, or leaders of social organizations or civil society if the country is included in the category of democracies.

This study also uses content analysis as one of the methods for analyzing the traits, motivations, and characteristics of world leaders. This method is an alternative or can complement the biographical technique. This study seeks the artifacts of one's personality, including the things one has said and written. In order to avoid bias, scholars who use content analysis suggest several ways to get accurate results, such as using spontaneous interviews. The second is diaries, letters to confidants, and automatic tape recording. The third is to obtain a large amount of text spanning different periods, audiences, and subjects.

According to Hudson and Day (2020), there are two forms of content analysis: thematic content analysis and quantitative (or "word-count") content analysis. In this study, I prefer to use thematic content analysis in order to develop a categorization of themes that I would like to investigate. In this regard, the dependent variable is the appearance or frequency of a theme within the text, or we can create a variable from the theme and record the value of variables.

Furthermore, to obtain information about well-defined and specific events and processes, according to Tansey (2007), the most appropriate sampling procedure is one that identifies primary political actors – those who are most involved in the process. Therefore, in this study, I interviewed several actors engaged in Indonesia and Malaysia's foreign policy in response to the Global War on Terror.

According to Tansey (2007), the goal is not to take a representative sample from a larger population of political figures that can be used as a basis for making generalizations about the entire population but, in this case, to draw a sample that includes the most important ones: political actors who have participated in the political events that have been studied. Therefore, in addition to secondary data such as literature and archives, I will also conduct interviews with several actors from the two countries' foreign ministries and figures with expertise and experience on this topic.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This study, as mentioned in the purpose of the study, is to examine the dynamics faced by Islamic-majority countries in dealing with the Global War on Terror after 9/11. I chose Indonesia and Malaysia because, as I have discussed above, they have similarities in several fields. Still, they have foreign policies with different nuances in responding to the Global War on Terror.

4.1 Indonesian Foreign Policy in Responding to the Global War on Terror under Megawati Soekarnoputri

4.1.1 Indonesia as a Bridge Builder

Exactly three days after president George W. Bush's speech on Sept. 16, 2001, using the term “global war on terrorism”, with rather crude and provocative terms such as: “This is a new kind – a new kind of evil. And we get it. And the American people are beginning to understand. This crusade, this war on terrorism, is going to take a while. And the American people have to be patient,” president Megawati Soekarnoputri made a state visit to the United States On Sept. 19, 2001, and expressed her deep sorrow directly to President George W. Bush for the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center (WTC) that occurred on Sept. 11, 2001. On this occasion, President Megawati condemned the barbaric and indiscriminate acts committed against innocent civilians and committed to cooperating with the international community in fighting terrorism. In this case, President Megawati underlined that terrorism was also increasingly threatening Indonesia's democracy and national security.

During the meeting, the two presidents agreed that their respective officials would immediately discuss concrete ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation in eradicating terrorism, especially in developing capacities and institutions. Even president Bush at that time expressed his belief that Indonesia's transition to democracy was one of the most significant

developments in this era. He also promised to support President Megawati's efforts to build a stable, united, democratic, and prosperous Indonesia. The concrete form was that the US government provided bilateral assistance worth at least \$130 million to Indonesia in the 2002 fiscal year, with a particular focus on assisting Indonesia's efforts in carrying out legal and judicial reform, and an additional \$10 million to help internally displaced persons, with a focus on Maluku. An additional \$5 million was given to support reconciliation in Aceh, help rebuild schools and other infrastructure destroyed by ongoing violence, and assist economic development projects, including environmental and transportation improvements. Finally, president Bush also committed, with congressional approval, to provide \$10 million to train the Indonesian police (Whitehouse, 2001).

According to AM Fachir, President Megawati's visit to the United States a few days after 9/11 was to present Indonesia's position in line with its foreign policy principles, namely “free and active” and our role in finding solutions to the international political dynamics that occurred after 9/11. Secondly, the government at that time could not avoid domestic conditions where the growth of negative labeling of Islam resulted in outbursts of anger from some Muslim groups. Even though the majority of Muslims in Indonesia are moderate, this condition became the basis for decision-makers to empower moderate groups not only in the field of diplomacy but also in dealing with the threat of terrorism (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024).

However, the Global War on Terror was a dilemma for Indonesia. On the one hand, Indonesia has to sympathize with and support the US in fighting terrorism, but on the other hand, the US unilateralism with the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan on the grounds of destroying terrorists received condemnation and protests from elements of society that were predominantly Muslim (Dhani, 2002). Some of the most vocal opponents came from Islamic organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and Laskar Jihad.

Some of them even intended to wipe out foreigners, especially the United States, as the initiator of the Global War on Terror.

In response to this pressure, according to Sukma (2002), the Megawati administration was considered slow and indecisive due to the unstable national political conditions after the 1998 Reform era, such as unfinished human rights issues, local conflicts due to religion and ethnicity, such as in Maluku and Ambon, and especially in dealing with the Free Aceh Movement. This is also, according to Kamarulnizam, one of the reasons why the Jamaah Islamiyah terrorist group carried out attacks in Indonesia. They were dissatisfied with the Indonesian government, which was considered not firm enough in defending Islam and unable to resolve cases of conflict such as in Aceh, Ambon, and Maluku (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 27, 2024).

Furthermore, to respond to those radical Muslim groups, the occasion of the Isra Mi'raj Commemoration at the Istiqlal Mosque, the largest government-owned mosque, was used as an opportunity for President Megawati to explain Indonesia's position in the dilemma. In her speech, she emphasized that the Indonesian government rejected any attack on other countries under the pretext of capturing terrorists. Although President Megawati did not specifically mention the name, the public understood that the country she was referring to was the United States (Dhani, 2002).

"There are measures and rules in the world that must be considered. Without them, actions to combat violence and terrorism will eventually slip into new acts of violence and terror." (Megawati,2002)

At the state level, there were two approaches of the Indonesian government in responding to the Global War on Terror after 9/11. The first was handling domestic terrorist acts through law enforcement with the birth of Densus 88 from the National Police. This indicated that Indonesia had a firm stance against terrorism. The second was empowering moderate groups from Muslim organizations by promoting interfaith dialogue, and the birth of

this policy actually occurred in the era of President Megawati (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024).

Therefore, according to Fachir, actually, the embryo of the policy of empowering moderate groups in responding to the Global War on Terror, which placed several Muslim countries in dilemmas, was during President Megawati's time, while the programs and implementation that emerged during President SBY's time were the translation of policies of the Megawati era. Fachir argues that Megawati's visit to Washington at that time was a symbol of concern and sympathy from Indonesia to the American people who were victimized by acts of terrorism (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024).

In this regard, the high degree of pluralism in Indonesia means that the Indonesian government must be at the forefront of condemning acts of violence, especially those linked to religious issues. Therefore, in Fachir's view, the policy of empowering moderate groups is actually in Indonesia's DNA. On the one hand, Indonesia wants to show the international community that in a pluralistic society, tolerance and respect for each other are required. Most importantly, minorities must be respected (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024). As for domestic political purposes, interfaith dialogue through the empowerment of moderate Islam is educating our public that, actually, in our own country, the issue of tolerance has not been fully resolved. In promoting interfaith dialogue, what Indonesia presents to the international community, especially Western countries, are interfaith leaders from Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Catholicism, not state officials such as diplomats. In doing so, according to Fachir, in the context of facing the dynamics of the Global War on Terror, where Islam faces a negative image, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah are Indonesia's guardians because they have moderate visions, thought, and principles, as well as attitudes (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024).

In this context, Fachir underlines that the Reform era, beginning in 1998, had a significant impact on the dynamic process of Indonesia's foreign policy decision-making. In this case, according to Fachir, the government encourages state institutions align themselves with democratic values and openness and involve many actors. The involvement of non-state actors in Indonesia's foreign policy in responding to the Global War on Terror was clearly seen when Megawati involved the leaders of religious organizations with moderate views, namely KH Hasyim Muzadi as chairman of the PBNU and Prof. Dr. Syafii Maarif as chairman of the Muhammadiyah central board and Prof. Azyumardi Azra as a representative of Islamic academia to meet and talk with president Bush when he visited Bali in the context of countering global terrorism (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024)..

Therefore, according to Fachir, since the Reform, foreign policy decision-making in Indonesia has had two formats. The first is a direct decision taken by the highest leader of the country, namely the president, and the second is a decision based on input from various elements of both the government and non-governmental entities. In doing so, according to Fachir, learning from his experience in the New Order on human rights issues, the figure of Hasan Wirajuda, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, became “Indonesia's foreign policy kitchen” during President Megawati's era. Therefore, the involvement of non-governmental organizations in the post-Reform era has colored Indonesia's foreign policy, for example, the emergence of public diplomacy, interfaith dialogue, etc. (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024).

Fachir added that the embryo of the involvement of moderate religious groups in Indonesian foreign policy on the issue of the Global War on Terror then became a pattern and tradition of government cooperation, especially the Foreign Ministry with civil society. In this regard, the involvement of those moderate groups is not only in instances of the Global War on Terrorism. For example, Fachir noted a case of harassment surrounding a Prophet

Muhammad cartoon that appeared in a French magazine in 2012. In this case, he argued that before this harassment spread in the country, the Foreign Ministry anticipated inviting religious leaders to ask for views on how the government should behave on this issue (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024).

“So our task at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at that time was to empower all existing stakeholders. The state needed help to go alone because our capacity was limited. The Reform era gave birth to openness where access to information could not be inhibited by the growth of the media, strengthening civil society, so we at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs saw this not as a threat, but a potential that could be empowered.” (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024)

Therefore, according to Fachir, Indonesia responded to the Global War Terror by always positioning itself as part of the solution by empowering domestic resources from civil society groups. Fachir stated that Indonesia wanted to bridge the two opposing camps, such as Islam and the West. He argued that becoming a bridge builder was in accordance with the Indonesian constitution, namely "to participate in implementing world order by peaceful means". At this point, Indonesia was on the solution side. Ultimately, Indonesia was in a position not to take sides with America or with other countries (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024).

In this context, the democratic transition after the 1988 Reform made the Indonesian government adapt both in terms of internal government and the growth of civil society elements. In addition, after the Reform era, in terms of state capacity, as mentioned by Kai Hee (2008), the Indonesian government faced a legitimacy crisis both from internal and external sources, such as international pressure that put Indonesia in the corridor of democracy and upholding human rights. In the midst of these conditions, the existence of a robust civil society that voices moderate and democracy makes essential capital for Indonesia to play a role as a bridge builder in responding to the Global War on Terror. Therefore, if we look at the concepts of Moderate Islam or Islam Wasatiyah, the ideas raised in the discourse in Indonesia are

mostly born from religious organizations that act as civil society groups rather than emerging from the government or state leaders.

4.1.2 Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah: The Voices of Moderation and Democracy

According to Azyumardi Azra (2006), two mainstream organizations have moderate principles and voices in addressing the dynamics of the Global War on Terror, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which strongly reject the call for jihad to Afghanistan promoted by other Islamic groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Laskar Jihad, Hizbut Tahrir (HTI), and the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement (GPII). The last of these groups even established a recruitment center for volunteers to be trained and sent to Afghanistan to face US-allied forces. More than 1,000 people registered with the GPII to become jihad volunteers (Azra, 2006).

In this case, NU, through its chairman, Hasyim Muzadi, stated, first, that it would not seek recruits for jihad to Afghanistan; second, that jihad should not be interpreted as a holy war but should be interpreted more broadly, namely jihad to build the ummah; third, that the 9/11 tragedy and the Global War on Terror policy should be construed as a humanitarian tragedy, not a religious tragedy and religious issue; and fourth, that Muslims must not engage in acts of terrorism or religious conflict (Azra, 2006).

As for Muhammadiyah, its chairman, Syafii Maarif, stated, first, that Muhammadiyah would not be involved in radical actions in the name of religion; second, that criticizing the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) regarding the meaning of jihad encouraged Muslims to be ready for jihad in responding to the issue, which Muslims could misinterpret at the grassroots level; third, that the term jihad must be rejected as a means of addressing the Global War on Terror (Azra, 2006).

Based on Azra (2006), NU and Muhammadiyah assumed a moderate attitude not only in responding to global terror but also regarding questions

of the basis of the Indonesian state. Both accept Pancasila as the basis of the state even though Indonesia is predominantly Muslim. In this case, Muhammadiyah is again committed to supporting Pancasila in the midst of radical groups who want to change Pancasila, and at a 2015 congress in Makasar, interpreted Pancasila as *Darul 'Ahdī wa Al-shahadah* (State of Consensus and Testimony), while NU believes that Pancasila is *Mu'ahadah Wathaniyah* (Nationality Agreement).

In this context, for Fachir, NU and Muhammadiyah are essential assets for Indonesia's foreign policy in the midst of internal pressure, namely the emergence of the "Muslim Die Hard" group, which continues to pressure the government to take a firm stance on the war on terror and its effects on the Middle East. Secondly, they counter external pressures where Islam is associated with terrorism and acts of terror in the country. Therefore, according to Fachir, when president Bush visited Indonesia in order to address the issue of terrorism, the leaders of the two mass organizations and other religious organizations were invited to meet Bush, according to him, as a starting point for empowering moderate groups in Indonesia's foreign policy (interview with Fachir, June 06, 2024).

In addition, according to Tanthowi (2021), these moderate principles are held firmly by NU and Muhammadiyah when facing the pressure of the Global War on Terror and the rise of radical actions and in order to eliminate the negative perception of Islam amid what could be considered the lowest point of relations between the West and Islam. In this case, it led to the emergence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from the womb of NU and Muhammadiyah, which young people mostly drove.

Tanthowi (2021) noted that in the NU environment, for example, there is a new NGO, the Wahid Institute, which was founded by Yeni Wahid, Gus Dur's daughter, as well as NGOs that have been established for a long time but are increasingly active, such as the Center for the Development of Pesantren and Society (P3M), and the Institute for Islamic and Social Studies

(LKIS). As for Muhammadiyah, among them are the Center for the Study of Religion and Civilization (PSAP), the Center for Dialogue and Cooperation among Civilization (CDCC) founded by Din Syamsuddin, one of the chairmen of the Muhammadiyah central board, and the Maarif Institute.

There is also an NGO driven by a collaboration of figures from NU and Muhammadiyah to voice moderate views, namely the International Centre for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), which is led by Syafii Anwar, a senior journalist and Muhammadiyah activist, and Syafiq Hasyim, a young intellectual of NU. In addition, there are also study communities such as the Liberal Islamic Network (JIL), which is driven by young NU people, and the Muhammadiyah Young Intellectual Network (JIMM), which is driven by young Muhammadiyah.

As for the context of democracy, several scholars such as Robert Hefner (2001), Greg Barton (2010), Woodward (2001), (and Tanthowi, 2021) are among the scholars who examine the role and contribution of NU and Muhammadiyah as Islamic organizations in democracy and democratization in Indonesia, especially before and after the Reform era in 1998. The momentum of the Reform era became a turning point, and the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime, which had been in power for 32 years, led to the era of democracy.

In looking at NU and Muhammadiyah and democracy, according to Tanthowi (2021), the organization's stances can be traced from their origins and traditions. One of the strong traditions is that they are characterized by community groups or associations that are self-regulating and try to balance power. Secondly, in terms of their history since their establishment, especially after the era of Indonesian independence, they have always involved themselves in social politics in Indonesia. Both in party politics during the late 1940s to the early 1980s, Muhammadiyah and NU aligned themselves with the Masyumi party. Then, NU established its own party, and both returned to religious and social organizations.

According to the record of Tanthowi (2021), since both groups were consistent in the path of serving as religious organizations, NU and Muhammadiyah have had the freedom to be critical of the government, especially during the Reform era. Muhammadiyah leaders such as Amin Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) were NU leaders, both of whom were actively involved in the eviction of the New Order regime. Amin Rais, according to Tanthowi (2021), was a Muhammadiyah leader who dared to raise the issue of succession to the Soeharto regime during the Muhammadiyah congress in Aceh in 1995.

Not only that, the succession discourse was also brought by Amin Rais to the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) organization, which is an Islamic organization approved by the Soeharto government to be close to Muslims. However, Amien was a sharp thorn in Suharto's side because he was part of the ICMI. Finally, Amin Rais was pressured to resign from the ICMI in 1997 (Slater, 2009).

As for Gus Dur, when the ICMI was established, he had already rejected it, according to Dan Slater (marked by a rally held ostensibly "to celebrate the organization's anniversary by reaffirming NU's allegiance to Pancasila in public," as was first expressed when NU accepted Pancasila over Islam as the basis of its ideology in 1983. This was because the ICMI, in Gus Dur's eyes, could hurt the feelings of non-Muslims and was certainly not in line with the principles of Pancasila. This happened less than a year after the formation of the regime-backed elite group. At the Democracy Forum level, Gus Dur clearly intended the rally to be a direct challenge to Soeharto's rule (Slater, 2009).

According to Slater (2009), the three figures, Amin Rais of Muhammadiyah, Gus Dur of NU, and Megawati of the PDI, served as powerful elite focal points in fostering mass resistance to Soeharto after the Asian financial crisis rocked Indonesia in late 1997 and early 1998. (Dan Slater), This is corroborated by Tanthowi (2021), who notes that in the final

months of 1997, the three figures above, Amin Rais, Gus Dur, and Megawati, increasingly consolidated. According to him, Amien Rais toured campuses, inviting students to continue the struggle of the three figures. In his speeches, he talked about "people power".

"If the democratic way to bring about change has reached a dead end, there is no other way than using mass movements" (Amin Rais, 1998).

The peak on May 20, 1998, coincided with National Awakening Day, which the Indonesian people annually commemorate as a form of national unity in the face of colonization. Several cities held large demonstrations consisting of students, Islamic groups, and other pro-demonstration groups to remove Soeharto from power for decades. Soeharto officially resigned on May 21, 1998.

Not only did it stop in the process of removing Soeharto from the throne of power, but according to Tanthowi (2021), NU and Muhammadiyah were also involved in consolidating democracy, one means that was highlighted was the contribution of young people from NU-Muhammadiyah and non-Islamic groups in monitoring the first elections after the outset of the Reform era by establishing a consortium called the Voters' Education Network for the People (JPPR), which was established in 1998 to ensure that the elections were fair and honest. The JPPR network spread throughout Indonesia following the networks of NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as other religious organizations.

The long history and strong commitment to democratic values, the moderate voices of Muhammadiyah and NU in domestic civil society, and the pressure from the United States in the context of the Global War on Terror encouraged the Indonesian government under President Megawati to take on a bridge-building role. This also became the distinguishing characteristic of Indonesia's foreign policy among other Muslim countries, namely by empowering civil society groups and encouraging dialogue between religions and civilizations. This fact is in line with Moravcsik's (1997) argument that

in a democratic state, the interests of civil society are paramount. In this case, the state is not the main actor but a representative institution that consistently accommodates and reconstructs the interests of society. This civil society will consistently pressure or provide input to decision-makers so that their policies are in accordance with the interests of society.

However, neither organization is without flaws and defects. For example, in the case of the killing of members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1965-1966, according to Fealy and McGregor (2010) there is historical evidence to suggest that NU was an active, not passive, participant in the massacre of communists, and in many areas, the ulama and *santri* did not provide much encouragement to commit acts of violence. Thus, they argue, it is difficult to sustain the argument that the military manipulated NU to launch the bloodbath. Likewise with Muhammadiyah, the existence of several Muhammadiyah sympathizers and cadres as ministers in the New Order era under Soeharto's leadership, including religious affairs ministers such as Abdul Mukti Ali (Development Cabinet I, 1971-1973, Development Cabinet II, 1973-1978), Munawir Sjadzali (Development Cabinet IV, 1983-1988, Development Cabinet V 1988-1993), and Tarmidzi Taher (Development Cabinet VI, 1993-1998) suggest that Muhammadiyah was a supporter of the authoritarian regime. In this context, Syamsudin (1991) calls it allocative politics, which instead of being confrontational, uses the form of suggestions, opinions and considerations through lobbying, hearings and official letters to the Soeharto government to influence policies. However, this image made Muhammadiyah an Islamic organization that was closer to the New Order under Soeharto than NU.

4.2 Malaysian Foreign Policy Responding to Global War on Terrorism under Mahathir Mohamad's Administration

4.2.1 Malaysian Foreign Policy as Defenders of Faith

For the Malaysian government, the Global War on Terror campaign by president Bush was a susceptible matter because, according to Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, the Malaysian Foreign Minister at that time, the Global War on Terror campaign was an instrument that created anti-Islamic views. In addition, the issue of terrorism and terror became common among Western countries in particular. In his view, the US and Western countries' policies often associated terror and violence with Islam. Then they defined it as Islamic terrorism (interview with Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, May 23, 2024).

In addition, according to Albar, because of the Global War on Terror agenda, much of the Muslim world was suffering. That is why Malaysia, under Mahathir's rule, was very vocal at the international and global level. Furthermore, Albar stated that the United States government under president Bush was too quick to conclude that terror was always related to Islam. For him, those days were an adamant time because the mainstream international media supported the Global War on Terror. With these problematic conditions, Malaysia, as a Muslim-majority country, has a duty and obligation to speak to defend the position of Muslims when labeled as terrorists (interview with Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, May 23, 2024).

Therefore, in that period, Malaysia, according to him, was very critical of the US, although Malaysia also condemned any violence and terror. In this case, he gives examples and confirms that Malaysia also condemned the 9/11 attacks. However, when the US campaigned using "either with us or with the terrorists" and, after that, the US military bombed Iraq and Afghanistan, Malaysia spoke loudly against the Global War on Terror. Especially at that time, Malaysia under prime minister Mahathir Mohamad always very vocal in international forums.

“So look at Gaza today, when there is violence related to Islam, some media always call it a terrorist act. It should be noted that Malaysia also condemns all acts of terror and violence, but Malaysia is the only Muslim country that is the first and brave to say Israel is state terrorism. They commit violence and terror in the name of the state by labeling Hamas and Palestinians as terrorists to legitimize their policies” (interview with Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, May 23, 2024).

In this context, prime minister Mahathir Mohamad has very openly criticized Western countries with their Global on War Terror policy. In a speech, he referred to several countries as “great practitioners of democracy” of “terrorizing the world”. Although he did not clearly mention which countries, some media, such as the BBC, the *Sun* and *China Daily*, assume that the countries Mahathir referred to in his speech were Israel, the United States, and Australia. These countries have most often been criticized by Mahathir, especially in his Global War on Terror policy (BBC, the Sun, China Daily, 2003).

“Terror attacks are not just by irregulars acting on their own. Indeed, we see states launching massive retaliation, not just to curb suspected terrorists, but his [the terrorist’s] family, his home, his village, and his town. It would be ridiculous to think such attacks do not terrorize the innocent. In fact, terrorism is even greater, for it is systematic and executed with heavy weapons in the hands of trained soldiers. It would seem that the great exponents and practitioners of democracy believe that the way to spread the doctrine and to break down resistance is by terrorizing the world” (Mohamad, 2003).

Interestingly, Mahathir's speech was delivered on the same day that President Bush arrived on Bali to meet with President Megawati to discuss and explain the Global War on Terror, which was the US agenda at that time. This speech was delivered when Mahathir Mohamad was invited to Indonesia to receive the Distinguished Fellow Award from the ASEAN Federation of Engineering Organizations in Yogyakarta on Oct. 22, 2003. Therefore, the speech above seems to want to show the firmness of Malaysia's foreign policy toward the US and its allies in the Global War on Terror. It has a different choice from Indonesia, which is more accommodating toward this policy. On one occasion, Mahathir even indicated that the Sept. 11 attacks on the US

were at least partly caused by US support for Israel toward Palestine (Al-Jazeera, 2003).

However, Syed Albar underlines that three elements remain the guideline in Malaysia's foreign policy in response to the Global War on Terror. Firstly, it must be sovereign and independent. Second, it must uphold its principles. Third, it must be part of the national interest. In holding these three elements, he noted that internal domestic conditions, both political and economic, must be stable. In this case, he recognizes Malaysia is a small country and does not want to be dictated to and bullied by other countries. Therefore, when Malaysia maintains its principles or ideology, big countries will still respect it even if Malaysia rebukes it. He also argues that one element that makes politics stable and robust is that UMNO has been the ruling party in Malaysia for several years (interview with Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, May 23, 2024).

“Malaysia wants to be a champion for the interests of the Muslim world, and we must show our identity as a Muslim country that speaks the truth and upholds humanity and justice. Since the beginning, Islam has been our value system, but we must also admit that many Islamic countries do not influence international dynamics; they cannot control anything. Therefore, Islam still maintains its ideology because historically, Malays and Islam are very close, but in foreign policy, Malaysia must be strong economically and politically with a pragmatic approach. So actually why we also criticize but on the other hand we collaborate with Western countries whose aim is for trade” (interview with Albar, May 23, 2024).

Despite Mahathir's criticism of the US, economic relations have not suffered. In fact, the US is one of Malaysia's largest foreign investors. In 1995, Malaysia began to receive large amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) from US multinational corporations, indicating US support for the Mahathir government's handling of economic relations between the two countries. US multinationals show that they are the largest investors in Malaysia at RM18.95 billion, which is greater than Japan's investment of only RM12.15 billion (Wan et al., 2017). Some of the US multinational companies that invest in Malaysia are SEAGATE, INTEL, IBM, and others. In fact, since

April 29, 1982, the US franchise company McDonald's has officially opened its outlets in Malaysia. And as of 2019, McDonald's Malaysia has opened 200 outlets (Mukhtaruddin, 2019).

Therefore, Malaysia dared to speak out loudly to criticize the US policy on global terror because, according to Albar Mahathir, the leaders were very confident with Malaysia's economic growth in a stable and growing condition in recent years. Malaysia during the Mahathir era had an average economic growth rate of 8.7 percent during the period of 1990 to 1997. Malaysia also enjoyed full employment opportunities, price level stability, and high economic growth. Malaysia was even ranked 35th in the world with reference to aggregate size and per capita income in 1997 (GNP) (Zaherawati, Noordin, Zoolhilmie, & Sawal, 2010) (Fathurachman, NA) (interview with Albar, May 23, 2024).

Another motivation for Malaysia to always be at the forefront of being vocal on several international issues, especially in the face of the Global War on Terror, as noted by Albar, is because Malaysia does not want Muslim countries to be in poverty and decline. Therefore, Islam has always been questioned for its contribution to the economy and development. Malaysia, in the Mahathir period, according to Albar, wants to show that Islam, modernity, and development are not contradictory, and Malaysia wants to be an influencer for Muslim countries and developing countries in development and economy (interview with Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, May 23, 2024). According to Tan Sri Jahwar Hassan, the Langkawi dialogue is also one example of him being a mouthpiece for developing countries by building relationships with African countries. Mahathir wanted to show that developing countries and third countries were able to be independent and rise economically (interview with Tan Sri Jahwar Hassan , May 26, 2024).

However, Albar emphasized that although Malaysia always wanted Muslim countries to develop and dared to oppose some Western policies that could harm Muslim countries and developing countries, Malaysia's foreign policy is like other secular countries, which is pragmatic in terms of foreign

policy and still always puts national interests first. He admitted that although Islam is the official religion in the constitution of Malaysia, because Malaysian people, according to him, immensely value the historical past, that does not mean theological. In foreign policy, Malaysia remains focused on maintaining economic growth and political stability in order to be heard by big countries like the US (interview with Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, May 23, 2024).

“Malaysia's national interest remains pragmatic, as we realize the real investment comes from Western countries. Hence, we provide land and stable sociopolitical conditions. However, in the context of global warfare, we remain true to our values, which are the values of Islam and developing countries, especially in protecting Muslim countries, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, who are not treated fairly by Western countries” (interview with Albar, May 23, 2024).

Although Malaysia's foreign policy is in its national interest and pragmatic, Jahwar argues that until now, the issue of identity and unity, especially in Peninsular Malaysia, has been a challenge. Islam is still a strong enough identity that it is also reflected in Malaysia's foreign policy, but even still, it is not too dominant, meaning that in Malaysia's foreign policy vision, there are only a few sentence points that discuss Islam (interview with Tan Sri Jahwar Hassan, May 26, 2024).

In this regard, written in the outline of Malaysia's foreign policy, it is stated that Malaysia implements an independent, principled, and pragmatic foreign policy based on the values of peace, humanity, justice, and equality. The main objective of its foreign policy is to safeguard its sovereignty and national interests and make a meaningful contributions to a just and equal community of nations through the implementation of effective diplomacy. As for several of Malaysia's foreign affairs principles, there are two points related to Islam or as a Muslim country and the Muslim world, namely point 7, which states that as a country with a Muslim majority, Malaysia also prioritizes community solidarity and the spirit of cooperation between the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and Malaysia's status as a developing country requires it to be actively involved in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the

Commonwealth, Group of Seventy-Seven (G77), Eight Developing Countries (D8), Asia Middle East Dialogue (AMED), Forum of East Asia-Latin America Cooperation (FEALAC), Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Point 8 states that through these organizations, Malaysia seeks to promote South-South Cooperation among developing countries and the Muslim world. Malaysia also advocates the “Prosper your neighbor” policy to improve economic relations and cooperation with neighboring countries through the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-the Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA), Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMTGT) and another entity (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, 2024).

Therefore, according to Jahwar, in terms of foreign policy, Malaysia is actually modern and secular. Still, at a certain point, because Malaysia is a member and one of the initiators of the OIC, even the first Secretary General of the OIC was Tunku Abdu Rahman, and Islam is written in the Malaysian constitution as the official religion of the state. In this regard, Jahwar argues that the most important thing is that the Malay identity is Muslim. Therefore, PAS navigates the fact of this social identity, so Islam becomes a significant factor in political competence within Malaysia. So even the UMNO, which is very secular, is motivated to play up Islamic issues, so there is a competition to see who can best defend the interests of Muslims and the Malay agenda in international eyes (discussed this issue in more detail in the following subsection) (interview with Tan Sri Jahwar Hassan, May 26, 2024).

In addition, Jahwar contends that the issue of Islam is always a concern (although not dominant) in Malaysia's foreign policy because Islam manifests itself in the image of Malaysia as a Muslim-majority country, easily seen from the symbol of the moon and stars in the Malaysian flag, so that actually the Islamic agenda in Malaysia is more robust, especially in domestic affairs. Although the Islamic identity is quite strong, Jahwar notes that Malaysia, also for its international image, always wants to present a moderate, progressive,

inclusive, and modern Islam. But because Malaysian Muslims, especially in Semenanjung, always feel insecure, the religious factor is always an issue, especially in facing elections. Second, because Malaysia is a small country and wants to contribute to a vast international community, it always tries to be loud on specific issues, especially Islam (interview with Tan Sri Jahwar Hassan, May 26, 2024).

However, Jahwar emphasizes one thing: Malaysia's foreign policy is the same as any other country's foreign policy, which is very secular and modern, unlike Islamic countries like Iran or Saudi Arabia. For those countries, Islamic values appear in foreign policy only as a philosophical element, and it depends on the personality of the leader as to how he understands Islam. In doing so, to respond to the Global War on Terror campaigned by the US and Western countries, which raises the stigma of Islam as a terrorist, to deflect that stigma, then similar to Indonesia, we also encourage the projection of moderate Islam (interview with Tan Sri Jahwar Hassan, May 26, 2024).

On the other hand, according to Ishak, there are three priorities for Malaysia's foreign policy. The priority is ASEAN because ASEAN is a neighboring country that is very close geographically, and especially in terms of geographical location, we border several ASEAN countries. The second priority is the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC). If you look at history, the first secretary general of OIC was Tunku Abdu Rahman, the former prime minister of Malaysia and the father of Malaysian independence. The third priority is the British Commonwealth because we negotiated independence with the British (interview with Dato' Mohamed Mustafa Ishak, May 27, 2024).

Regarding the relationship between Malaysia and the OIC, coincidentally, when the US was campaigning against global terror, Malaysia hosted the OIC summit from Oct. 11 to 18, 2003. This gathering forum of Muslim countries was used as an opportunity for Mahathir Mohamad to criticize US policy in the Global War on Terror. Terrorism simultaneously

depicts the current situation as one of the lowest points in Islamic history. It highlights the deepening gap between the West and the Muslim world in various fields, especially economics.

In a CNN note (2003), Mahathir even called on Muslims to imitate the Jewish response to the oppression experienced in the past, arguing that currently, the Jews have controlled the most powerful countries, and they, this small community, have become a world power. After the speech, according to a VOA report (2003), Australia, the European Union, and Belgium strongly criticized Mahathir Mohamad and called him an anti-Semite. The accusation that Israel controls powerful countries made in Mahathir's speech on the OIC drew a strong response from the Bush administration. President Bush labeled the statement as "false and divisive". The US Senate even threatened to cut military aid to Malaysia by US\$1.2 million over Mahathir's anti-Semitic remarks (Simon, 2004).

However, on the other hand, Mahathir also criticized Muslims in his speech by saying that Muslims have been mistaken for many years in believing that Islam rejects new technology and progress. For Mahathir, such an interpretation, coupled with accusations that Islam supports terrorism after 9/11, is the main reason why all Muslims suffer oppression and humiliation.

"Islam is not just for the seventh century AD. Times have changed. Like it or not, we have to change, not our teachings [...] Islam is not wrong, but the interpretation of our scholars can be wrong." (Mahathir, 2003).

Mahathir also, on that occasion, suggested that the OIC, as the foremost defender of Palestine, must act in unity and use its political, economic, and demographic power to restore the situation because, for almost 50 years, the Palestinians have remained marginalized by Israel. Apart from that, Mahathir also criticized the Muslim world for its lack of influence in the Palestine-Israel conflict and other issues (VOA, 2003).

The OIC Summit held in Putrajaya produced the Putrajaya Declaration on Knowledge and Morality for the Unity, Dignity, and Progress of the Ummah. However, Mahathir's speech as the host was very harsh in criticizing the US and insinuating that Israel ruled the world by controlling strong

countries by means other than war. This is slightly contrary to the six points. Putrajaya's declaration is, in fact, very normative and mainly encourages Muslim countries to be active at the international level and strengthen solidarity in the economy, even encouraging them to prioritize dialogue and cooperation in terms of dealing with terrorism. As the second point of the declaration states:

“We recognize the need for the Islamic world to enhance its engagement and interaction with other cultures and civilizations, including the West, and to take the initiative to promote constructive dialogue and mutual understanding with them, particularly in the context of the global efforts against international terrorism” (OIC, 2003).

In this case, according to Kamarulnizam, although Mahathir strongly criticized Bush's policies in the US-led Global War Terror, the US government continued to work with Malaysia because in Malaysia under Mahathir, the UMNO party was considered to have strong legitimacy and to be successful in countering radical movements. However, it was controversial under the Internal Security Act (ISA) umbrella. Since independence, under the Mahathir administration, the ISA umbrella became part of the pre-emptive law and one of the essential parts of Malaysia's development (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 24, 2024).

In this regard, Ishak argues that Malaysia has a long experience in dealing with radical Islamic groups in the country. For example, the Malaysian government once dealt with the Darul Arqam group because they wanted to establish an Islamic state, so in 1994, the Malaysian government banned Darqom, a ban that remains in place. According to Ishak, actually, in the context of fighting terrorist groups as campaigned for by America, we have done well. We know how dangerous they are, and we understand how they operate. Another example is that several Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist plans were foiled by Malaysian police and intelligence, for example, the JI attack plan in Bukit Bintang Kuala Lumpur, which failed because it was

detected by Malaysian intelligence (interview with Dato' Mohamed Mustafa Ishak, May 27, 2024).

However, despite Malaysia's perceived success in countering terror, as there have been almost no significant attacks in the country thanks to the ISA framework, this is still a concern for human rights activists and senators in the US. The meeting, according to current Malaysian reports, was to boost Mahathir's tarnished image in the US, especially after then-US Vice President Al Gore chastised the Malaysian government for stifling freedoms and praised those who rallied against Mahathir's government after the removal of Anwar Ibrahim as deputy prime minister. Even Mahathir's meeting, according to several media reports such as in *The Age* and *Sydney Morning Herald*, said the Malaysian government paid Abramoff's lobbyists, with payments from Malaysia made to the American International Centre, a fake "international think tank" founded by Abramoff's associate Michael Scanlon (*The Age*, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 2006)

In this case, it can be clearly seen that Mahathir's foreign policy, especially in addressing the Global War on Terror, has always taken refuge in being a defender of beliefs or values, be they Islam, Malay cultural identity, or the values of developing countries' interests, when, in fact, the policies he made were for his domestic political needs to maintain his power. Therefore, the role conception enacted by Malaysia under Mahathir was defender of faith. A more detailed explanation of this will be provided after this subsection by exploring the UMNO's history in the political dynamics that occur in Malaysia.

4.2.2 The Identities of Islam and Malay Cultural Identity on the UMNO's Political Strategy

According to Kamarulnizam, Islam is very dynamic in Malaysia's foreign policy. However, Islam is an official religion in the Malaysian constitution. In reality, Islam does not play a significant role in Malaysia's foreign policy. In this case, Islam is instead used as a political tool both in

Malaysia's foreign policy and especially domestic politics. One example Kamarulnizam cites is when Malaysia joined the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in 1971, which is a set of bilateral defense relations established by a series of multilateral agreements between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom, all members of the Commonwealth that used to be part of the British Empire with the aim of deciding what actions to take, either jointly or separately in response to external threats to the five countries (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 24, 2024).

Malaysia, under the leadership of Tunku Abdurrahman, was one of the countries that gave birth to the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1969, and even Tunku Abdurrahman was the first OIC secretary general. If it is consistent with the struggle of Islam, Malaysia should not be part of the FPDA because the UK is participating, a country that played a role in the birth of the state of Israel. Therefore, according to Kamarulnizam, the Palestinian issue and Malaysia's contribution to OIC are actually being capitalized for domestic political interests (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 24, 2024).

Due to the dynamic nature of the Islamic movement and politics within Malaysia, the government, dominated by the UMNO party, sought to address it through a pro-Islamic foreign policy. The aim is to win the hearts and minds of Malaysians by seeing Islam as part of Malaysia's foreign policy and defending the interests of Muslims in general. Therefore, because of the dynamics of internal Islamic politics, Malaysia always wants to be at the forefront of Islamic issues that are of international concern, such as the Palestine issue and, of course, the issue of the United States' invasion of Iraq in the Global War on Terror. Mahathir, who is supported by UMNO, is taking advantage of these issues. Even though Mahathir does not have Islamic credentials, he is skilled at playing Malaysian foreign policy in international matters, especially those related to Islamic topics and issues faced by developing countries (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 24, 2024).

Furthermore, the Global War on Terror campaigned for by the US was actually used by the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) as UMNO opposition to attract public sympathy. In October 2001, around eighty PAS members demonstrated in front of the US embassy with chants of "destroy the United States", "destroy the infidels", and "God is great" – the first protest held under the party's banner. Not only that, PAS even made a blanket statement that all Muslims who supported the United States were betraying Islam. The action was held again after Friday prayers on Oct. 12. Around 2,000 PAS supporters gathered outside the US embassy to protest US military actions in Afghanistan and call for jihad against the United States. According to Nathan (2002), the police even used water mixed with chemicals to disperse demonstrators when they started spreading their prayer mats to ask for God's intervention.

On the one hand, Kamarulnizam argues that the Global War on Terror was also a kind of a blessing in disguise because it justified Mahathir's government in confronting and suppressing Islamic movements, especially radical Islam and, of course, very vocal Islamic parties that wanted to defeat UMNO dominance like the PAS. In Nathan's notes (2002), the government arrested Islamic activists under the Internal Security Act (ISA) (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 24, 2024).

Among those arrested were top judicial leaders, including Ezam Mohd Noor (Youth Leader) and Tian Chua (deputy president). In addition, several PAS members, including Nik Adli, son of Kelantan Chief Minister Nik Abdul Aziz, have also been detained under the ISA umbrella. In this case, the Mahathir government reasoned that it was detaining several members of the Malaysian Militia Group (KMM) because they were taking part in training in Afghanistan. A wave of arrests under the ISA umbrella occurred in June 2001, when the government detained 25 KMM members. According to Nathan (2002), the government used the opportunity to fight domestic terror to stem the tide of Muslim support for the PAS, especially from government employees, lecturers, and students on campuses, by requiring them to sign a

"good behavior" pledge to reduce politics and ensure loyalty to the government.

According to Azizuddin, the UMNO and Mahathir have always been dealing with movements and political Islam in Malaysia, not only during the Global on Terror. In response to the Iranian revolution in 1979, fearing that his political opponents would adopt the Shia sect and its revolutionary movement, he co-opted the Islamic activist figure from ABIM, Anwar Ibrahim, who was influential in the Islamic Revivalism movement in Malaysia to enter Mahathir's government as deputy prime minister (interview with Azizuddin, May 27, 2024).

The political dynamics above caused Malaysia, in Reza Nasr's (2001) argument, to enter the period of Islamization (1981-1997), characterized by first, Malaysia experiencing a period of strong political stability and, second, factionalism within the UMNO decreasing. Nasr argues (2001) that this stability provided opportunities for the state to expand its power. In this phenomenon, Islamization extended the reach of the state into the private lives of Malays. Ultimately, Islamization provided the state with greater social control so that it could focus on building economic development. For example, the establishment of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), the establishment of Islamic Banking, and the encouragement to wear the hijab in public spaces.

However, Nasr (2001) argues that the Islamization carried out by the UMNO and Mahathir had many opposing sides for Malaysia, namely, poor laws and discrimination against women and minorities, as well as ideologization of political discourse in the public arena. Additionally, it encouraged Islamist activism and militant attitudes. For Nasr (2002), Islamization in some Muslim countries serves the interests of weak post-colonial states at a critical time and is always used to defend against severe challenges to their authority and to provide a means for them to survive serious challenges to their authority, and provides them with ideological tools that enable them to expand their power and reach and to create greater

harmony in state-society relations. Therefore, political legitimacy during the Mahathir era was robust. Muslims, as the majority, looked happy that Mahathir was seen defending Islamic values, in other words, emphasizing nationalist Islam with indigenous identity (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 24, 2024).

In this regard, Mahathir and the UMNO believe in the importance of a strong state for economic development; the value of democracy from the West does not necessarily have to be taken all. For example, because terrorism cells are challenging to detect, the ISA umbrella authorizes the Malaysian government to arrest someone who is considered a terrorist before they carry out an attack. Law enforcement is even authorized to detain for two years without bringing the detainee to court. Still, they are not labeled criminals if later proven innocent, and the government will provide rehabilitation. For the Malaysian government, prevention is more important than handling an act of terrorism. That is why Malaysia is considered a success in dispelling Jamaah Islamiyah (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 24, 2024). For instance, in the case of the Bali Bombings in Indonesia, the Malaysian police had provided information on a terrorist movement that would carry out a bombing action; in fact, the police in Indonesia could not prevent an arrest directly because they did not have a pre-emptive law and only relied on criminal law (KUHP) (interview with Kamarulnizam, May 24, 2024).

The other issue is economic inclusion. The UMNO and Mahathir were trying to leave behind Western values and influences in an attempt to improve the economic capabilities of the natives (Malays), for instance, Asian Tiger jargon. In this regard, Malay identity and Islam are very strongly connected. There is a tradition that ethnic Malays must be Muslim (interview with Azizuddin, May 24, 2024). In doing so, Mahathir promotes Asian values that have four pillars: strong authority, prioritizing groups rather than individuals, and strengthening the economy. Therefore, to achieve those agendas, the UMNO and Mahathir will always be in the wrapping of Malay and Islamic

identity. Consequently, Malaysia has difficulty building a Malaysian identity, unlike Indonesia, which has successfully built its Indonesian identity with Pancasila. However, that is what the UMNO can do with its inherent beliefs and values aimed at international dynamics to gain domestic political advantage (interview with Azizuddin, May 24, 2024).

As proof, the emphasis on Malay and Islamic identity has always been an issue in Mahathir Mohamad's speeches. No wonder he is considered the Ultra Malay in his party, the UMNO (David, 2010). For instance, on Sept. 28, 1999, Mahathir made a speech at a lunch at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.

“When the colonial powers left us, they also left us with huge ethnic and religious problems. Whereas before, Malaysia was predominantly Malaya and mostly Muslims, we have become a multi-racial society, a society divided into many religions and many languages, with loyalties to many religions and many languages. Many religions and many languages, uncertain loyalties, and conflicting identities. The Indigenous Malays, who numerically constitute the numerical majority and who constitute the majority of the electorate – the majority and who constitute the majority of the electorate – which the British say came to their aid and rescue – also find themselves the poorest and most backward community.”

According to Nasr (2001), the Islamization policy brought by the UMNO and Mahathir actually slowly diminished when, in 1997, several Southeast Asian countries were hit by an economic crisis, which resulted in disharmony in monetary policy between PM Mahathir and Deputy PM Anwar Ibrahim. Anwar Ibrahim encouraged Malaysia to be more open with advice from the IMF and economic restructuring and reform. At the same time, Mahathir preferred to protect the Malay elite businesses that he had nurtured for decades. However, the policy dispute in dealing with the economic crisis between these two government figures in Nasr's (2001) account led to a conflict over power. The fall of Soeharto from power in Indonesia for decades was used as an opportunity for Anwar Ibrahim to oust Mahathir from power with pro-democracy ideas and against authoritarian regimes. However, according to Nasr (2001), because Mahathir was backed by solid parties such

as the UMNO with its Malay elite, he sacked Anwar Ibrahim from his deputies and imprisoned him with immorality cases.

Differences in political support, especially coalition variations, are developed by Pepinski (2009), and so is understanding Soeharto's authoritarian regime in Indonesia, as well as Malaysia in the face of economic crisis. In Indonesia, the coalition between ethnic Chinese with mobile capital and fixed capital holders in the military prevented the regime from taking adjustment measures. Fixed capital holders in the military prevented the regime from adopting coherent adjustment measures, so inter-group conflicts toppled Soeharto from decades in power. In contrast, the coalition in Malaysia between Malay fixed capitalists and the Malay masses made the regime adopt coherent adjustment measures. The alliance between the Malay fixed capitalists and the Malay masses made the regime adopt an adjustment strategy that protected both interests and enabled the regime to adopt a coherent adjustment strategy. Mahathir successfully weathered the worst economic crisis in Southeast Asia.

In this case, according to Mustafa Ishak, because Malaysia is one of the countries that managed to get through the financial crisis that hit almost all countries in Southeast Asia, the Mahathir government was very confident and felt economically independent, so after that, Mahathir also wanted to appear independent in foreign policy and began to leave dependence on the spirit of Islamization, which started to be abandoned since parting with Anwar Ibrahim. But in fact, Ishak notes that there was a severe threat of domestic politics for the UMNO and Mahathir, namely the PAS, with its Islamic ideology, which continues to use religion as a tool to increase sympathy and voters. Even as the interplay between Islamic forces and the Mahathir regime disappeared after Anwar Ibrahim's imprisonment, the PAS increasingly used the space by using *takfiri* labels against its political opponents by labeling UMNO elites as *kafir* (interview with Ishak, May 27, 2024). In fact, Azizuddin notes that several Muslim political figures in the UMNO resigned because they did not like Mahathir's treatment of Anwar Ibrahim, who was

sacked and detained on immorality charges. Some of them joined the PAS (interview with Azizuddin, May 24, 2024).

In this case, according to Nasr (2002), Mahathir and the UMNO did win the 1999 election against a resurgent PAS and National Justice Party. However, the election result was a setback in the UMNO's electoral politics. The UMNO-led Barisan Nasional's victory stemmed solely from the strong showing of its constituent parties with their traditions, such as those in Borneo, southern Malaysia, and the Chinese. According to Nasr (2001), the ruling alliance did not do well among the Malays, which can be interpreted as a defeat for the UMNO. In Nasr's (2001) account, the UMNO performed poorly in northern Malay-dominated states, and its total number of seats dropped from 88 in the 1995 election to 72.

Meanwhile, the PAS maintained control of Kelantan, winning the state elections in Terengganu and provincial polls in Perlis and Kedah (Mahathir's home state). Even in Kelantan, the PAS won 41 of the 43 state parliamentary seats, and in Terengganu, 28 of the 32 seats, which the UMNO lost in both states. The PAS also increased its presence in the national parliament from eight to 27 members. The above election results also prove that the collapse of the Mahathir Muhammad and Anwar Ibrahim alliance has indeed opened up opportunities for the opposition, such as PAS, to bring Islam more profoundly into the national political constellation in Malaysia (Nasr, 2024).

In addition, according to Ishak, this situation was actually a form of *déjà vu*, when Mahathir needed a figure who could fight the PAS, namely Anwar Ibrahim, one of the influential Islamic activist figures, wanting to show that the UMNO is not a secular party. The government is not secular and has a strategy to deal with the PAS. Although, in reality, Mahathir was very secular, the above policies were carried out to defeat the PAS, which began to threaten his power. The dynamics of domestic politics encouraged Mahathir to demonstrate Islamic values and defend Islam in his foreign policy. For example, he was a defender of Islam, defending Muslims in conflicts such as the genocide in Bosnia and, of course, Palestine. Therefore, Malaysia has

always wanted to stand out in the OIC, and it is a priority part of our foreign policy. However, despite his vigorous defense of Muslims in several cases of international concern and the capitalization of Islam in his foreign policy, he also wants to show himself as a moderate Islamic leader. The UMNO is a very pragmatic party, so when the UMNO is in power, the government also follows the UMNO's style. Pragmatic here means that the UMNO is not driven by a particular ideology (interview with Dato' Mustafa Ishak, May 27, 2024).

In addition, according to Ishak, the UMNO is a strong party because it maintains three values: the monarchy, the Malay language, and Islam (Raja, Bahasa, Agama), and it is written in the Articles of Association and Statutes of the UMNO Party. These three things make the UMNO a strong party in Malaysia, apart from the fact that the party has consistently produced leaders with muscular regeneration, one of whom is Mahathir. The UMNO, in recent years, especially during the Mahathir era, has been the backbone of the Malaysian government. Therefore, the values and what the UMNO stands for are reflected in the dynamics of domestic politics and Malaysia's foreign policy (interview with Dato Mustafa Ishak, May 27, 2024).

Ishak also argues that Malaysia's domestic political dynamics were dominated by political parties that fought each other. He added that NGOs and civil society would mushroom and be strong when the government was not able to answer the demands and needs of the public, so the anti-government forces and sentiments are high. The Philippines and Indonesia are examples of where NGOs and civil society organizations grew because the government was unable to answer the challenges and needs of the public when the economic crisis hit Southeast Asian countries. Moreover, he acknowledges Malaysia, unlike Indonesia, does have a long historical dynamic related to big religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah (interview with Dato' Mustafa Ishak, May 27, 2024).

In doing so, according to Ishak, Mahathir's behavior in addressing the Global War on Terror cannot be separated from domestic political interests,

namely, to deal with the PAS and to consolidate UMNO voters. Foreign policy is an extension of domestic politics. There is a term that foreign policy begins at home, while the substance of Malaysia's foreign policy objectives has never changed, namely for the national interest. The terms that emerged after the Mahathir era, such as Hadari Islam in the Ahmad Badawi era, Wasatiyah Islam in the Najib Rajak era, and Masyarakat Madani in the Anwar Ibrahim era, were only concepts and packages according to the needs of their leadership domestically and internationally (interview with Ishak, May 27, 2024).

In this context, the UMNO, as the ruling party for many years in Malaysia, has a great interest in always maintaining its power. This is in line with Peterson's (1981) opinion referring to Appleton's hypothesis that getting the most votes for the next election is still the goal of rational party leaders and they will always position themselves as the party closest to the median voter's opinion on the issues faced in foreign affairs. Mahathir's leadership style and capacity to understand international problems and play on the sentiments of indigenous identities, both Islamic and Malay, makes him play the role of defender of faith in responding to the Global War on Terror in order to gain voter sympathy in facing the next election amid the threat of the PAS, whose focus is to take the Muslim vote niche. We can also see that the concepts of moderate Islam or Wasatiyah Islam that were raised in response to the Global War on Terror in Malaysia were almost all born from confident political leaders or regimes that have agendas for their respective political interests.

4.3 Idiosyncrasy Analysis of Megawati Soekarnoputri and Mahathir Mohamad

4.3.1 Leadership of Megawati Soekarnoputri

Megawati Soekarnoputri was born on Jan. 23, 1947, in Yogyakarta, one of the daughters of Soekarno, who was the first president of Indonesia and the proclaimer of Indonesian independence. Megawati was born in a situation

where the struggle for Indonesian independence was still trying to escape from the colonizers entirely, so she grew up in a situation of the Soekarno family that was not entirely normal. This is because, according to Ma'ruf (2013), Megawati had to go through an entire childhood of struggles and grow up when her father, Soekarno, experienced various political changes in Indonesia, as well as witnessing firsthand the process of removing Soekarno from the position of President of Indonesia until her husband died in the line of duty as a pilot of the Indonesian Republic Armed Forces (ABRI). With a series of sad events, according to Ma'ruf (2013), Megawati is known as quiet and motherly.

In childhood, Megawati was introduced to how to be a fighter and understand national and international politics. In her biography, she wrote:

“If *Bapak's* guests had returned home, *Bapak* often gave us explanations and comments on the issues discussed, especially if there were national and international events; for me, it was a valuable lesson when *Bapak* was still alive, while from *Ibu* Fatmawati, I learned a lot about how to maintain fortitude in the face of any suffering.”

According to Idris Thaha (2018), initially Megawati did not enter politics because the New Order regime that overthrew her father was still too strong and even endangered the family. Still, Megawati's second husband, Taufiq Kemas, sought to persuade Soekarno's children, including Guntur Soekarnoputra and Guruh Soekarnoputra, but only Megawati finally entered politics.

Megawati officially entered politics in 1987. However, she needed to catch up to her late father, Soekarno, in terms of rhetorical techniques. However, because of Soekarno's blood, the young Megawati's presence improved the image and votes of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in the elections. At that time, Megawati was elected as a member of the House of Representatives from the Central Java constituency, and within the party structure, she served as the chair of the PDI Branch Leadership Council (DPC) in Central Jakarta. At that time, Megawati was known as a

quiet and closed person, even known to rarely attend official sessions of members of the House of Representatives in the House of Representatives (Dhani, 2002).

Megawati only caught the attention of the public and especially President Soeharto's regime in 1993 when she was elected chair of the PDI-P and became increasingly popular and received sympathy from various levels of society when her leadership was overthrown through a “puppet” Congress created by the New Order regime in Medan in 1996. The peak of her popularity was when a group of people forcibly occupied the PDI-P office on July 27, 1996, known as the Kudatuli incident.

The character of rarely communicating and choosing to remain silent apparently carried over when Megawati became the fifth president of Indonesia, replacing President Abdurrahman Wahid, who was ousted by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR).

Megawati's lack of public speaking as head of state was sharply criticized by several political observers, such as Arbi Sanit (1999):

“President Megawati's silence is very worrying; presidents in some countries speak loudly, and she cannot hide from her character, which is considered quiet, and she is currently the leader of the nation.”

This is in contrast to Muslim scholar Nurcholis Madjid (2003), who said that President Megawati's biggest mistake was not being communicative.

"The national leadership needed at this time [of transition] is one able to deal with various crises. If the President acts as an administrator or manager, the crisis at hand will not be resolved” (Madjid, 2003).

According to Dhani (2002), there was a difference in communication style between her and President Abdurrahman Wahid, who was spontaneous. Journalists could ask the president directly about any issue, and journalists could even get the context and background information from the presidential spokesperson. In the era of President Megawati, apart from rarely speaking directly to the media, the presidential spokesperson was removed, and

government policies could only be conveyed by three coordinating ministers, namely the coordinating minister for political, legal, and security affairs; the coordinating minister for the economy and, finally, the coordinating minister for people's welfare.

However, even though this was Megawati's shortcoming, according to Thaha (2018), Megawati was one of the openers of the gates of democracy, including, first, the election of the president and vice president by the people. In this case the people can directly elect their leaders through Law No. 23 of 2003. Second was the establishment of the Constitutional Court through Law No. 24 of 2003. It is tasked with examining laws against the 1945 Constitution. Third was the establishment of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) as a law enforcement effort specifically to deal with corruption, which was rampant in the New Order.

According to AM Fachir, former official state interpreter for President Megawati and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for the 2014-2019 period, in his observation while accompanying President Megawati and associating with state leaders abroad, she always avoided dominant leadership, meaning that the interests of the country at that time were above her principal political interests because the issue of the Global War on Terror was not used as a political tool for her in domestic political affairs. After all, there was nothing to gain (interview with AM. Fachir, June 06, 2024).

In this case, according to Fachir, President Megawati was a low-profile figure who always wanted to learn and listen and always wanted to meet with people who were open to discussion. When visiting Washington after 9/11, she secretly met Henry Kissinger to hear input from the senior expert on international politics. Therefore, according to Fachir, the visit to the White House in the midst of the Global War on Terror was not just to deliver a message to the world. She also wanted to hear and learn from leaders of other countries and from experts (interview with AM. Fachir, June 06, 2024).

Furthermore, according to Fachir, Megawati was a low-profile figure in international relations and did not want to show that Indonesia was a big country, especially in ASEAN. Even when she was a newly elected president and it was a tradition to visit ASEAN countries, she always said, "I want to learn from your experience as leaders of countries in ASEAN", despite the fact that Indonesia was the largest country and had a tradition of leadership in ASEAN. In the eyes of Fachir, when Indonesia faced difficult times, president Megawati had the principle that unity was number one, so if you look at her expressions in her speeches, for example about the concept of "gotong royong" and "Pancasila", the diversity of Indonesia was really very much maintained by her (interview with Fachir, June 6, 2024).

According to Thaha (2018), in leading, Megawati prioritized the concept of "nation and character building", namely prioritizing the interests of the state amid the diverse Indonesian nation. Even though Indonesia is predominantly Muslim, Megawati is not a political Islamic figure, but she is a nationalist figure in line with the ideology of her party, the PDI-P. In this case, according to Thaha (2018), because of this nationalist nature, the values that the party fights for on the national stage are sometimes not in line with the aspirations of Muslims as the majority in Indonesia, for example, the rejection of the PDI-P and the Peace and Prosperity Party (PDS) of the pornography bill in 2006 was considered to contain sharia and Islamization. In fact, historically, Megawati's party was a vehicle and party that accommodated minority groups in Indonesia, such as Catholics and Protestants (Thaha, 2018).

In addition to Megawati's nationalist ideology and commitment to Pancasila, Fachir noted that President Megawati became President at that time because she continued the term of President Abdurrahman Wahid, meaning that there were different characteristics of leadership at that time. According to Fachir, Megawati's character at that time was indeed quite silent, but at certain times she came out with thoughts and was very accommodating to

various policy suggestions, one of which was from Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda, a senior diplomat at the Foreign Ministry who at that time handled Indonesia's diplomacy in human rights affairs from the transition from the New Order to the Reform era (interview with AM Fachir, June 06, 2024).

From the personal and character description above, namely when responding to the Global War on Terror, she displayed that she was a leader who was willing to listen and build dialogue with other countries and accommodate and involve leaders of religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah in the crisis. Megawati can be included in the category of consultative leaders, who respect constraints, stay close to information, focus on relationships and focus on monitoring that other power sources will support, or not actively oppose, what they want to do in a problematic situation. She was also accommodative, respecting constraints, open to information and focused on relationships, reconciling differences, building consensus, empowering others, and sharing accountability in the process (Hudson and Day, 2020). Therefore, the role that is enacted in Indonesia's foreign policy in response to the Global War on Terror is bridge builder. That is, instead of being confrontational, because Indonesia is consolidating democracy and has moderate religious organizations, Indonesia plays a listening role. It tries to be a bridge between Islam and the West, which were at the lowest point of their relationship because of the 9/11 incident, which was followed by the Global War on Terror policy by the US.

4.3.2 Leadership of Mahathir Mohamad

Mahathir Mohamad is from Alor Setar, Kedah Malaysia. Since childhood, Mahathir was strictly raised by his parents and disciplined, especially in daily learning (Rosdie and Shafie, 2020; Ong, 2005). This parental education made Mahathir a child who studied diligently and was persistent in his desires. At school, he was a popular student known for always carrying books and having good English skills (Rosdie and Shafie, 2020). During his medical education, Mahathir was already active in student

organizations, and his leadership skills began to emerge when he became president of the Islamic Union at the faculty (Harson, 1998). In addition, he has also started to actively write in the *Strait Times* and *Sunday Times* media, under the pen name C.H.E Det, addressing the issues and problems faced by the Malay nation, ranging from economic and educational to political issues (Mohamad, 2012).

After getting a medical degree, working as a doctor, and being bound as a royal employee, he did not stop being part of the UMNO party. Mahathir began to get seriously involved in politics in 1958 and released himself as a royal worker; then, in 1964, he entered Malaysian politics more deeply by becoming a member of parliament for Kota Setar Selatan by defeating a candidate from the PAS party (Mohammad 2012). After becoming a member of parliament at the city level and becoming a leading UMNO politician on Malay issues in 1969, and was awarded the Ultra Malay title by Lee Kuwan Yee, who became Prime Minister of Singapore (Ahmad, 1980).

The severity of Mahathir's criticism of PM Tunku Abdul Rahman in defense of the Malay nation led to his dismissal from the UMNO. At that time, Tunku Abdul Rahman was considered to be less defending the Malays and more concerned with non-Malays, especially in economic issues. During the dismissal period, Mahathir wrote a very phenomenal book entitled *The Malay Dilemma*, which voiced the privileges of the Malay Nation who had the right to their homeland (Bagi Khoo, 1995). The publication of the book was banned in Malaysia. After the ascension of Abdul Razak to the office of prime minister in 1972, Mahathir returned to the UMNO and was entrusted several times by PM Abdul Rahman in several positions, from the minister of lessons to becoming the Naib president of the UNMO at the 26th UMNO Grand Assembly and chosen to be the deputy prime minister of Malaysia in 1976 (Adam, 2004) (Rosdie and Shafie, 2020). The highlight of Mahathir's political career was when he became prime minister of Malaysia in 1981, replacing Hussein Onn.

During his tenure as prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad was known as “Bapa Permodenan Malaysia” because of the many development projects he undertook, such as the North-South Highway, Kuala Lumpur City Center, Petronas Twin Towers, Putrajaya, Cyberjaya, and Kuala Lumpur International Airport. According to Boo Teik Khoo (2003).

“Tun Dr. Mahathir introduced new policies in 1982, his mission and objectives were made clear, thus enabling him to modernize the system in the Malaysian public sector directly and bring the issue into behavioral change among the public service, civil servants, and structures”.

One of the most prominent features of Mahathir's leadership was being able to develop or transform Malaysia from an agrarian country to an industrialized nation. Mahathir believed that through his strong and positive leadership style, he could establish and modernize Malaysia into one of the “Asian Tigers” along with Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea (Boo Teik Khoo, 2003) (Udin, Khamis, Umar, 2020).

As for foreign policy issues, according to Dosch (2014), leaders like Mahathir are unique. He was characterized by outspoken views that polarized the international public. However, his distinctive style and charisma also fascinated listeners of Mahathir's speeches and statements. Instead of compromising, Mahathir's views provoked his opponents. In this context, Dosch (2014) gives examples of some of Mahathir's statements, such as:

“On Singapore: "It is impossible to be friendly with Singapore because of the neighboring city-state's unfriendliness towards Malaysia. Singapore is in a mood that rejects anything that comes from Malaysia. We try to be as friendly as possible. Still, it is not possible (2002), then On Australia: ‘European values in Asia, as if these were the good old days when people could shoot the aborigines without caring about human rights’ (2002), On Israel: ‘Jews rule the world by proxy’ (2003), lastly, On Myanmar: ‘Myanmar may have to be kicked out of ASEAN [...] in the end it may have to be that way’”.

Therefore, in Dosch's (2014) view, Mahathir had a strong character in foreign policy, especially in how he saw its relations with the West in general and Singapore, Australia, the United States, and Europe. The prime minister

almost entirely dominated Malaysia's foreign policy during the Mahathir era. Mahathir, in this case, shaped and directed his country's foreign affairs based on his values, beliefs, and preferences. In this context, Josch (2014) gives examples such as “Buy Britain Last” and the “Look East” campaign as the most striking example of a highly personalized foreign policy resulting from Mahathir's stable and uncontested domestic position over several years and aimed at reaching out to the broader public to gain domestic support.

According to Jahwar, a prime minister is the most decisive person in the decision-making process regarding Malaysia's foreign policy. This can be studied traditionally and historically. Malaysian foreign policy has always been dominated by the prime minister, for example, Tunku Abdu Rahman, then Tun Razak, and of course, Mahathir Muhammad, who was very dominant both at home and abroad. In this case, Jahwar Mahathir has a personality that makes his leadership strong because he is brilliant but also controversial. While serving as prime minister, he made Malaysia a rapidly developing country, especially in the economic field (interview with Tan Sri Jahwar Hassan, May 26, 2024).

Syed Ahmad Albar, a Mahathir-era foreign minister, confirmed that the prime minister was always the number one foreign policymaker in the Malaysian government. In his experience accompanying Mahathir Mohamad, he recognized him as a pioneer. One example is the prime minister, who always brings business people when visiting abroad because he knows the Malaysian economy must develop quickly. On the other hand, according to Albar, Mahathir is controversial, assertive, an avid reader, and a prolific writer, and he likes to express his opinions openly. So, according to him, Malaysia under Mahathir has strong leadership power, so its foreign policy is very confident (interview with Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, May 23, 2024).

On the other hand, in terms of personality, according to Albar, Mahathir is very analytical because of his background as a doctor, and he speaks very clearly. Mahathir really understands the subject he will relate in depth in each

speech. Therefore, what made an impression on Albar was that when the crisis hit Asia in 1998, Mahathir was like an economist who explained everything very systematically and brought new ideas. The shortcomings of Mahathir's leadership for Albar were that he needed to be more firm on corruption and prepare leaders who had capacity like him, especially in the UMNO party (interview with Tan Sri Syed Ahmad Albar, May 23, 2024).

The above statement is in line with Sudarnoto, who argues that there is almost no UMNO figure who can replace Mahathir's character and leadership. Sudarnoto argues that one of the characteristics of an authoritarian leader is the inability to prepare a figure as strong as himself. Evidently, after Mahathir stepped down in 2003, the UMNO has yet to produce a figure of Mahathir's class, and the UMNO is also not as strong as when Mahathir was in power. Because what the UMNO has prepared is a political machine, not figures ready to replace Mahathir. In addition, conflicts between leaders are also extreme in Malaysia, such as the conflict between Mahathir Mohamad and Anwar Ibrahim. Therefore, the UMNO also relies heavily on Mahathir's charisma because the defense of Malay is quite strong, and nationalism is vital, so he refuses, is vocal on the issue of sovereignty, and dares to fight the West (interview with Sudarnoto Abdulhakim, June 07, 2024).

In the context of addressing the Global War on Terror, according to Embong (2015), Mahathir reacted strongly by saying “they have shown that they are ready to invent false allegations to fight wars to kill children, the elderly, the sick, the war on terrorism since 9/11 is an excuse for Anglo-Saxon Europeans to return to their violent ways”. Mahathir made this statement at the NAM Summit. Later, after taking over the chairmanship of NAM in 2003, Mahathir stated, “The Global War on Terror is taking place because of the revival of the old European trait of wanting to rule the world, and the expression of this trait has always involved injustice and oppression of people of different ethnicities and skin colors.”

Those views, according to Embong (2014), made media such as the *New York Times* label Mahathir a “courageous politician”. Still, at the same time, they regarded Mahathir as “aggressive”, “abrasive”, and often “sharp-tongued”. In this case, Mahathir's criticism of the West is more about the arrogance of Western countries because, on the one hand, he also admires Western progress. Because of his courage and self-confidence, Mahathir has, in recent years, become the primary spokesperson for developing countries facing Western progress. In doing so, because he supports the Arab and Muslim struggle in the international arena in response to the Global War on Terror, Mahathir is considered a “bigot” and anti-Semitic figure by Western countries.

In this regard, according to Jahwar, in looking at Malaysia's foreign policy, the most crucial factor to look at is the character of a leader. He argues that Mahathir is outspoken and sometimes gets in trouble because his personality is very dominant. However, Jahwar underlined that although Mahathir strongly defended Muslim countries affected by the Global War on Terror, in fact, he was not solely defending Islam. In this regard, in Jahwar's view, it must be seen from a broad perspective because the issues above are always voiced by developing countries about injustice. Therefore, when the Global War on Terror advocated by the US became a misperception of Islam but the other leaders of Muslim countries were busy with their domestic affairs, Mahathir took advantage of the opportunity to speak out loudly against the Global War of Terror's methods (interview with Tan Sri Jahwar Hassan, May 26, 2024).

According to Azizuddin, Mahathir had capital because his 22 years of leading Malaysia were strong, making him famous and charismatic, always bringing the UMNO to power. However, because he felt that Malaysia was a small country, he always wanted to show that Malaysia had a vital role in other countries (interview with Azizuddin, May 27, 2024). In addition, Azizuddin also noted that big ideas about concepts and policies in Malaysia

always emerged from the figure of the leader, for example, Asian Values by Mahathir and Hadari Islam by Ahmad Badawi. In addition, traditional Malaysian society was still feudal, so the figure and charisma of the leader were very influential and powerful in Malaysia (interview with Azizuddin, May 27, 2024).

Therefore, if you look at Mahathir's footsteps since he was young, as reviewed above, Mahathir was known to be critical. Even at the beginning of his career as a politician, he criticized the UMNO elite for being too accommodating to non-indigenous Malay people after independence from Britain, so he poured his critical ideas into the book *The Malay Dilemma*. This caused Mahathir to have his idiocentrism, so his charm, prestige, and image have always been a concern in international forums, and some even dubbed him a little Soekarno (interview with Dato' Mustafa Ishak, May 27, 2024).

Thus, from the six concepts of the idiosyncrasy approach proposed by Herman (2003) to analyze foreign policy by looking at Mahathir's character both from his policies and speeches so far, Mahathir was a charismatic leader, namely, open to information and focused on relationships that were focused on achieving the agenda by involving others in the process and persuading them to act as he encouraged OIC leaders to unite in providing support to Palestine and to be critical of the Global War on Terror. He also belongs to the category of directive leaders, who personally guide policies along a path consistent with their views while still working within the norms and rules of their current position. This is reflected in the ideas that come out of his mind for Malaysia projection such as "Look Least," "Asian Values" and also "Tiger of Asia".

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

By examining two Muslim-majority countries in Southeast Asia, this study shows that there are two variations of foreign policy produced by the governments of the two countries in response to the Global War on Terror. By using a two-level game approach in recognizing Robert Putnam's (1988) foreign policy, namely by looking at the internal domestic dynamics of a country, both political party and interest groups or civil society, and using role conception theory to see the patterns of commitment, national identity, principles and values that a country wants to project at the international level, this study found that Indonesia enacted the role of bridge builder under Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration to respond to the Global War on Terror due to the strength of civil society at the domestic level, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah in responding to the Global War on Terror after 9/11, which caused misperceptions between the West and Islam. According to Holsti (1988), the national role conception of bridge builder often appears in a vague form, consisting of various forms of diplomatic interposition in conflict issues. The themes raised usually imply communication, namely acting as a "translator" or connector of messages and information between people of different cultures, races, and religions.

In addition to the existence of these two mass organizations, Indonesia's post-reform conditions caused Indonesia to engage in a democratic transition, which made the government unstable, marked by several domestic religious and ethnic conflicts such as in Ambon, Maluku, and the separatist movement in Aceh. This also encouraged the Indonesian government to open itself up to various inputs and assistance both at the international level and domestic elements such as NU and Muhammadiyah in navigating the Global War on Terror. By using the idiosyncrasy approach, this study also looks at the character and personality of Megawati, who grew up in the Soekarno family, which is very nationalist and secular. Still, it has a low profile that prefers to listen and learn from outsiders, so in responding to the Global War on Terror, Megawati, referring to Herman (2003), is categorized as

consultative accommodative. Apart from her short term as president of only three years, this attitude and style made Megawati less dominant in Indonesia's foreign policy.

As for Malaysia, under Mahathir Mohamad, Malaysia's foreign policy was pragmatic in practice, promoted the national interest and was secular despite Islam being the country's official religion. However, in responding to the Global War on Terror, Malaysia under Mahathir Mohamad strongly criticized this agenda, especially when the US attacked several Islamic countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In this sense, domestic politics and the interests of the UMNO party in electoral competence forced them to play the role of projecting the values that were a strong part of Malaysian identity, such as Islam, Malay, and empathy for the conditions of developing countries.

In this case, the role of being the protector of Islam was of particular importance because the threat to the UMNO and Mahatir's rule was the PAS, a party that heavily relies on Islamic discourse as a political tool to attract votes. As Holsti (1970) argues, the defender of faith role is when some governments view their foreign policy objectives and commitments in defending a value system. Those who subscribe to the national role conception of defenders of certain beliefs and values consider that they have a special responsibility to guarantee and maintain ideological purity for their country or other countries.

This role as defender of faith is supported by Mahathir Mohamad's assertive and dominant character and leadership style. His outspoken nature and strong vision made it very easy for Mahathir to play the values he believed in for the betterment of Malaysia and his domestic political interests. The experience of leading Malaysia for two decades and having a stable economy made him confident enough to strongly criticize the West in the context of the Global War on Terror and also be an advocate for the Muslim world. So, in Herman's (2003) categorization, his leadership style was that of a charismatic leader, namely, open to information and focused on relationships that are focused on achieving the agenda by involving others in the process and persuading them to act. He was also a directive leader,

focused on policies that personally guided policies along a path consistent with his views while still working within the norms and rules of his current position (Herman, 2003).

Hence, this study contributes to the study of democracy and the power of civil society in Muslim countries, which is not only able to change the government system at the domestic level but also has an impact on a more open foreign policy. On the other hand, it also contributes to the study of leadership and political parties in terms of how to maintain power through foreign policy. If the Global War on Terror was a kind of hidden gift for Mahathir Mohamad and the UMNO to gain domestic political interests to maintain power, then for Indonesia, the Global War on Terror was also a kind of a blessing in disguise for the increasing role of non-state actors in foreign policy like NU and Muhammadiyah and other mass organizations. These findings are relevant to Paterson's (1981) hypothesis because the nature of parties is to maintain power in order to face the next election, they will always push foreign policies that are relevant to their need to attract the sympathy of domestic voters. Meanwhile, in the conditions of a democratic country, many actors will emerge, especially if there is a strong civil society, and will play a role both as pressure groups and in providing input in foreign policy (Moravcsik, 1997)

Furthermore, when looking at the historical and domestic political approaches, this study also finds the same pattern that strong parties with charismatic and strong leaders in Muslim-majority countries always use foreign policy as a tool to attract the sympathy of Muslim-majority voters. Tunku Abdu Rahman used the OIC as a platform to attract Muslim sympathies when his influence was waning in domestic politics in 1969 due to ethnic conflicts in Malaysia. In Indonesia, Soeharto also did the same thing by bravely visiting conflict areas in Bosnia in 1995 to attract Muslim sympathy when ABRI, his leading supporter, had begun to abandon him, so he approached Islamic forces to maintain his power, domestically then established the ICMI and established many mosques through the Pancasila charity foundation (Slater, 2009).

The discovery of the pattern above is a result of looking at the relevant issues using a historical approach. Especially in the case of Malaysia, the domestic political interests of the ruling party, such as the UMNO, ultimately gave rise to a stable role for Malaysia as a defender of faith or a ranger for the Muslim world. As said by Karim (2018), historical experience can be an important factor for a country in developing its current role conception because historical experience is usually a legitimizing tool to justify or support the foreign policy agenda of leaders. In this case, Karim (2018) stated that the superiority of national role conceptions based on a historical perspective is usually more stable and continues to be upheld by leaders, while newer role conceptions can be easily challenged and reduced, especially if the concept is not in accordance with the historical perspective.

However, this study has limitations in that it only examines the dynamics of the two Muslim-majority countries in responding to the Global War on Terror and focuses more on domestic politics that had an impact on the foreign policies of the two countries. This has implications for the findings, which almost all explain the domestic situation faced by the two governments at the time. One illustrates the dynamics of domestic politics, namely parties and leaders who want to maintain power through elections, while the other is reorganizing the post-reform government so as to empower civil society to respond to Global War on Terror policies.

Furthermore, it must be recognized that comparing figures such as Mahathir Mohamad and Megawati Soekarnoputri when measured by experience and length of rule is clearly very different. This certainly has an impact on the state capacity of the two governments, which can be measured accurately with a statistical and quantitative approach. Therefore, this study did not cover the state capacity and state bureaucracy in influencing the foreign policies of the two Muslim-majority countries with the nuances of political economy studies. Future research can take this approach to enrich and patch up the shortcomings in this research, especially in studying the Muslim majority's foreign policy in responding to Global War on Terror or responding to international issues that significantly affect them.

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