POLITICS, PROSELYTIZATION, AND THE GLOCALIZATION OF SALAFISM IN POST-9/11 INDONESIA AND NIGERIA

A Thesis

Submitted to the Masters Study Program of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts (M.A.)

By:

Muhammad Muhammad Nasir

01212220005

UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA

DEPOK

2024

POLITICS, PROSELYTIZATION, AND THE GLOCALIZATION OF SALAFISM IN POST-9/11 INDONESIA AND NIGERIA

A Thesis

Submitted to the Masters Study Program of Islamic Studies at the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts (M.A.)

By:

Muhammad Muhammad Nasir

01212220005

UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA

DEPOK

2024

ABSTRACT

Muhammad Muhammad Nasir
Muhammad.nasir@uiii.ac.id
01212220005
MA in Islamic Studies
Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII)

Contrary to the simplistic view that portrays the dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria as solely influenced by Saudi Arabia, this thesis offers a novel perspective through a comparative study of these two important Muslim-majority countries outside of the Arab world. Although Saudi financial support played a significant role in the spread of Salafism, I contend that local actors are significantly influencing the dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, and to a certain extent, even shaping how it took root and evolved. Thus, the concept of *Glocalizing Salafism* is introduced to emphasize the importance of considering both global influences and the local agency in understanding Salafism's development and dynamics in Indonesia and Nigeria. To be precise, this concept highlights how local actors adapt Salafism discourse and practices to align with local cultural norms, political realities, and social needs, making Salafis a sort of 'dynamic actors', particularly in the wake of the events of 9/11 and the ongoing geopolitical changes in Saudi Arabia. In the same fashion, I also assess the impact of pivotal global events, mainly in the middle east in the 1979, such as the Grand Mosque seizure, known in many literature as the 'Mecca Uprising', and the Iranian revolution, which prompted the dissemination of Saudi Salafism, and by implication buttresses the Saudi Arabia's strategic geopolitical manoeuvring to politically position itself as the central player in the Middle East, and to maintain its preeminent in the Muslim world. Grounded in qualitative interviews and fieldwork in Indonesia and Nigeria, this study explored the diverse trajectories of Salafism shaped by local cultures, geopolitical influences, and global events through a novel comparative approach. Still, future research could explore the evolving nature of Salafism in these regions, considering the ongoing geopolitical changes in Saudi Arabia under MBS.

Keywords: *Geopolitical Influences, Glocalizing Salafism, Indonesia, 9/11, Nigeria, Salafism, Saudi Arabia*.

الملخص

الاسم: محمد محمد ناصر

البرنامج: الدراسات الإسلامية

العنوان: السياسة والتبشير وعولمة السلفية (Glocalizing Salafism) في إندونيسيا ونيجيريا ما بعد 11 سبتمبر (11/9)

على عكس النظرة التبسيطية التي تصور تطورات التدين السلفي في كل من إندونيسيا ونيجيريا والمتأثر بالدعم والتوجيه من قبل المملكة العربية السعودية، حاولت في هذه الأطروحة تحدي هذه النظرة التبسيطية من خلال تقديم منظور جديد يقارن بين بلدين مهمين واستراتيجيين من الدول ذات الأغلبية المسلمة خارج العالم العربي، إندونيسيا ونيجيريا. على الرغم من أن الدعم المالي السعودي لعب دورًا مهمًا في انتشار السلفية في هذين البلدين، إلا أنني أزعم أن الجهات الفاعلة المحلية تؤثر بشكل كبير على تطورات التدين السلفي في إندونيسيا ونيجيريا، بل إنها هي من تساهم في تجذر وتطور الأنموذج السلفي وبالتالي، تم تقديم مفهوم "عولمة السلفية (Glocalizing Salafism) في هذا البحث للتأكيد على أهمية النظر في كل من التأثيرات العالمية والفاعلين المحليين في فهم تطور وحركية السلفية في إندونيسيا ونيجيريا. وبالتحديد يسلط هذا البحث الضوء على كيفية تكييف الجهات الفاعلة المحلية لخطاب السلفي وممارساته كي يتماشى مع المعايير الثقافية المحلية والواقع (Dynamic Actors) السياسي والاحتياجات الاجتماعية، مما يجعل السلفيين نوعًا من "الفاعلين الديناميكيين ، خاصة في أعقاب أحداث 11 سبتمبر (11/9) والتغيرات الجيوسياسية الجارية، لا سيما في المملكة العربية السعودية. وعلى نفس المنوال، أقوم أيضًا بتقييم تأثير الأحداث العالمية المحورية، خاصة في الشرق الأوسط في عام 1979، مثل اقتحام المسجد الحرام، المعروف في العديد من الأدبيات بـ "انتفاضة مكة"، والثورة الإيرانية، هذه بعض المعطيات التي جعلت المملكة العربية السعودية تعمل على توظيف السلفية لدعم التمركز الجيوسياسي الاستراتيجي في الشرق الأوسط، والحفاظ على ريادتها الدينية في العالم الإسلامي. واستنادًا إلى المقابلات النوعية والعمل الميداني في إندونيسيا ونيجيريا، استكشفتُ المسارات المتنوعة للسلفية التي شكلتها الثقافات المحلية والتأثيرات الجيوسياسية والأحداث العالمية من خلال نهج مقارن جديد. وبالتالي فإن للبحث إمكانية استكشاف الطبيعة المتطورة للسلفية في هذه المناطق، ثم النظر إلى التغيرات الجيوسياسية الجارية في المملكة العربية السعودية في ظل حكم محمد بن سلمان (MBS).

الكلمات المفتاحية: المؤثرات الجيوسياسية، عولمة السلفية، إندونيسيا، 11 سبتمبر (11/9)، نيجيريا، السلفية، المملكة العربية السعودية

ACKNOWLEDMENTS

First and foremost, I am forever grateful to Almighty Allah for His divine guidance, inspiration, and grace throughout my academic journey. My academic journey at Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia has been a remarkable experience, shaped by the guidance, support, and expertise of numerous individuals. I am forever grateful for their contributions. I extend my heartfelt appreciation to my supervisor, Prof. Noorhaidi Hasan, for his precious guidance, support and expertise in Islam and Politics. His suggestions and feedback have significantly enhanced the quality of this thesis.

Likewise, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my friends here at UIII. Their presence has been a constant source of motivation and strength. I am particularly indebted to Abdullahi Abubakar and Youssef Faiz, for their assistance in translating the interviews data from Arabic to English. Specifically, Mr. Abubakar's support during the data collection process in Yogyakarta and LIPIA, Jakarta, has been instrumental. Their proficiency in Arabic has greatly contributed to the accuracy of the interview data translation.

In addition, I extend my appreciation to my professors at the Faculty of Islamic studies at UIII for their guidance, support, and rigorous training. I am particularly grateful to Haula Noor, Ph.D., for her meticulous attention to detail, ensuring that we paid attention to the smallest details, such as using the right phrases in the correct context. For instance, she would say, "Nasir, this is a proposal, so include the word 'will' when you use the phrase 'the research examines…' In the same fashion, I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Syamsul Rijal, Ph.D., Prof. Yanwar Pribadi, Ph.D., Dr. Phil. Syafiq Hasyim, Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin, S.J.D., Bhirawa Anoraga, Muhammad al-Marakeby, Ph.D., Aria Nakissa, Ph.D., Faried F. Saenong, Ph.D., Dr. M. Ilyas Marwal, MM., and other lecturers for their invaluable contributions to my academic journey.

I would also like to thank the staff at UIII for their kindness and support, especially the administrative staff at the Faculty of Islamic Studies. Special thanks to Anindhita Timika Aryani, Fakhriyan Ardyanto, Dzakiyyah Fauziya R, and M. Naufal Wiratama, who made me feel at home throughout my time in Indonesia. I will always cherish the memories of the variety of snacks and goodies they provided.

Also, the cooperation and participation of my interviewees and interlocutors were essential to the success of this research. I am deeply grateful to each of them for generously sharing their time and information throughout my fieldwork. Their tremendous support was critical in completing this research. In addition, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to my Nigerian friends and colleagues who served as my research assistants back home. This effort could not have been accomplished without their unwavering support.

Last but not the least, I am grateful to my family, and Miss Saemah Shamim, and all my loved ones for their encouragement, prayers, and support. May Almighty Allah's blessings continue to be upon them.

Table of Contents

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

In scholarly discourse and journalistic reports, there is a prevailing notion that Saudi Arabia's financial backing for transnational religious proselytization plays an important role in the spread of its variant of Salafism across the world[1]. Undoubtedly, the subsidized dissemination of Salafi literature from and by Saudi-based institutions and networks has significantly contributed to the accessibility of Salafism in various regions, a topic extensively discussed by many scholars in distinct contexts[2][3]. As a result, for the past five decades, the religious proselytization initiatives by Saudi Arabia have exerted a profound influence on the religious, social, and cultural structure of many Muslim majority and minority countries.

Since the 1960s, both the Saudi religious establishment and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs have invested significant financial resources into religious proselytization activities or *da'wa*[4]. These include diverse initiatives such as the construction of mosques, financial support for religious schools, dissemination of religious literature, sponsorship of scholarships for religious education in Saudi Arabia, and using media to promote religion and Islamic identity. In addition to the Saudi government's efforts, many other Saudi-affiliated entities have also helped in this endeavour. These include quasi-governmental organizations like the Muslim

[1] See David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006), https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755609444., Carol E B Choksy and Jamsheed K Choksy, "The Saudi Connection: Wahhabism and Global Jihad," *World Affairs* 178, no. 1 (2015): 23–34, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43555279., Simon Ross Valentine, *Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond* (Hurst & Company, London, 2015)., Krithika Varagur, "The Call. Inside The Global Saudi Religious Project," 2020.

[2] See Amanda Kovacs, "Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia's Muslims," *7*, no. 7 (2014).

[3] Noorhaidi Hasan, "Salafism in Indonesa: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance," in *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia*, ed. Robert W. Hefner (Routledge, 2018).

[4] Peter Mandaville, *Wahhabism and the World*, *Wahhabism and the World*, vol. 53 (Oxford University Press, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197532560.003.0001.

World League (MWL) and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), humanitarian relief agencies such as the International Islamic Relief Organization (IRO), and private charities like *Waqf al-Islami*[5].

Consequently, contemporary discussions on Salafism have evolved beyond its classical roots, particularly in the wake of the 1970s when Saudi Arabia embarked on a strategic rebranding of Wahhabism. This transformation, aptly termed as a *reconstituted form of Wahhabism*[6] saw Saudi Arabia exporting a repackaged form of Wahhabism under the label of Salafism. In the subsequent chapter, I will provide a detailed assessment of the political, and religious factors that have contributed to the rise of this variant of Salafism[7]. While this may appear as an ideological endeavour by Saudi Arabia to propagate its variant ideological system, it also bears elements of geopolitical and strategic manoeuvring, positioning Saudi Arabia as a central force in the Muslim world. This ideological drive aligns with the political economy of Saudi Arabia. With historical support from the United States during the Cold War era[8]. Also, currently the shift in allegiance to the West underscores the evolving dynamics of this geopolitical struggle.

However, these transformations did not occur in isolation. Several factors both internally and externally have contributed to this shifting paradigm, including challenges to the legitimacy of ibn Saud by groups such as the *Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (the Muslim Brotherhood), the Juhayman al-Otaybi's seizure of the grand mosque, as well as the Iranian revolution, the Arab-Israeli war, which ultimately led to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty known as the camp David accord of September 1978 with the intervention of the USA. All these were some of the significant factors resulted in this shift[9].

---

[5] Mandaville.
[6] Hasan, "Salafism in Indonesa: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance."
[7] Saudi variant of Salafism is used interchangeably with reconstituted Wahhabism, or Salafism throughout this research.
[8] Noorhaidi Hasan, "Salafism, Education, and Youth: Saudi Arabia's Campaign for Wahhabism in Indonesia," ed. Peter Mandaville, *Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam* (Oxford University Press, April 14, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197532560.003.0007.
[9] Nasir Al-Huzaimi, *The Mecca Uprising: An Insider's Account of Salafism and Insurrection in Saudi Arabia*, ed. David Commins, *Paper Knowledge . Toward a Media History of Documents* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2021).

Also, it is crucial to note that a historical analysis of modern Saudi religious transnationalism reveals that, following the 1979 Iranian revolution, Saudi concerns about the potential of Iran to challenge the Saudi Arabia's preeminent Muslim voice in the geopolitical landscape grew. Hence, Saudi religious export activities were diverted to counter further Iranian influence, especially in sub-Saharan Africa[10].

However, the spread of Saudi transnational Salafism cannot be solely attributed a top-down politically motivated strategy. Also, it emanated from the sense of religious obligation that the Saudis feel towards other Muslims around the world. For example, the direction of the Saudi supports in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s also correlated with the increasing popularity of Pentecostal evangelical Christianity, indicating a competitive dimension between the Muslims and the Christians[11]. Muslim groups in countries like Nigeria, facing growing Christian influence, have actively sought Saudi support and resources to bolster their own Islamic Movements. This indicates another dimension beyond pure geopolitics motive. But, considering the above illustration related to the geopolitical dimension of the spread of Salafism, it becomes pertinent to undertake this research considering multiple dimensions, especially political, and socio-religious perspective. This is significant because, contrary to conventional realpolitik which suggests that religion holds little significance in world politics, this study aims to demonstrate how the use of religious soft power can intertwine with geopolitical strategies, shaping the spread of transnational Salafism.

Indonesia in southeast Asia and Nigeria in west Africa with their substantial Muslim populations, Indonesia being the largest Muslim-majority country by population and Nigeria having one of the largest single Muslim populations[12]–, serve as significant recipients of Saudi global Salafism. Mainly through institutional support, educational activities as well as proselytization efforts. This makes them a compelling context for a comparative case study of the Saudi Salafism's historical evolution and trajectories outside the Arab world–particularly Indonesia and

[10] Peter Mendaville, "Soft Power, Islam, and Religiosity: Perspectives From the Middle East" (RSIS Video Cast, 2023), https://youtu.be/9DhTMVDlEPk?si=AsR8W0VZxKAKU8r8.
[11] Mendaville.
[12]Pewresearch, "The Future of the Global Muslim Population," *Pew Research Center*, 2011, https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/.

Nigeria. It is observed that this variant of Salafism (Saudi Salafism) can be conceptualized as a form of reconstituted Wahhabism, marked by its concern with matters of creed and morality, including strict monotheism, divine attributes, purification of Islam from accretions, anti-Sufism, and development of the moral integrity of the individual. Because of the pejorative connotation of the term Wahhabi among Muslims, the term Salafism has been used as the banner of the movement[13].

Therefore, Indonesia and Nigeria were selected as case studies due to the distinct manifestations of transnational Salafism in these countries. Also, by being among the most significant countries who serve as the recipients of the Saudi Arabia generous supports via institutional support, educational supports, in the form of awarding scholarships for students to study in Saudi Arabia, and in some cases, by even establishing educational institutions in the countries. For example, the establishment of LIPIA in Indonesia. However, it is important to note that Indonesia, with its historical tradition of syncretic and mystical Islam, has a relatively small Salafist minority compared to Nigeria.

Thurston, in his study, examines Nigeria's experience with Salafism through the lens of a canon, defined as *a communally negotiated set of texts governed by rules of interpretation and appropriation*[14] He identifies two phases, from 1880 to 1950, which saw Sunni scholars with a common Hadith-cantered methodology coming into closer contact. The second phase, from the 1960s to the present, witnessed the founding of key Salafi institutions in Saudi Arabia, such as the Islamic University of Medina, and the sponsorship of students from countries like Nigeria to study in Saudi Arabia. These students were deeply immersed in the Saudi variant of Salafism, before returning home to spread it among the local Muslims[15].

[13] Hasan, "Salafism in Indonesa: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance."
[14] Alexander Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria Islam, Preaching, and Politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2016).
[15] Alexander Thurston.

Nigeria and similar regions proved to be fertile ground for the dissemination of Salafism from Saudi Arabia (and even the broader Arab Gulf), by harnessing their petrodollars. This provided an opportunity for local Muslims, especially those from more humble backgrounds to challenge the dominance of hereditary ruling families and established religious classes who were mainly loyal to the Saudi regime and its *ulama*. Hence, while acknowledging the role played by the local actors at the national contexts, it is also important to recognize that historical institutional and educational support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries played a more significant role than this suggests. Saudi Arabia, through institutions like the Islamic University of Medina, provided a key platform for Nigerian Salafis. Many prominent Nigerian Salafi preachers, for instance, are graduates of Medina and their understanding of Islam was undoubtedly shaped in one way or another by their education there. Financial backing from the Gulf also aided the establishment and early growth of some Salafi institutions in Nigeria[16].

In Indonesia, Saudi Arabia has expanded its influence beyond the traditional approach of offering scholarships, by establishing its own institutions, such as the *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* (LIPIA) in Jakarta around the 1980s. This strategic location enables the LIPIA to serve as a hub for Salafi norms and traditions, effectively creating a Saudi microcosm in the heart of Indonesia[17]. Moreover, the LIPIA plays a crucial role in facilitating Saudi Arabia's broader influence on Indonesian society and serves as a gateway for Salafi ideology to spread across Southeast Asia. Largely, I maintain that these local Salafi institutions in Indonesia play a crucial role in disseminating Salafism in the region. Likewise, in Nigeria, a similar approach was employed. Moreover, in the 1990s, Indonesia experienced a significant increase in Saudi-backed transnational religious influence and funding over the past few decades. This has led to a surge in Islamic religious proselytization activities promoting Salafism, resulting in the establishment of Salafi-focused foundations and *madrasahs*[18].

[16] Ousmane Kane, *Muslim Modernity In Postcolonial Nigeria* (BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON, 2016).
[17] Kovacs, "Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia's Muslims."
[18] Noorsharil Saat & Ahmad Najib Burhani, ed., *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia* (ISEAS Publishing, Singapore, 2020).

In this research I examine the role of Saudi transnational proselytization in driving the emergence and trajectories of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria through the lens of a comparative study. This approach underscores the importance of the agency of local Indonesian and Nigerian Salafi actors in shaping Salafism discourse and practice. Contrary to some existing scholarship and policy-oriented analysis that depicts Salafism as merely a Saudi export, at the heart of this research, I seek to problematize such simplistic portrayals by highlighting how local and national contexts, and the strategies of local religious actors have shaped the dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria. I contend that local actors are significantly influencing the dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, and to a certain extent, even shaping how it took root and evolved. Thus, the concept of *Glocalizing Salafism* is introduced to emphasize the importance of considering both global influences and the local agency in understanding Salafism's development and dynamics in Indonesia and Nigeria. This local demand plays a significant role in shaping Salafism, making it a more complex and multifaceted phenomenon than a simple top-down imposition. As Mandeville views, it is incorrect to assume that the flow of religious influence or the global dynamics of the Saudi Salafism always follows a one-way, hegemonic pattern, where Saudi Arabia imposes its brand of Islam on the world. Besides, it is important to note that in some cases, the demand for Saudi religious engagement has often originated locally, driven by specific social, political, and religious factors in various regions, including Africa[19].

Accordingly, I contend that many scholarship approaches that focus primarily on transnational explanations for the nature of Salafism often fall into the trap of perpetuating a simplistic view, long advocated by policymakers and politicians[20]. Therefore, I shift my focus from solely examining transnational factors and instead, also pay attention to exploring the nature and dynamics of Salafism within the local and national contexts of Indonesia and Nigeria. To reiterate, this research undertakes a historical examination of the currents of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, tracing its transnational trajectories and identifying the key factors and events that have shaped its development. With the

[19] Mandaville, *Wahhabism and the World*.
[20] E.g., Commins, 2015; Choksy, 2015; Valentine, 2015; and more recently, Varagur, 2020.

aim to determine whether the trajectories of Saudi Salafism diverge or converge in the two countries, and how state policies and the agency of local scholars have influenced the adaptation of Salafism in these contexts.

Furthermore, recent developments, particularly the rise of Muhammad bin Salman as Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia since 2017, have led to a reduction in the capacity of Saudi-led humanitarian aid institutions to distribute resources in other countries unlike before. Moreover, many countries have implemented measures to restrict the flow of Saudi funds into their territories, particularly in the wake of the global war on terrorism by the USA following the events of 9/11. In the case of Indonesia, a good example is the regime's own national 'war on terrorism'. This represents a significant paradigm shift, especially looking at how the Salafi institutions are maintained for instance, despite the lack of external support. Consequently, in recent years, the transnational connections between Saudi Arabia and Salafis abroad arguably play a diminished role in shaping Salafism in some Muslim-majority countries, including Indonesia and Nigeria. Yet this does not necessarily imply a complete cessation of transnational influences.

Via preliminary fieldwork, and interviews conducted with Salafis in Nigeria and Indonesia for this research, it becomes apparent that Salafism has adapted to the local political and social contexts of these two nations. Indonesia, has become a hub for significant debates within contemporary Salafism, focusing on issues like religion and state relations, political organization, and the morality and efficacy of violence[21]. These discussions involve not only Salafi scholars but also political parties, activists, dissidents, and militants who practice Salafism in their daily lives. Notwithstanding, a significant gap exists in current scholarship, as scholarship typically conducts single-case studies of Salafism, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. This research, however, seeks to advance the study of contemporary Salafism by canvassing an in-depth comparative examination of Salafism in the two important Muslim-majority countries – Indonesia and Nigeria – situated across two distinct geographical regions.

[21] For further information on these dynamics, see Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*, *Laskar Jihad*, 2019, https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501719226.

Many scholarships focus primarily on the Middle East and, to a certain extent, North Africa, without adequately addressing the complexities of Salafism outside the Arab world. This oversight highlights the need for a comprehensive and comparative study that examines the trajectories of Salafism in diverse regional contexts, such as Indonesia and Nigeria. Despite the expectation that Salafism in these two nations would exhibit marked differences due to their distinct political and cultural contexts, yet I aim to explore the nuances of developments of Salafism in their respective trajectories in order to fill an important gap in the understanding of the global Salafism's dynamics, by comparing different geographical regions, a task fraught with challenges due to the differences in political structure and culture across the two countries. Arguably, this highlights the lack of existing research in the area, and by implication buttresses the novelty of my research.

While I acknowledge that extensive research on Salafism has been conducted in these two nations distinctively. Whereas some of these studies offer critical insights into the internal dynamics of Salafism and its transnational aspects, they often lack the comparative frameworks necessary for a nuanced comprehension of its dynamics across multiple geographical contexts, especially through a comparative lens. Besides, most of these studies primarily emphasize the transnational dimensions of Salafism, highlighting the impact of worldwide networks and foreign entities on the growth of Salafi groups, echoing notions long advocated by policymakers and politicians.

Mark Woodward, and journalists like Varagur have conducted studies across Indonesia and Nigeria, but their work lacks an in-depth understanding of the local and national contexts that have shaped Salafism in these countries. Varagur's work draws on Indonesia and Nigeria as case studies. In her book *The Call*[22] she provides a complex account of Saudi Arabia's religious proselytization missions. A major weakness is its overly broad generalizations about the Western response to Saudi Arabia's exportation of conservative Islam, particularly the simplistic portrayal of

[22] Varagur, "The Call. Inside The Global Saudi Religious Project."

Salafism leading to jihadism, a claim questioned by many academics due to the non-monolithic nature of Salafi groups.

On the other hand, Mark Woodward et al [23] challenge conventional wisdom on Salafism and violence, demonstrating that there is no significant correlation between theology and violent tendencies. However, their analysis does not thoroughly examine the transnational and national socio-political factors driving Salafism in these nations comparatively, nor does it assess the agency of local Salafi scholars in shaping the movement's development. Overall, there is still a notable deficiency in comparative analyses that methodically examine Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria.

This research will therefore examine the transnational and national socio-political factors driving Salafism in these nations, by assessing the agency of local Salafi scholars in shaping the movement's development. Also, the research seeks to explore how Salafism has been shaped by local and national imperatives and how it, in turn, influences the politics, and society of the two regions respectively. Though Salafism may not be transforming the political order of these countries, still it offers a valuable lens through which to examine state-society dynamics and questions of national and supranational identity. Thus, by understanding the dynamics of Salafism in these regions, this research aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of this critical region and the global phenomenon of global Salafism, and how it has been negotiated with local contexts in Indonesia and Nigeria.

1.2 Research Aims and Objectives

The research objectives are twofold: Firstly, it seeks to assess whether Indonesia and Nigeria have followed similar or divergent trajectories in their adoption of Salafism, through a historical analysis. This involves tracing the transnational endeavours employed by Saudi Arabia in the 1980s to disseminate Salafism in both countries, by examining similarities in roots, strategies, and modalities used. Secondly, it aims to highlight the agency of national and local actors/*ulama* in

[23] and Mariani Yahya Mark Woodward, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmaniyah and Abstract, "Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom" 7, no. 6 (2018): 58–78.

reshaping the dynamics of Salafism in their distinct contexts. By recognizing the significant role of local actors in shaping Salafism's adaptation and practice, the research aims to provide a better understanding of the complex interplay between transnational and local factors that have contributed to the reshaping of Salafism in these countries.

Although the roots of the global spread of Salafism can be traced back to early periods, such as the 1960s or even earlier, the primary focus in this research will be on the *reconstituted Wahhabism*, which mirrors contemporary Salafism propagated by Saudi Arabia prompted by the events of 1970s. By juxtaposing the developments in Indonesia and Nigeria, the research determines patterns and dynamics. But it is very important to note that this research does not intend to dive into the theological nuances of Wahhabism or Salafism, instead, the focus will be on examining the geopolitical interest aspects attached with the proselytization of the movements in the early 1960s-70s (upward).

Secondly, the research shifts focus from solely examining transnational influences to offering a fresh perspective on the contemporary dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, by contending that the local actors play a significant role in shaping Salafism's trajectories and adaptation, by introducing the concept of *Glocalizing Salafism*. It also aims to assess the dynamics of Salafism after major events such as the USA's war on terrorism post-9/11 and Indonesia's national war on terrorism. This is because these events have significantly influenced the discourse of Salafism in the region. Hence, through a comparative analysis of the trajectory of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, the research aims to contribute to ongoing academic discussions within the discourse of Islam and politics, especially the study of Islamist and Salafi movements. In other words, the research will explore how contemporary Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria responded to changing circumstances, especially post-9/11.

1.3 Research Questions

Considering the transformations in the global political landscape and the internal dynamics of Saudi Arabia, particularly under the leadership of Muhammad bin

Salman and his ambitious "Vision 2030" project, a significant shift in priorities has occurred. Notably, the global proselytization of Saudi Salafism, a hallmark of previous Saudi regimes, is no longer a primary focus. As a result, institutions in Indonesia, Nigeria, and even in other countries, that have historically received Saudi support for decades are now encountering a substantial obstacle.

A case in point is the experience of Ustaz Abu Nida, a prominent Salafi scholar in Indonesia, and an alumnus of the King Saud University in Riyadh. Also, a founder of a leading Salafi-oriented institution in Indonesia *Bin Baz Islamic Centre* which has received backing for decades from Middle Eastern countries such as Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In an interview, Ustaz Abu Nida revealed to me that securing resources from Saudi Arabia has become exceedingly challenging, in contrast to the past when his institutions and similar ones enjoyed robust Saudi support. According to Abu Nida, Saudi support now necessitates a cooperative approach. Based on my observations, similar institutions in Nigeria are facing comparable challenges, while others, especially those whose owners deem themselves as "*Madkhalis*" still receive the support in the form of establishing educational institutions, conducting series of *dauras* and *halaqats* as well as building the mosques[24].

Accordingly, I raise three important questions in this research: **First**, have the trajectories of Saudi Arabia's transnational Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria converged or diverged? **Second**, to what extent do Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria exercise agency in shaping the Salafism discourse, and to what extent is the influence of transnational Islam, particularly from Saudi Arabia, on the overall dynamics of Salafism in these countries? Alternatively, how have state policies and the agency of local scholars shaped the adaptation and evolution of Salafism in these countries? **Third**, how have the dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria evolved in the post-9/11 era, considering changes in geopolitical landscapes, regional conflicts, and shifts in Saudi Arabia's internal and foreign policy, and priorities? The research seeks to answer the questions raised above using a multifaceted approach that will be elaborated on in the methodology section. By

[24] An Interview with *Madkhali* interlocutor from Nigeria.

employing a combination of methodologies, the research aims to capture the agency of Salafis within Indonesia and Nigeria and analyse their interplay with external influences.

1.4 Theoretical Framework

Given that the primary aim of this research is to provide answers to the questions which comprise to what extent do Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria exercise agency in shaping the Salafism discourse and practice within their distinct contexts, and how has transnational Islam, notably by Saudi Arabia, influenced their practices? Alternatively, to what extent do Salafis in these regions internalize and perpetuate the frameworks of thoughts and perceptions brought upon them by dominant forces, in this case, Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, the research is situated within Bourdieu's theory of domination to explore how the development and transformation of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria are influenced by symbolic power and cultural hegemony. Pierre Bourdieu, a renowned French sociologist, formulated the notion of symbolic power and cultural hegemony within the framework of his comprehensive theory of social practice. The focus of his work is on illustrating how dominant groups uphold their status by influencing the views, attitudes, and actions of marginalized individuals in society. According to Bourdieu's theory, dominant groups assert influence by imposing frameworks of thought and perception on marginalized social actors, thereby perpetuating a social order that serves the interests of the already dominant[25].

In the context of this research, this could be seen in the ways Saudi Arabia's propagation of its Salafism moulds the perspectives and practices of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria. Although Saudi Arabia's historical and religious importance presents it as an enormous symbolic strength in the Muslim world, yet through the proselytization of its version of Salafism, Saudi Arabia shapes the discourse surrounding Salafis practices, theological interpretations, and social norms. Salafis

[25] Radka Radimská, "Pierre Bourdieu: Sociologist of Dominance and of the Dominated," *Sociologický Časopis / Czech Sociological Review* 38, no. 3 (2002): 395–98, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41131821.

in Indonesia and Nigeria often view Saudi Arabia as a primary authority, with ease adopting its practices and beliefs.

Also, Salafis in both case study nations, Indonesia, and Nigeria internalize the dominant frameworks propagated by Saudi Arabia. These frameworks cover precise interpretations of Islamic texts, for example, prescribed dress codes like the Saudi (*thawb* or *jalabiya*), a kind of long clothes, mostly worn by the Arabs. Keeping long beards, drawing trousers above the ankles (*isbal*), and the use of *niqabs* by women etcetera. Saudi Arabia's dissemination of its variant of Salafism has significantly shaped the worldwide understanding of what is considered a genuine form of Salafism or even Islam as a whole. Any deviation from these norms may be perceived by Salafis as a departure from proper Islam. Thus, framing this research within this framework will help in providing a better understanding of how this operates within the context of dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, elucidating how this shapes the beliefs and practices of Salafis in the regions.

Successively, the research applies Scott's theory of everyday resistance to simultaneously examine how the Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria employ subtle forms of resistance to contest prevailing power dynamics and to shape their own religious observances. Indonesian Salafis often adapt Salafi teachings to fit local customs and traditions, subtly resisting the rigid orthodoxy of Saudi transnational Salafism. This selective adaptation represents a form of everyday resistance, where local actors assert their agency by shaping Salafi practices to align with their socio-cultural realities. James C. Scott's principle of normal resistance makes a specialty of the less visible, regular forms of resistance that people appoint to contest strength and domination. He argues that although prepared uprisings and protests often get hold of good-sized attention, subtle acts of resistance such as foot-dragging, evasion, feigned compliance, and minor acts of riot are equally crucial however regularly unnoticed[26].

Another dimension to harness this framework in this research is to assess how the Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria employ tactics such as feigned ignorance

[26] Stellan Vinthagen and Anna Johansson, ""Everyday Resistance": Exploration of a Concept and Its Theories," no. 1 (2015): 1–46.

or evasion to contest the religious authority hegemony against rival religious groups. This enables Salafis to exchange and oppose prevailing power institutions without engaging in direct conflict. Scott's theory underscores the significance of comprehending how power functions in ordinary life and how individuals utilize these subtle resistances to challenge prevailing or existing structures. By incorporating this theory into this research, it tends to provide a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, and how Salafis use everyday forms of resistance to shape their own religious practices and sometimes even to contest dominant power structures. Additionally, it aids in exploring how the Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria utilize cultural expressions such as specific language use mostly Arabic or a combination of few Arabic vocabularies into the local languages, or the modes of a specific type of dress to affirm their religious identity and resist prevailing cultural norms.

1.5 Research Significance

This study holds significance on multiple fronts. First, it highlights the notion that since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has sought to promote a variant of Salafism, which essentially, constitutes repackaged Wahhabism. While Saudi Arabia labels this as Salafism, it diverges from the traditional conception of Salafism, in the sense that it serves as a means for Saudi Arabia to assert itself strategically as the epicentre of the Muslim world by exporting a specific version of Islam, which essentially represents Saudi state ideology. These understanding sheds light on the geopolitical and strategic dimensions of Saudi Arabia's transnational Islam.

Secondly, the research aims to contribute to the existing literature by conducting a comparative study on the transformations and dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, highlighting the crucial role of local actors in shaping the adaptation and practice of Salafism in the two countries. By examining the complex interplay between transnational and local factors, this study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of Salafism in the two contexts, emphasizing the agency of local actors in shaping its trajectory. Also, by tracing their historical trajectories, geopolitical dimensions, and contemporary dynamics,

the study aims to offer an assessment of how ideology, geopolitics, and global events influence the expansion and evolution of Salafism beyond its traditional origin. In other words, outside of the Arab world. In a nutshell, the research determines to contribute to the existing literature by shedding light on the historical evolution, trajectories and the dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, specifically in the post 9/11 era through a comparative study approach.

1.6 Methods

By conducting fieldwork and interviews in Indonesia and Nigeria, this research provides a comprehensive analysis of Salafism's historical evolution and trajectories, and its current dynamics in the two countries. The process of gaining primary data combines open-ended, in-depth interviews and participant observations. The decision to use interviews in this research was guided by the flexibility of qualitative interviewing, which allows for adjustments in research emphasis based on emerging issues during the interviews[27]. By utilizing purposive sampling, the research includes prominent Salafi figures from Indonesia and Nigeria. Furthermore, micro-ethnography was conducted, involving participant observations at some selected Salafi institutions in two cities in Indonesia, namely Yogyakarta in and Jakarta. The two cities were selected for their significance as hubs for prominent Salafi institutions, individual and communities, with some key figures interviewed for this research.

By focusing on these specific urban contexts, the study gained a better understanding of the dynamics of Salafism in the two countries. Again, the micro-ethnographic approach was employed due to the time constraints inherent in undergraduate or master's thesis. Hence, it allows for a focused study of specific aspects within a group or institutions, as opined by some social scientific research scholars[28]. Similarly, in Nigeria, the research concentrates on Kano state in the northwest region and Gombe state in the northeast region, selected due to their high concentration of prominent Salafi scholars and intellectuals. All data collection in Nigeria, including interviews and observations, was conducted in these two states

[27] Alan Bryman & Edward Bell, *Social Research Methods*, Fift Canad (Oxford University Press, 2019).
[28] Bell.

through a research assistant. Additionally, my native familiarity with the region enabled retrospective observation and contextual insight, leveraging my insider perspective to enrich the study's findings.

To facilitate participant accessibility and maximize data collection, interviews were conducted through multiple methods: in-person interviews in Indonesia, and online or telephone interviews in Nigeria. This is employed because previous studies comparing telephone and face-to-face interviews have suggested that both methods yield comparable data quality[29]. Additionally, a research assistant conducted some interviews in Nigeria, further enhancing the flexibility and reach of data collection process. A novel addition to the methodology is the use of video technology such as 'zoom', which offered the opportunity to observe the research settings. Although as a native of the region, I possess an inherent understanding of the selected institutions being observed. However, the use of video technology is particularly beneficial in this kind of situation, particularly to revisit my retrospective observation[30]. The quality and the feasibility of video interviews were enhanced through the participants' familiarity with the technology, investment in high-quality equipment, and thorough testing and practice.

In Nigeria, interviews were conducted in the Hausa language, transcribed, and translated into English for further analysis. In Indonesia, interviews were conducted in Arabic and subsequently translated into English. This is because the participants were able to express themselves easily in the Arabic language. Participants were selected based on criteria such as being graduates of the Saudi Arabia based universities (E.g., Islamic University of Medina, King Saud University in Riyadh and so on), owning Islamic institutions, and having a significant number of followers, which implies their influence in their respective regions. This approach enables participants to share their perspectives through a

[29] Eloise C.J. Carr and Allison Worth, "The Use of the Telephone Interview for Research," *NT Research* 6, no. 1 (2001): 511–24, https://doi.org/10.1177/136140960100600107.
[30] Charl de Villiers, Muhammad Bilal Farooq, and Matteo Molinari, "Qualitative Research Interviews Using Online Video Technology – Challenges and Opportunities," *Meditari Accountancy Research* 30, no. 6 (January 1, 2022): 1764–82, https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-03-2021-1252.

comprehensive and detailed interview. Also, an examination of social media discourse, particularly in Nigeria was considered.

Furthermore, the study will draw on secondary sources such as published scientific works and online materials to provide a broader context for the findings, including historical records. This approach allows for an in-depth examination of the perspectives of the study participants and a deeper understanding of the broader context in which the study is situated. The data gathered from the interviews undergone analysis in a thematic pattern, designed to identify, analyse, and report on themes or patterns within the collected data. Thus, this approach entails discerning patterns of meaning throughout the qualitative data and organizing these patterns into coherent themes. In a nutshell, the process includes identifying patterns and themes within the data that directly correspond to the research questions.

1.7 Outline

This research is organized into five chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction, providing an overview of the study's background, research aims and objectives, research questions, theoretical framework, significance, and methods. The second chapter examines relevant literature on the historical roots of Salafism and Wahhabism, with a particular focus on the emergence of Saudi variant of Salafism within and outside the Saudi context. It further discusses significant factors which raised to the emergence of Saudi Arabia transnational Salafism. Major factors such as fractures in alliances with the Muslim Brotherhood and the challenges posed by figures like Juhayman al-Otaybi, among other historical trajectories that facilitated the expansion of the transnational Salafism. The third chapter transitions to an exploration of the spread of Salafism in the specific regions of Indonesia and Nigeria, shedding light on Saudi Arabia's influence in disseminating Salafism in these areas through a comparative study. Moving forward, the fourth chapter aims to determine the contemporary situations of Salafists in Indonesia and Nigeria, especially in the aftermath of major events like 9/11. This chapter also examines the extent to which local Salafists in these regions

exercise their agency in terms of shaping the Salafism discourse and how these evolved. The final chapter presents conclusions and areas for further exploration, with concluding remarks.

CHAPTER II

THE INTERSECTIONS OF GEOPOLITICAL INFLUENCE IN SAUDI TRANSNATIONAL SALAFISM

To comprehend the manifestation of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, it is essential to trace the broader and global historical trajectories of Salafism and the emergence of Wahhabiyya. Although it is superficial to say that there is a generally agreed period in which Salafism emerges. Most scholarship maintain that the discourse of Salafism had not attracted much attention in academia before 9/11, except for the classical period or early modern period, and in such cases, Salafism was mostly studied in Saudi Arabia as part of its history. Nevertheless, it is crucial to acknowledge the classical and early modern periods as significant milestones. It is worth noting that when evaluating Saudi religious transnationalism, it is important to distinguish Wahhabism from early Salafism, a widely prevalent and doctrinally similar movement. This distinction is crucial, as Wahhabism represents a Saudi-specific variant of the broader Salafi current, sharing many similarities with it. This point will be explored in greater depth later in this chapter, drawing on existing scholarly research and theoretical perspectives.

2.1 Complexities in Definitions and Subcategorization of Salafism

For nearly a century, scholars have grappled with uncertainties and paradoxes surrounding the origin and meaning of Salafism[31]. In the opening paragraph of Lauziere's renowned work, *The Making of Salafism,* he addresses the inherent complexities and the near impossibility of offering a single definition of Salafism. Lauziere argues that while one might assume that clarifying the concept begins with the question *What is Salafism?* it is far from straightforward. Even with the most cautious definitions, the deep-rooted confusion surrounding the meaning and historical origins persists due to the current state of knowledge. However, in this research, I primarily rely on definitions sourced from secondary literature on Salafism, incorporating perspectives from both Western and Eastern

[31] Henri Lauzière, "The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, no. 3 (2010): 369–89, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743810000401.

methodologies. Despite the various definitions and conflicting narratives of Salafism among academics and journalists, numerous scholars[32] continue to define it as a literal interpretation of the religious sources, Qur'ān, Hadith, and even the works of the pious predecessors.

Till today, the traditional definition still holds weight in literature. For example, according to Raihan Ismail's *Rethinking Salafism*… the term '*Salafi'* derives from *al-Salaf al-Salih*, meaning; 'pious predecessors' and referring to the first three generations of Muslims after the prophet Muhammad. Salafism holds that the pious predecessors or ancestors are to be emulated as they were closest to the prophet and belong to the golden age of Islam[33]. This definition did not go outside the usual definitions of Salafism put forward by numerous classical scholars of the subject. Instead, it further implies that Salafism urges a return to the pristine purity of Islam, putting forward renewed emphasis on the study of Islam's fundamental sources: the Qur'ān and Hadith. It rejects *taqlid* or 'blind' following the four canonical law schools (*madhhab*); instead, it accepts *ijtihad* (individual interpretation) within strict parameters. In Islam, the Qur'ān is considered God's direct message, while the life of Prophet Muhammad is viewed as the ideal embodiment of the Qur'ān's teachings. Hence, Salafism is not only scripturalist but also literalist, emphasizing that Muslims should model their behaviour after[34].

The above paradigmatic understanding aligns with what is commonly known as "*purist Salafism*," a perspective that has gained significant prevalence in contemporary times. Many scholars and a vast majority of individuals identifying as Salafis worldwide define Salafism as the most authentic and pure form of Sunni Islam. Purist Salafis position themselves at the forefront of intra-Islamic debates by asserting that theirs is the only true path to salvation within Islam. However, critics often equate this form of Salafism with Wahhabism. Purist Salafis vehemently

[32] See Roel Meijer, *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, *Global Salafism*, vol. 15, 2014, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001.
[33] Raihan Ismail, *Rethinking Salafism: The Transnational Networks of Salafi ʿUlama in Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia* (Oxford University Press, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190948955.001.0001.
[34] Muhammad Muhammad Nasir, "Weaving Modernity in Salafism A Comparative Study of Muhammadiyah and Izala Movements," *Australian Journal of Islamic Studies* 8, no. 3 (2023): 100–125, https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.55831/ajis.v8i3.619.

rejected this characterization, disavowing both the term "Wahhabism" and the notion that Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab initiated a new religious orientation. They argue that Salafism represents nothing but the original Islam as it was revealed, free from any innovations, deviations, or external influences. It embodies the pure form of Islam adhered to by the devout predecessors of the first three generations[35]. But it is important to note that this is a point I shall question later in this chapter, by highlighting the intricate interplay between Wahhabism and Salafism.

Furthermore, over the past two decades, scholars and commentators from various backgrounds have further subdivided the purist understanding of Salafism into several distinct subcategories[36], with jihadist Salafism (*al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya*) and quietist scholarly Salafism (*al-salafiyya al-ilmiyya*) being the most prominent among them[37]. These labels are introduced to facilitate analysis, although it is important to note that they are often imposed by external observers[38]. Purist Salafis frequently reject these subcategories because they believe such categorizations diminish the unique essence of Salafism as they perceive it. From their point of view, there cannot exist different types of Salafism, just as there cannot be premodern and modern variations of it. Instead, there is only one authentic Salafism, passed down through generations since the era of the pious ancestors. Therefore, while self-proclaimed Salafis may engage in disagreements and accuse each other of straying from Salafism, they typically vie for the same label. This explains why they sometimes resort to phrases like "*pure Salafism*" (*al-salafiyya al-naqiyya*) and "true Salafism" (*al-salafiyya alhaqqiya*) to assert their stance[39].

The above traditional conception falls short of capturing the multifaceted reality of the dynamism and diversity of Salafism. However, from the grassroots, it can be ascertained that most of the Salafi-inspired groups share this ideological

[35] Henri Lauzière, *The Making of Salafism*, *The Making of Salafism*, 2016, https://doi.org/10.7312/columbia/9780231175500.001.0001.
[36] Frederic Wehrey & Anouar Boukhars, *Salafism in the Maghreb Politics, Piety, and Militancy* (Oxford University Press, 2019).
[37] Meijer, *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*.
[38] Lauzière, *Mak. Salafism*.
[39] Lauzière.

foundation rooted in early or classical Salafism. Moreover, the use of the term Salafism itself is complex, as essentially every Muslim considers themselves a Salafi in the literal sense, aiming to emulate the Prophet and the early Muslim community (the *Salaf*). Most often, self-identified Salafis aspire to follow the *Salaf*, believing this period closely aligns with the era of the Prophet and embodies the purest form of Islam. By doing so, they emphasize the authenticity of their understanding of Islam[40]. Such definitions oversimplify Salafism, presenting problems when generalized. Still, it is important to note that Salafis are not a monolithic group, they are diverse. Another interesting fact worthy of consideration is that, unlike the established Islamic legal schools or *Madhahib* for instance, Salafists lack doctrinal uniformity. Also, their diversification, especially with mass literacy and widespread access to religious texts, further challenges a monolithic view.

Therefore, this research recognizes the diversity of Salafism and refrains from making broad generalizations about the operations or practices of Salafists across different contexts and times. Such generalizations can be misleading and lead to unfounded claims. Definitions of such abstract terms can shift over time. Although contemporary scholars have categorized Salafism into quietist, apolitical, political, and jihadi varieties etcetera[41] this does not capture its complete complexity. For instance, in Nigeria, the current of Salafism is remarkably diverse and multifaceted. Defying simplistic categorization. Its complexities cannot be fully captured by the above categorization, and I will explore these complexities further in the subsequent chapters, providing a more detailed and contextualized understanding of its various facets. However, what I resort to in this research is that, understanding Salafism's current variations is intertwined with the broader understanding of the geo-political landscapes, especially of Saudi Arabia and the broader Middle East. Therefore, my focus will be on tracing the historical trajectories of the Saudi variant of Salafism, with particular attention to its transnationalism proselytization, and how it was disseminated to Indonesia and

[40] Emad Hamdeh, *Salafism and Traditionalism Scholarly Authority in Modern Islam* (Cambridge University Press, 2021), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108756594.
[41] Théo Blanc and Olivier Roy, ed., *Salafism : Challenged by Radicalization? : Violence, Politics, and the Advent of Post-Salafism.* (European University Institute (EUI), 2021), https://doi.org/10.2870/309942.

Nigeria. These two regions serve as important recipients of Saudi Arabia's extensive transnational proselytization of Wahhabism, packaged under the guise of Salafism during the latter part of the 20th century.

2.3 The Saudi State and the Advent of Wahhabism

To emphasize, this research centres on Wahhabism, a distinctive branch of Salafism promoted by Saudi Arabia, known for its political conservatism, and endorsed by the Council of Senior ʿ*Ulama* (*Majlis Hay'at Kibar al-ʿUlama*). Led by Abdullah Bin Baz, this council faithfully discourages public dissent or challenges to the government. Rooted in the teachings of classical Salafi scholars such as Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), Wahhabism emphasizes theological principles that oppose rebellion against legitimate Muslim rulers[42]. While some scholars argue that Wahhabis appropriated, adopted, or were labelled as Salafis by modernist reformers in the early twentieth century, they often assume that the term "*Salaf*" had a modernist connotation without questioning whether "*Salafiyya*" was indeed the slogan of modernist reformers. Nevertheless, I posit that the transition away from the term *Wahhabiyya* may be driven by a desire to be distanced from the perception of Wahhabism as an ultraconservative interpretation of Islam, frequently associated with jihadi violence, as discussed in various literature, including works referenced by Valentine[43] where he posits that:

> *Saudi scholars disseminate their call for jihad through various mediums such as lectures, booklets, videos, and social media platforms. This Wahhabi propaganda, often characterized as hate literature, infiltrates mosques and educational institutions worldwide. Additionally, Muslim students studying in Saudi Arabia and pilgrims visiting the country are exposed to Wahhabis' teachings, subsequently becoming missionaries of Wahhabism in their home countries*[44].

I find this argument to be superficial and lacking proper justification. Building on Mandeville's proposition[45] there is a prevalent existing commentary and analysis

[42] Mandaville, *Wahhabism and the World.*
[43] Valentine, *Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond*.
[44] See Valentine.
[45] Mandaville, *Wahhabism and the World.*

which suggest a link between the global spread of Wahhabism and support for jihadi violence, although the exact nature of this connection and its causal mechanisms are often unclear or vaguely defined. This perception has likely driven Saudi Arabia's shift towards using the term Salafism instead of Wahhabism.

Moreover, the term "*Wahhabism*" is often misused as a derogatory label for any conservative religious practice, regardless of its actual origin. For example, governments in Central Asia and the Caucasus have incorrectly branded various religious groups as *Wahhabis*, including those with no affiliation with Wahhabism, such as the *Hizmet* movement led by Fethullah Gülen[46]. Therefore, referring to the so-called *Wahhabi-jihadi* as the main religious force behind Saudi Arabia's global outreach can be misleading. While the Wahhabism discourse predominantly advocates quietism and loyalty to authority, it can be pointed out that there exists a minority trend, termed *Wahhabi-Jihadi,* associated with figures like Muhammad Surur and other dissident members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. However, this trend is marginalized by Saudi authorities and excluded from officially transnational religious outreach efforts[47].

In the literal sense, Wahhabism is a pre-modern movement founded by Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792). He thought that Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula at that time had become ignorant of their religion and were living in a condition of ignorance (*Jahiliya* period), which he considered to be the cause of Islam's spiritual and political decline since its golden period. He thought the only way to achieve salvation and restore past glory was to reaffirm total monotheism and belief in the oneness of God (*Tawhid*) as the foundation of the Islamic faith (*Aqida*). This required a return to the Qur'ān and Sunna. To attain this purity, he condemned rituals that involved intermediaries between humans and God, such as veneration of saints' graves, sacred trees, astrology, and soothsayers. Like classical Salafism, he regarded these practices as associating partners with God (*shirk*) or engaging in idolatry and polytheism, like the form of syncretic religion practiced in

[46] Mandaville.
[47] Mandaville.

Mecca before Muhammad began preaching Islam (*Jahiliya* period). These practices were regarded as repugnant innovations (*bid'a*)[48].

Primarily speaking, the rhetoric of returning to the sacred texts, along with upholding its literal interpretation without considering intermediaries, and the practices of the pious predecessors in addition to rejecting the *Madhahib* or legal schools of thought, allows Wahhabism to be counted under the broader Salafism[49]. Although this research does not prioritize theological discourse, it is worth noting that some Wahhabi beliefs diverge from mainstream Salafism. For instance, since the 12th century, there has been a codified understanding of the Salafi's attitude toward God's attributes among theologians and scholars. However, this consensus was historically challenged, particularly during the time of Ibn Taymiyya[50], whose ideas have significantly influenced Wahhabism. Over time, Salafism has evolved, branching out into different interpretations, with some focusing on political activism and others on religious purification. As a specific branch of Salafism, Wahhabism has distinct beliefs and practices, sharing some similarities with mainstream Salafism but also exhibiting notable differences.

It is undeniable that Wahhabiyya emerged within the historical and political context of Saudi rule. Wahhabism represents a political discourse demanded by political authority, which made it susceptible to divisions, dissents, and even evolutions in different times and places. The struggle against religious deviance persisted in the 18th century led by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab necessitated the backing of political power. This attitude never ceases to exist Within the contemporary Wahhabism discourse. A strong governing authority is deemed necessary to safeguard the faith from corruption, preserve the Salafi tradition, and enforce punitive measures against transgressors or deviants. This underscores the belief that only a strong and pious state can practice the fundamental Islamic

[48] Nasir, "Weaving Modernity in Salafism A Comparative Study of Muhammadiyah and Izala Movements."
[49] Madawi Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation* (Cambridge University Press, 2007), https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.44-6469.
[50] Namira Nahouza, "Wahhabism and the Rise of the New Salafists:Theology, Power and Sunni Islam," *I.B. Taurus*, no. september 2016 (2018): 1–273.

obligation of *amr bi l-maruf wa l-nahy an al-munkar* (the promotion of virtue and prohibition of vice)[51].

Wahhabism serves as the official religious doctrine of the Saudi state, and it has developed because of Saudi Arabia's ambitious global campaign for the Wahhabization of the Muslim ummah. This campaign can be seen against the background of the Arab Cold War, especially when Saudi Arabia tried to reinforce its position as the centre of the Muslim world following the fading influence of Arab socialist nationalism developed by Gamal Abdul Nasser after the Arab-Israeli War of 1967[52]. Concomitantly, the Wahhabiyya gained momentum within and outside the Saudi state during the latter half of the 20th century, facilitated by a strong alliance between the house of the al-Saud and the Wahhabi religious establishment at that time. This alliance was forged through a combination of *da'wa* (the call to islām) and *dawla* (state power) [53], which gave the Saudi regime of that time the chance to shift the centre of political power and religious influence from Egypt to Saudi Arabia.

It can be alleged that, without Wahhabiyya, there would not be a Saudi state, for the simple fact that the emergence of the Saudi state is deeply connected to the alliance between the Al-Saud family and the religious revivalist movement led by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) in the eighteenth century. This alliance provided the ideological foundation for the creation of the first Saudi state and has continued to shape the religious and political landscape of Saudi Arabia. Again, it is important to note that the propagators of Wahhabiyya never called themselves Wahhabis. They often call themselves *Muwahhidun*, (which means; those who believe in the oneness of Allah)[54]. This term, which refers to the core doctrine of the movement, became the preferred self-identification of the Wahhabis over time [55]. Still, the term "*Wahhabi*" was widely used by both critics and supporters of the movement, and it came to be associated with the movement and

[51] Commins, *Wahhabi Mission Saudi Arab.*
[52] Hasan, "Salafism in Indonesa: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance."
[53] Commins, *Wahhabi Mission Saudi Arab.*
[54] Chanfi Ahmed, *West African ʿulamāʾ and Salafism in Mecca and Medina :Jawāb Al-Ifrīqī—The Response of the African*, *Modern Islam: Traditions and Concerns* (BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON, 2015).
[55] ibid.

its followers. Even today, the term *Wahhabiyya* is still used to describe the religious ideology that underpins the Saudi state. However, as mentioned earlier, after strategic efforts in the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia initiated a rebranding campaign, presenting a modified version of Wahhabism labelled as Salafism, a sort of a *reconstituted form of Wahhabism*.

2.4 Geopolitical Influence and Strategic Dimensions of Propagating Salafism

The historical alignment between Wahhabiyya and the autocratic monarchy led by the al-Saud family, enriched by oil revenues, enhanced the movement's prominence and conferred legitimacy on the ruling elite. Oil wealth facilitated the spread of *Wahhabiyya* through advancements in mass education, communication technology, printing, and easy transportation and movement. All these eased the exportation of the transnational Wahhabism under Saudi patronage[56]. The dissemination of religious texts and scholarships for people to go and study in Saudi further facilitated the teachings of Wahhabiyya founders and proponents to reach global audiences. While oil wealth elevated Saudi Arabia's international stature, Wahhabiyya also provided it with Islamic legitimacy as the centre of the Muslim world, asserting its role as a guardian of Islamic principles and sacred sites. In the 18th century, Wahhabiyya played a crucial role in centralizing political authority in Saudi Arabia, laying the foundation for the al-Saud dynasty and the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia[57].

Officially, Wahhabiyya serves as a discourse for legitimizing power, utilizing religious interpretations by the *ulama* to validate political authority, thereby fostering a deep-rooted association with authoritarianism and at times, despotism within Islam[58]. Although there is a claim to govern under Islamic principles, contemporary Wahhabiyya often relies primarily on rhetoric and symbolic gestures[59]. Since the 1970s, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a dominant

[56] Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign Transnational Islam and the Salafi Madrasa in Post-9/11 Indonesia," *South East Asia Research* 18, no. 4 (2010): 675–705, https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2010.0015.
[57] Madawi Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*, Second Edi (Cambridge University Press, 2010), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-3606.2004.tb00989.x.
[58] Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*.
[59] Hasan, "Salafism in Indonesa: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance."

force, surpassing Egypt, and gaining a significant influence. Thanks to the country's vast oil wealth, which has not only enhanced the visibility of the state's religious tradition (*Wahhabiyya*) within Saudi Arabia but has also extended its reach globally.

The Saudi regime strategically employed a combination of *da'wa* (religious proselytization) and *dawla* (state power) to shift the centre of power from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, particularly in the latter half of the 20th century, amid changing regional dynamics. This led to the export and dissemination of Wahhabism, alongside the ideology of the Muslim brotherhood as a by-product of the campaign. This strategic manoeuvring elevated Wahhabiyya to a hegemonic position, surpassing its intellectuals' origins in the 18th century. Despite Saudi Arabia's relatively small population and limited development at that time, these endeavours have proven successful, enabling Saudi Arabia to assert itself as a central force in the Arab world[60]. Subsequently, I will examine how Saudi Arabia's strategic geopolitical manoeuvres evolved, as well as shed light on the factors that contributed to the propagation of Salafism.

Therefore, the central inquiry here revolves around the socio-political and religious factors that have led to the rise of what we commonly term Salafism today and its propagation by the Saudi state. However, it is crucial to understand that Saudi Salafism is essentially a revamped version of Wahhabism promoted by Saudi Arabia. While this may appear as an ideological endeavour by Saudi Arabia to propagate its variant belief system, it also bears elements of geopolitical and strategic manoeuvring, positioning Saudi Arabia as a central force in the Muslim world. This push for ideological dominance is closely tied to Saudi Arabia's economic and political interests, especially considering its historical alliances, such as with the United States during the Cold War. Hence, it is vital to examine these factors in detail and understanding how they continue to shape the present-day scenario. By analysing this complex interplay between religious ideologies, geopolitical interests, and strategic goals, a clearer picture of how these factors have

[60] Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*.

shaped the evolution of what is known as Salafism today and its significance on the global stage is illustrated.

2.5 Challenges to Saudi Arabia's Legitimacy and the Influence of Transnational Salafism Through *Tasfiyya and Tarbiyya*

The year 1979 marked a period of political turmoil in the Middle East, with one shock after another shaking the region. The Mecca uprising unfolded amidst this regional crisis from November 4 to December 24, 1979. Other events during this time included the Iranian Revolution, the seizure of American hostages in Tehran, a Shiite rebellion in the eastern region of Saudi Arabia, and anti-American riots across the Muslim world. Also, the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty further destabilized the region[61]. The peace treaty, detested by Islamic groups in Egypt and the Arab world, ultimately led to the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Particularly, this event prompted Saudi Arabia to challenge Egypt's central role in the Muslim world.

At the same period, Ibn Saud's legitimacy came under scrutiny by the Ikhwan. Following their offer of asylum in Saudi Arabia to escape persecution from secular Arab regimes, nobody could have anticipated that the Muslim Brotherhood would effectively disseminate their ideologies within the kingdom to the extent of undermining the dominance of Wahhabism to the point of challenging the moral authority of the regime. Although the Ikhwan did not openly declare Ibn Saud as a *kafir* (apostate), they viewed certain actions, particularly his alliance with and subservience to Britain as acts of *kufr* (Disbelief). Far earlier, the conflict between Ibn Saud and the Ikhwan fighters in the 1920s was commonly attributed to their objection to his relations with Britain. But the rebellion of the Ikhwan was motivated by pragmatic concerns and power struggles, although, it was framed in rhetoric centred on principles such as *al-wala wa-l bara* (loyalty to Muslims and disassociation to non-Muslims). The alliance between the ideological allies, the Ikhwan and the Wahhabiyya fractured in 1990 following Riyadh's call for military

[61] Al-Huzaimi, *The Mecca Uprising: An Insider's Account of Salafism and Insurrection in Saudi Arabia*.

aid from the USA in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait[62]. The kingdom's former allies swiftly turned into vocal critics, condemning the al-Saud for allegedly betraying Islam by inviting non-Muslim forces to occupy the sacred land.

Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood activists, who solicited political protection from the Saudi government following Egypt's policy to pursue and arrest them, used the Wahhabism campaign for their political interests. They actively promoted the Brotherhood ideology among Saudi activists. This activism resulted in the rise of the *al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Awakening) movement, which soon became a central element of the Saudi social fabric[63]. Juhayman al-ʿUtaybi represented this faction (*al-Sahwa al-Islamiyah*) of Salafi within Saudi Arabia. This group vehemently challenged the moral authority of the Saudi regime[64]. Thus, Juhayman led a group to seize control over Mecca's Grand Mosque in 1979, an event popularly known as the Mecca uprising. Juhayman exposed what he deemed as blasphemous practices of the Saudi regime at that time, citing the emergence of corrupt leaders and foreign influence, particularly from the Western world. This sentiment was echoed in publications such as "*alKawashif al-jalliya fi kufr al-dawla al-Saudiyya*" (Clear evidence of the blasphemy of the Saudi regime) by the author known as Abu al-Bara al-Najdi (Asim al-Barqawi al-Maqdisi), though without directly labelling individuals within the regime as disbelievers[65].

Due to these events, Saudi Arabia learned quickly about the danger of Salafism when it is infiltrated by the Brotherhood ideology. As a response, Saudi Arabia developed a policy of advertising its commitment to Islamic purification while suppressing the ideology of the Brotherhood. A new variant of Salafism whose concern is more on seemingly trivial, superficial issues, like maintaining long beards, observing modest dress codes, and adhering to specific symbolic rituals. This has since proliferated both internally and externally because of this policy[66]. In other words, after this shifting paradigm, Saudi Salafism sought to place

[62] Al-Huzaimi.
[63] Mandaville, *Wahhabism and the World.*
[64] Stéphane Lacroix, *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia* (Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England 2011, 2011), https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.49-3496.
[65] Al-Huzaimi, *The Mecca Uprising: An Insider's Account of Salafism and Insurrection in Saudi Arabia*.
[66] Hasan, "Salafism in Indonesa: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance."

greater emphasis on symbols and rituals (i.e., *tasfiyya* and *tarbiyya*) as means of purifying Islam. This marked a departure from the more fluid approach of the early 1970s, which saw Salafism influenced by a fusion of ideas from the Muslim Brotherhood.

The surge in global oil prices during the 1970s provided Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to advocate for the spread of Salafism within the Muslim community. Through the *Rabitat al-ʿAlam al-Islami* (Muslim World League, MWL), established in 1962 following a conference of Muslim scholars in Mecca, Saudi Arabia aimed to distribute funds generously for the construction of mosques, Islamic schools, and social amenities worldwide. This effort, in collaboration with local partners, also supported *da'wa* activities for Islamic organizations, facilitating the dissemination of Salafism[67]. Besides, the momentum for promoting Salafism increased notably after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which posed a challenge to Saudi Arabia's geopolitical and geostrategic dominance within the Muslim world.

Therefore, the campaign for the massive Wahhabization of the Muslim ummah in the context of Saudi Arabia can be understood as an aspiration to establish itself as the epicentre of the Muslim world, especially after the failure of the united Arab forces led by Egypt in the 1967 War against Israel. Asserting its status as the guardian of the two holy sanctuaries, Saudi Arabia deemed it essential to garner the support of both the Muslim-majority countries and even Muslim minority countries with a significant number of Muslims, to enhance its domestic and external legitimacy. By the 1980s, Saudi Salafism, often perceived as a reconstituted form of Wahhabism, had undergone significant evolution. By departing from its earlier forms, it became characterized by a shift towards a more doctrinally rigid interpretation. In other words, it sought to place a greater emphasis on symbols, mostly *tarbiyya* and *tasfiyya*.

Therefore, with all the changes in the geopolitical landscape, and even the internal changes, particularly in the Saudi policies, it becomes pertinent to examine the current state of Salafism in Muslim-majority nations such as Indonesia in

[67] Al-Rasheed, *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*.

Southeast Asia and Nigeria in West Africa. In other words, what is happening with the Salafis in these nations, who have for long been recipients of the transnational Salafism. Indonesia and Nigeria serve as compelling focal points for such analysis due to their diverse historical trajectories, socio-political landscapes, and religious compositions. In Indonesia, with its syncretistic Islamic tradition, the encounter with Salafism represents a complex interplay between indigenous religious practices and imported doctrinal frameworks. On the other hand, in Nigeria, Salafism has emerged as a significant socio-religious, and to some degree political force, particularly in the northern regions. Thus, in the subsequent chapter, I shall explore the spread of Salafism in the specific regions of Indonesia and Nigeria, shedding light on Saudi Arabia's influence in disseminating their brand of Salafism in these areas through a comparative study approach.

CHAPTER III

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SALAFISM'S TRAJECTORIES IN INDONESIA AND NIGERIA

The spread of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria offers a fascinating case study on the transnational dynamics of Salafism outside of the Arab world. Despite geographical and cultural differences, both countries have experiences significant growth of Salafism, largely influenced by Saudi Arabia's transnational Islam. Though, in retrospect, the emergence of modern Saudi religious transnationalism in the early 19780s, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, was partly driven by the geopolitical strategy by Saudi Arabia, which aimed to counterbalance the influence of its strong rival (Iran) in the region, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This development marked the beginning of a new regional politics characterized by a 'holier than thou' dynamic between Riyadh and Tehran.

The Saudis were concerned that the Iranian Revolution might spread throughout the region, potentially eclipsing Saudi Arabia's claim to be the preeminent Muslim voice in geopolitics. Consequently, Saudi religious transnational activities were redirected to blunt Iranian influence in the region. The influence of this endeavour by the Saudis began to manifest clearly especially around early 200s. However, even though some scholars argue that this endeavour was primarily geopolitical, it is essential to recognize that it also stemmed from a sense of religious obligation from the Saudis, especially when we look back the role of Saudi Arabia in providing support to Muslims around the world for Islamic causes, particularly in 1960s and even before. As Mandeville notes, the Saudi royal family and rulers engaged in this activity out of a genuine sense of duty as the custodians of the two holy mosques, feeling responsible for supporting Islamic causes worldwide[68].

In this chapter, a comparative analysis of the historical evolution and trajectories of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria is conducted, by examining the religious and socio-political factors that have shaped its trajectories and

[68] Mendaville, "Soft Power, Islam, and Religiosity: Perspectives From the Middle East."

dissemination in the two countries. In doing so, the chapter sheds light on the complex interplay between local and transnational factors that have contributed to the growth of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria. Based on the given research questions of this research, two primary questions guide my analysis in this chapter: First, have the trajectories of Saudi Arabia transnational Salafism converged or diverged in Indonesia and Nigeria? Second, to what extent do Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria exercise agency in shaping the Salafism discourse, and how has the transnational Islam, notably by Saudi Arabia, influences their day-to-day practices vis-à-vis religious interpretations?

3.1 The Spread and Impact of Transnational Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria

The 1979 political upheaval, marked by the takeover of the grand mosque Juhayman al- 'Utaybi and his followers, was a significant moment in the rise of Saudi Salafism, as discussed by various scholars mentioned in the previous chapters. In the aftermath of the Grand Mosque seizure and other significant events of 1979, the Saudi government responded by initiating a sort of an accommodating form of Salafism. This approach prioritized symbolic rituals such as wearing the *jalabiyya*, *niqab* and *isbal*. Again, the state tried to appease the religious establishment, notably the *ulama*, to secure their support and legitimacy for the continuation of the House of al-Saud[69].

In the same vein, Salafism was disseminated externally alongside the Saudi humanitarian endeavours in the so-called developing countries like Indonesia and Nigeria. Some of the main efforts used in spreading Salafism abroad included renovating and building mosques, establishing Islamic schools, supporting educational activities, and distributing religious materials etcetera. Moreover, the Saudi Government actively promoted Salafism worldwide through institutional assistance and proselytization (*da'wa*) activities. In the following sections, I will elaborate in detail on each of the mentioned channels.

[69] Al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia*.

Practically, Saudi Arabia influences the discourse around Salafis behaviours and social norm. Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria frequently regards Saudi Arabia as the supreme authority, readily adopting its practices and ideas. While there are exceptions, mostly in the case of well learned Salafis who often question the idea of blind following, even if it is the Saudi religious establishment. Yet, this general trend is evident in both Indonesia and Nigeria. During my fieldwork in one of the leading Salafi schools in the Yogyakarta special region of Indonesia, I observed that most students wore the *Jallabiya* with trousers above ankles *(isbal),* and some senior students kept beards.

When asked if this dress code was mandatory or voluntary, most students informed me that they willingly imitated the Islamic mode of dressing. For them, the Saudi mode of dressing is an ideal Islamic dressing. A similar scenario unfolded in Nigeria. From my observations, the school uniforms in many Salafis schools were tailored in the form of a *Jallabiya*, demonstrating a significant embodiment of the principle of *tasfiyya*. Additionally, a teacher whose name is withheld for confidentiality, and who graduated from the University of Medina with a bachelor's degree in Hadith, was particularly meticulous about the student's dress code, especially regarding *isbal*. I frequently observed him ensuring that student's trousers were above their ankles, and taking strict measures like tearing the students' trousers if they compromise with the *isbal*. These examples illustrate how the principles of *tasfiyya* and *tarbiyya* significantly manifest and impact Salafis day to day activities vis-à-vis religious interpretations in both Indonesia and Nigeria.

Consequently, the phenomenon described above can be examined using Bourdieu's theory of domination, which explains how dominant groups maintain their power by influencing the beliefs, attitudes and behaviours of marginalized members of the society. According to Bourdieu, dominant groups wield power by imposing frameworks of thought and perception on marginalized social actors, perpetuating a social order that benefits the dominant group[70]. In this context, Saudi

[70] Radimská, "Pierre Bourdieu: Sociologist of Dominance and of the Dominated."

Arabia, as the dominant entity, through its dissemination of transnational Islam subtly imposes a sort of foreign frameworks on the religious practices of the Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria.

By spreading its brand of Salafism, Saudi Arabia exports not only religious practices but also a distinct worldwide view which aligned with its geopolitical interests, especially maintaining its preeminent in the Muslim world. Thus, the Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria maintain Saudi Arabia's ideological and political hegemony by internalizing these frameworks. This technique of symbolic domination ensures that Saudi Arabia's influence remains entrenched, as local Salafis groups in these countries adopt and propagate Saudi-endorsed Islamic norms and practices, reinforcing the socio-political system favoured by the Saudi state. Besides, to understand how the spread of Saudi Arabia transnational Salafism manifested in Indonesia and Nigeria, it is essential to analyse the primary channels through which this ideological and religious influence was spread. Although there may be numerous methods through which Salafism was disseminated to the two countries distinctly, I will only focus on the main channels detailed below, drawing from a vast scholarship on transnational Salafism.

3.2 Institutional Support and Educational Activities

Institutional support in form of governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, NGO's and even individuals support have played a significant role in the spread of Salafism worldwide[71]. In addition, educational activities such as building schools, offering scholarships for international students to study in Saudi Arabia are some of the crucial factors[72]. Students from Indonesia and Nigeria are no exception in this regard. They have also been benefiting from these efforts for decades. Besides, it is not a new thing that this strategical generous support by the

[71] For more information on Global Salafism See Meijer, *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*. Though, it has also been emphasized that Salafism is not a unified movement and that different currents within Salafism have their own historical trajectory and combination of local and transnational networks.
[72] Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign Transnational Islam and the Salafi Madrasa in Post-9/11 Indonesia."

Saudi manifested in several countries.

At the forefront of this educational activities is the establishment of Islamic University of Medina, which has played a critical role in drawing a diverse student body from all over the world[73]. In 1961, King Saud established the Islamic University of Medina, incorporating older institutions like *Dar al-Hadith* in Mecca and Medina, with a primary focus on *da'wa* in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa[74]. The university's faculty consisted of Muslim Brotherhood members, Indian scholars, and others from diverse regions, enhancing its religious prestige. Despite sharing broad Salafi trends, they held diverse views on doctrine and political engagement. Many faculty members hailed from sub-Saharan Africa, and both they and their students played a crucial role in disseminating Saudi doctrine and adapting it to the African context[75].

In light of the aforementioned, Saudi Arabia also funded educational institutes in Indonesia and supported students to further their studies in the Kingdom. In the early 1970s, Saudi Arabia sent a special envoy, Abd al-Aziz al-Ammar, to Indonesia to discuss prospective cooperation. Al-Ammar, a student of the Saudi Grand Mufti and a respected contemporary Salafi figure Abdullah Bin Baz (1910-1999), met with Mohammad Natsir, a major Muslim figure and former leader of the *Masyumi*, the largest Islamic Political party during the Soekarno era[76]. After *Masyumi's* dissolution in the 1960, Natsir moved his attention from politics to social activism, establishing the DDII (Indonesian Council for Islamic Promulgation), which promotes *da'wa* and Islamic education[11]. Natsir also developed international relations with Muslim countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, and became active in International Islamic bodies[12]. The encounter between al-Ammar and Natsir was vital, shaping the future direction of the Islamic movement in Indonesia.

---

[73] Christopher Anzalone and Yasir Qadhi, "*From Dir'iyya to Riyadh: The History and Global Impact of Saudi Religious Propagation and Education,"* ed. Peter Mandaville, *Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam* (Oxford University Press, April 14, 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197532560.003.0003.

[74] Ulrike Freitag, *The Projection of Saudi Arabian Influence in West Africa*, *Islam and Muslim Life in West Africa: Practices, Trajectories and Influences*, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110733204-009.

[75] Freitag.

[76] Jajang Jahroni, "Saudi Arabia Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism," *Al-Jami'ah* 58, no. 1 (2020): 35–62, https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2020.581.35-62.

A few years later, an Islamic college specializing in Sharia and Arabic, LIPIA was established in Jakarta sponsored by Saudi Arabia[77], with al-Ammar appointed as its director. Despite some controversy surrounding the issue, the college was eventually established. Over time, educational institutions such as LIPIA produced graduated who adhere to strict, traditional Islamic Principles rooted in Salafism. LIPIA, established in Jakarta with Saudi funding, plays a significant role in promoting Salafi ideology through its rigorous curriculum and emphasis on traditional Islamic teachings. Similarly, the *Bina Masjid Kampus* (Campus Mosque Program) has been instrumental in cultivating a cadre of scientifically minded yet devout Muslims who integrate their religious beliefs with modern scientific knowledge[78]. These programs, supported by Saudi Arabia, provide students with an education deeply rooted in Salafi principles, further embedding these ideologies within the local context of Indonesia.

On the other hand, looking back to the beginning of the 1980s, around two thousand African students pursued their studies in Saudi Arabia. Thousands of copies of the Quran and a significant amount of Wahhabi theological literature were distributed in northern Nigeria. Part of the subsidies was transmitted to *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam*, which established several schools, including those in remote areas. These schools were managed by Muslim missionaries, some Nigerians, and other Egyptians, Pakistanis, and Muslims from other countries. These missionaries were well-versed in the Wahhabi literature and dedicated to spreading it in the region. In short, Saudi Arabian aid to third world countries amounted to 6% of its aggregate GNP. In Africa, 96% of Saudi aid had been awarded to Muslim countries until the early 1980s. Quantifying the aid is challenging due to the involvement of numerous official and non-official governmental institutions. But undoubtedly, this has contributed significantly to promoting Arabic and Islamic education in Sub-Saharan Africa. Besides the MWL, several other Saudi Islamic charities sponsored Arabic

[77] Hasan, *Laskar Jihad*.
[78] Jamhari and Saifudin Asrori, "The Making of Salafi-Based Islamic Schools in Indonesia," *Al-Jami'ah* 60, no. 1 (2022): 227–64, https://doi.org/10.14421/AJIS.2022.601.227-264.

and Islamic education in Africa, notably the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), and International Federation of Arab and Islamic Schools[79].

In Nigeria, the spread of Salafism through institutional support and educational activities manifested in a multifaceted manner. For instance, Shaykh Umar Fallata, who had studied at Dar al-Hadith in Medina, played a crucial role in recruiting Nigerian students to study at the University of Medina. Students were recruited through both direct recruitment and through the efforts of organizations such as the Muslim World League (MWL), facilitating the spread of Salafism in the region[80]. Saudi Arabia's promotion of Salafism was further channelled through the establishment and support of various educational institutions. Notably, alumni of the Islamic University of Medina established schools in different parts of Nigeria. Graduates were encouraged but not obliged to promote Salafism in their home countries. Figures like Shaykh Ja'far Mahmoud Adam (1961/2-2007), Dr Muhammad Sani Umar Rijyar Lemo (b.1970), Shaykh Abdulwahhab Abdullah (b.1953), and additional half-dozen Muslim intellectuals.

As young preachers in the 1980s, they were awarded scholarships at Saudi Arabia's Islamic University of Medina. They studied a canon of writings that included works from the ninth century Middle East. Thurston tracked Nigerian's return home in the 1990s and 2000s, examining how they taught the canon and used it to politics[81]. Thus, these alumni-founded educational institutions and foundations, often supported by the Muslim World League and other quasi-governmental organizations, as well as affluent Saudi individuals. Undoubtedly, this helped in propagating Salafism in the country. Likewise, *Al-Muntada* Trust[82] Schools, located in various cities including Lagos and Kano, received Saudi funding and focused on Islamic and Arabic education[17], promoting Salafi ideologies. Graduates from these schools often pursued further education in Saudi Arabia or other Middle Eastern

[79] Kane, *Muslim Modernity In Postcolonial Nigeria*.
[80] Freitag, *The Projection of Saudi Arabian Influence in West Africa*.
[81] Alexander Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria Islam, Preaching, and Politics*.
[82] *Al-Muntada* Trust is a UK-based charity established in the 1999, with the aim of promoting Islamic values, education and community development. The organisation can be said to be Salafi inspired, at least considering their activities in Nigeria, especially the kind of individuals they employ in their schools. Still, the organisation's specific theological leanings may be subject to varying perspectives and debates.

countries, where their educational and religious worldview aligned closely with those prevalent in Saudi Arabia. Additionally, organizations like the *Al-Muntada* Trust supported activities such as Quranic recitation competitions, Islamic conferences, schools, and *da'wa* (proselytizing) programs. Consequently, Salafism gained significant traction in Nigeria, particularly in the northern regions, impacting the religious landscape and often leading to tensions with other Muslim groups.

3.3 Proselytization Efforts in Indonesia and Nigeria

Salafism has benefitted from the growth of global civil society, utilizing technology to disseminate ideas across borders. Transnational faith movements have thrived due to the ease of communication, facilitating the spread of ideas and funds[83]. **In Indonesia**, Saudi Arabia fostered close collaborations with the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (DDII, *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*) and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences (LIPIA, *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab*) to promote Salafism[84]. Both institutions played a significant role in recruiting cadres to promote Saudi Arabia's ideology. Founded by Natsir in the 1970s, DDII actively translated works of Middle Eastern Muslim thinkers and was the first Islamic group to send Indonesian students to Middle Eastern universities, such as the University of Riyadh, the University of *Madinah al-Munawwarah*, Al-Azhar University, and the University of ibn Saud[85].

DDII was instrumental in embedding the transnational Islamic movement in Indonesia, at that time especially the *Haraki* type of Salafism. However, Salafism gained momentum in Indonesia in the late 1980s, evidenced by the emergence of adherents with distinctive appearances and practices such as long beards (*lihya*), Arab-style robes (*jalabiyya*), turbans (*imama*), and ankle-length trousers (*isbal*). Women adopted the all-encompassing black veil (*niqab*). Identifying as Salafis,

[83] Jamhari and Asrori, "The Making of Salafi-Based Islamic Schools in Indonesia."
[84] Noorhaidi Hasan, - (2020) *Salafism, Knowledge Production and Religious Education in Indonesia.* In: The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia. ISEAS Publishing, Singapore, pp. 131-150. ISBN 978-981-4881-47-0.
[85] Jamhari and Asrori, "The Making of Salafi-Based Islamic Schools in Indonesia."

these individuals sought to separate themselves from the permissive society, forming tight-knit, exclusive communities. During the 1990s, the movement rapidly developed, organizing study sessions on university campuses and in mosques across urban and rural areas[86].

In that period, Salafism in Indonesia maintained an apolitical stance before the fall of the New Order, focusing on monotheism and strict religious practices. Their discourse revolved around seemingly minor issues like dress codes, which were seen as significant steps toward transforming Muslim society. Salafis advocated for graduated societal transformation through education (*tarbiyya*) and purification (*tasfiyya*), with some exhibiting a more of Political or even *jihadi* type of Salafism by aiming to implement *sharia* fully. They passionately engaged in *da'wa* activities, establishing study circles (*halaqats*) and Islamic seminars or workshops (*dauras*). Thus, in essence, it can be opined that over time, Salafism in Indonesia fragmented into three main factions: purists (focused on Islamic purity), politicos (politically active), and jihadists (advocating *jihad*). These groups further divided into *Sururis* (followers of Muhammad Surur) and non-*Sururis* (aligned with Yemen's Muqbil Ibn Hadi al-Wadi'd). Despite their differences, all factions sought legitimacy and financial support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries [87]. A vivid example of the significance of DDII and LIPIA in promoting Saudi Islamic ideology is profound *madrasas* across Indonesia[88].

On the other hand, since 1960s Saudi Arabia initiated efforts to spread Salafism **in Nigeria** by fostering relationships with northern Nigerian leaders. This elite group also included individuals educated in colonial institutions and abroad, often in England or the Arab world. They were generally open to adopting modern ideas and reforming traditional structures[23]. Their international exposure facilitated connections, particularly in the Arab world. Mainly Ahmadu Bello, a prominent northern Nigerian leader, emerged as a crucial partner for Saudi Arabia. Although not a Salafi himself, Bello was instrumental in facilitating Saudi influence due to

[86] Hasan, "Salafism, Education, and Youth: Saudi Arabia's Campaign for Wahhabism in Indonesia."
[87] Hasan.
[88] Hasan.

his interest in international relations over strict religious alignment. He maintained many of the customs of his *Qadiriyya*-affiliated royal family and employed Sufi traditions in his efforts to reform Islamic law and practice in northern Nigeria. Out of this, Bello's initiative to unify Northern Muslims, termed *Usmaniyya*, was named after his ancestor Shaykh 'Uthman dan Fodio, a revered *Qadiri* scholar who led a *jihad* in the early 1800s and remained a symbol of justice for many Nigerians throughout the 20th Century[89].

Bello prioritized improving relations with the Muslim and Arab world forging connections with Saudi Arabia and Egypt's President Nasser. He served as the first vice president of the MWL, with Shaykh Abubakar Gumi (1924-1992) as his representative. Some of Bello's projects, such as *Jama'at Nasr al-Islam* (The society for the Victory of Islam), were funded by donations from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait[90]. Gumi became a prominent opponent of Sufism during this period, leading the rise of Salafism in the 1960s and 1970s. As the top Islamic judge in the northern Nigeria from 1962 to 1966 and later a famous radio speaker, Gumi frequently denounced Sufism[91]. Furthermore, Gumi established strong connections with Saudi political and religious authorities when he was appointed as a pilgrim officer.

This enabled him to procure economic assistance and become a prominent advocate for religious and social reform aligning with the Wahhabi principles and thoughts[92]. Although at that time, prominent scholars like Gumi himself had limited familiarity with Salafi doctrines at that time and did not fully adhere to the strict Salafi methodology, which includes rejecting Sunni legal schools and discarding weak hadiths. Subsequently, this divergence led to tensions with Medina-trained scholars in the 1990s, who advocated for more substantial reforms in Muslim thought, including the abandonment of strict adherence to a single school of thought[93].

---

[89] Alexander Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria Islam, Preaching, and Politics*.
[90] Alexander Thurston.
[91] Alex Thurston, "Abubakar Gumi's Al Aqida Al-Sahiha Bi-Muwafaqat Al-Shari: Global Salafi Sm and Locally Oriented Polemics in a Northern Nigerian Text," *Islamic Africa* 2, no. 2 (2011): 9–21, https://doi.org/10.5192/21540993020209.
[92] Kane, *Muslim Modernity In Postcolonial Nigeria*.
[93] Freitag, *The Projection of Saudi Arabian Influence in West Africa*.

In 1978, followers of Shaykh Abubakar Gumi formed the Society for the Removal of Heretical Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna, known as *Izala* with the acronym JIBWIS (*Jama'atu Izalatil Bid'a wa Ikamatus Sunnah*)[94]. Izala emerged as a powerful force against Sufism in Nigeria. However, internal tensions arose, particularly after Gumi's death in the 1990s, leading to a split into two main factions based in Kaduna and Jos, northern Nigeria[95]. Meanwhile, young Izala preachers who had studied at the Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia began returning home. Some of these Medina graduates were dissatisfied with Izala, viewing it as parochial and not sufficiently aligned with authentic Salafi teachings and practices.

In the 1990s, some Medina graduates began to present themselves as independent *ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama'a*[96]. These scholars sought to be recognized not merely as Izala members but as representatives of a purer form of Sunni Islam, particularly Salafism. Notable among them was Shaykh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam (1961/2-2007), rising from humble beginnings to becoming a prominent Salafi preacher in northern Nigeria. Upon his return from Medina in 1993, Adam promoted a scholarly and political style of Salafism. His political involvement increased after the implementation of Sharia in northern Nigerian states in 1999. Adam served in the Kano State government but resigned in 2005, claiming that Sharia was not being properly implemented. He was assassinated in 2007, and the crime remains unsolved[97]. In academic discussions on Nigerian Salafism, Adam is often mentioned in relation to his mentorship and subsequent estrangement from Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009), the founder of Boko Haram. Their conflicts marked a critical moment for Salafism in Nigeria[98].

---

[94] Muhammad Muhammad Nasir and Haula Noor, "Women , Faith , and Authority : Malama Zainab Ja ' Afar and the Navigation of Religious Authority in Northern Nigeria" 8, no. 2 (2023): 107–22, https://doi.org/10.18326/attarbiyah.v8i2.107-122.

[95] Amara Ramzi Ben, "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharīʿa Re-Implementation," no. June (2011): 379.

[96] John Campbell, "Salafism in Northern Nigeria Beyond Boko Haram," Council on Foreign Relations, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/salafism-northern-nigeria-beyond-boko-haram.

[97] Alex Thurston, "Nigeria's Mainstream Salafis between Boko Haram and the State," *Islamic Africa* 6, no. 1–2 (2015): 109–34, https://doi.org/10.1163/21540993-00602007.

[98] Campbell, "Salafism in Northern Nigeria Beyond Boko Haram."

Over time, Saudi Arabia's strategy towards Nigeria evolved and became more sophisticated. African Salafis residing in Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in contextualizing and localizing the Salafi message to resonate with African contexts. These efforts resulted in a cohort of Nigerian students deeply influenced by Salafism, positioning Nigeria as a significant target for recruitment by the Islamic University of Medina. Attracted by the promise of free education and scholarships, Nigerian students studied in Saudi Arabia and returned home as trained Salafi scholars. They established educational institutions and Islamic centres, assuming roles as *imams*, teachers and leaders of various Islamic organizations. The influence of these scholars was profound, significantly shaping religious practices and beliefs across Nigeria[99]. This shift led to a significant increase in northern Nigerian students engaging with and propagating Salafi teachings. Prominent figures such as Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam in Kano propagated Salafism not only as preachers but also through recorded audio and video lectures, further disseminating the teachings.

3.4 The Convergent and Divergent Trajectories of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria

A comparative analysis of transnational Salafism's trajectories in Indonesia and Nigeria reveals both convergent and divergent factors in its dissemination and evolution. A central converging factor in the dissemination of Salafism in both countries is the instrumental role of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has strategically employed institutional support, establishing and funding educational institutions like *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab* (LIPIA) in Indonesia, and supporting the various Islamic University of Madinah's Alumni schools in Nigeria. These institutions serve as crucial hubs for training scholars with reinforced commitment to Salafism.

This endeavour by Saudi Arabia to propagate Salafism through educational scholarships, institutional funding, and support for local Islamic organizations represents a form of transnational dominance considering Bourdieu's theory of

[99] Alexander Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria Islam, Preaching, and Politics*.

domination. By Leveraging its substantial financial resources and religious authority—by virtue of being the holiest sites of Islam, Saudi Arabia seeks to establish and maintain its religious and political influence over Muslim Communities worldwide. This effort is not solely an ideological endeavour but also a strategic geopolitical manoeuvre, positioning Saudi Arabia as a central force in the global Muslim community through maintaining its preeminent in the heart of the Muslims. Saudi Arabia's ideological drive to propagate transnational Salafism aligns with its broader political economy.

Moreover, the geopolitical context significantly fuels this endeavour, particularly in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which positioned Iran as a challenger to Western hegemony and a model for Islamic governance. In response, Saudi Arabia intensified its efforts to counter Iranian influence by promoting its own version of Salafism. Additionally, the geopolitical ramifications of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Egypt-Israeli peace treaty of 1978 also played a role. These events reshaped alliances and rivalries in the Middle East, prompting Saudi Arabia to bolster its religious outreach as a means of consolidating its leadership in the Muslim world. Through institutions both internally and externally, like LIPIA in Indonesia and the Islamic University of Madinah in the kingdom, Saudi Arabia systematically trained a cadre of scholars and religious leaders committed to Salafism, thereby extending its ideological and political reach.

This top-down dissemination of Salafism aligns with Scots's notion of the dominant power, as seen in the attempt by Saudi Arabia to tacitly impose its cultural and ideological frameworks on subordinate groups. Educational scholarships provided by Saudi institutions, particularly the Islamic University of Medina, have been crucial in this process. Students from both Indonesia and Nigeria have benefitted from these opportunities, resulting in a cadre of scholars deeply influenced by Salafism. This transnational educational exchange underscores the influence of Saudi Arabia and highlights the effectiveness of its strategic investments in education as a means of both ideological dissemination and gaining

political influence, to maintain its preeminent in the Muslim world and to position itself as the central player in the political landscape of Middle East.

However, the trajectories of transnational Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria diverge significantly, shaped by distinct socio-political context and local dynamics. In Indonesia, in the late 1980s Salafism adopted an apolitical stance, focusing primarily on religious purification (*tasfiyya*) and education (*tarbiyya*)[100]. This allowed Salafism to integrate gradually into the socio-religious fabric of the country without significant resistance, unlike in Nigeria where the campaign faced a significant resistance especially from the Sufis, which often led to physical violence. Where Salafism in Indonesia had to adapt to coexist with other Islamic traditions and local customs, although there exists some resistance especially from the entrenched syncretic oriented Islam in Java. But arguably, the resistance is not as pronounced as in the case of Salafism encounter with the local Sufis in Nigeria.

Over time, Salafism in Indonesia has fragmented into various factions, each with differing approaches to politics and religious practices. The emergence of these factions – ranging from purists who emphasize doctrinal purity to politicos and *jihadist* with differing degrees of political engagement – illustrates the dynamic and evolving nature of Salafism in Indonesia. But still, these groups seek legitimacy and support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries[101], yet their adaptation to local contexts demonstrates a significant exercise of the agency of the Indonesian Salafis in shaping the discourse and practice of Salafism.

In Indonesia today, Salafis often blend Salafism with local customs and traditions, quietly challenging existing cultural norms, such as dress codes, Additionally, some groups, particularly quietist ones, subtly resist the strict orthodoxy of Saudi Salafism, adapting it to fit their local context. This selective adaptation represents a form of everyday resistance, where local actors assert their

[100] Hasan, "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign Transnational Islam and the Salafi Madrasa in Post-9/11 Indonesia."
[101] Noorhaidi Hasan, "SRP Webinar on Soft Power , Islam , and Religiosity II – Glocalisation of Islam in Southeast Asia," 2024.

agency[102] by shaping Salafi practices to align with their socio-cultural realities. For instance, many Indonesian Salafis adopt the symbolic practices promoted by Saudi Arabia, such as wearing the *jalabiyya*, keeping long beards and maintaining *isbal*.

However, they also engage in practices and discourses that reflect their local cultural context. In an interview, Abu Nida informed me that in Indonesia, it is required of any religious affiliation to respect each other despite their differences. Harsh criticisms towards each other are rarely exchanged in public spaces, aligning with the pluralistic nature of the state as embodied in their state philosophy. But in Nigeria, the reverse is the case. Although, even in Indonesia some Salafis can be vocal in condemning those who do not belong to their fold, this set remains relatively small. This selective adaptation represents a form of subtle resistance, as local actors assert their agency by shaping Salafi practices to align with their socio-cultural realities.

In contrast, Salafism in Nigeria faced a more contentious integration, marked by direct confrontation with entrenched Sufi traditions dominant in the northern regions. The initial spread of Salafism was facilitated by the cooperation of northern Nigerian elites, such as Ahmadu Bello, who leveraged their political influence to foster connections with Saudi Arabia. However, this also led to significant resistance from established religious authorities who were deeply rooted in Sufi traditions[103]. Particularly, figures like Abubakar Gumi played critical roles in challenging Sufism, leading to the formation of groups like the Society for the Removal of Heretical Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna (*Izala*), which explicitly opposed Sufi practices[104].

This direct confrontation has sometimes resulted in tensions and conflicts within the Nigerian Muslim community, highlighting a more contentious and polarized integration of Salafism compared to Indonesia. The formation of the

[102] James C. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance," *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 4 (1989): 33, https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v4i1.1765.
[103] Mark Woodward, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmaniyah and Abstract, "Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom."
[104] Campbell, "Salafism in Northern Nigeria Beyond Boko Haram."

Society for the Removal of Heretical Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna *Izala* and its subsequent internal splits reflect the dynamic and contested nature of Salafism in Nigeria. These internal conflicts and the emergence of independent Salafi scholars in the 1999s, such as Ja'afar Mahmood Adam, illustrate the *hidden transcripts* of resistance, where local actors challenge both Sufi dominance and the orthodoxy of Salafism as propagated by the early proponents like Gumi.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia's transnational Islamic influence has been profound in both countries, yet the extent and nature of this influence have been shaped by local circumstances and the agency of local scholars. In Indonesia, local Salafis have navigated a complex religious landscape, balancing the adaptation of Salafism, reflecting a significant degree of local agency in shaping its discourse. In Nigeria, the interplay between Saudi influence and local agency has been marked by more pronounced conflicts. In a nutshell, local scholars and leaders in both countries have exercised agency in shaping how Salafism was negotiated with the resistance, especially from the practitioners of a more syncretic form of Islam, most often associated with Sufism. This led to a more fragmented and contentious religious landscape. Thus, this fragmentation and negotiation has underscored the critical role of local socio-political dynamics in shaping the adaptation and evolution of Salafism in the country.

CHAPTER IV

THE DYNAMICS AND THE GLOCALIZATION OF SALAFISM IN INDONESIA AND NIGERIA POST 9/11

The 1970s (upward) witnessed a surge of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria, fuelled by distinct political and social dynamics of each of the countries. In Indonesia, Suharto's New Order (1966-1998) weakened traditional Islamic institutions and promoted a more secular state. Thus, this endeavour by Suharto made Indonesia into a country that does not want to be defined as Islamic or secular, but rather as a religious state[105]. This created space for alternative interpretations of Islam, including Salafism. A growing disillusioned middle class students' movement which sought a more puritanical Islam. Seeing that, the Salafis seized the moment, establishing schools and even using new media to spread their ideology[106].

Besides, in Indonesia, the aftermath of 9/11 and the US war on terror significantly impacted the dynamics of Salafism in the country. Increased government scrutiny and the association of Salafism with global terrorism forced many Salafis to moderate their stance and distance themselves from more radical interpretations[107]. In contrast, unlike in Indonesia where the after math of 9/11 significantly impacted the dynamics of Salafism, to the extent of forcing many groups to recalibrate their approaches and methods of teaching Salafism, the situation in Nigeria diverge significantly from what observers observed in the case of Indonesia. The emergence of Boko Haram, an extremists' violent *jihadi* group, is what undoubtedly impacted the dynamics of Salafism in Nigeria, casting a long shadow, but the US war on terror influence in Nigeria is a less clear-cut. Again, it is important to acknowledge the fact that Indonesia's democratization led to a rise of moderate Islam, with some Salafi groups even entering the political arena, as I will illustrate in this chapter subsequently.

[105] Carool Kersten, "Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas and Values" (Oxford University Press, January 5, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190247775.001.0001.
[106] Hasan, "Salafism, Education, and Youth: Saudi Arabia's Campaign for Wahhabism in Indonesia."
[107] Hasan, "Salafism in Indonesa: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance."

4.1 Salafism and Cultural Integration in Indonesia

In Indonesia, the Salafism of the 1980s significantly differs from the contemporary Salafism, considering the observation conducted for this research. Nonetheless, the former has indelibly influenced the latter's current trajectory. The global political landscape, particularly following the event of 9/11 and Indonesia's subsequent national war on terror, prompted a shift among the Indonesian Salafis towards a greater cultural integration and a sort of symbolic and rhetorical moderations. This shift involved particularly a move from strict adherence to Salafism's practice to, for example, the specific customs towards embracing local Indonesian symbolic cultures.

A vivid example of this is, in 2000s it was very common to identify the Salafis by their appearance, such as the consistent use of *jallabiya*, maintaining *isbal* and keeping long beards. Which the Salafis believe that this sort of symbolic practices signified their religious commitment[108]. But today, many Salafis are more accepting of Indonesian cultural symbols. For example, it has become common to see Salafis wearing *Batik* (the traditional Indonesian clothing) in public and social events. Perhaps this shift could be a part of a broader strategy to appeal to a wider audience and reduce the perception of Salafism as a sort of alien ideology in the country. Regardless, my observation inferred that the current dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia reflect a significant shift in cultural adaptation and engagement with local traditions. A growing number of Salafis are now more accepting of local cultural symbols, unlike before wherein such practices could be deem as *bid'a*.

Notwithstanding, my fieldwork in Yogyakarta suggests otherwise in the sense that, I observed that at the Bin Baz Islamic centre, both students and teachers continue to adopt the symbolic practices like the *isbal*, jallabiya and so on, to denote their religiosity. This observation can be analysed using Bourdieu's framework of symbolic power and cultural hegemony. According to Bourdieu, dominant groups assert influence by imposing frameworks of thought and perception on

[108] Hasan.

marginalized social actors, thereby perpetuating a social order that serves the interests of the already dominant[109].

In the context of this research, this can be analysed in the prescribed symbolic practices which are essentially alien to the region. For instance, as it has been highlighted throughout the previous chapters, the use of prescribed dress codes, such as the *jallabiya*, keeping long beards, drawing trousers above the ankles (*isbal*), and the use of *niqab* by the women. These practices, mainly emanated out of the Saudi Arabia propagation of transnational Salafism, and have significantly shaped the global understanding of what is considered a genuine form of Salafism or even Islam as a whole. Any deviation from these norms may be perceived by Salafists as a departure from proper Islam.

In Indonesia in the Salafi institutions, basically both students and staff often wear *jallabiya* and the white skull cap known as '*Peci Putih*'. This distinct dress code highlights their adherence to Salafi identity through symbolic practices. Though, when I questioned the students about their appearance, they informed me that it is not mandatory but a personal choice to display their religiosity. Not only that, but it also highlights their devotion to a particular way of life shaped by Salafism. In essence, this is contrary to my observation at some of the traditional Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia, where students typically wear local or traditional attire. For example, at NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*) affiliated *Pesantren* (Islamic boarding school), students commonly wear traditional Indonesian attire such as *Sarong* (A type of wraparound skirt), *Baju Koko* (A traditional men's shirt), and *Peci* (A traditional cap). Consequently, these differences highlight how symbolic power operates differently within various contexts, with some institutions adhering to Salafi inspired appearances, asserting their religious identity and others integrating more localized cultural symbols.

Surprisingly, contrary to the above, it has been found that there is a noticeable shift at institutions like LIPIA, historically known as hubs of Salafism in Indonesia. My interlocutor at LIPIA informed me that symbolic practices such as

[109] Radimská, "Pierre Bourdieu: Sociologist of Dominance and of the Dominated."

the *isbal* are no longer significant in the discourse and practice of Salafism[110]. This shift indicates a broader trend of cultural adaptation and a move away from rigid doctrinal expressions of Salafism. Therefore, observation shows that the currents in Indonesia indicate that some Salafis are actively rebranding their approach to appeal to younger generations. They are employing commodification strategies to increase their appeal, as exemplified by hosting events which can be deem as 'cool'.

For instance, events like the *Indonesian Halal Fair,* which showcases a collaboration between Salafis, fashion brands and so on. During my fieldwork in Yogyakarta, I was informed that I cannot meet with one of my crucial interviewees, Ustaz Abu Nida on the initial scheduled date of our interview[111]. This was because Abu Nida himself was invited to deliver a public lecture at the Halal Fair. This scenario inferred a promotion of *da'wa* proselytization that is distinctly soft and inclusive, diverging from the traditional strict approach in Salafism. This also suggests a deliberate attempt to reposition Salafism as a more relatable and attractive ideology to Indonesian younger generation, especially the youths, and demonstrating how Salafism in Indonesia is been negotiated with local culture, popular trends, the state, and the dominant political system, making Salafis a sort of a 'dynamic actors'.

4.2 Salafism in Nigeria: Challenges, Adaptations, and Outside Influences

Although Salafism in Nigeria has faced significant challenges, particularly in the wake of 9/11, but the challenges did not really impact the dynamics of Salafism as profoundly as in the case of Indonesia. Nonetheless, the after math of the event of 9/11global war on terror has led to suspension of most external Salafi activities and even the closure of some of the prominent Salafi institutions, such as the Al-Haramain Charitable Foundation and the World Islamic Forum Foundation[112].

Despite these setbacks, Salafis in Nigeria adapted by internally establishing new organizations and institutions like the Al-Furqan Foundation. These

[110] Interview with Abu Hashim. June 10, 2024.
[111] A discussion with Ustaz Aiman (My intermediary between Abu Nida, also his right man).
[112] Interview with Shaykh Hadi Yunus. May 12, 2024.

foundations and many others owned by individuals continue to manage numerous schools and mosques with material and moral support mainly form the Saudi Arabia regardless of the changes that occurred post 9/11[113]. Thus, what has significantly affected the dynamics of Salafism in Nigeria was the emergence of Boko Haram, a violent extremists jihadist group. The violent associated with Boko Haram forced mainstream Salafis groups to distance themselves from any kind of extremists' interpretations or practices which could result in a government scrutiny and surveillance[114].

Furthermore, the recent political changes in Saudi Arabia have impacted the dynamics of Salafism in Nigeria, coupled with the economic hardship in the country. Particularly, this has affected the ability of the Salafi schools to operate in full scale unlike before, leading to measures such as charging school fees, reducing staff numbers, and cutting salaries[115]. For a long period, the support from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries (quasi) organizations like *Al-Muntada* Trust, was crucial in sustaining numerous Salafi institutions. This financial backing enabled the payment of monthly salaries to employees who adhered to and propagated the Salafi teachings and curriculum. In the side of the students, they benefited from free education and sometimes received monthly bonuses as evidenced by institutions like the Al-Bayan Islamic Secondary School in Jos, Plateau State[116]. This school and other similar institutions are mainly run by the graduates of Middle Eastern universities, especially Saudi Arabia.

In this vein, Thurston argues that graduates of Medina University are now in a contest with Boko Haram to define Islam and its textual foundations in Nigeria. This struggle, according to him, will have a more profound impact on Nigeria's religious trajectory than the ongoing conflict between Boko haram and the Nigerian state. But even at the early years of the emergence of Boko haram, prominent Salafi scholars in the country like Shaykh Sani Umar Rijiyar Lemo assert that Boko haram

[113] Interview with Abdurrahman Sani. May 13, 2024.
[114] Interview with Abdurrahman Sani. May 13, 2024.
[115] Interview with Shaykh Hadi Yunus. May 12, 2024.

[116] Interview with Shaykh Hadi Yunus. May 12, 2024

has deviated from the mainstream Salafism, relying on poorly informed intermediaries for their interpretations, rather than consulting legitimate and esteemed scholars. Since citing textual evidence is a cornerstone of Salafi practice to validate their positions, Shaykh Rijiyar Lemo's challenge to Boko haram's evidence effectively questions their legitimacy as Salafis[117]. Prior to Boko haram's rise, Nigerian Salafis often included *Takfiri* (excommunication) expressions in their rhetoric, denouncing other Muslims as infidels due to their differences of *Aqeeda*.

Undoubtedly, the hardline stance was part of their broader religious stance, especially when we consider the proselytization approaches of pioneer Salafi scholars like Shaykh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi. Although recently, the brutality and radicalism of Boko haram led to increased scrutiny from the Nigerian government, compelling Nigerian Salafis to adopt a softer, more moderate approach to a large degree[118]. This new approach mainly emphasizes *Tarbiyya* and *Tasfiyya*, focusing on personal piety and general community development rather than overt political confrontation.

However, it is not surprising that the young Salafi scholars in Nigeria are now becoming more prominent in the spheres of preaching and proselytization, using various new media platforms. Assessment shows that this younger generation often engaged I heated debates with the Sufis, particularly on social media platforms. The debates are frequently recorded and circulated as video clips, highlighting the ongoing ideological and theological tensions between Salafism and Sufism in the country. These interactions not only reflect the vibrancy and contestations in religious discourse in Nigeria, but also showcases the influence of digital media in shaping contemporary religious debates. Thus, this is a crucial area that warrants further research to fully understand its implications and dynamics.

[117] Alexander Thurston, *Salafism in Nigeria Islam, Preaching, and Politics*.
[118] Interview with Abdurrahman Sani. May 13, 2024.

4.3 Quietist Salafis in Indonesia Gone Political?

Scholars have long argued that quietist Salafis constitute the largest sub-group of Salafism, particularly in the southern Mediterranean region[119]. Likewise, in the Southeast Asia, particularly in the contemporary Indonesia, the prevailing form of Salafism is also characterized as quietist especially in the late 1980s, again in some cases even apolitical. Historical accounts further highlight this stance: Initially, the *Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah* Indonesia (DDI) played a central role in propagating Salafism in Indonesia. However, the influence of DDI waned with the return of Indonesian graduates from the Saudi universities. Notable figures like Ustaz Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Aunur Rafiq Ghufron, and Yusuf Usman Baisa leveraged their deep knowledge of Salafism, drawing on classical and contemporary authorities like ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Their appeal among university students, who sought a pure and authentic form of Islam, catalysed their prominence in urban centre such as Yogyakarta, Bandung, Makassar, Solo, Surabaya, and Jakarta.

However, it is important to recognize that Salafism in Indonesia was not inherently quietist or apolitical, especially during its initial period of evolution. Initially, it emerged as a puritan movement, leading to conflicts with the existing syncretic religious practices, often associated with Sufism in Java[120]. But fast-forward, in the early 1980s, Indonesian DDI cadres who studied in Saudi Arabia were inspired by a more Haraki type of Salafism under the umbrella of Tarbiyya movement. But the successors of this cadres, particularly with the establishment of LIPIA and the changes in Saudi Arabia political and religious landscape, prompted by the events of 1979 (as described in the previous chapters), in turn, they learnt a more sort of apolitical quietists Salafism, contrary to what the first cadres absorbed in Saudi Arabia. Upon their return, they organized workshops (*halqa*) and study

[119] Inga Kristina Trauthig and Guy Robert Eyre, "'Quietist' Salafis after the 'Arab Revolts' in Algeria and Libya (2011–2019): Between Insecurity and Political Subordination," *Mediterranean Politics* 00, no. 00 (2023): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2023.2272474.
[120] Nasir, "Weaving Modernity in Salafism A Comparative Study of Muhammadiyah and Izala Movements."

Circles (*daura*) around university campus especially in Yogyakarta special region. These figures soon became the main proponents of Salafism in Indonesia[121].

Thus, while quietist Salafism is predominant in Indonesia, it is not the only type of Salafism existing in the region. For instance, even in the late 1980s, some Salafis, inspired by their experiences in Afghanistan, engaged in political and jihadist activities in Indonesia. To be precise, the Indonesian followers of Darul Islam-inspired Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) felt disillusioned with clandestine movements and joined Salafi study circles in the 1980s. Key figures like Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'sayir, who initially escaped to Malaysia to avoid arrest, later recruited followers and enhanced their militancy. Between 1985 and 1990, they sent approximately 200 members to Afghanistan for military training, alongside acquiring jihadist Salafism approaches. This led to the eventual establishment of *Jema'ah Islamiyah* (JI) in 1996, which actively promoted jihadi Salafism in Indonesia[122]. But still, here, I prioritize an assessment of the dynamics of the quietists Salafism. A focus justified by the historical context in which Salafism massively emerged in Indonesia, i.e. particularly in the 1980s, because of Saudi Arabia's efforts to promote accommodating Islam. Again, it is worthy of reiterating that other factions of Salafism such as the political and *Jihadi* Salafism also play a role in the trajectory of Salafism in Indonesia.

Contrary to what has been observed in the past, in Indonesia today, my interlocutor highlighted that, in a significant political development, a Salafi candidate is poised to potentially hold one of the most influential ministerial positions in the government, marking a historic first[123]. This development suggests a notable shift in the political landscape of the country, indicating a possible increase in Salafi political representation and influence. It further shows that gone are the days where Salafis are often branded as quietist and apolitical in Indonesia, particularly after 1980s (henceforward) where the rise of Salafism in Indonesia became a part of a broader religious revival that began with political unrest in Saudi

[121] Burhani, *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*.
[122] Burhani.
[123] Interview with Abu Fadhli (Pseudonym). May 4, 2024.

Arabia in 1979. Following the Grand Mosque seizure, Saudi Arabia promoted an accommodating form of Islam, significantly supporting the institutionalization of Salafism in Indonesia.

While my interlocutor has been deemed by some scholars[124] as notable a quietist Salafi figure, his/their implicit political stance suggests a more nuanced position. Despite not overtly engaging in political discourse, their actions and affiliations indicate a level of political engagement that calls for questioning the traditional categorization of quietists Salafism, most often viewed as inherently apolitical, particularly in Indonesia. Hence, building on Eyre's proposition[125], which examines how prominent quietists Islamists social movement in North Africa, despite their claims of abstaining from politics and focusing solely on religious education, they actually engage in political practices. Eyre argues that these quietist movements conduct politics through intra-group political friendships and contestation with competing Islamist networks.

My observation in Indonesia reveals similar dynamic, prompting a revaluation of the conventional classifications of the Salafis in Indonesia, such as political, quietists, *jihadi* and, so on as implied by numerous scholars[126]. Moreover, recent scholarship[127] proposes modifying this taxonomy by shifting the focus from viewing Salafi actors as rigid representative of doctrinal camps to recognizing their individual positions and adaptive strategies. Salafis should be seen not merely standard actors, but as '*dynamic actors*' who adeptly adjust to changing atmosphere and circumstances in each country. This perspective challenges the traditional classifications and highlights the flexibility and strategic adaptability of Salafis in different socio-political contexts.

[124] For further information about the subcategories of Salafis in Indonesia, see Hasan, "Salafism, Education, and Youth: Saudi Arabia's Campaign for Wahhabism in Indonesia."
[125] SOAS University of London, "Guy Robert Eyre," 2022, https://www.soas.ac.uk/about/guy-robert-eyre.
[126] E.g. Quintan Wiktorowicz.
[127] A good example is *Philipp Bruckmayr's et al, "Introduction: Challenges from 'the Periphery'? - Salafi Islam Outside the Arab World*.

4.4 Political Salafis in Nigeria Gone Quietists?

In Nigeria, the opposite trend as illustrated above is unfolding. Nigerian Salafis are known to be politically engaging to a significant degree. This striking difference highlights how Salafism is not monolithic but rather is shaped by the unique social and political contexts of each nation. In Nigeria, right from the beginning, there was a solid alliance between pioneering Salafi actors, the elites and the government in the early 1990s. Although Nigerian Salafis focused on local communities and mosques, some also forged alliances with the elites (the ruling class), thereby solidifying their influence; A vivid example of a key actor who leveraged on this kind of alliance was shaykh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi.

In essence, considering the discussions throughout this research, the mainstream Nigerian Salafis can be identified as *politicos*. Scholarship maintains that *politico* Salafis diverge from quietists Salafis by participating in parliamentary politics or, where they do not or are prevented from doing so, by undertaking contentious political debate and activism, they express their views on how the country should be run through letters, organizations, and sometimes even petitions. Moreover, a broader notion of political Salafis includes actors who voice their opinions in the public sphere, whether through participation in formal politics or by mobilizing informal networks (protest, social activism, and media appearances). In contrast, quietists including the *Madkhalis*, are distinct from political Salafis to a large degree[128].

Furthermore, a new development that is unfolding regarding the current dynamics of Salafism in Nigeria is the ongoing influence of returning graduate Salafis from Saudi Arabia universities, Yemen and Sudan. These class of Salafis, who view themselves as, *Madhkhalis*—whom I refer to (henceforth) as the 'Neo-Salafis'—have significantly started to shape the trajectory of Salafism in Nigeria. Particularly, they engage in debates questioning the teachings and practice of the early proponents of Salafism in the country. The neo-Salafis see them as

[128] Trauthig and Eyre, "'Quietist' Salafis after the 'Arab Revolts' in Algeria and Libya (2011–2019): Between Insecurity and Political Subordination."

'*mutasaahilun'* (very negligent). For them, the early generation of Salafis, like Shaykh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam and his contemporaries, or even pioneer figures like Shaykh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi, did not accurately practice and proselytize the real message of Salafiyya as it should be. Some of the main concerns of the neo-Salafis centre on issues such as the public denial or criticism of a ruler. Also, their anti-stance on reform movements, particularly those deriving their approach or methods from the Muslim Brotherhood.

Though, their views have not gained widespread acceptance among the general public yet, largely due to the religious authority enjoyed by the mainstream Salafis before them[129]. But their presence is likely going to drastically shape the discourse of Salafism in the few years to come. The emergence of the neo-Salafis has introduced a new dynamic in the discourse of Salafism in Nigeria. The contestations among and within Salafis in Nigeria is interestingly gaining traction. The neo-Salafis constantly challenge the authority of the mainstream by questioning the sources in which they derive their *manhaj* (Approach) Instead, the advocate for a more rigid adherence to Saudi-inspired interpretations of Islam. These divisions, oftens culminate in heated debates, between the neo-Salafis and the students of the mainstream Salafi prominent actors across Nigeria, especially on social media platforms.

The division within and among the Salafis in Nigeria has led to fractions and rivalries. Like the fragmentation observed in Indonesia during the early 1990s-2000s in the first schism between Ja'afar Umar Thalib and Yusuf Usman Baisa, mainly about the legitimacy leadership of the Salafis in Indonesia. Also, the second schism between Umar Thalib and Ustaz Abu Nida on the issues of *Sururiyya*[130]. However, unlike in the Indonesian context where key actors can be identified, the Nigerian situation is distinct by far and large. Anyone can become a preacher if they have a platform and the basic understanding of the religion. Although the students who graduated from Saudi Arabian universities are viewed as legitimate Islamic

[129] Interview with Bin Khamis. June 17, 2024.
[130] Hasan, "SRP Webinar on Soft Power , Islam , and Religiosity II – Glocalisation of Islam in Southeast Asia."

scholars, which emboldens them to preach at a very young age. This complexity further obscures the challenges of identifying who is who among the Salafis in Nigeria. Considering that, the classification or categorization of the Salafis in Nigeria is notably complex, with various factions I hypothetically identified as quietist, jihadist, political, apolitical, propagandist, and other numerous categories.

4.5 Fragmentation and Adaptation: A Cessation from Transnational Salafism?

Findings suggest that the dynamics of Salafism in Nigeria differ markedly from what has been found in Indonesia. While Indonesian Salafis have increasingly integrated local culture, pop culture, and politics, evolving towards what can be termed as *Post Salafism*, Nigerian Salafism remains distinct and multifaceted, adding multiple layers of complexity to its observers. Again, Salafism in Nigeria, in contrast with Salafism in Indonesia has not yet reached this level of integration. In Indonesia, Salafis have adapted to the local context by embracing indigenous symbols and moderating their rhetoric. However, this started to happen largely due to the country's counter-terrorism policy endeavours, which resulted in heightened scrutiny of the Salafis in the country, especially in the post-9/11 era.

On the other hand, findings suggest that the 9/11 events and the subsequent US global war on terror have a negligible impact on the dynamics of Salafism in Nigeria[131], unlike in Indonesia. The influence of transnational networks in Indonesia has historically played a major role in the development of Salafism in the country. This influence has manifested through generous support ranging from educational activities, institutional support, and sometimes even human resource contributions, as discussed in the previous chapters. A notable example is the establishment of LIPIA in Jakarta. Due to its major role in the development of Salafism in Indonesia and its strategic importance in Southeast Asia at large, the institution attracted significant attention from international prominent scholars and even members of the Saudi royal family[132]. In a nutshell, the transnational support

[131] Interview with Abdurrahman Sani. May 13, 2024.
[132] Hasan, "Salafism, Education, and Youth: Saudi Arabia's Campaign for Wahhabism in Indonesia."

towards the development of Salafism in Indonesia has played a vital role in the country for a long time.

However, a significant paradigm shift seems to be emerging in recent years. In an interview with Abu Nida, he revealed that lately, obtaining resources from Saudi Arabia has now become exceedingly difficult. Abu Nida added the Saudi generous support that scholars like him have been receiving for decades now necessitates a cooperative approach[133]. This indicates a major strategic shift in Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, particularly towards the transnational support they have been rendering for Muslim majority and minority countries since the 1970s-80s. The decline in direct support from Saudi Arabia has compelled some Indonesian Salafi institutions to seek alternative means of sustenance and engagement, potentially leading to a more localized form of Salafism.

However, Abu Nida revealed that the generous support from other Gulf countries like Kuwait is still coming through their embassy in Indonesia[134]. Nonetheless, LIPIA continues to receive support from Saudi Arabia, as it is a part of King Saud University. The nature of LIPIA's support differs from funding supplied to Salafis in other nations for example[135]. Hence, it is observed that Saudi support in Indonesia, which used to be directed towards individuals, has now become more difficult to obtain or at least necessitates certain measures that were not in place prior to the events of 9/11. This shift indicates a more cautious and structured approach in the dissemination of funds and resources, reflecting the heightened scrutiny and regulatory changes in the post-9/11 era, coupled with the changes in Saudi Arabia foreign policy.

In sharp contrast, the situation in Nigeria presents a different picture. Saudi Arabia continues to support institutions and even individuals that align with their interests. In particular, the *Madkhalis* are the ones benefiting from the generous support of Saudi Arabia in recent years. My Nigerian interlocutor, one of the prominent *Madkhalis* figures and a graduate of the University of Madina,

[133] Interview with Ustaz Abu Nida. May 4, 2023.
[134] Interview with Abu Nida.
[135] Dr Torkis Lobis. June 26, 2024.

highlighted that Saudi Arabia maintains its generous support in Nigeria through resource provision. He added, that in 2023 alone, he collaborated with the Saudi representatives to conduct a series of *daura* (Islamic seminar) in Nigeria successfully[136]. Apart from other support like building schools, mosques, and so on[137].

While in Nigeria, the Saudis continue to support the *neo-Salafis*, indicating a sustained effort to influence the religious and political discourse, rendering support to those whose ideology align with the recent Saudi state interests. Just like it was witnessed with their alliance with the Muslim brotherhood in the 1960s. Therefore, the current dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria are profoundly shaped by the shifts in Saudi Arabia internal and foreign policy. The contrasting patterns in these two countries highlight the complex interplay between local contexts and the transnational influences. It is worthy of reiterating that, in Indonesia, the decline in Saudi support to the mainstream Salafis may lead to a more indigenized form of Salafism in years to come. While in Nigeria, sustained Saudi backing may continue to reinforce a moderated, and politically sensitive version of Salafism.

The shift in Saudi foreign policy, which now prioritizes support for individuals and institutions that align with its vision and interests to eschew extremism associated with the Salafism of the 1970s, that was propagated at that time alongside the interpretations and views of the Muslim Brotherhood. Considering the current dynamics in Indonesia and Nigeria illustrated above, it can be argued that this approach reflects the adage 'he who pays the piper dictates the tune'. Directly or indirectly, Saudi Arabia aims to reshape the ideological landscape in both Indonesia and Nigeria by promoting a more moderate and politically neutral version of Salafism. It is important to note that, based on the findings it can be maintained that in Indonesia, this strategic shift has led to a reduction of in direct Saudi support to some prominent figures who for long have been beneficiaries of the support, forcing them to adapt and potentially evolving in a more locally

[136] Interview with Ja'afar (Pseudonym). May 12, 2024.
[137] Interview with Dr Samaila. May 8, 2024.

nuanced direction. This adaptation may result in a form of Salafism that is more integrated with Indonesian political and cultural context, reflecting a move away from the transnational model that was prevalent prior to the events of 9/11.

Therefore, it can be opined that the role of the local actors and scholars is what is shaping the current situation of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria. Although, the influence of transnational networks cannot be abstained from this dynamic, particularly the role of the Saudis. Still, the transnational influence is waning, unlike before. Moreover, looking back, it is crucial to emphasize that a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of Salafism in Nigeria requires acknowledging factors such as the role of the local context and the agency of local scholars. Pioneer Salafi scholars like Shaykh Abubakar Mahmoud Gumi established alliances with elites in northern Nigeria, as explained in the previous chapters. This endeavour helped in providing a crucial foundation for Salafism's foothold in the country[138], even before significant Saudi transnational influence manifested in the region.

Gumi's alliance with the government and elites at that time helped create a supportive environment for the spread of Salafism in Nigeria. Furthermore, it was Gumi's students who later established the *Jama'atu Izalatil Bid'a Wa Ikamatus Sunnah* (JIBWIS), which has become the largest and the most significant Islamic reform movement in west Africa[139]. JIBIWIS play a vital role in disseminating the Salafi teachings across Nigeria and beyond, emphasizing purification of Islamic practices from what they consider heretical innovations (*bid'a*) and sole adherence to the Qur'an and Sunnah (the traditions of the prophet). This movement continues to have a profound impact on the religious landscape in Nigeria and beyond, influencing public and political discourse, as well as religious practices.

Additionally, Nigeria's relative economic strength compared to other countries in the sub-Saharan Africa might have lessened the dependence of Nigerian Salafis on the transnational financial support, mainly from the gulf

[138] Kane, *Muslim Modernity In Postcolonial Nigeria*.
[139] Nasir, "Weaving Modernity in Salafism A Comparative Study of Muhammadiyah and Izala Movements."

countries. This has allowed for a significant degree a self-sufficiency in establishing religious institutions and disseminating Salafi teachings in Nigeria[140]. Therefore, whereas Saudi Arabia's influence on Salafism in Nigeria, particularly in educational activities has been significant, still a complete understanding of this interplay between transnational and local actors, requires acknowledging the role of pre-existing local networks, Nigeria's economic context, and the agency of the Nigerian Salafis in shaping their own movements. Besides, evolving scholarship on Salafism questions the emphasis on Saudi Arabia's central role in shaping our understanding of global Salafism. It is argued that this focus (on Saudi central role) can obscure more complex historical realities and diminish the agency of other Muslims outside Saudi Arabia in shaping their own discourse of Salafism[141].

Again, take Ethiopia in the eastern part of Africa for example. Østebø argues that the rise of a new interpretation of Islam among Oromo Muslims was linked to the emergence of new socio-economic groups seeking status recognition. Whereas Saudi Arabia's propagation of its interpretation coincided with the local developments, the Saudi message was significantly adapted to address Ethiopian sensibilities and challenges[142]. It became a cultural reference point that promised solutions to local problems. Thus, Østebø's proposition highlights that a crucial point. In the context of this research, although financial support from Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries has played a significant role in the development of Salafism in countries like Indonesia and Nigeria, still the transnational influence can vary greatly. In other cases, as seen in Ethiopia for instance, and even other countries outside of Africa, it can be said that transnational Salafism coincided with the preexisting local developments in those countries. These further warrants rethinking the notion that Salafism is solely propagated by the Saudi establishment using financial and logistic means.

[140]Interview with Abdurrahman Sani. May 13, 2024.
[141] Bruckmayr and Hartung, "Introduction: Challenges from 'the Periphery'? - Salafi Islam Outside the Arab World. Spotlights on Wider Asia."
[142] Terje Ostebo, "LOCAL REFORMERS and the SEARCH for CHANGE: The EMERGENCE of SALAFISM in BALE, ETHIOPIA," *Africa* 81, no. 4 (2011): 628–48, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0001972011000660.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

5.1 Concluding Remarks

Scholarship has long argued that Saudi Arabia's financial backing for transactional Islamic proselytization plays a crucial role in spreading its variant of Salafism globally, influencing the religious landscape of many countries. The subsidized dissemination of Salafi literature from and by Saudi-based institutions and networks has significantly contributed to the accessibility of Salafism in various regions, fostering a shared theological language. While this may appear as an ideological endeavor by Saudi Arabia to propagate its variant ideological system, the research illustrates that it also bears elements of geopolitical and strategic maneuvering, positioning Saudi Arabia as a central force in the Muslim world. Several internal and external factors contributed to this paradigm shift, including the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. These events prompted Saudi Arabia to emphasize *tasfiyya* (purification) and *tarbiyya* (education) as means of purifying Islam, marking a departure from the more fluid approach of the 1970s, which saw Salafism influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology.

The surge in global oil prices during the 1970s enabled Saudi Arabia to advocate for the spread of Salafism within the global Muslim community, fostering a transnational Salafism movement. This period marked the beginning of significant Saudi support for Salafi movements abroad, shaping the religious landscape of many countries, including Indonesia and Nigeria. For example, the Saudi transnational Salafism efforts manifested more in the sub-Saharan Africa especially, after the Iranian Revolution, Saudi concerns about the potential of Iran to challenge Saudi Arabia's preeminent Muslim voice in the geopolitical landscape grew. Hence, Saudi religious export activities were diverted to counter further Iranian influence,

especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Nonetheless, the spread of Saudi transnational Salafism cannot be solely attributed to a top-down politically motivated strategy. It also emanated from the sense of religious obligation that the Saudis feel towards other Muslims around the world. In the same fashion, while I acknowledge the vital role of transnational networks in the spread of Salafism, still, I demonstrated in this research that the spread of Salafism cannot be solely attributed to a top-down politically motivated strategy. Rather, it has been influenced by a complex interplay of transnational, local and national contexts, as well as the strategies of local groups and religious actors in shaping the trajectory of Salafism. Therefore, this study has challenged the notion of Salafism as merely a Saudi top-down imposition, instead highlighting the importance of local agency in shaping Salafism in the context of Indonesia and Nigeria.

Through fieldwork, and interviews with Salafis in Indonesia and Nigeria, this research reveals the diverse trajectories of Salafism in these countries, shaped by local cultures, geopolitical influences, and global events, Accordingly, a comparatively analysis of the historical evolution and trajectories of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria was conducted by examining the religious and socio-political factors that have shaped its dissemination and adaptation in the two countries. Also, the research highlights the complex interplay between local and transnational factors contributing to the growth of Salafism and shaping its dynamics in the two countries respectively. Based on the research questions of this study, it is found that the trajectories of transnational Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria diverge significantly, shaped by distinct socio-political contexts and local dynamics.

In Indonesia in the 1970s to early 1980s, Indonesian DDII cadres who studied in Saudi Arabia were inspired by more *Haraki* type of Salafism under the umbrella of *Tarbiyya* movement. But the successors of this cadres, especially after the establishment of LIPIA and the changes in Saudi Arabia political and religious landscape, they learned more sort of apolitical quietists Salafism, focusing primarily on religious purification (*tasfiyya*) and education (*tarbiyya*). However, it

is important to reiterate that Salafism in Indonesia was not inherently quietist or apolitical, especially during its initial period of evolution.

Over time, Salafism in Indonesia has fragmented into various factions, each with differing approaches to politics and religious practices. This fragmentation reflects the pluralistic nature of Indonesian Islam, where Salafism had to adapt to coexist with other Islamic traditions and local customs. Although there exists resistance from the existing syncretic religious groups, most often Sufi-affiliated, the resistance is not as pronounced as in Nigeria, perhaps due to the smaller number of Salafis in Indonesia. Additionally, puritan Salafis who maintain a quietist or apolitical stance are not the only ones present in Indonesia. However, considering the important time frame when changes in Saudi Arabia religious and political landscape occurred prompted by the events of 1979. I focus on the quietists, because they constitute the largest number of Salafis in the country especially after the establishment of LIPIA. Thus, the emergence of these factions-ranging from purists who emphasize doctrinal purity to politicos and jihadists with differing degrees of political engagement-illustrates the dynamic and evolving nature of Salafism in Indonesia.

In contrast, Salafism in Nigeria faced a more contentious integration, marked by direct confrontation with entrenched Sufi traditions dominant in the northern regions. This initial spread of Salafism was facilitated by the cooperation of northern Nigeria elites, such as Ahmadu Bello, who leveraged their political influence to foster connections with Saudi Arabia. However, this also led to significant resistance from existing religious authorities who were deeply rooted in Sufi traditions. Particularly, figures like Abubakar Gumi played critical roles in challenging Sufism, leading to the formation of groups like the Society for the Removal of Heretical Innovation and the Establishment of the Sunna (Izala) with the acronym (JIBWIS), which explicitly opposed Sufi practices. This direct confrontation has sometimes resulted in tensions and conflicts within the Nigerian Muslim community, highlighting a more contentious and polarized integration of Salafism compared to Indonesia. The formation of the Izala movement and its

subsequent internal splits reflect the dynamic and contested nature of Salafism in Nigeria.

5.2 Trajectories

The comparative approach adopted in this research reveals the nuanced ways in which Salafism has interacted with local cultures, geopolitical influences, and global events, particularly in the post 9/11 era in Indonesia and Nigeria. One of the key findings is the significant shift in Saudi Arabia's strategy of disseminating its support. Historically, Saudi support was directed generously and relatively unconditionally towards Salafi individuals and institutions in many countries. However, in the post 9/11era, there has been a noticeable decline in direct support, necessitating stricter measures and cooperation for the disbursement of funds, particularly in Indonesia. This strategic shift underscores a more cautious approach by Saudi Arabia, influenced by global security and the heightened scrutiny of Islamic movements.

Hence, Salafism in Indonesia has adapted to local political and social contexts, becoming a hub for significant debates withing contemporary Salafism. These debates focus on issues such as religion and state relations, political organization, and the morality and efficiency of violence. Salafism in Indonesia has shown a remarkable capacity for adaptation and integration with local cultural symbols. This is evidenced by the acceptance of local cultural practices and symbols by Salafis, a stark contrast to the earlier rigid doctrinal expressions. This strategic adaptation is further highlighted by the involvement of Salafi groups in commodification strategies to appeal to younger generations, such as the organization of events like the Indonesian Halal Fair. Conversely, in Nigeria, the dynamics of Salafism have remained complex and multifaceted, significantly influenced by local conditions and the emergence of extremist groups like Boko Haram. The impact of the USA led global war on terror on Nigerian Salafism is less pronounced compared to Indonesia. However, the classification and identification of Salafi groups in Nigeria are more challenging due to the diverse and fragmented nature of these groups, ranging from quietist to jihadist, and many other factions.

Conclusively, this research underscores the importance of the agency of local Indonesian and Nigerian Salafi actors in shaping Salafism discourse and practice in these nations. Contrary to some existing scholarship and policy-oriented analysis that depict Salafism as merely a Saudi export, this study problematizes such simplistic portrayals. It highlights how local demand and national imperatives have shaped Salafism, making it a more complex and multifaceted phenomenon than a simple top-down imposition.

Thus, the study contributes to the existing literature by providing a detailed understanding of the historical evolution, trajectories and dynamics of Salafism in Indonesia and Nigeria. It highlights the complex interplay between global influences and local contexts, offering perspectives into the adaptive strategies of Salafism in the contemporary Indonesia and Nigeria, a process I refer to as *Glocalizing Salafism*. This concept illustrates the importance of considering both transnational and local agency and contexts in understanding the spread and evolution of Salafism. Local actors play a crucial role in shaping Salafism discourse and practice, adapting it to cultural norms, political realities, and social needs. Future research could explore the evolving nature of Salafism in these regions, particularly considering ongoing geopolitical changes, especially of Saudi Arabia under MBS and the shifting strategies of transnational Islamic movements. While this research offers a comprehensive analysis, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of an overboard study.

Bibliography

Ahmed, Chanfi. *West African ʿulamāʾ and Salafism in Mecca and Medina :Jawāb Al-Ifrīqī—The Response of the African*. *Modern Islam: Traditions and Concerns*. BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON, 2015.

Al-Huzaimi, Nasir. *The Mecca Uprising: An Insider's Account of Salafism and Insurrection in Saudi Arabia*. Edited by David Commins. *Paper Knowledge . Toward a Media History of Documents*. London: I.B.Tauris, 2021.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi. *Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation*. Cambridge University Press, 2007. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.44-6469.

Al-Rasheed, Madawi. *A History of Saudi Arabia*. Second Edi. Cambridge University Press, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1949-3606.2004.tb00989.x.

Alexander Thurston. *Salafism in Nigeria Islam, Preaching, and Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Anzalone, Christopher, and Yasir Qadhi. "From Dirʿiyya to Riyadh: The History and Global Impact of Saudi Religious Propagation and Education." Edited by Peter Mandaville. *Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam*. Oxford University Press, April 14, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197532560.003.0003.

Bell, Alan Bryman & Edward. *Social Research Methods*. Fift Canad. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Boukhars, Frederic Wehrey & Anouar. *Salafism in the Maghreb Politics, Piety, and Militancy*. Oxford University Press, 2019.

Bruckmayr, Philipp, and Jan Peter Hartung. "Introduction: Challenges from 'the Periphery'? - Salafi Islam Outside the Arab World. Spotlights on Wider Asia." *Welt Des Islams* 60, no. 2–3 (2020): 137–69. https://doi.org/10.1163/15700607-06023P01.

Burhani, Noorsharil Saat & Ahmad Najib, ed. *The New Santri: Challenges to Traditional Religious Authority in Indonesia*. ISEAS Publishing, Singapore, 2020.

Campbell, John. "Salafism in Northern Nigeria Beyond Boko Haram." Council on Foreign Relations, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/blog/salafism-northern-nigeria-beyond-boko-haram.

Carr, Eloise C.J., and Allison Worth. "The Use of the Telephone Interview for Research." *NT Research* 6, no. 1 (2001): 511–24. https://doi.org/10.1177/136140960100600107.

Choksy, Carol E B, and Jamsheed K Choksy. "The Saudi Connection:

Wahhabism and Global Jihad." *World Affairs* 178, no. 1 (2015): 23–34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43555279.

Commins, David. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*. *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*. I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd, 2006. https://doi.org/10.5040/9780755609444.

Freitag, Ulrike. *The Projection of Saudi Arabian Influence in West Africa*. *Islam and Muslim Life in West Africa: Practices, Trajectories and Influences*, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110733204-009.

Hamdeh, Emad. *Salafism and Traditionalism Scholarly Authority in Modern Islam*. Cambridge University Press, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108756594.

Hasan, Noor Haidi. "Salafism in Indonesa: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance." In *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia*, edited by Robert W. Hefner. Routledge, 2018.

Hasan, Noorhaidi. *Laskar Jihad*. *Laskar Jihad*, 2019. https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501719226.

———. "Salafism, Education, and Youth: Saudi Arabia's Campaign for Wahhabism in Indonesia." Edited by Peter Mandaville. *Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia's Global Influence on Islam*. Oxford University Press, April 14, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197532560.003.0007.

———. "SRP Webinar on Soft Power , Islam , and Religiosity II – Glocalisation of Islam in Southeast Asia," 2024.

———. "The Failure of the Wahhabi Campaign Transnational Islam and the Salafi Madrasa in Post-9/11 Indonesia." *South East Asia Research* 18, no. 4 (2010): 675–705. https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2010.0015.

Ismail, Raihan. *Rethinking Salafism: The Transnational Networks of Salafi ʿUlama in Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia*. Oxford University Press, 2021. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190948955.001.0001.

Jahroni, Jajang. "Saudi Arabia Charity and the Institutionalization of Indonesian Salafism." *Al-Jami'ah* 58, no. 1 (2020): 35–62. https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2020.581.35-62.

Jamhari, and Saifudin Asrori. "The Making of Salafi-Based Islamic Schools in Indonesia." *Al-Jami'ah* 60, no. 1 (2022): 227–64. https://doi.org/10.14421/AJIS.2022.601.227-264.

Kane, Ousmane. *Muslim Modernity In Postcolonial Nigeria*. BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON, 2016.

Kersten, Carool. “Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas and Values.” Oxford University Press, January 5, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190247775.001.0001.

Kovacs, Amanda. “Saudi Arabia Exporting Salafi Education and Radicalizing Indonesia’s Muslims.” *7*, no. 7 (2014).

Lacroix, Stéphane. *Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia*. Harvard University Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England 2011, 2011. https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.49-3496.

Lauzière, Henri. “The Construction of Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History.” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, no. 3 (2010): 369–89. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743810000401.

———. *The Making of Salafism*. *The Making of Salafism*, 2016. https://doi.org/10.7312/columbia/9780231175500.001.0001.

Mandaville, Peter. *Wahhabism and the World*. *Wahhabism and the World*. Vol. 53. Oxford University Press, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197532560.003.0001.

Mark Woodward, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmaniyah, and Mariani Yahya, and Abstract. “Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom” 7, no. 6 (2018): 58–78.

Meijer, Roel. *Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement*. *Global Salafism*. Vol. 15, 2014. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333431.001.0001.

Mendaville, Peter. “Soft Power, Islam, and Religiosity: Perspectives From the Middle East.” RSIS Video Cast, 2023. https://youtu.be/9DhTMVDlEPk?si=AsR8W0VZxKAKU8r8.

Nahouza, Namira. “Wahhabism and the Rise of the New Salafists:Theology, Power and Sunni Islam.” *I.B. Taurus*, no. september 2016 (2018): 1–273.

Nasir, Muhammad Muhammad. “Weaving Modernity in Salafism A Comparative Study of Muhammadiyah and Izala Movements.” *Australian Journal of Islamic Studies* 8, no. 3 (2023): 100–125. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.55831/ajis.v8i3.619.

Nasir, Muhammad Muhammad, and Haula Noor. “Women , Faith , and Authority : Malama Zainab Ja ’ Afar and the Navigation of Religious Authority in Northern Nigeria” 8, no. 2 (2023): 107–22. https://doi.org/10.18326/attarbiyah.v8i2.107-122.

Ostebo, Terje. “LOCAL REFORMERS and the SEARCH for CHANGE: The

EMERGENCE of SALAFISM in BALE, ETHIOPIA." *Africa* 81, no. 4 (2011): 628–48. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0001972011000660.

Pewresearch. "The Future of the Global Muslim Population." *Pew Research Center*, 2011. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/.

Radimská, Radka. "Pierre Bourdieu: Sociologist of Dominance and of the Dominated." *Sociologický Časopis / Czech Sociological Review* 38, no. 3 (2002): 395–98. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41131821.

Ramzi Ben, Amara. "The Izala Movement in Nigeria: Its Split, Relationship to Sufis and Perception of Sharīʿa Re-Implementation," no. June (2011): 379.

Roy, Théo Blanc and Olivier, ed. *Salafism : Challenged by Radicalization? : Violence, Politics, and the Advent of Post-Salafism.* European University Institute (EUI), 2021. https://doi.org/10.2870/309942.

Scott, James C. "Everyday Forms of Resistance." *The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies* 4 (1989): 33. https://doi.org/10.22439/cjas.v4i1.1765.

SOAS University of London. "Guy Robert Eyre," 2022. https://www.soas.ac.uk/about/guy-robert-eyre.

Thurston, Alex. "Abubakar Gumi's Al Aqida Al-Sahiha Bi-Muwafaqat Al-Shari: Global Salafi Sm and Locally Oriented Polemics in a Northern Nigerian Text." *Islamic Africa* 2, no. 2 (2011): 9–21. https://doi.org/10.5192/21540993020209.

———. "Nigeria's Mainstream Salafis between Boko Haram and the State." *Islamic Africa* 6, no. 1–2 (2015): 109–34. https://doi.org/10.1163/21540993-00602007.

Trauthig, Inga Kristina, and Guy Robert Eyre. "'Quietist' Salafis after the 'Arab Revolts' in Algeria and Libya (2011–2019): Between Insecurity and Political Subordination." *Mediterranean Politics* 00, no. 00 (2023): 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2023.2272474.

Valentine, Simon Ross. *Force and Fanaticism: Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and Beyond*. Hurst & Company, London, 2015.

Varagur, Krithika. "The Call. Inside The Global Saudi Religious Project," 2020.

Villiers, Charl de, Muhammad Bilal Farooq, and Matteo Molinari. "Qualitative Research Interviews Using Online Video Technology – Challenges and Opportunities." *Meditari Accountancy Research* 30, no. 6 (January 1, 2022): 1764–82. https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-03-2021-1252.

Vinthagen, Stellan, and Anna Johansson. ""Everyday Resistance": Exploration of a Concept and Its Theories," no. 1 (2015): 1–46.