

“Fiqh Peradaban”

***The Religio-Political Developments of Nahdlatul Ulama in
Contemporary Indonesia***

A Thesis

**Submitted to the Master’s Study Program of Islamic Studies at the
Faculty of Islamic Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of**

Master of Arts (M.A.)



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Muhammad Yaufi Nur Mutiullah

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ABSTRACT

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This study explores the religio-political development of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in contemporary Indonesia, focusing on the leadership era of Yahya Cholil Staquf (Gus Yahya). NU, as the largest Islamic organization in the world, with more than 60 million followers in Indonesia and 30 million worldwide, plays a significant role in harmonizing Islamic teachings with modern socio-political challenges through the concept of Fiqh Peradaban. This study uses an interdisciplinary approach that integrates the interpretation of Islamic legal theory (*usūl al-fiqh*), Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*), and social science analysis. The research methods include literature study and fieldwork, including interviews with important NU figures as well as analysis of related literature. The findings of this study show that NU in the Gus Yahya era, with the concept of Fiqh Peradaban, had a mission to bring a religious paradigm capable of addressing global issues. Fiqh Peradaban seeks to discuss actual issues relevant to the international context, such as the United Nation (UN) Charter and human rights, which are often overlooked in classical *fiqh* discourse. Additionally, this study found that NU's civilizational mission did not eliminate the characteristics of NU's traditionalist thinking, which still maintains the study of the yellow book (*kitab kuning*). This study argues that NU in the Gus Yahya era was different from previous leadership eras, which tended to focus on local and national issues. The concept of Fiqh Peradaban allows NU to play a more active role in global diplomacy without sacrificing its traditionalist principles. From a political perspective, this study also shows that NU's civilizing mission in the Gus Yahya era maintained the central role of the government, even though NU's close relationship with the government could give rise to internal conflict within NU itself.

Keywords: *Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Gus Yahya, Fiqh Peradaban, Islamic jurisprudence, Global issues.*

ملخص البحث

تستكشف هذه الدراسة التطور الديني والسياسي لجماعة نُهضة العلماء (NU) في إندونيسيا المعاصرة، مع التركيز على عصر القيادة ليحيى خليل ثقوف (غوس يحيى). تُعد جماعة نُهضة العلماء أكبر منظمة إسلامية في العالم، حيث تضم أكثر من 60 مليون متابع في إندونيسيا و30 مليوناً في جميع أنحاء العالم، ولها دور كبير في موازنة التعليم الإسلامية مع التحديات الاجتماعية والسياسية الحديثة من خلال مفهوم فقه الحضارة. تستخدم هذه الدراسة منهجاً متعدد التخصصات يدمج تفسير النظرية القانونية الإسلامية (أصول الفقه)، والفقه الإسلامي، وتحليل العلوم الاجتماعية. تشمل أساليب البحث دراسة الأدبيات والعمل الميداني، بما في ذلك المقابلات مع شخصيات مهمة من جماعة نُهضة العلماء وكذلك تحليل الأدبيات ذات الصلة. تظهر نتائج هذه الدراسة أن جماعة نُهضة العلماء في عصر غوس يحيى، مع مفهوم فقه الحضارة، كانت لها مهمة تقديم نموذج ديني قادر على مواجهة القضايا العالمية. يسعى فقه الحضارة إلى مناقشة القضايا الفعلية ذات الصلة بالسياق الدولي، مثل ميثاق الأمم المتحدة وحقوق الإنسان، التي غالباً ما يتم التغاضي عنها في خطاب الفقه الكلاسيكي. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، وجدت هذه الدراسة أن مهمة جماعة نُهضة العلماء الحضارية لم تقضِ على خصائص التفكير التقليدي لجماعة نُهضة العلماء الذي لا يزال يحافظ على دراسة الكتب الصفراء (الكتاب الأصفر). تجادل هذه الدراسة بأن جماعة نُهضة العلماء في عصر غوس يحيى كانت مختلفة عن عصور القيادة السابقة التي كانت تميل إلى التركيز على القضايا المحلية والوطنية. يسمح مفهوم فقه الحضارة لجماعة نُهضة العلماء بلعب دور أكثر نشاطاً في الدبلوماسية العالمية دون التضحية بمبادئها التقليدية. من منظور سياسي، تظهر هذه الدراسة أيضاً أن مهمة جماعة نُهضة العلماء الحضارية في عصر غوس يحيى حافظت على الدور المركزي للحكومة، على الرغم من أن العلاقة الوثيقة لجماعة نُهضة العلماء مع الحكومة يمكن أن تؤدي إلى نزاع داخلي داخل جماعة نُهضة العلماء نفسها.

الكلمات المفتاحية: نُهضة العلماء (NU)، غوس يحيى، فقه الحضارة، الفقه الإسلامي، القضايا العالمية

TRANSLITERATION GUIDE

IJMES TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM FOR ARABIC, PERSIAN, AND TURKISH

CONSONANTS

A = Arabic, P = Persian, OT = Ottoman Turkish, MT = Modern Turkish

	A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT
ء	ʾ	ʾ	ʾ	—	ز	z	z	z	z	ك	k	k or g	k or ñ	k or n
ب	b	b	b	b or p	ژ	—	zh	j	j				or y	or y
پ	—	p	p	p	س	s	s	s	s				or ğ	or ğ
ت	t	t	t	t	ش	sh	sh	ş	ş	گ	—	g	g	g
ث	th	ṯ	ṯ	s	ص	ṣ	ṣ	ş	s	ل	l	l	l	l
ج	j	j	c	c	ح	ḥ	ḥ	z	z	م	m	m	m	m
چ	—	ch	ç	ç	ط	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	t	ن	n	n	n	n
ح	ḥ	ḥ	ḥ	h	ظ	ẓ	ẓ	ẓ	z	ه	h	h	h ¹	h ¹
خ	kh	kh	h	h	ع	ʿ	ʿ	ʿ	—	و	w	v or u	v	v
د	d	d	d	d	غ	gh	gh	g or ğ	g or ğ	ي	y	y	y	y
ذ	dh	z	z	z	ف	f	f	f	f	ة	a ²			
ر	r	r	r	r	ق	q	q	q	k	ال	a ³			

¹ When h is not final. ² In construct state: at. ³ For the article, al- and -l-.

VOWELS

	ARABIC AND PERSIAN		OTTOMAN AND MODERN TURKISH	
<i>Long</i>	ا or آ	ā	ā	} words of Arabic and Persian origin only
	و	ū	ū	
	ي	ī	ī	
<i>Doubled</i>	ـَيّ	iyy (final form ī)	iy	(final form ī)
	ـَوّ	uww (final form ū)	uvv	
<i>Diphthongs</i>	اَوّ	au or aw	ev	
	اَيّ	ai or ay	ey	
<i>Short</i>	ا	a	a or e	
	و	u	u or ü / o or ö	
	ي	i	i or i	

For Ottoman Turkish, authors may either transliterate or use the modern Turkish orthography.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Research Background

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest mass Muslim organization is the largest Islamic organization in the world, with a population of just over 60 million followers in Indonesia and 30 million worldwide.¹ This organization was founded on January 31, 1926. KH. Hasyim Asy'ari (Kiai Hasyim) and KH. Wahab Hasbullah (Kiai Wahab) was the two founders of this organization.² In 2021, under the leadership of Yahya Cholil Staquf (Gus Yahya), NU introduced the concept of Fiqh Peradaban (Fiqh of Civilization), which brought about a paradigm shift in fiqh from local to global. Fiqh Peradaban emerged as a response to the limited focus of fiqh discourse in Islamic boarding schools (pesantren), which only refers to classical literature (turats) without considering the modern social context, which has experienced significant sociological changes.

The concept of Fiqh of Civilization emphasizes the importance of discussing actual issues relevant to the international context, such as the United Nations (UN) Charter and human rights, which are often neglected in classical fiqh discourse. Gus Yahya invited NU elites to discuss these topics in the halaqah fiqh of civilization.³ In the NU discussion tradition, NU ulama divides discussion topics into three categories: wāqī'iyya (actual cases), mawdu'iyya (thematic cases), and qānūniyya (legal categories). The discussion methods used are qawlī, ilhāqī, and manhājī. The qawlī method is an answer whose reference can be found in the classical book. The ilhāqī method developed an analogy of a problem that is not found in the Salaf books and is found in other classical books. Meanwhile, the manhājī method is further thought and researched to find out how scholars think in determining the law of a case.⁴

This study investigates the origins and objectives of Fiqh of Civilization, as well as how NU responds to modern issues using the applied concept of fiqh. This work aims to reveal how NU in the Gus Yahya era, with its Fiqh of Civilization, brought a religious paradigm to NU followers in particular and other religious groups, in general, to use religious narratives in dealing with global and international issues. In doing this, NU did not sacrifice the principles of their traditionalist thinking and still maintained the study of the yellow book (kitab kuning) as the basis of their thinking.

This study uses an interdisciplinary approach that integrates Islamic legal theory (usūl al-fiqh), fiqh, and social science analysis. One of the key questions asked in this research is, "What are the implications of the Fiqh of Civilization for NU's social, political, and religious life?". This study also

¹ "Arifianto, A. R. (2017). Practicing What It Preaches? Understanding the Contradictions between Pluralist Theology and Religious Intolerance within Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama. *Al- Jami'ah*. 55(2), 241-264. <https://doi.org/10.14421/Ajis.2017.552.241-264>," n.d. A survey conducted by Mujani and Liddle (2004) found that 42 percent of the Muslim population in Indonesia, which corresponds to over 227 million individuals, associated themselves to various degrees with the NU. Additionally, almost 38 million Muslims in the country acknowledged a strong affiliation with the NU. S. Mujani and W. Liddle, "Indonesia's Approaching Elections: Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion.," *Journal of Democracy* 15(1) (2004): 109–23.

² "Ismail, F. (2011). The Nahdlatul Ulama: Its Early History and Contribution to the Establishment of Indonesian State. *Journal of Indonesian Islam*, 5(2), 247-282. <https://doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2011.5.2.247-282>," n.d.

³ "Live Halaqah Fiqh Civilization 'Fiqh Siyasah Dan Kewarganegaraan' Di PP. Al Anwar 3 Sarang SESI I, Channel Youtube (Gondan, Karangmangu Rembang: PP. Al-Anwar 3," (Rembang, 2022), <https://youtu.be/eMmy-h6F-cE>.

⁴ Saenong, "Nahdlatul Ulama (NU): A Grassroots Movement Advocating Moderate Islam."

highlights the importance of maintaining NU's traditional way of thinking amidst changes in the global social context. This work also highlights how NU maintains a balance between its political and social roles and the government. In the Gus Yahya era, NU's close relationship with the Joko Widodo government was clearly visible, like the era of Said Aqil Siraj (Kiai Said) leadership. This close relationship had internal impacts on the NU itself, creating conflict regarding the extent to which the NU should be close to the government.

In the halaqah (regular workshops and seminars that look at social problems through the perspective of Islamic law) *fiqh peradaban* at pesantren Al Anwar Purworejo, 16 November 2022, Gus Yahya, conveyed his perspective on *fiqh peradaban*. Gus Yahya said that the primary purpose of *fiqh peradaban* is to analyze society in the context of Indonesia and the international community.⁵ Moreover, *fiqh peradaban* is a PBNU initiative to establish a forum where experts with different perspectives can gather to explore crucial aspects of human existence in a diverse global society. Gus Yahya raised *Fiqh Peradaban* as a crucial topic and discussed it in 250 scientific halaqahs in various pesantren throughout Indonesia. These *halaqahs* discuss *Fiqh Peradaban* with the big theme "Fiqh Siyasa (fiqh of politics) NU and the Reality of the New Civilization."⁶

Additionally, PBNU held a significant international conference known as Religion of Twenty (R20) as part of their initiative to advocate *fiqh peradaban*. The world's main political agenda, the Group of Twenty (G20), is being held in Bali on 2-3 November 2022.⁷ This forum comprised 19 countries, including the European Union. Heads of state gathered in a forum to discuss global issues at this meeting. R20, also known as Religion of Twenty 2022, is a religious and sect leaders meeting with key participants from G20 member countries. This was done by taking advantage of Indonesia's presidential position this year. However, the R20 also invited religious leaders from 32 countries whom the G20 did not endorse. Four hundred sixty-four invitations were given to participants: 170 from abroad from five continents, and 40 resource persons also came from five continents. Religious and sect leaders supported by millions of participants.

The R20 forum differs from other global meetings, seminars, or conferences. The participants discussed religious issues in the context of various humanitarian problems worldwide and their solutions.⁸ R20 has been inaugurated as an official member of the G20. R20 was held sequentially by the order of the G20 presidency, with India being held in 2023, Brazil being held in 2024, and South Africa being held in 2025. President Joko Widodo plays an important role in its implementation. R20 was held in Indonesia, a Muslim-majority country, the following year in a Hindu-majority country, and the following year in a Catholic-majority country.⁹

This study can significantly contribute to understanding how NU adapts to global social and political changes and maintains and implements its traditionalist principles in an ever-changing context. It also illustrates the importance of an interdisciplinary approach in understanding and applying Islamic legal concepts in a modern context. Through this study, readers can understand the complex dynamics

⁵ Y.C. Staquf, "Sambutan Ketua Umum PBNU KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf Di Acara Halaqah *Fiqh Peradaban* Di Pondok Pesantren Al-Anwar Purworejo" (Purworejo, 2022), www.youtube.com/tvnuid.

⁶ Triono, "2 Tujuan PBNU Gelar Halaqah Peradaban," NU Online, 2022," accessed May 19, 2024, <https://www.nu.or.id/nasional/2-tujuan-pbnu-gelar-halaqah-Fiqh-peradaban-bVnr8>.

⁷ "https://Nu.or.Id/Nasional/R20-Adalah-Forum-Resmi-G20-Untuk-Dorong-Nilai-Agama-Berperan-Dalam-Ekonomi-Politik-CbV8p," n.d., accessed May 19, 2024.

⁸ Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin, "Gus Yahya and the NU's New Path: Note on the 24th Congress.," *Studia Islamika: Indonesian Journal for Islamic Studies* 29, 2 (2022).

⁹ "https://Nu.or.Id/Nasional/R20-Adalah-Forum-Resmi-G20-Untuk-Dorong-Nilai-Agama-Berperan-Dalam-Ekonomi-Politik-CbV8p."

between tradition and modernity in NU's religion-political development, as well as how Fiqh of Civilization plays an important role in bringing NU to the global stage.

1.2. Theoretical Framework

Conceptually, the Islamic legal theory that I refer to in this study is part of *maqāsid* (public goodnes), *maqāsid al-sharī'ia* (the goals of *syarī'ah*) or *al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khams* (the five necessities).¹⁰ In the concept of *maqāsid al-sharī'ia*, or *al-ḍarūriyyāt al-khams*, human survival should be the main priority that is protected. In the context of *fiqh peradaban*, Gus Yahya said that conflicts and even wars that occur in the contemporary world today must be stopped because they are detrimental to human survival. Therefore, in this case, religious figures or *ulama* are responsible for voicing the issue of world peace. In the view of Gus Yahya, the United Nations has a very influential role in this case.¹¹ Therefore, one of the main discussions in the idea of *fiqh peradaban* is the policy status of the United Nations. Often, to protect human life, one is permitted to change or reinterpret the rules of worship. In Islamic legal theory, the concept of *maqāsid* or *maqāsid al-syarī'ah* has long been discussed by classical scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 1111),¹² al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388),¹³ and others. Globally, the concept of *maqāsid* is commonly used to respond to human rights issues. Modern Muslim scholars who study this, such as Ahmad al-Raysūni, Muḥammad al-Zuhaylī Muḥammad Utsmān Shabir, Abdullahi al-Naim and many others, have used *maqāsid* as the first principle of human rights in Islam.¹⁴

This work accepts approaches to pure Islamic legal theory from classical and recent Muslim academics such as al-Ṭūfī (d. 1316),¹⁵ al-Shāṭibī (d. 1388),¹⁶ and al-Jābirī (d. 2010),¹⁷ among others. Al-Ṭūfī further emphasized that "maintaining consensus is better than maintaining differences of opinion" (*al-tamassuk bimā ittufīqa awlā min al-tamassuk bimā ikhtalafa fīhi*); therefore, the texts demonstrate diverse and sometimes conflicting perspectives. Therefore, he emphasized, prioritizing the public interest is the most important thing: "*fakāna itbā'uhu awlā*."¹⁸ Al-Ṭūfī offers a potential solution to the problem of textual dominance, which sometimes hinders the creation of new interpretations of the *syarī'ah*. In essence, the idea of *maqāsid* includes two essential elements in formulating *Syarī'ah* law: textual and intertextual analysis and consideration of social reality. Therefore, in defining *maqāsid*, it is necessary to consider textual evidence and actual social conditions. We cannot rely solely on the authority of texts or the power of social facts. Al-Shāṭibī defines *maqāsid* as ideas that help us understand the fundamental elements of Islamic law, especially its text and context. Al-Shāṭibī innovatively used the concept of *maqāsid*, previously put forward by his predecessors, to formulate an appropriate methodology for finding appropriate legal principles by considering social circumstances. According to al-Shāṭibī, strict adherence to the law's literal wording should not be so flexible as to ignore the main aims and objectives of the *syarī'ah*.¹⁹ In this case, the concept of *fiqh peradaban* aims

¹⁰ F. Opwis, "Maslaha in Contemporary Islamic Legal Theory." *Islamic Law and Society*. (Islamic Law and society, 2005); Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqat Fi Usul al-Ahkam*. (Cairo: al-Manar, 1914).

¹¹ Staquf, "Sambutan Ketua Umum PBNU KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf Di Acara Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban Di Pondok Pesantren Al-Anwar Purworejo."

¹² Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Al-Mustasfa Fi al-'Ilmi al-Ushul* (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1993).

¹³ al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqat Fi Usul al-Ahkam*.

¹⁴ Ahmad al-Raysuni, Muhammad al-Zuhayli, and Muhammad Uthman Shabir, *Huquq Al-Insan: Mihwar Maqasid al-Sharia*. (Qatar: Wizarat al-Awqaf wa Shu'un al-Islamiyah, 2002).

¹⁵ Najm al-Dīn Al-Ṭūfī, *Risāla Fī Ri'āya Al-Maşlahā* (Cairo: Dār al-Miṣriyya al-Lubnāniyya, 1993).

¹⁶ al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqat Fi Usul al-Ahkam*.

¹⁷ Muhammad 'Abid Al-Jabiri Al-Jabiri, *Democracy, Human Rights and Law in Islamic Thought* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009).

¹⁸ Al-Ṭūfī, *Risāla Fī Ri'āya Al-Maşlahā*. 151.

¹⁹ al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqat Fi Usul al-Ahkam*. 394

to achieve two main goals: first, the implementation of God's will, and second, the realization of a prosperous and just human life. These two aims are also consistent with the basic principles of maqāsid.

Before going into more detail, it is also important to explain what it means to label NU as traditionalist Islam. The dichotomization of Islam in Indonesia into Traditionalist Islam and Modernist Islam was first popularized by Deliar Noer in his classic writings. In this book, Noer explicitly dichotomizes between Modernist Islam represented by Muhammadiyah and Traditionalist Islam represented by NU.²⁰ This distinction has actually been made by scholars who have studied the dynamics of Islamic thought and movements in the modern period in the Middle East and the Indian Continent. Adams, for example, examined Islamic modernism in Egypt²¹, or Smith and Ahmad who studied the modernist Islamic movement in the Indian Continent.²²

In later developments, the modernist-traditionalist typology distinction was increasingly discussed. It began to be questioned whether modernist-traditionalist referred to religious understanding, or to religious practice. There were also sociological changes in the Islamic movement. Therefore, scholars began to redefine the typology. Fazlur Rahman, for example, Rahman created a new typology, namely modernists (including classical modernists and neo-modernists) and revivalists (including classical revivalists and neo-revivalists).²³ The typology offered by Rahman can be used to see the position of NU. If we use the typology proposed by Rahman, then NU falls into the neo-modernist category. The reason is that NU is quite adaptive in responding to the challenges of the times that have emerged recently. One of them is through *fiqh peradaban*, which is tried to be discussed in this study. Through *fiqh peradaban*, NU responds to modern problems with the topics I have explained above.

Another scholar's thought that can be used to look at NU is Sayyed Hossein Nasr's argument.²⁴ According to Nasr, the word "tradition" used by traditionalist Muslims refers to God's revelation and the interpretation of that revelation in every human life in a specific time and environment. Therefore, in Nasr's view, tradition includes three essential things. *First, al-dīn*, namely the definition of religion in a broad sense covering all aspects of religion; *second, al-sunnah*, which was born and grew based on sacred forms so that it became a tradition; and third is genealogy or *sanad*, meaning the chain or connection that connects every era, thought and religious tradition. In short, according to Nasr, tradition is a sacred truth whose application occurs continuously in various conditions of space and time.

If we look at NU using Nasr's argument, Nasr's argument is almost identical to what Martin Van Bruinessen did. According to Van Bruinessen, the key concepts in understanding tradition that the Islamic traditionalist group understands are Hadith, sunnah, and custom. The Hadith in question is news attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. In this case, there is no difference between Islamic traditionalist and modernist groups; they use Hadith as an essential reference in religion. However, in Van Bruinessen's view, what differentiates them (traditionalists and modernists) is the slogan of *kembali kepada Quran dan Hadis* (returning to the Quran and Hadith).²⁵ For modernists, what they mean by the Hadith they use as a reference is a hadith whose authenticity has been tested regarding *sanad* (news chain) and *matan* (news content). Then, this model hadith is known as authentic Hadith (*hadis sahih*).

²⁰ See D. Noer, *The Modernists Muslim Movement in Indonesian 1900-1942* (Oxford University Press., 1973).

²¹ See A. Adams, *Islamic Modernism in Egypt* (Reprint New York, 1968).

²² See A. Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857-1964*, London, 1967. (London, 1967).

²³ See F. Rahman, *Islam: Past Influence and Present Challenge" Challenges and Opportunities* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Press, 1929).

²⁴ See S.H. Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*, (London and New York: Paul International, 1990).

²⁵ Bruinessen, "Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse within NU."

Meanwhile, for traditionalist, it is the same as for modernist. Traditionalists also recognize authentic Hadith or hadis sahih, but what is more prevalent among traditionalists are classic ulama books that explain the legal essence of each issue. So, in Van Bruinessen's view, Islamic traditionalist groups, specifically NU traditionalism, are more inclined to follow the conclusions of great scholars in the past rather than drawing their conclusions independently based on the Quran and Hadith.

From this point on, I agree with Van Bruinessen on one point and disagree on another. I agree that *nahdliyin* (NU followers) prefers to follow scholars from the past rather than directly referring to the Quran and Hadith. However, this is only partially the case; *nahdliyin* also needs to close itself off from revising the opinions of classical scholars. More precisely, *nahdliyin* recontextualizes classical scholars' conclusions to suit the times' challenges. NU is doing that through the idea of *fiqh peradaban*, which I discuss in this work. Therefore, in this work, I categorize NU as a traditionalist group. I agree with that categorization. Regarding NU, which later turned out to be quite adaptive in responding to modern challenges, in my view it did not cause NU to lose its traditionality. As for scholars who create new typologies such as post-traditionalism and neo-modernism to be pinned to NU²⁶, in my view it is only a development, not eliminating its traditionality. Greg Barton also wrote on NU. Barton examined the neo-modernist movement and thought in Indonesia. He included NU as part of Islamic neo-modernism, with Abdurrahman Wahid as its figure. Apart from Abdurrahman Wahid, Barton mentions other figures who are representatives of Islamic neo-modernism in Indonesia, such as Nurcholis Madjid, Djohan Effendi, and Ahmad Wahib.²⁷

Besides Barton, Mitsuo Nakamura also conducted a study on NU. Nakamura refers to NU as radical traditionalism.²⁸ What Nakamura means by radical traditionalism is that NU developed a sharp criticism of the development implemented by the government. As maintained by Nakamura, NU has deviated from the tradition of accommodative politics. NU began to deviate from the tradition of accommodative politics since the rise of the New Order. The situation peaked during the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid who was at odds with President Soeharto. In the 1970s NU emerged as a strong critic of the New Order government. However, it cannot be denied that NU was also very close to the government. Gus Dur was once a member of parliament representing the Golongan Karya (Golkar) party, which incidentally represented the government under Suharto.²⁹ This means that NU's political attitude is always active but fluctuating and adaptive. Nakamura's argument then becomes one of the theoretical foundations in this study. I argue that NU during Yahya's leadership no longer operates as a radical traditionalism. But it returned to accommodative traditionalism.

Another scholar who has studied NU is Martin Van Bruinessen. As maintained by Martin, to understand NU one must first understand what is meant by tradition. Based on Van Bruinessen, tradition here means what Islam understands as tradition, namely hadith, sunnah, and custom. Continuing his argument, Van Bruinessen says that traditionalists share the same attitude as modernists and reformists

²⁶ See Rumadi, *Islamic Post-Traditionalism in Indonesia*. (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2015); Martin Van Bruinessen, "Indonesian Muslim in A Globalising World; Westernisation, Arabisation, and Indigenising Responses," *RSIS Nanyang Technology University* no. 313 (May 3, 2018): 2–18.

²⁷ "Barton, G. 1997. 'Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo- Modernist Thought.' *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*. 8:3, 323–350.," n.d.

²⁸ M. Nakamura, "'The Radical Traditionalism of the Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia: A Personal Account of the 26th National Congress, June 1979, Semarang,'" *Southeast Asian Studies* 19 (n.d.): 187–204.

²⁹ Yanwar Pribadi, *Islam and Politics in Madura: Ulama and Other Local Leaders in Search of Influence (1990 – 2010)* (Leiden University, n.d.).

in looking at the hadith, both of which regard the hadith as a vital source of Islamic law.³⁰ Of course, the modernists and reformers have a well-known slogan of "return to the Qur'an and Hadith".

However, as said by Van Bruinessen, traditionalists do not use hadith master books such as Sahih Bukhari and Muslim hadith in the NU pesantren environment. Traditionalists are more familiar with secondary hadith books by classical scholars of the past that contain collections of hadith. Furthermore, traditionalists use hadith as reinforcement for fiqh arguments. A little more detailed than Van Bruinessen's explanation, In this work I maintain that NU's traditionalist attitude towards hadith is not as simple as Van Bruinessen stated. The NU places the hadith as the second basis of law after the Quran. In understanding hadith, especially when it comes to matters of Islamic law, traditionalists refer to the books of hadith that have complete *sanad* (news chain) . After that, the traditions is understood as maintained by the rules and procedures established by classical scholars, especially those with *Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama'ah* (Aswaja)³¹ views.³² Aswaja means that NU employs not only Quran and Hadith, but also utilises the function of human perception to comprehend reality through empirical means. Kiai Hasyim Asy'ari, the founder of NU, believed in adopting the teachings of Abū l- Ḥasan al-Ash'arī and Abū Maṣṣūr al- Māturīdī. In terms of jurisprudence, NU follows one of the four primary madzhab (Syāfi'ī, Mālikī, Ḥanafī, or Ḥanbalī). In the context of tasawwuf, NU follows the teachings of Ash Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī and Junayd al-Baghdādī.

Nahdliyin, they do not directly understand and deduce from the textual reading of the hadith alone. This is what NU traditionalists call *istinbat al-ahkām* (method of understanding Islamic law). Actually, Martin also explained that NU strongly emphasizes *taqlid*. Martin explained that NU wants a way of religion that follows the standards in the four Sunni schools of fiqh, namely Hanafī, Syāfi'ī, Mālikā, and Hanbalī. But it is actually not that simple, under certain conditions, NU can even do its own *ijtihad* (efforts to decide Islamic law). Collective *ijtihad* or what is called *ijtihad ijtima'i* is an effort to make legal decisions jointly between the ulama.

The goal of fiqh peradaban is to make religion a source of inspiration for the development of good civilization, thereby producing legal stability rooted in religious principles and not creating a *syarī'ah* state. Asef Bayat's concept of "post-Islamism" deserves consideration to fortify the analytical concept of political Islam in this work. Bayat produces the term "post-Islamism" to denote the increasing prevalence of conservative religiosity, particularly among Muslims. This trend is manifest in their transition from Islam for political purposes to Islamic piety and religiosity. This phenomenon is a new form of activism and religious commitment expressed by Muslims in response to the decline of the Islamist agenda, which was dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state.³³ In this case, the spirit of Islamism is referred at all forms of activism that can increase the loyalty and obedience of Muslims to their religion. This phenomenon is referred to as active piety, which entails Muslims not only practicing their religion but actively propagating it and employing it to convert others to Islam.³⁴ In short, this phenomenon is a form of "Islamization without an Islamic state".³⁵ The essence of post-Islamism entails the profound transformation of Islamism, encompassing its beliefs, methodologies, and actions, both

³⁰ Bruinessen, "Traditions for the Future: The Reconstruction of Traditionalist Discourse within NU."

³¹ Asy'ari, H. 1418 H. *Risalah Ahl al-Sunnah Wa al-Jama'ah*. Tebuireng, n.d.

³² Asy'ari, H. *Muqaddima Qanun Asasi Li Jam'iyati Nahdlatil Ulama'*. Tebuireng. Maktabah Turats, n.d.

³³ Asef Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 147.

³⁴ G. Fealy, "Consuming Islam: Commodified Religion and Aspirational Pietism in Contemporary Indonesia," in *Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia*, (Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2008). 26.

³⁵ Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. 147.

internally and externally.³⁶ Post-Islamism encompasses two significant domains. Firstly, it arises because of certain political and social circumstances in which the credibility of Islamism has been depleted. Furthermore, post-Islamism can be understood as a deliberate endeavor to conceptualize and strategize the reasoning and methods for moving beyond Islamism in social, political, and intellectual spheres. Post-Islamism refers to a state of being that is characterized by being "in between". It does not involve being against Islam, being non-Islamic, or being secular.³⁷

1.3. Previous Studies

The work of Amanda Seeth (2023)³⁸ is significant in comparison with my work. Seeth's work explores the potential of Indonesian Islamic concepts, including Islam Nusantara and Fiqh Peradaban from Nahdlatul Ulama, to contribute to the discourse of sustainable development from an Islamic perspective. The Fiqh Peradaban is a highly appropriate approach, as it occupies a middle position that mediates local and global development paradigms, as demonstrated by Seeth's mapping of the current intellectual debate regarding the development of Civilizations. According to Seeth, Fiqh Peradaban's global appeal and effectiveness can be attributed to its emphasis on humanism and Islamic legal reasoning in serving all individuals, irrespective of their religious affiliation. This study is based on the notes taken at the "Indonesian Islam and World Peace" conference in Surabaya on February 5, 2023, and the first Fiqh Peradaban conference in Surabaya on February 6, 2023. Moreover, Seeth incorporates discussions about the relationship between Islamic concepts in Indonesia and sustainable development into broader academic and policy debates about the role of religion in sustainable development. Nevertheless, Seeth has yet to be included in the primary topics of fiqh peradaban. In fact, the NU encourages its adherents to engage in discussions regarding contemporary issues presented in the context of fiqh or Islamic law. The fiqh peradaban should not neglect the examination of issues such as the fiqh of nationality, fiqh of citizenship, fiqh of minorities, and fiqh of border regimes. Additionally, Seeth still needs to comprehensively examine the traditionalist approach of NU to address contemporary issues.

Asmawi investigates the Fiqh Peradaban in his work.³⁹ Asmawi analyzes the establishment of the Nahdlatul Ulama Ijtihad via several movements and actions in preparation for celebrating its hundredth anniversary. Asmawi states that Nahdlatul Ulama is the preeminent Islamic institution in Indonesia, playing a pivotal role in assisting Muslims. Asmawi maintained that NU played a significant role in elucidating the concepts of humanity and civilization. Nahdlatul Ulama is particularly concerned about strategic concerns related to inter-religious violence, social injustice, loss of economic rights, and other humanitarian difficulties faced by the Ummah. In preparation for its hundredth anniversary, Nahdlatul Ulama is executing its goals and strategies by organizing forums on fiqh peradaban and Religion Twenty. The objective is establishing a proactive and forward-thinking ijtihad to solve human issues effectively. Asmawi's literary analysis concluded that the development of Islamic jurisprudence in the fiqh peradaban and Religion Twenty forums was accomplished by employing maqasid al-

³⁶ Bayat. 150.

³⁷ Bayat. 11.

³⁸ A.T. Seeth, "Renegotiating the Islam Development Nexus in Indonesia: Fiqh Peradaban as a Middle Ground between Local and Global Development Paradigms," *Journal for the Study of Islamic History and Culture, UNUSIA Jakarta* 4, no. 2 (2023): 2–26.

³⁹ Asmawi, "Murūnah Ijtihād Jam'iyah Nahdah al-Ulama Min Fiqh al-Haḍārah Ila Dīm al-'Ishrīn," *Journal of Indonesian Islam (JIS)* 17, 1 (2023): 213–38.

shari'ah.⁴⁰ Contrary to Asmawi's statement, in my work, I argue that NU's fiqh peradaban is not solely grounded in maqasid thinking. Instead, it necessitates utilizing Islamic legal and philosophical instruments, including ushul fiqh and other related methodologies of Islamic law. Moreover, as Asmawi proposed as the remedy for civilization, the endeavor to establish fiqh peradaban would only succeed if it effectively mobilized and harmonized viewpoints from both the NU grassroots and the NU elite.

In addition, Rumadi Ahmad's (2022)⁴¹ work addresses one of the most significant subjects in fiqh peradaban: the status of non-Muslim citizenship. Islamic politics (fiqh al-siyāsah) has long been debated on this subject. This issue was particularly prevalent following the establishment of the new world order at the beginning of the 20th century, which abolished the concept of religion as a basis for citizenship. The status of non-Muslims is categorized into four groups in al-siyāsah fiqh literature: 1) kafir zimmi (non-Muslims who receive protection), 2) ḥarbī infidels (infidels who are permitted to carry out attacks), 3) kafir mu'āhad (kafirs who are bound by a peace treaty with Muslims), and 4) kafir musta'mān (kafirs who are granted asylum in Islamic countries). Ahmad addressed a dictum of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) that denies the classification of non-Muslims as infidels, as is defined in Islamic political doctrine. Instead, they regard non-Muslims as citizens. This work is a qualitative field study. Interviews, direct observation of the discussion process, and the search for pertinent data, including media debates, were employed to gather primary data. Ahmad argued that NU's decision to address the status of non-Muslim citizens was a response to the transformations in the new world order, which were rooted in tradition. It is a result of NU's adoption of the nation-state ideology, which prioritizes the equality of all citizens.⁴²

Another significant work concerning NU notions is the study conducted by Syafiq Hasyim (2023).⁴³ This study analyzes the endorsement of prioritizing human life in Indonesian fatwas concerning COVID-19. This article analyzes the COVID-19 fatwas given by three prominent Islamic organizations: NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI. The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 prompted a fresh examination of the application of Islamic legal reasoning in Indonesian fatwas. The concept of prioritizing the preservation of life (ḥifz al-ḥayā), which is seldom regarded as a legitimate principle in issuing religious rulings (fatwas), arose during the Covid-19 pandemic. Hasyim maintained that the fatwas issued by NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI have effectively persuaded Indonesian Muslims to adhere to the prescribed measures and regulations to avoid the spread of COVID-19. The fatwas continue to serve as revered religious authorities held in great regard by most Muslims in Indonesia, as demonstrated by the vaccine fatwa. Hasyim additionally argued that the robust endorsement of NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI for state policies loses effectiveness when the state cannot maintain consistency in its policies and their execution. Furthermore, according to Hasyim, NU employed the ḍarūra reasoning, which precedes life over religion, as the foundation for a fatwa during the early stages of the pandemic. It effectively persuaded Indonesian Muslims to see the necessity of implementing certain essential modifications in Islamic customs, grounded in syarī'ah, to prioritize life above religious considerations.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Asmawi. 230.

⁴¹ Rumadi Ahmad, "Speaking the Unspeakable: The Status of 'Non-Muslims' in Indonesia," *Samarah* 6,2 (2022): 734–56, <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjkh.v6i2.13576>.

⁴² Ahmad. 754.

⁴³ Syafiq Hasyim, "Prioritizing Life over Religion in Indonesia's Covid-19 Fatwas: The Fatwas of NU, Muhammadiyah, and MUI," *Studia Islamika* 30,3 (2023): 407–30, <https://doi.org/10.36712/sdi.v30i3.32732>.

⁴⁴ Hasyim. 430.

Studies on NU have also been conducted by Rumadi Ahmad (2015).⁴⁵ Ahmad refers to NU which has developed since the 2000s, as a post-traditionalist Islamic group. For Ahmad, post-traditionalist Islam places tradition as its fundamental epistemological condition. The tradition base is then transformed into a new tradition that is firmly rooted in the old tradition. With a perspective of objectification and rationalization, post-traditionalist Islam deconstructs old traditions so that new traditions emerge that are more actual and contemporary.⁴⁶ The new generation of NU is currently building on Gus Dur's idea of the indigenization of Islam. Since 2000, the term post-traditional has emerged among scholars.⁴⁷ The post-traditional categorization of Islam in question is to imagine a critical evaluation of tradition with traditional values and norms (*al-turāth*) itself. Post-traditional Islam takes tradition as its fundamental epistemology to transform into a new tradition that is firmly rooted in the old tradition with a progressive ethos. Through objectification and rationalization, post-traditional Islam deconstructs tradition so that the new tradition is more in line with the present. This is different from modernism, which ignores or even rejects tradition to achieve modernity.⁴⁸

Further work by Arifianto (2021).⁴⁹ He did study on the concept of religious moderation understood by NU in the concept of Islam Nusantara. According to Arifianto, the concept of moderation that NU has understood so far has experienced a shift in meaning. NU's closeness to the Jokowi government has resulted in NU's religious concept becoming not moderate. Arifianto's argument stems from the fact that NU activists attack other Islamic groups who have different theological understandings, such as Ahmadi and Shia Muslims.

The closeness of NU to the government has also been discussed in other works by Alexander Arifianto (2021).⁵⁰ Arifianto utilizes the sectarianization thesis proposed by Hashemi and Postel to examine the resurgence of political sectarianism between NU and Muhammadiyah. It is observed that although these organizations have different philosophies and rituals that set them apart, the confrontations between them can be traced to political sectarianism rather than ideological differences. The contribution demonstrates Indonesia's successful politicization of sectarianism due to limited governmental capacity and other societal issues. The Joko Widodo regime faced a legitimacy challenge because of these issues, which Muhammadiyah and other Islamist-leaning groups initiated during the 2016/17 Defending Islam movement. Therefore, the dictatorship associates itself with the NU, which employs sectarian language to undermine the credibility of these groups. However, during this process, NU perform the enduring sectarianism between itself and Muhammadiyah.

Another important study is the work of Hasse Jubba et al (2021).⁵¹ This work explores the concept of Islamic moderation in Indonesia. This work is based on interview data and a comprehensive analysis of information regarding Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama and their efforts to encourage religious

⁴⁵ Rumadi, *Islamic Post-Traditionalism in Indonesia*. 9.

⁴⁶ Rumadi, *Islamic Post-Traditionalism in Indonesia*. 12.

⁴⁷ See Rumadi, *Islamic Post-Traditionalism in Indonesia*.; See Baso. A. 2015. *Islam Nusantara Ijtihad Jenius Dan Ijma' Ulama Indonesia*. Jakarta. Pustaka Afid., n.d.

⁴⁸ Baso. A. 2015. *Islam Nusantara Ijtihad Jenius Dan Ijma' Ulama Indonesia*. Jakarta. Pustaka Afid.; Rumadi, *Islamic Post-Traditionalism in Indonesia*.

⁴⁹ A.R. Arifianto, "From Ideological to Political Sectarianism: Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and the State in Indonesia.," *Religion, State, and Society*, 2, 49 (2021): 126–41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2021.1902247>.

⁵⁰ Arifianto, "From Ideological to Political Sectarianism: Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and the State in Indonesia."

⁵¹ Hasse Jubba, Z. Qodir, and Mustaqim Pabbajah, "The Contestation between Conservative and Moderate Muslims in Promoting Islamic Moderatism in Indonesia," *Cogent Social Sciences*, Taylor & Francis 8 (2022): 1–14.

moderation in response to the ideology of exclusive organizations such as the Islamic Defenders Front and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. This work shows the commitment of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama's commitment to upholding and advancing a peaceful interpretation of Islam rather than a radical one. This study concludes that one of the main difficulties faced by these organizations is the rise of conservative interpretations of Islam that depict the religion as inflexible and restrictive. This perspective, which is at odds with Indonesian culture, tends to ignore the legitimacy of different civilizations and often refuses to accept established institutions. Therefore, an alternative form of Islam emphasizes applying basic Islamic principles in every aspect of life. Rather than setting strict rules, what is essential is that there is mutual respect between all parties involved.⁵² Furthermore, this work is still based on the concept of Islam Nusantara, which NU campaigned for during the era of Kiai Said Aqil Siraj. However, my work discusses the concept of Fiqh Peradaban in the Gus Yahya era. As a continuation of Islam Nusantara, fiqh peradaban no longer discusses local issues of religious moderation. However, its scope is more complex and has more global problems, as I mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, and I will discuss it again specifically in chapters 3 and 4.

My study focuses on the ideas of fiqh peradaban brought by PBNU in the Gus Yahya era. Specifically, starting from the beginning of the official halaqah of fiqh peradaban in August 2022 to 2024, particularly before the general election. This study takes data in the form of related literature discussing NU, both in the form of journal articles and books. Apart from that, this article also takes data in the form of documents resulting from halaqah decisions, R20, and other important events related to fiqh peradaban. Likewise, this study takes data in the form of interviews with figures who I consider important to ask for their views. There were three sources who were the interview objects for this study, namely Gus Yahya himself as the general chairman of PBNU and the pioneer of the idea of fiqh peradaban; and KH. Afifuddin Muhajir as a member of the NU *rais 'am* who is also known as the NU representative ulama. *Rais 'am* is the leader of *Syuriah*. *Syuriah* is the highest decision-making deliberative body within NU. Kyai Afif is one of the key speakers at several important events when discussing fiqh peradaban. The next interview object is KH. Ulil Absar Abdalla (Gus Ulil) who served as chairman of the Institute for Human Resources Studies and Development (Lakpesdam) PBNU. Lakpesdam Lakpesdam is an institution that moves to empower the resources of NU residents in particular and community members in general.

1.4. Methods and the structure of the study

This study is qualitative research that combines library investigation and fieldwork. Some literature and oral sources are significant, including printed materials such as official documents, notes of meetings and discussions, and fatwas issued by the Nahdlatul Ulama. All materials used were published between 2000 and 2023. To access written sources, I searched for results of essential decisions within NU, whether in discussions, Bahşul Maşāil, halaqah, conferences, or other important meetings. Apart from that, I also searched for the writings of Gus Yahya, who was an essential figure in the idea of fiqh peradaban. I have collected three critical books; one is *The Great Struggle of Nahdlatul Ulama (Perjuangan Besar Nahdlatul Ulama)* by Gus Yahya. This book is Gus Yahya's big project, which he prepared while leading NU. The second book is a collection of fatwas and results of the NU conference. Furthermore, I also searched for data through lectures or online scientific orations, which I accessed via YouTube. Later, I also received additional references in the speech of Gus Yahya's scientific oration when he received an academic award at UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta.

⁵² Jubba, Qodir, and Pabbajah. 7.

Additionally, to obtain information not contained in written sources, I adopted the tradition of oral research: "the collection of material through the method of oral exchange or interviews with other people on a topic being researched by the interviewer."⁵³ I try to obtain information that cannot be found in written materials through interviews. In doing this, I prepared a list of several interviewees who were knowledgeable about the relevant topic and prepared myself with questions that could not be answered from written sources. With many informants being quiet and not easily sharing information, I tried to be skilled in my approach. In my interview with KH. Afifuddin Muhajir and Gus Ulil Absar Abdalla (both important NU figures) needed extra time to prepare for this interview. I also struggled to meet the two sources in person because they were difficult to find. To Kiai Afif, I focused on questions regarding philosophical and in-depth fiqh arguments because he is known as a NU figure who is very intelligent in Islamic law, fiqh, ushul, fiqh, and several other Islamic fields of knowledge. Moreover, with Gus Ulil, I focused on more global and methodological questions, namely, what is the actual global context that Fiqh Peradaban wants to target, what underlies the birth of the idea of Fiqh Peradaban, and what kind of thinking methods does NU use as a representation of traditionalist Islam. Gus Ulil is known as a contemporary NU thinker who is quite authoritative in NU; he is the chairman of the Lakpesdam of PBNU. I used a structured interview method⁵⁴ with a series of topics and research questions to be covered in the interview. The interviewer should also prepare an outline to suit the interviewee's background. This model can also be called a focused topical interview.⁵⁵ This method is relevant to this research because the informants are senior members of NU.

This study is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter contains an introduction (this chapter), a brief overview of Nahdlatul Ulama, previous studies, the focus of the study, methods and sources, and the study's structure. Chapter 2 discusses the post-reform part of NU's history after 1998. The basis of the study is presented in Chapter 2. This chapter describes the political Islam in Indonesia during the Soeharto era. Specifically, this chapter will describe the big ideas of Nahdlatul Ulama during the leadership of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Said Aqil Siraj (Kiai Said), and Hasyim Muzadi (Kiai Hasyim). Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 describe the main topic of this work, namely Fiqh Peradaban, and the background context for the birth of the idea of Fiqh Peradaban. Chapter 3 focuses on explaining the analysis of Fiqh Peradaban using a scientific approach to Islamic Studies, namely fiqh, uṣūl fiqh, and maqāsid. Meanwhile, Chapter 4 explains PBNU's real program in the campaign for fiqh peradaban through two forums, namely halaqah civilizational fiqh and religion twenty (R20).

⁵³ J.H. Morrison, "'A Global Perspective of Oral History in South in Southeast Asia Theory and Method,' in Oral History in Southeast Asia Theory and Method," *Singapore ISEAS*, 1998, 2.

⁵⁴ L.H. Seng, "'Interviewing the Business and Political Elite of Singapore,' in Oral History in Southeast Asia Theory and Method, Ed. P. Lim Pui Huen, James H. Morrison, and Kwa Chong Guan," *Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies*, 2000, 55-56.

⁵⁵ D. Chew, "'Oral History Methodology: The Life History Approach,' in Oral History in Southeast Asia Theory and Method, Ed. P. Lim Pui Huen, James H Morrison, and Kwa Chong Guan," *Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia Studies*, 2000, 47.

Chapter 2

Nahdlatul Ulama after the post-reform era in 1998

2.1 Introduction

The transformation and development of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in the post-reform era after the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998 marked a significant shift in Indonesia's socio-political and religious landscape. This chapter deals with the evolution of NU, focusing on its adaptation and responses to the changing political environment and the ideas propagated by its prominent leaders: Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Hasyim Muzadi (Kiai Hasyim), and Said Aqil Siraj (Kiai Said). Each leader contributed unique perspectives and strategies that shaped NU's role in Indonesian society. This chapter discusses Nahdlatul Ulama's (NU) transformation and existence after the fall of Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998. This chapter analyses how NU has adapted and developed in response to Indonesia's social and political changes post-reformation. This transformation demonstrates NU's ability to remain relevant and contribute positively to promoting moderate and inclusive Islamic values amid the challenges of the times. The main focus is on explaining how NU has developed and adapted to the social, political, and religious changes in Indonesia post-reformation. It is important to discuss this chapter before entering into the main discussion of this study about the current NU under the leadership of Yahya Cholil Staquf (Gus Yahya).

The concept of *Pribumisasi Islam* is based on the interconnectedness of religion and culture in everyday life.⁵⁶ The idea of *Islam Rahmatan lil 'ālamīn* means Islam as a religion of love, bringing peace, friendliness, and wisdom to all people.⁵⁷ Subsequently, a reworking of NU's foundational theological ideas, *Islam Nusantara* integrates local rituals like *tahlilan* prayer with classical Islamic law (*fiqh*) and Islamic theology (*aqidah*).⁵⁸ Indeed, Gus Yahya's *Fiqh Peradaban* idea, which is the core topic of my study, cannot be separated from the ideas above. Therefore, it is important to look at the dynamics of NU in each of these three people's leadership because the socio-political conditions and problems of each are different. Among the questions posed in this chapter are: *What are the dynamics of the times faced by NU in each organizational leadership, specifically after the reformation of the collapse of the Soeharto government? What ideas were conveyed by each NU leader in each period? How does NU respond to each of these situations?*

This chapter argues that NU has become more open, democratic, accommodative, and pluralistic since the Reformation. Gus Dur was very open and political, Hasyim Muzadi tended to embrace conservative groups, while Said Aqil openly opposed groups that differed from NU's socio-political and religious lines. Gus Dur, emphasized the importance of accommodating local traditions in religious practices, which helped strengthen Indonesia's cultural identity while remaining faithful to Islamic teachings.⁵⁹ They sought to address the challenges of radical groups by emphasizing the values of compassion and wisdom contained in Islamic teachings. This chapter shows that NU has not successfully transformed from an organization dominated by politics to one more focused on social,

⁵⁶ Mujiburrahman, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid.," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 10(3) (1999): 342.

⁵⁷ A. Hasyim. Muzadi, "Islam Rahmatan Lil 'Alamin: Menuju Keadilan Dan Perdamaian Dunia (Perspektif Nahdlatul Ulama)" (Pidato Pengukuhan Doktor Honoris Causa (Dr. HC) Dalam Peradaban Islam Yang Disampaikan di Hadapan Rapat Terbuka Senat Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) Sunan, Surabaya, 2006).

⁵⁸ S.A. Siradj, "Pembukaan Muktamar Ke-33 NU" Accessed on May 11, 2024." (Jombang, 2015), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnbqQXtWDFw>.

⁵⁹ A. Wahid, "Salahkah Jika Dipribumikan?" [Isn't It Wrong If It Is Indigenized?]. Reprinted in NU Online, at: (Accessed 29 April 2024)," *Tempo*, 2015, <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/60814/salahkah-jika-dipribumikan>.

educational, and cultural activities. This transformation is crucial for maintaining NU's relevance and role in Indonesia's increasingly complex society.

After the political transition in Indonesia in 1998, Islamism received increasing attention as supporters of political Islam, previously oppressed by authoritarian rule, were allowed to express their beliefs openly.⁶⁰ Islamism is a form of political Islam that wants to build a real Islamic state. Putting Syari'ah law into place is one way to do this, but another is to use politics to create an Islamic state. Some people support Islamist ideas and think that Islam can solve all the Muslim's problems in all times and places.⁶¹ Indonesia's Islamism can be linked back to Soeharto's New Order, a time when Islam was known for being radical and against the dictatorship that was in power.

According to Bassam Tibi, Islam, as a system of beliefs, and Islamism, as a religious and political category, are distinct things. Tibi asserts that Islamism is not inherent to Islam. Islamism is a political ideology that interprets and applies Islam in a political context.⁶² The foundation of Islamism lies not in the core beliefs of Islam but rather in the utilization of religion for political purposes. Islamism is not just a political issue. Furthermore, Islamism is related to religionized politics, and by Tibi, this model is the rightest illustration of the global phenomenon of religious fundamentalism. "Religionized Politics" is a model where a group of people offers a political order that they believe is God's will. Tibi strongly rejects this model. According to his perspective, Islam does imply certain political values but does not require a specific governance system. Islamism can be said to be a form of interpretation of Islam, but it is not Islam itself because it is a form of political ideology.⁶³

During the New Order administration in 1966-1998 (Orde Baru), political Islam frequently posed a challenge to the existing power structure, hindering the development of positive connections between Muslims and their political leaders.⁶⁴ As a result, it was not unusual for the government to use violence against its populace.⁶⁵ The military-backed political system effectively subdued any imagined uprising by the forces of political Islam for an extended period, employing swift and brutal measures.⁶⁶ However, In the 1990s, the Soeharto regime established the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, ICMI), which resulted in the rise of Indonesia's Muslim middle class.⁶⁷ Indonesia had experienced significant political changes since the reform era in 1998. Political Islam movements have demonstrated an increased willingness to collaborate and participate in dialogues with the ruling political regime, since they are no longer subjected to discriminatory and exploitative actions by the state.⁶⁸

⁶⁰ E. Aspinal and M. Mietzner, "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call.," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 50 (3) (2014): 347–69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2014.980375>.

⁶¹ R. Olivier, *The Failure of Political Islam*. (Harvard University: Massachusetts: Harvard University., 1994). 37.

⁶² B. Tibi, *Islamism, and Islam* (Yale University Press, 2012). 24.

⁶³ Tibi. 25.

⁶⁴ P.G. Riddell, "The Diverse Voices of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2002* Vol. 13, No. 1, (2002).

⁶⁵ A. Heryanto, "Identity and Pleasure: The Politics of Indonesian Screen Culture. Identity and Pleasure: The Politics of Indonesian Screen Culture," 2014, 1–256.

⁶⁶ T.B. Pepinsky, W. Liddle, and S. Mujani, *Indonesian Democracy and the Transformation of Political Islam.*, 2010; E. Aspinal, "Oligarchic Populism: Prabowo Subianto's Challenge to Indonesian Democracy. Indonesia," no. 99 (2015): 1–28, <https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.99.0001>.

⁶⁷ Robert W. Hefner, "Islam, State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for the Indonesian Middle Class. 2.," 1990.

⁶⁸ Aspinal and Mietzner, "Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy's Close Call.,"; E. Warburton and E. Aspinal, "Explaining Indonesia's Democratic Regression: Structure, Agency and Popular Opinion.," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 41 (2) (2019): 255–85, <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs41-2k>.

Indonesia may transition from Islamism to post-Islamism by embracing inclusivity, tolerance, and accommodation. The recommended way might be described as moderate, in line with the ideas advocated by the prominent Islamic groups in the country, notably Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).⁶⁹ These groups have continually promoted and supported the acceptance and respect of different beliefs, opinions, and lifestyles. NU has long been recognized for its commitment to promote tolerance.⁷⁰ Noorhaidi Hasan states that the advent of Islamic civil organizations marked the emergence of post-Islamism in post-reform Indonesia. These organizations prioritize the cultivation of a peaceful coexistence between Islam and democracy, actively champion human rights, provide assistance to minority communities, and advance gender equality.⁷¹

Post-Islamism is a political movement that emerged in response to the expansion of Islamism and its ineffectiveness in addressing contemporary political issues.⁷² Chamkhi observed the emergence of Post-Islamism in the Middle East following the Arab Spring.⁷³ A new movement has emerged in Tunisia because of the Islamism's failure to adequately answer the demands and realities of democracy.⁷⁴ In Egypt, post-Islamism has arisen as a reaction to the ineffectiveness of authoritarian governance in promoting the well-being of society.⁷⁵ Post-Islamism in Turkey refers to the critique of efforts to formally create Islamic law.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, in Pakistan, post-Islamism has evolved as a response to the continuous discussion regarding the participation of non-Muslims in public areas.⁷⁷ Post-Islamism aims to reinvent political Islam as a viable option for practical politics.⁷⁸

The socio-political environment that influences the experiences of Indonesian intellectuals who have distanced themselves from Islamist ideas differs from those of post-Islamist intellectuals in the Middle East or other Muslim countries. The post-Islamist intellectuals in Iran have an Islamic heritage, with some of them having previously held positions as government officials appointed after the revolution. Nevertheless, the discontent with the result of the revolution prompted them to reassess the significance of religion within the nation's structure.⁷⁹ Likewise, the intellectuals in Pakistan who were

⁶⁹ H. Nashir, Z. Qodir, and a. Nurmandi, "Muhammadiyah's Moderation Stance in the 2019 General Election.," *Al-Jami'ah* 57 (1) (2019): 1–24.

⁷⁰ Mietzner and Muhtadi, "The Myth of Pluralism: Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia."

⁷¹ Noorhaidi Hasan, "The Making of Public Islam: Piety, Agency, and Commodification on the Landscape of the Indonesian Public Sphere.," *Contemporary Islam* 3(3) (2009): 229–50; Noorhaidi Hasan, "Post-Islamist Politics in Indonesia." In *Post-Islamism: The Changing Face of Political Islam*, Ed. Asef Bayat., in *Post-Islamism: The Changing Face of Political Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., n.d.).

⁷² Asef Bayat, "Islamism and Social Movement Theory.," *Third World Quarterly* 26 (6) (2005): 891–908, <https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590500089240>.

⁷³ T. Chamkhi, "Neo-Islamism in the Post-Arab Spring.," *Contemporary Politics* 20 (4) (2014): 453–68, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2014.970741>.

⁷⁴ E. Sigillo, "Islamism and the Rise of Islamic Charities in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia: Claiming Political Islam through Other Means?" *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Taylor & Francis Online, n.d., 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2020.1861926>.

⁷⁵ E.S. El-Aswad, "State, Nation, and Islamism in Contemporary Egypt: An Anthropological Perspective.," *Urban Anthropology* 45(1-2) (2016): 63–92.

⁷⁶ A. Tomac, "Rejecting the Legacy, Restoring the Honor': The Anti-Capitalist Muslims in Turkey.," *Religions* 11(11) (2020): 1–11, <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11110621>.

⁷⁷ H.A. Harmakaputra, "ISLAMISM AND POST-ISLAMISM 'Non-Muslim' in Socio-Political Discourses of Pakistan, the United States, and Indonesia. 53(1), 179–204. <https://doi.org/10.14421/Ajis.2015.531.179-204>," *The United States and Indonesia* 53(1) (2015): 179–204, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2015.531.179-204>.

⁷⁸ M. Dokhanci, "Post-Islamism Redefined: Towards a Politics of Post-Islamism.," *Journal of Contemporary Study of Islam* 1(1) (2020): 28–54, <https://doi.org/10.37264/jcsi.v1i1.13>.

⁷⁹ Bayat, *Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn*. 85-6.

previously involved in the Islamist movement experienced a change in their beliefs and actions.⁸⁰ Dagi contended that the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the current ruling party in Turkey, is comprised of post-Islamist activists who have adjusted their strategy to appear more inclusive in response to the current socio-political environment.⁸¹

The renewal also draws upon the intellectual wealth of classical Islamic thinking, including the ideas of Ibn. Thaimiyah, Ibn Qayyim, Abd.Wahhab, Abduh, and various more individuals. Fazlur Rahman has categorized the process of Islamic reformation into distinct phases, starting with the era of pre-modernist revivalism, followed by classical modernism, neo-revivalism, and finally neo-modernism. The resurgence of Islamic intellectualism, which emerged in the 17th to 19th centuries, has been evident in Indonesia since the early 20th century with the establishment of Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam (Persis). These organizations have placed a strong emphasis on the purity and refinement of Islamic beliefs as a primary focus of their movement. Like the concepts proposed by Ahmad bin Abdul Wahhab and Muhammad Abduh, the early phase of Indonesian Islamic modernism was marked by a strong aspiration to depart from conventional beliefs and practices. The actions taken involve promoting *ijtihad*, which is independent legal reasoning, rather than *taqlid*, which is blind adherence to established opinions. Additionally, there is an emphasis on the necessity of *qiyas*, which is analogical reasoning, to capture the essence of the law as documented in legal texts. Furthermore, there is a deliberate decision to decrease reliance on Hadith to prioritize the Qur'an and the teachings of the Prophet.⁸²

The idea of modernity advocated by Muhammadiyah and Persis for over fifteen years has generated confrontations with traditionalist groups, such the *pesantren* Kiai. This conservative faction of Kiai holds the belief that *ijtihad*, specifically in relation to fundamental legal issues, is both unattainable and unnecessary. They contend that the classical academics who established the four schools of thought possess incomparable experience dating back to the tenth century, making the truth in the realm of Islamic law beyond doubt. Traditionalist ulama adhere to the legal norms put out by the school of Imams due to this very reason, known as *taqlid*. The controversy prompted the Kiai to establish a significant religious and social organization in Indonesia called the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) in 1926.⁸³ This organization was the result of a conservative response to the modernist movement of Muhammadiyah.⁸⁴

In Indonesia, the modernism movement throughout the later part of the 20th century was marked by theological disputes and a transition towards political involvement, specifically between the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations. Like other Islamic regions, the Indonesian Islamic reform movement eventually adopted a relatively stable political approach. While the rivalry between Muhammadiyah and NU may not completely represent an anti-Western stance. The process of modernization in Indonesia shares certain similarities with post-revolutionary Iran. In both cases, intellectuals are divided into two distinct groups: those who embrace the concept of Western modernity while maintaining religious beliefs, and those who hold anti-Western views. Observing these circumstances, Michel Foucault posed a somewhat ironic query, "what precisely is occurring in Iran

⁸⁰ H. Amin, "From Islamism to Post-Islamism: A Study of New Intellectual Discourse on Islam and Modernity in Pakistan." (Erasmus University: Ph.D. Dissertation, 2010), <http://repub.eur.nl/pub/19340>.

⁸¹ Ihsan Dagi, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectual in Turkey." *Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 13(2) (2004): 135–51.

⁸² G. Barton, "Indonesia's Nurcholis Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought.," *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 8(3) (1997): 323–50.

⁸³ R. Bush, "Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia: The Case of the Nahdlatul Ulama," *Dissertations: University of Washington*, 2002.

⁸⁴ A. Sutarto, *Menjadi NU Menjadi Indonesia: Pemikiran K.H. Abdul Muchith Muzadi (2nd Ed.)*. (Khalista, 2005).

(and Indonesia, for that matter), where the majority of individuals, regardless of their political leanings, appear somewhat annoyed?"⁸⁵

The rise of post-Islamist groups in Indonesia stems from the efforts of previous thinkers, including Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. Both Madjid and Wahid, as shown by various studies, represent the prevailing trend of Islamic intellectualism in Indonesia. Madjid spearheaded a campaign throughout the 1970s to encourage significant changes in Islamic theology. He advocated for the concept of "Islam Yes! Islamic Party No!"⁸⁶ The concepts articulated in his succinct analysis about secularization and modernization rapidly garnered acclaim following their presentation in a public forum for discussion.⁸⁷ Wahid, also known as "Gus Dur", was an intellectual who was affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization. He promoted the localization of Islam, known as "pribumisasi Islam", within the context of Indonesian identity. Pribumisasi Islam is a concept that emphasizes the interdependence of religion and culture in daily life.⁸⁸ The efforts made by Madjid and Wahid to "Indonesianize" Islam had a profound influence on the character of Indonesian Muslims, particularly in moulding the dynamic between religion and the state.

2.2 Abdurrahman Wahid Era

Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, was born on August 4, 1940, in Denanyar Jombang. He was the eldest of six siblings and was also known by the moniker Abdurrahman Ad-dakhil. His father is K.H. Abdul Wahid Hasyim, a descendant of KH Hasyim Asy'ari, one of the founders of the Nahdlatul Ulama. Apart from that, his mother, Nyai Hj. Sholihah is a descendant of prominent NU figure K.H. Bisri Syamsuri, who founded the Denanyar Jombang Islamic Boarding School and served as Rais 'Am Syuriah PBNU.⁸⁹ Gus Dur, genetically descended from both his father's and mother's lineages, is a prominent individual who holds a privileged position in Indonesian society. His paternal and maternal grandfathers were K.H. Hasyim Asy'ari and K.H. Bisri Syamsuri, respectively. Both grandfathers were renowned ulama figures within the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization and held significant influence in Indonesia.

Gus Dur is a prominent Kiai figure who served as Indonesia's fourth president and Chairman of the PBNU. Gus Dur, while serving as President of Indonesia and General Chairman of PBNU, often showed a unique attitude and communication approach. Likewise, Gus Dur often used an adaptable and populist style when interacting with the public, prioritizing direct decision-making and communication over bureaucratic processes. Gus Dur faced many challenges, especially in the humanitarian field, when he advocated for the rights of marginalized and minority communities and the protection of human rights.⁹⁰

Gus Dur emerged from the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) ranks, which played a crucial role in fueling a democratic movement that resisted the Soeharto government. Gus Dur supported the Indonesian

⁸⁵ M. Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*. In L. D. Kritzman (Ed.), *Politics, Philosophy, Culture* (Routledge, 1988), <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203760031>.

⁸⁶ Carool Kersten, *Islam in Indonesia: The Contest for Society, Ideas and Values*. (London: Hurst, n.d.). 38.

⁸⁷ Barton, "Indonesia's Nurcholish Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid as Intellectual Ulama: The Meeting of Islamic Traditionalism and Modernism in Neo-Modernist Thought."

⁸⁸ Mujiburrahman, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid."

⁸⁹ G. Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*. (Jakarta, Indonesia: Equinox Publishing (Asia) PTE, Ltd., 2002). 16.

⁹⁰ C.D. Kromphardt, "Unpresidented! Or: What Happens When the President Attacks the Federal Judiciary On Twitter. Journal Of Information Technology and Politics," *Journal of Information Technology and Politics* 18(1) (2021), <https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2020.1805389>.

Democratic Party (PDI) led by Megawati Soekarnoputri, the daughter of Soekarno.⁹¹ Megawati had gained significant backing from the military and was known for her criticism of Soeharto. The strategists of Soeharto's regime recognized the potential danger posed by a political coalition between NU and PDI, which had the potential to weaken the regime's power. A comprehensive propaganda effort was initiated, targeting Gus Dur and Megawati, questioning their legitimacy as devout Muslims and associating them with the conservative mass executions of 1965-1966.

Ultimately, the government financially supported a brutal assault on Megawati's PDI headquarters and falsely attributed it to a minor Communist political group. This tactic provoked a strong reaction from certain Muslim extremists, who organized large-scale protests in favor of Soeharto. Nevertheless, Muslim public intellectuals like Gus Dur formed alliances to counteract these cunning tactics. They advocated for the establishment of a diverse and inclusive civil society in Indonesia as a means to oppose Soeharto's oppressive and corrupt New Order regime. In 1998, the duo of Gus Dur and Nurcholis Madjid, also known as Cak Nur, gained significant influence in shaping the direction of what is referred to as Islamic neomodernism in contemporary Indonesia's literature on Islam.⁹²

Thus, it is unsurprising that following the Reformation in 1998, which resulted in the overthrow of the Soeharto Regime, the Khittah NU group, under the leadership of Gus Dur, established the PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa /The National Awakening Party) party, with the support of PBNU. Gus Dur's founding of PKB is often condemned by his adversaries, who perceive it as a violation of the Khittah.⁹³ Gus Dur became the fourth president of the Republic of Indonesia in 1999 through the People's Consultative Assembly (PKB). Several internal disagreements within the PKB prompted several kiai to form new political organizations or align themselves with pre-existing parties.⁹⁴

The NU movements transitioned from being predominantly led by kiai-politicians to being led by kiai-intellectuals. The transformation of NU with its return to the 1926 Khittah and the leadership of Gus Dur. NU's current manifestation diverges from its previous incarnation as a political party. It seeks to establish itself as an Islamic religious political organization, aiming to create a clear distinction between NU and PKB, the party established by PBNU under Gus Dur's tenure. NU's mentality also impacts its political conduct as it mitigates conflict and internal dynamics. NU young individuals who follow this cultural route possess valuable qualities that can contribute to NU's progress. They have a strong commitment to engaging in political activities, such as providing support to street children, offering political education, and empowering agricultural workers. NU has the potential to foster community autonomy and lead the way in enhancing civil society following Gus Dur's rise to power. The departure of Gus Dur from his position of authority can be seen as a significant cultural triumph for NU.

Subsequently, the New Order regime began to adopt a more accommodating stance towards Islamic groups in the late 1980s. The pinnacle moment occurred in 1990 with the formation of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia/The Association of Muslim Scholars Indonesia). However, the majority of NU Kiai, under the leadership of Gus Dur, refused to participate in it since they believed it was a ploy by the administration to ensnare Muslims.⁹⁵ Gus Dur and other Islamic officials, through

⁹¹ S. Raymond, "The Anthropology of Islam as 'Applied Anthropology,'" *Routledge*, 2010, <http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/00988150390197668a>.

⁹² Barton, *Gus Dur: The Authorized Biography of Abdurrahman Wahid*. 86.

⁹³ Rickard and R. Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia*. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009). 68.

⁹⁴ R. Bush, "Redefining 'Political Islam' in Indonesia: Nahdlatul Ulama and Khittah '26.," *Studia Islamika* 7(2) (2000): 39–86.

⁹⁵ A. Salim, "Between ICMI and NU: The Contested Representation of Muslim Civil Society in Indonesia, 1990-2001.," *Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies* 49(2) (2011): 295–328, <https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2011.492.295-328>; T. Jones, "Culture, Power, and Authoritarianism in the

their spokesperson, believe that the political interests of the regime drove the foundation of ICMI. They believe that the establishment of ICMI will lead to the emergence of a new form of sectarianism based on religion, which is detrimental to the growth of Indonesia's nationalism in the future.

Furthermore, the participation of kiai in post-Reformation politics has introduced new viewpoints to Indonesia's political environment, with the ongoing changes in political dynamics. It is widely recognized that Gus Dur has made significant contributions to the process of democracy in post-Reformation Indonesia. Although his reign lasted only two years, he made substantial contributions to the nation's advancement by repealing Presidential Instruction No. 14 of 1967, issuing Presidential Decree No. 6 of 2000 to acknowledge the Confucius, and officially designating Chinese New Year as a national holiday.⁹⁶ Furthermore, Gus Dur also enacted substantial reforms, including the eradication of the military's dual function. Law No. 40 of 1999 was enacted during President Habibie's reign to establish the freedom of the press. Gus Dur significantly enhanced this freedom, therefore effectively terminating the 32-year-long period of curtailed freedom of expression under the New Order rule.

Meanwhile, Gus Dur attempted to elucidate the religious principles underlying the policies and conduct of NU. He said the NU was not characterized by opportunism or accommodationism, as outsiders commonly described it. The NU adhered to a heritage of Islamic theology that integrated earthly and spiritual life aspects into a unified and continuous whole. This approach served as a strong bulwark against secularism. He emphasized that the political conduct of NU should be interpreted within this framework. Gus Dur stated that NU made two significant decisions in 1983 and 1984. Firstly, they adopted Pancasila as the sole foundation. Secondly, they decided to disengage from active political involvement. NU articulated this determination in a declaration called "Kembali Ke Khittah 1926", which translates to "Return to the Commitment of 1926".⁹⁷

Gus Dur emphasized the significance of integrating local customs and traditions into Islam as a fundamental element in promoting religious moderation. It continually interacts with the surrounding world through speech. Inter-religious discourse demonstrates interfaith conversation by placing a high value on the dignity and equality of all individuals.⁹⁸ The notion of Indigenization of Islam (Pribumisasi Islam) was initially introduced by Gus Dur in the 1980s. This term refers to the assimilation of Islam, a prescriptive monotheistic religion, into a human-derived society. Indigenization does not aim to prevent the emergence of resistance from local cultural forces. It does not involve conforming to the religious customs of Muslim communities in the Middle East. The indigenization of Islam is essential, as it is necessary to prevent the inevitable polarization between religion and culture.⁹⁹ The propagation of Indigenous Islam closely resembles the methods employed by the Wali Songo (nine saints) in disseminating the Islamic faith. The Wali Songo employed a localized traditional cultural method to propagate Islamic beliefs.

Fundamentally, Gus Dur has also mainstreamed the "Indigenization of Islam" concept, which tries to initiate an understanding that considers local needs when formulating religious law without changing it. The idea of the Indigenization of Islam is an answer to the problems faced by Muslims from the past, namely, how to reconcile culture with norms. According to Gus Dur, the overlap between

Indonesian State: Cultural Policy across the Twentieth Century to the Reform Era.," *Verhandelingen van Het Koninklijk Instituut Voor Taal-, Land En Volkenkunde, Volume 287*. Leiden; Boston: Brill. 287 (2013).

⁹⁶ A. Freedman, "Political Institutions and Ethnic Chinese Identity in Indonesia.," *Asian Ethnicity* 4(3) (2003): 439–52, <https://doi.org/10.1080/1343900032000117259>.

⁹⁷ R. Bush and G. Fealy, "The Political Decline of Traditional Ulama in Indonesia: The State, Umma and Nahdlatul Ulama," *Asian Journal of Social Science* 42(5) (2014): 536–60.

⁹⁸ Mujiburrahman, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid."

⁹⁹ A. Munjid, "Building a Shared Home: Investigating the Intellectual Legacy of the Key Thinkers of Inter-Religious Dialogue in Indonesia," *Temple University*, 2014.

religion and culture will continue to occur as a process that will enrich life. According to Gus Dur, this concept positions Islam as a normative teaching originating from God, which is accommodated into a culture originating from humans without losing its respective identity.¹⁰⁰

Indigenization of Islam refers to the process of integrating Islam, which is a normative message originating from God, into human society without compromising its distinct identity. For Gus Dur, Arabism or aligning oneself with Middle Eastern culture results in a detachment from our cultural origins. Furthermore, Arabism has failed to fulfil the requirements. Indigenization aims to safeguard indigenous cultural forces from being lost rather than to evade the creation of resistance.¹⁰¹ The core of indigenous Islam is the recognition that the separation between religion and culture is unavoidable and should not be avoided.

Gus Dur emphasized the indigenization of Islam as the central aspect of teaching Islamic moderation. It consistently engages in conversation with the surrounding environment. Inter-religious discourse exemplifies interfaith dialogue by prioritizing human dignity and equality.¹⁰² Subsequently, Gus Dur proceeded to cultivate and advance these principles. For instance, the concept of *tasāmuh* pertains to an individual's disposition and capacity to embrace divergences, encompassing those about varying ideas. Gus Dur further developed the concept of indigenization to incorporate the four principles of moderation. The indigenization of Islam focuses solely on addressing local requirements in the formulation of religious laws without altering the fundamental principles of the religion. Moreover, its objective was to maintain cultural identity while still embracing Islam by adjusting to cultural demands through utilizing various interpretations of religious scriptures while following Islamic jurisprudence and legal principles. Islam should practice equitable and proportional treatment towards individuals of diverse religious beliefs.

Gus Dur firmly stated that the "Indigenization of Islam" did not change Islam but only changed the manifestation of Islamic religious life. Apart from that, the "Indigenization of Islam" does not necessarily place Islam in the subordination of culture and tradition, nor does it carry out "javanization" or syncretism. Gus Dur supported for the promotion of Islamic moderation as a means of religious moderation, particularly in the Indonesian context. Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim nation, nevertheless has a substantial population of Christian adherents in Eastern Indonesia and Hindu devotees. Furthermore, it includes the quantitative depiction of underrepresented communities in different geographic regions. Gus Dur's primary aim was to promote religious moderation to save Indonesia's diverse nature. He held the belief that humanism and plurality are the core elements of religious moderation.¹⁰³

Gus Dur and other prominent religious leaders from many backgrounds employed interfaith conversation to advocate for religious moderation.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, his concept of interreligious interaction centers around the interconnectedness of three key elements: universalism, cosmopolitanism, and indigenization.¹⁰⁵ The concept emerged particularly at a period when government policies were

¹⁰⁰ Wahid, "Salahkah Jika Dipribumikan? [Isn't It Wrong If It Is Indigenized?]. Reprinted in NU Online, at: (Accessed 29 April 2024)."

¹⁰¹ A. Wahid, *Islamku, Islam Anda, Islam Kita: Agama, Masyarakat, Negara Demokrasi* (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2006).

¹⁰² M. Bahri, "Abdurrahman Wahid, Depth Islam, and Religious Pluralism, '," *Ulumuna* 19(2) (October 2022): 216, <https://ulumuna.or.id/index.php/ujis/article/view/216>.

¹⁰³ Bahri, "Abdurrahman Wahid, Depth Islam, and Religious Pluralism.203".

¹⁰⁴ M.R. Syabibi, "Communicative Cultural Dakwah of Abdurrahman Wahid in Pluralistic Society,'," *Journal of Social and Islamic Culture* 29(2) (n.d.): 269–70.

¹⁰⁵ Mujiburrahman, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of Abdurrahman Wahid."

progressively more exclusive in the 1980s and 1990s. In addition to various religious figures not affiliated with government-formed religious organizations, such as T.H. Sumartana (Protestant Christian), Gedong Bagus Oka (Balinese Hindus), YB. Mangunwijaya (Catholics) and Sri Panavarro Mahathera (Buddhists), their actions have contributed to the formation of discourses and have become significant contributors to the international interfaith dialogue movement. Comprehending many religious viewpoints is crucial for him to become a balanced and calm individual. Prejudice can arise when individuals lack sufficient time to acquire knowledge about distinctions. Gus Dur emphasized that discussion is the initial step toward achieving a religiously moderate society.

In conclusion, the indigenization of Islam has resulted in religion and culture no longer being in conflict or diminishing each other. Instead, the indigenization of Islam is evident in a rational approach to religion that no longer adheres strictly to its original form but aims to bridge the gap between religion and culture. The indigenization of Islam aims to foster a diverse mindset (Islam) to be adapted to the specific local contexts, resulting in the development of "Indigenous Islam." It is a response to the promotion of "Authentic Islam" or "Purificative Islam," which seeks to impose Arabism on all Islamic communities worldwide, asserting that Middle Eastern Islam is the original and most accurate form. In this instance, the term "Pribumisasi Islam" highlights the multitude of interpretations of the religious practices of Islam throughout various regions, encompassing factors such as race, tribe, culture, nation, and state. Therefore, Islam is now perceived as multifaceted, adapting to many cultures and customs in which it is practised. The assumption that Islam in the Middle East is inherently pure, and the most accurate form of Islam is no longer valid, as Islam as a religion has evolved throughout time.

2.3 Hasyim Muzadi Era

Kiai Hasyim Muzadi was elected as the Chairman of the central board of Nahdlatul Ulama during the 30th Congress of NU in Lirboyo, Kediri, in 2000. Kiai Hasyim was chosen as the head of the PBNU during his second term, while concurrently holding the position of Chairman of the East Java regional board of NU. He assumed office after KH. Abdurahman Wahid (Gus Dur), who held the position of NU head for three consecutive terms: 1984-1989, 1989-1994, and 1994-1999. Nevertheless, during a span of five years, Gus Dur and Kiai Hasyim were prepared to participate in the 31st conference of NU in Donohudan Boyolali, Central Java, in 2004.¹⁰⁶ Typically, leaders of NU, especially at the central level, predominantly originate from influential Kiai families. However, this does not apply to the man who is an advocate of NU in East Java, commonly referred to as Kiai Hasim, or "cak" in the local East Javanese dialect, which means brother. He was born into a modest family in Bangilan, Tuban, East Java. Muzadi, the father, was employed as a tobacco merchant.

The lack of coherence in Gus Dur's viewpoints inside NU became apparent when he was succeeded as the general chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama by Hasyim Muzadi, a renowned kiai who espoused more conventional theological beliefs. After assuming the presidency, he swiftly dismissed the youthful NU activists who had strong connections to Wahid from PBNU.¹⁰⁷ Under Muzadi's leadership, NU issued a fatwa condemning the Ahmadiyah Muslim sect, aligning with the prior denouncement made by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI). Muzadi strongly denounced the Shi'a

¹⁰⁶ A.M. Hasan, *Biografi A. Hasyim Muzadi*, 1st (Keira Publishing, 2018). 8.

¹⁰⁷ Martin Van Bruinessen, "'NU: New Leadership, New Policies?' Inside Indonesia," June 16, 2010, <https://www.insideindonesia.org/new-leadership-new-policies>.

minorities, who have seen multiple episodes of persecution.¹⁰⁸ The local religious academics and activists associated with NU were alleged to have advocated for and participated in these acts of violence, particularly in Sampang, a district in East Java.¹⁰⁹

Kiai Hasim Muzadi proposed the concept of Islam *Rahmatan lil 'Ālamīn*, which serves as a comprehensive framework for da'wah. Kiai Hasyim's interpretation of Islam fostered the concept of a tranquil and harmonious Islam, promoting peace both within and beyond the religion. He implemented Islam within the framework of amicable religion and state relations. Hasyim Muzadi's leadership and subsequent activities focused primarily on promoting world peace and interfaith cooperation, with a particular emphasis on the actualization of rahmatan lil 'ālamīn.¹¹⁰ Hasyim Muzadi's leadership and subsequent activities focused primarily on promoting world peace and interfaith cooperation, with a particular emphasis on the actualization of rahmatan lil 'ālamīn. Therefore, the teachings of the Abrahamic religion prioritize salvation or peace based on three main beliefs. For example, Islam signifies complete submission to God's will and the establishment of unity among individuals through the performance of good deeds. On the other hand, Judaism emphasizes the concepts of organic harmony, fulfilment of obligations and duties, acts of kindness, and rational resolution of disputes.

Islam Rahmatan lil 'ālamīn significantly differs from the ideas of Islamic Nusantara and Fiqh Peradaban. Indeed, these ideas share the vision of reading Islam with complete gentleness peace and being a solution for the world. However, the term Islam Rahmatan lil 'ālamīn is familiar in Islamic thought. The word "Islam" comes from the word *aslama*, which is rooted in the word *salama*. Islam is the infinitive form of the word *aslama*. "rahma or mercy" means *al-Riqqatu wa al-Ta'attufi* (tenderness combined with compassion).¹¹¹ Ibn Faris interpreted this word as referring to the meaning of humility, compassion, and gentleness. From the root of this word, *Rahima* was born, which means blood ties, brotherhood, and kinship.¹¹² Al-Asfahani emphasized that rahma is mere mercy (*al-Riqqat al-Mujarradah*) and kindness without mercy (*al -Ihsân al-Mujarrad dûna al-Riqqat*).¹¹³ This means if mercy is attributed to God, then it means "sheer goodness," and if it is attributed to humans, then what is meant is "mere sympathy". To this day, in their daily conversations, Arabs interpret the grace attributed to God to mean mercy, kindness, and sustenance.

About this concept of mercy (rahma), Kiai Muzadi interprets the words "rahma" and "rahim" differently. According to Kiai Muzadi, Rahma is for all creatures, including non-Muslims. At the same time, Rahim is only intended for people who obey God and believe in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. In examining the idea of Rahmatan lil 'ālamīn from the perspective of KH. Hasyim Muzadi, referring to primary sources, namely Islam Rahmatan lil 'ālamīn towards World Justice and

¹⁰⁸ G. Fealy, "Greg Fealy on Former NU Leader Hasyim Muzadi (1944-2017)," <https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/greg-fealy-on-former-nu-leader-hasyim-muzadi-1944-2017/>, *Indonesia at Melbourne*, 2017, <https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/greg-fealy-on-former-nu-leader-hasyim-muzadi-1944-2017/>.

¹⁰⁹ Aan. Suryana, "State Officials' Entanglement with Vigilante Groups in Violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a Communities in Indonesia," *Asian Studies Review* 43 (3) (2019): 475–92; Ken Michi and Yuka Kayane, "The Politics of Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: The Shi'a Response to the Sampang Incidents of 2011-12.," *TRaNS: Trans-National and -Regional Studies of Southeast Asia* 8(1) (2020): 51–64; Yuka Kayane, "Understanding Sunni-Shi'a Sectarianism in Indonesia: A Different Voice from Nahdlatul Ulama under Pluralist Leadership," *Indonesia and The Malay World* 48(140) (2020): 78–96.

¹¹⁰ Muzadi, "Islam Rahmatan Lil 'Alamin: Menuju Keadilan Dan Perdamaian Dunia (Perspektif Nahdlatul Ulama)." 20.

¹¹¹ Ibnu Mandzur, *Lisânul Arab*, vol. 5 (Beirut: Dâr Ihyâ al-Turâts al-Arabi, 1999). 173.

¹¹² Abi Husain Ahmad Ibn Faris, *Mu'jam Maqâ'yisu al-Lughati*, vol. 2 (Beirut: Dâr al-Fikr, 1979). 498.

¹¹³ Abi al-Qasim al-Husain Ibn Muhammad Al-Asfahani, *Al-Mufradâtu Fî Gharîbi al-Qur'âni*, (Makkah: Maktabah Nizâr Mustafa al-Bâz, n.d.). 253-54.

Peace.¹¹⁴ This concept has been campaigned throughout the world since his leadership at NU, either with the National Moral Movement (Gernalnas) or the International Conference of Islamic Scholars [ICIS]. This campaign has made people worldwide sympathetic to Islam and made him one of the World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP) presidents at the seventh World Religious Leadership Meeting in Kyoto on 29 August 2006. There were 800 religious leaders from 100 countries around the world participated in and produced the Kyoto Declaration.¹¹⁵

Kiai Hasyim Muzadi concurs with the notion that moderate Islam does not align with either liberalism or fundamentalism.¹¹⁶ This type of interpretation is not limited to Indonesian Muslims alone. Ali A Mazrui, a renowned Muslim scholar hailing from Kenya, shares a comparable interpretation. According to him, a person or organization will be deemed moderate if they maintain a central stance between liberalism and Islamism. Hasyim Muzadi frequently asserts that moderate Islam exists as a middle ground between extremism and liberalism. Muzadi contends that this kind of Islam has the potential to address and resolve issues related to religious radicalism-terrorism as well as liberalism-secularism.¹¹⁷

The intellectual and cultural traditions that exist in Islamic boarding schools, as well as the knowledge learned in the Yellow Book, are some of the characteristics of NU in being tolerant of differences at the national and international levels. This tradition of accepting differences is the basis of Rahmatan lil ‘ālamīn's Islamic vision. The concept of Islam extends mercy to anyone, even non-Muslims. The idea of Islam rahmatan lil ‘ālamīn originated from international and national events. In the international arena, especially in the view of Western society, both in the United States and beyond, it increased after the tragedy of the World Trade Center Twin Towers [WTC], 11 September 2001. George W. Bush said that the perpetrators of the attacks were terrorists from al-Qaeda. Led by Osama bin Laden, a businessman from Saudi Arabia. At the national level, for example, the tragedy of 1 June 2008 at the National Monument (Monas). Islamic-Christian incidents in the Maluku conflict, the Free Aceh movement adopted by Islamic circles, attacks on Ahmadiyah in Banten, destruction of churches in Temanggung, Central Java, and a series of cases in Indonesia. All of this can invite high levels of hatred, both among Muslims and non-Muslims. Apart from that, the spread of Islamophobia, which has penetrated the lives of non-Muslims, has also been a factor in the birth of Islam rahmatan lil ‘ālamīn.

Kiai Hasyim is very committed to combating the ongoing terrorist activities in Indonesia, particularly the bombings targeting police headquarters. Hasyim Muzadi consistently disapproved of the Police handler's actions towards terrorists, particularly those carried out by the Special Detachment (Densus) 88, which frequently resulted in the fatal shooting of suspected terrorists. He argued that using these approaches is equivalent to fighting terrorism with a different form of terrorism. Hasyim Muzadi asserts that the management of terrorism should continue to be conducted within the framework of legal consolidation. "It is important to refrain from using lethal force against individuals who have not been legally determined to be terrorists through a court process." The approach is referred to as countering terrorists with terror. Furthermore, he objects to the public broadcast of raids and apprehensions of

¹¹⁴ Muzadi, “Islam Rahmatan Lil ‘Alamin: Menuju Keadilan Dan Perdamaian Dunia (Perspektif Nahdlatul Ulama).”

¹¹⁵ See “The Kyoto Declaration on Confronting Violence and Advancing Shared Security, Religions for Peace Eighth World Assembly,” 2016, (<http://www.religionsforpeaceinternational.org/node/285?language=es>), accessed on 11 June, 2024.

¹¹⁶ Iwan Taunuzi, “Islam Ekstrem Dan Liberal Bukan Produk Indonesia’.” [Http://www.tribunnews.com/2011/03/23/islam-ekstrem-dan-liberal-bukan-produk-indonesia](http://www.tribunnews.com/2011/03/23/islam-ekstrem-dan-liberal-bukan-produk-indonesia),” *Tribunnews*, March 23, 2011, <http://www.tribunnews.com/2011/03/23/islam-ekstrem-dan-liberal-bukan-produk-indonesia>.

¹¹⁷ Ali.A. Mazrui, “Liberal Islam versus Moderate Islam: Elusive Moderation and the Siege Mentality’.” *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 22(3) (2005): 83–89.

individuals believed to be involved in terrorist activities through live television broadcasts. This approach cultivates animosity among the family members or supporters of the terrorists.

Kiai Hasyim maintained that terrorism is not an innate characteristic of the Indonesian population. Without a doubt, specific factors have a role in the rise and growth of terrorist organizations within a country. He conducted an analysis and determined that terrorism worldwide may be categorized into two separate types: pure terrorism and terrorism that is part of warfare. The period of terror that occurred in Indonesia after the reformation era was marked by intense fear, as it occurred in a previously peaceful society. Terrorism is a fundamental element of the ongoing confrontation between Israel and Palestine. He asserts that suicide bombing as a form of intellectual terrorism is a well-established terrorist organization. They have boldly initiated an assault and openly defy. The mosque was the intended target of the attack, much like the incident that took place at the At-Taqwa Mosque in Cirebon, West Java on June 15, 2011. This empirical evidence unequivocally establishes that terrorism is not intricately linked to the doctrines of Islam. Hasyim Muzadi noted the distinct inclination to link acts of terrorism in Indonesia with Islam. This general classification has led to the involvement of many Muslims. Consequently, there is a failure to include something. If this mentality becomes widespread in society, terrorism in Indonesia will be eliminated. Kiai Hasyim Muzadi had the belief that the presence of terrorists in Indonesia was a long-lasting and ongoing effort. The evidence suggests that the efforts made by the parties responsible for preventing terrorism primarily involve discussions rather than tangible actions of ideological dissemination within society.¹¹⁸

In Indonesia, this approach has resulted in the emergence of new acts of terrorism. If the current situation persists, the level of militancy exhibited by the terrorists will escalate. Consequently, they may become progressively more ruthless in their assaults on the police. The United Nations (UN) has passed a resolution affirming the crucial role of civil society organizations in the fight against terrorism. Nevertheless, the execution of the ruling in Indonesia remains inadequate. Civil society groups should be involved in addressing terrorism due to its multifaceted nature and diverse manifestations. Civil society organizations have the potential to address and mitigate terrorism by focusing on non-physical factors, such as ideology and socio-economic conditions.¹¹⁹

As a mass organization, NU has given high importance to the problem of terrorism in Indonesia. NU consistently promoted a moderate form of Islam and aggressively worked to combat terrorism in both domestic and international contexts. NU thinks that strengthening modern Islam could serve as an effective deterrent against radical Islamic organizations. Hasyim Muzadi diligently conducted a relentless campaign on promoting Islam as a source of mercy for all of humanity, using the influential platform of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organization until his demise. This arises from the acknowledgment that countering terrorism is not just the responsibility of the government, but also the duty of the community and religious establishments. The issue of terrorism was a significant topic of discussion during the 32nd NU conference, held in Makassar, South Sulawesi, in 2010. The Conference Recommendation emphasized the importance of involving civil society in efforts to combat terrorism.¹²⁰

Nevertheless, during the Hasyim Muzadi era, the simplistic tendency to view things in terms of binary opposition and absolute categories, such as moderate Islam vs radical Islam, becomes evident in contemporary Indonesia when we come across a particular instance: The PWNU in East Java arranged a seminar at Hotel Bumi Surabaya on February 22nd, 2011, to commemorate the 88th anniversary of NU.¹²¹ The annual commemoration of NU's anniversary is often observed, hence it was not notably

¹¹⁸ Hasan, *Biografi A. Hasyim Muzadi*.

¹¹⁹ Foucault, *Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings, 1977-1984*. In L. D. Kritzman (Ed.), *Politics, Philosophy, Culture*.

¹²⁰ "Http://Nasional.Vivanews.Com, Accessed on April 29, 2024," n.d.

¹²¹ "Http://Www.Tempointeraktif.Com, Accessed on April 29, 2024.," n.d.

extraordinary. What was particularly peculiar was the involvement of the notable individuals from FPI (Front Pembela Islam/Islamic Defender Front), specifically Rizieq Shihab and Munarman. Rizieq's presence was remarkable as he was explicitly invited to serve as a guest speaker at the conference. Rizieq was recognized not just as a visitor, but also as a member of NU, as stated by Hasyim Muzadi in his speech when he commented, "Habib Rizieq is an essential component of NU and he consistently expressed his affiliation with NU." Muzadi provided a defense to deny the dissolution of FPI.¹²²

The scene was unquestionably unusual. The moderation of NU seemed to amalgamate and fuse with the FPI's assertive manner. There was an absence of constraint, or at the very least, it became increasingly ambiguous. If it were as straightforward for everyone to distinguish the disparity between the moderate approach of NU and the extremist stance of FPI as it was for NU leaders in the past, the forum seemed to obscure the distinction. The FPI and NU have amalgamated. The violent behavior of FPI may be linked to the Islamic movement of NU, or conversely, the moderate position of NU could impact the extreme movement of FPI.

NU is acknowledged as a moderate Islamic organization, with its moderation frequently contrasted with the customary violence carried out by radical Islamic groups. Meanwhile, FPI is widely acknowledged as the Islamist organization that commonly perpetrates acts of violence. NU leaders who have divergent views from NU frequently express their understanding of moderation when discussing FPI. NU embodies a form of Islam that is marked by moderation, while FPI embodies a more radical and extremist interpretation of the faith. During that time, the most prominent person in FPI was invited to be a guest speaker to discuss the ideology of his Islamic views and was recognized as a member of NU.

2.4 Said Aqil Siraj Era

Following the removal of Soeharto and the transition to democracy in Indonesia in 1998, the Islamic religious narrative war in this country has become very competitive. Until recently, the government did not put any limits on a diverse of Islamic groups, allowing them to publicly express their ideas, regardless of their theological and political viewpoints. In the 2010s, NU's leadership, led by Said Aqil Siraj, began to view certain rising parties, such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (the Justice and Development Party) (PKS) influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), as ideological threats. Within the NU, the emergence of new conservative factions, such as 'Straight Path NU' (NU Garis Lurus), aimed to contest the prevailing authority of the moderate NU leadership. To address these internal and external challenges, NU authorities have prioritized protecting their position as one of Indonesia's significant Islamic organizations. They have chosen to back the Jokowi administration and employ aggressive strategies to suppress their adversaries rather than seeking resolution through democratic and humane methods.

During the 2015 NU muktamar in Jombang, the chairman of NU, Said Aqil, presented a novel theological doctrine known as Islam Nusantara. The objective of this notion is to enhance the authority of moderates inside NU, to address the growing ideological challenges originating from both internal and external origins. The term "pribumisasi Islam" (Islamic indigenization), coined by Wahid in a previous subsection, refers to the integration of orthodox Islamic theology with local rituals, rites, and traditions, according to proponents of this notion.

Siraj argued that Islam Nusantara functions as a strategy for NU to position itself between two contrasting ideological positions: the extreme end characterized by inflexibility and conflict, and the

¹²² "Http://Www.Tempinteraktif.Com, Accessed on April, 2024.," n.d.

liberal end characterized by adaptation, tolerance, and leniency.¹²³ The leaders of NU underlined that Islam Nusantara is neither a foreign or progressive interpretation of Islam. Instead, it stems from the authentic understanding of Sunni Islam (Ahlul Sunnah wal Jama'ah). Therefore, NU embodies the fundamental understanding of Sunni Islam, which is currently disregarded by the majority of Muslims in the Middle East. A religious understanding that exhibits an acceptance of local cultural customs while simultaneously advocating for nationalism, which entails a profound sense of love and loyalty towards their own nation. Following the Sunni Islam principles of balance (tawazun), moderation (tawassut), tolerance (tasamuh), and justice (i'tidāl), Islam Nusantara is an Indonesian-style Islam that strengthens Islam as a blessing for humanity.¹²⁴

Ma'ruf Amin (one of the leader or rais 'am of the NU) said that Islam Nusantara is the Islam of Ahl Sunnah wal Jama'ah al Nahdliyah. According to Ma'ruf Amin, Indonesian Islam has three pillars: thought (fikrah), movement (harakah), and real action ('amaliyyah). Meanwhile, there are five markers of Indonesian Islam: reform (islāhiyyah), balance (tawazuniyyah), voluntary (tatawwu'iyah), polite (akhlaqiyyah), and tolerant (tasamuh).¹²⁵

Said Aqil Siroj maintained that NU includes the fullness of Indonesian Islam in its organizational culture and activities. The efforts of NU at the institutional and jam'iyah levels provide a comprehensive model for harmonizing religion, philosophy, and nationalism. Indonesia, as a stronghold of Islam, is actively working to develop knowledge, improve networks, and formulate a national policy that aligns with the country's diverse nature. The development of Indonesian ulama knowledge has been performed since the time of Wali Songo. In addition, Indonesian scholars known as ulama, like Shamad al-Palimbani, Mahfudh at-Termasi, Nawawi al-Bantani, Yusuf al-Makassari, Ahmad al-Mutamakkin, and the collective network of Indonesian ulama, have demonstrated the significance of developing Islamic knowledge in Indonesia.¹²⁶

The presence of cultural identity, isnad, genealogy, genealogy of knowledge, and an extensive network in the realm of Islamic knowledge prove that Islam Nusantara is a point of reference for the global community. The NU ulemas have consistently demonstrated a profound understanding of Islamic studies and national political strategy. This characteristic has been represented by prominent figures such as Hasyim Asyari, Wahab Chasbullah, Bisri Syamsyuri, and their successors, who have maintained this tradition throughout NU's history.¹²⁷

In addition, Azyumardi Azra clarified that the concept of Islam Nusantara is characterized not only by its rich and diverse Islamic traditions and practices but also by its influence on social, cultural, and political aspects of life. Thus, the validity of referring to Islam Nusantara based on religious activities is limited to a certain extent.¹²⁸ Islam Nusantara, as defined by Azra, is related to "Southeast Asian Islam" found in the Muslim areas of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Pattani (Southern Thailand), and Mindanao (Southern Philippines) within the academic realm. The region known as the Islamic Archipelago in pre-colonial literature was referred to as the "land below the wind." In Arabic literature

¹²³ Siradj, "'Pembukaan Muktamar Ke-33 NU' Accessed on May 11, 2024."

¹²⁴ Syafiq Hasyim, *Islam Nusantara Dalam Konteks: Dari Multikulturalisme Hingga Radikalisme*, (Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Penerbit Gading, 2018).

¹²⁵ M. Amin, "'Islam Nusantara Adalah Islam Ahl Sunnah Wal Jama'ah al Nahdliyah'", [Http://Www.Elhooda.Net/](http://www.elhooda.net/), 18 May 2024. 1.," n.d.

¹²⁶ S.A. Siradj, "Menjaga Marwah Ulama," in *Nasionalisme Dan Islam Nusantara*, Ed. Abdullah Ubaid Dan Mohammad Bakir, (Jakarta: Kompas, 2015), 56. (Jakarta: Kompas, 2015), 56.

¹²⁷ Siradj. 56.

¹²⁸ Azyumardi Azra, "Jaringan Ulama Nusantara," in *Islam Nusantara: Dari Ushul Fiqih Hingga Paham Kebangsaan*, Ed. Akhmad Sahal Dan Munawir Aziz. (Bandung: PT. Mizan Pustaka, 2015), 171.

since the 16th century, the region of Southeast Asia is referred to as "bilād al-Jawī" (Muslim Land of Java). Indonesian Muslims are commonly known as aṣḥāb al-Jawīyyin or jamā'ah al-Jawīyyin.¹²⁹

Azyumardi Azra said that the normative concept of Indonesian Islam upholds the same principles of faith and harmony as individuals in whatever geographical location. To a certain degree, it exhibits its distinctions. An example is the distinction between Indonesian orthodoxy and Saudi Arabian orthodoxy. The Islam Nusantara combines three key components: kalam (theology) following the 'Asy'āriyah pattern, Syāfi'iyah fiqh (jurisprudence), and Al-Ghazālī Sufism. Arab Islamic orthodoxy is comprised of two main components: the first is the theology of Salafi Wahhabi, and the second is the Hambali jurisprudence, which is the strictest school of Islamic jurisprudence. It distinguishes between Indonesian Islamic orthodoxy and Saudi Arabian Islamic orthodoxy. Indonesian Muslims find the orthodoxy of Salafi Wahhabi Islam to be too conservative and simplistic, as they are committed to practicing an exciting and complex Islam based on their history in the past.¹³⁰

NU organized a national forum in the city of Jombang, in East Java, focusing on the Islam Nusantara theme for Indonesia and worldwide. NU aims to demonstrate the uniqueness of Indonesian Islam by establishing connections with locales in the archipelago, differentiating it from Arab-Islamic culture, and emphasizing Muslims' tolerant and moderate disposition, together with a nationalist message.¹³¹ The Islam Nusantara movement highlights the religious practices of Islam, where Muslim communities use local customs to demonstrate their commitment and dedication to their faith. Additionally, adherents of a religiously conservative and Islamist will oppose the Islam Nusantara movement.¹³²

The term 'Nusantara' is derived from the ancient Javanese words 'nusa' and 'antara,' which translate to 'islands' and 'opposite' or 'across from' respectively.¹³³ Nusantara encompasses Sumatra, Java, the Sunda Islands, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Maluku, and West Papua (Irian Jaya) within the present Indonesian borders. It also includes many Southeast Asian places, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippines.¹³⁴ The distinguishing feature of Islam Nusantara is its recognition and value of the diverse local cultures, encompassing regional languages and distinct practices within these regions.

Islam Nusantara should not be mistaken for a recently developed Indonesian interpretation of Islamic teachings.¹³⁵ The proponents of the Islam Nusantara movement consistently defend the authenticity of Islam. There is a notion that Indonesian tradition has always included the orthodoxy of Islam. Azyumardi Azra identifies three primary factors that have significantly shaped Islam Nusantara: The text discusses the orthodox Sunnī theology of al-Ash'arī or Asy'ariyah, the judicature of al-Syāfi'ī and other judicial schools within the Sunnī tradition, and the Ṣūfism of the Persian mystic al-Ghazālī.¹³⁶

Additionally, there is a notion that the Islam distributed throughout the Indonesian archipelago is deeply connected to the Prophet Muḥammad. Ahmad Baso asserts that the progeny of the Prophet, known as sayyids or asyraf, played a direct role in the dissemination of Islam over the Southeast Asian

¹²⁹ A. Azra, "Genealogy of Indonesian Islamic Education: Roles in the Modernization of Muslim Society', Heritage of Nusantara," *International Journal of Religious Literature and Heritage* 4(1) (2015): 85–114.

¹³⁰ Azra. 90

¹³¹ Hisanori Kato, "The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia," in *Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements* (BRILL, 2021), 110.

¹³² Kato.

¹³³ Ahmad Baso, *Islam Nusantara Ijtihad Jenius Dan Ijma' Ulama Indonesia*, I (Jakarta: Pustaka Afid, 2015). 2.

¹³⁴ Baso. 3.

¹³⁵ Hasyim, *Islam Nusantara Dalam Konteks: Dari Multikulturalisme Hingga Radikalisme*, 8.

¹³⁶ Azra, "Genealogy of Indonesian Islamic Education: Roles in the Modernization of Muslim Society', Heritage of Nusantara";. 170."

region, encompassing the Indonesian islands.¹³⁷ The consensus is that the nine saints, also known as wali songo (sanga/ nine saints), had a significant impact on the spread of Islam in Java. Baso states that the wali songo, who were the progeny of the Prophet Muḥammad, established the basis of Islam Nusantara.¹³⁸ He used the words of one of the wali songo to describe the dialectical progression of Islam, which involves adopting aspects from the pre-existing culture to strengthen and improve the new one. In this process, the traditional rituals serve as the medium, while the elements of religion provide the substance.

Siraj argued that NU occupies a middle ground between two opposing positions: the radical pole, characterized by strictness, conflict, and rigidity, and the liberal pole, characterized by compromise, permissiveness, and hedonism. He maintained that since both extremes are incorrect, Muslims should preserve and protect religious beliefs that align with the moderate and balanced perspective.¹³⁹

The leadership of NU, led by Siraj, gathered forces to advocate for Islam Nusantara and criticize conservative Islamic movements. Indeed, many critics within the organization oppose Siraj's promotion of Islam Nusantara, notably his predecessor, the late Hasyim Muzadi, and clerics associated with NU Garis Lurus. Nevertheless, due to Siraj's faction's absolute dominance over the NU leadership, he quickly disregarded this criticism. Therefore, although NU is also filled with many factions and has a significant Islamic contingent within the organization, its leaders are willing to use stronger tactics to marginalize the more conservative factions and push them back into the more obscure public sphere.

A group of young NU kiai, known as "Straight Path NU" (NU Garis Lurus or NUGL), has emerged as an internal opposition to the leadership of NU. The aim of this faction is to restore NU to its original core principles and eliminate the "liberal and pluralist ideologies" advocated by Abdurrahman Wahid and other reformists. They argue that these ideologies are inconsistent with the principles of traditional Sunni Islamic (Aswaja) beliefs. NUGL was established by Luthfi Bashori, Idrus Ramli, and Buya Yahya, all of whom obtained extensive theological education in the Middle East and garnered significant fame through personal interactions and social media platforms. Furthermore, Abdul Somad, a traditionalist Islamic preacher hailing from Riau, has extended his support to this specific faction of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) movement. Presently, he is generally recognized as one of the major online evangelists in Indonesia. Somad has the largest number of Instagram followers among all other hardline Islamist preachers, with a peak of 9.7 million during his peak popularity.

The leaders of NU are concerned by the emergence of new Islamist movements and the fragmentation of their own authority. The NU was especially concerned about the increasing influence of organizations such as NU Garis Lurus, which had been skillful in gaining new members. Aqil Siraj, the leader of NU, forged a more robust alliance with the Jokowi administration with the aim of securing enhanced opportunities for official favors and financial benefits.

The Jokowi government strongly backed NU's national and international push to define Islam Nusantara since the president was under growing pressure from conservative Islamic organizations and was primarily seen by hardliners as lacking enough Islamic legitimacy. After Bela Islam (Aksi Bela Islam) took action against former Jakarta Governor and his ally Basuki Tjahaja Purnama in 2016, which helped Purnama lose and face a trial and sentence for alleged blasphemy, Jokowi began to feel more and more threatened by these organizations.¹⁴⁰ After the rally, Jokowi gave NU more attention than he

¹³⁷ Baso, *Islam Nusantara Ijtihad Jenius Dan Ijma' Ulama Indonesia*. 10.

¹³⁸ Baso. 30.

¹³⁹ S.A. Siraj, "Pesantren Tidak Produksi Generasi Liberal". Interview in NU Online," *NU Online*, 2004, http://nu.or.id/page/id/dinamic_detil/i/i279/Warta/Said_AqilPesantren_Tidak_Produksi_Generasi_Liberal_quot.

¹⁴⁰ Mietzner, "Fighting Illiberalism with Illiberalism: Islamist Populism and Democratic Deconsolidation in Indonesia."

did other Islamic groups; for instance, in his several appearances at NU-related events, he spoke positively of Islam Nusantara as an ideology that is in harmony with Indonesia's national philosophy.¹⁴¹

Following their alignment with Jokowi, officials from NU, such as Said Aqil and other moderate members, are now displaying a greater level of decision in openly criticizing their adversaries, both within and beyond the organization. Furthermore, Said Aqil, the leader of NU, not only categorizes his adversaries as 'Wahhabis,' but also advocates for NU assuming control over all mosques and Islamic organizations in Indonesia. This is done with the aim of protecting the nation from conservative Islamist views. On January 27, 2019, he announced that only individuals associated with NU will be qualified for positions such as mosque prayer leaders (imams), preachers, judges (qadi), and the Minister of Religious Affairs. However, they have the ability to misguide the committed individuals. The comments elicited harsh responses from Muhammadiyah leaders, with one of them asserting that Said Aqil's stance is "a perilous declaration that has the potential to jeopardize the unity of Indonesia".¹⁴² The implementation of exclusivist pluralist policies by NU, in response to theological challenges from conservative opponents, is intensifying the sectarian gap between NU and other Indonesian Islamic organizations, especially Muhammadiyah. These warnings are disconcerting.

The collaboration between NU and the Jokowi regime has encouraged NU to engage in robust, sometimes aggressive, efforts to intimidate its Islamist opponents and marginalize them from the public domain. For instance, Banser, a paramilitary outfit associated with Ansor, the organization's youth division, regularly disrupted gatherings funded by HTI and forcefully stopped preaching sessions conducted by prominent Islamic preachers like Felix Siauw, who was believed to have strong connections with HTI.¹⁴³

2.5 Conclusion

In the post-reform era, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has experienced a significant transformation that reflects its adaptation and resilience to political and social changes in Indonesia. Gus Dur with the concept of "Indigenization of Islam," Kiai Hasyim with "Islam Rahmatan lil 'Alamin," and Kiai Said with "Islam Nusantara" each made unique and strategic contributions to NU's role in Indonesian society. Gus Dur was very open and political, Hasyim Muzadi leaned towards accommodating conservative groups, while Said Aqil explicitly opposed groups that diverged from NU's socio-political and religious stances.

Gus Dur emphasized the importance of integrating local traditions into religious practices, which helps strengthen Indonesia's cultural identity while remaining faithful to Islamic teachings. Kiai Hasyim expands this inclusivity with the concept of Islam as a mercy for all nature, emphasizing the values of compassion and wisdom in Islamic teachings. Meanwhile, Kiai Said emphasized the importance of adapting Islamic law to local contexts, reinforcing that Islam can coexist harmoniously with various cultural traditions.

NU has yet to succeed in changing itself from a dominant political organization to one more focused on social, educational, and cultural activities. This transformation is important to maintaining NU's relevance and role in an increasingly complex Indonesian society. In the post-reform era, NU is more open, democratic, accommodating, and pluralistic. Gus Dur, Kiai Hasyim, and Kiai Said have

¹⁴¹ D. Hamdani, "Defending Islam Nusantara," *The Jakarta Post*, 2019, <https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2019/03/08/defending-islam-nusantara.html> (accessed 18 May 2024).

¹⁴² R. Atriana, "Tokoh Muhammadiyah Sesalkan Pernyataan Said Aqil Soal Imam-Khatib Harus NU." (Accessed 29 April 2024).," *Detik.Com*, 2019, <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4403199/tokoh-muhammadiyah-sesalkan-pernyataan-said-aqil-soal-imam-khatib-harus-nu>.

¹⁴³ Ahmad Najib Burhani, "Islam Nusantara as a Promising Response to Religious Intolerance and Pluralism," *ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute*, 2018, https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/TRS21_18. (Accessed 22 June 2024).

shown that NU can be a moderate force promoting inclusive and compassionate Islam.. Thus, NU is important in promoting tolerance and peace in Indonesia, making Islam a blessing for all of nature.

Chapter 3

Fiqh Peradaban of Nahdlatul Ulama

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses how Indonesian Islamic ideals established locally can contribute to global sustainable development with the idea of Fiqh Peradaban. I argue that the Fiqh Peradaban offers more substantial things to the world regarding a sustainable development agenda than Islam Nusantara, Islam rahmatan lil alamin, and Pribumisasi Islam (as the ideas of previous NU leaders). The Fiqh Peradaban, emphasizing Islamic law, may bring concrete Islamic ideas into the debate on sustainable development while maintaining a secular complexity and legitimizing the 2030 Agenda with Islamic legal reasoning. In contrast to discursive approaches like Islam Nusantara and preceding NU concepts, fiqh peradaban could significantly impact the situation. As a result, by employing Islamic jurisprudence methods, the Fiqh Peradadaban can significantly contribute to sustainable development and its interdependent economic, social, and environmental aspects.

Fiqh Peradaban is a concept introduced by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as it begins its second century. It developed as a response to the limited focus of fiqh discussions in pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), which primarily depend on classical literature (turats) without considering the present social milieu, which has experienced substantial sociological transformations.¹⁴⁴ Actually, the discourse on the Fiqh Peradaban can be traced to scientific works in the Middle East. The book "Fiqh al-Tahaḍḍur al-Islāmī" was authored by Abdul Majid Al-Najjar,¹⁴⁵ a prominent figure in Tunisia known for his activism, politics, and academic involvement. This book is divided into three chapters that methodically explore topics presented in the discourse on the Fiqh of Civilization. Al-Najjar has formulated the framework and features of the fiqh of Civilization in this book. The book was initially released in 1999 by Dār Al-Gharb Al-Islāmī, a well-known publisher in the Middle East. Al-Najjar examines the determinants that influence the roles played by humans in the construction of civilization. In the third section, al-Najjar introduces some civilization initiatives that have been previously formulated.¹⁴⁶

Al-Najjar seek to overcome the lack of progress in Islamic civilization, starting with intellectual discussions, in order to develop a plan for a modern Islamic civilization that can serve as a basis for the Islamic world in advancing Islamic civilization in the era of 5.0 and beyond. According to al-Najjar, the Fiqh of Civilization should start with concrete evidence that Islam is a religion of civilization that can adapt to any global transformation. The Islamic culture is a manifestation of human civilization. It symbolizes a remarkable accomplishment of human civilization, focused on the highest standards of human ethics and the welfare of individuals and society.¹⁴⁷

Muhammad Imarah, an Egyptian intellectual, also wrote a book titled "Fiqh al-Hadhârah al-Islâmiyyah," which explores the law of Islamic Civilization.¹⁴⁸ This 115-page book, published in 2007, explores different aspects of the fiqh of Civilization. It covers the foundations of the state, prophetic studies, moderation, pluralism, the spirit of Islamic Civilization, Islamic philosophy, and the relationship between reason and revelation in the paradigm of Imam Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd.

¹⁴⁴ "Live Halaqah Fiqh Civilization 'Fiqh Siyash Dan Kewarganegaraan' Di PP. Al Anwar 3 Sarang SESI I, Channel Youtube (Gondan, Karangmangu Rembang: PP. Al-Anwar 3," (Rembang, 2022), <https://youtu.be/eMmy-h6F-cE>.

¹⁴⁵ Abdul Majid Al-Najjār, *Fiqh Al-Tahaddhur al-Islâmi*, II, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār Al-Gharb Al-Islâmī, 2006).

¹⁴⁶ See Al-Najjār.

¹⁴⁷ Al-Najjār.

¹⁴⁸ Muhammad Imarah, *Fikih Al-Hadhârah al-Islâmiyyah*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2007).

Muhammad Imarah holds membership in the Haiiah Kibar al-'ulamā' Al-Azhar (Al-Azhar et al. Committee), the Majlis A'lâ li Syu'ûn al-Islâmiyyah (High Council of the Islamic Religion) and serves as the editor in chief of the Al-Azhar Journal. Numerous works and articles examined the Fiqh of Civilization following these two works. This study delves into multiple subjects of the Fiqh of Civilization, encompassing fundamental aspects such as the establishment of states, prophetic missions, moderation, pluralism, the essence of Islamic civilization, Islamic philosophy, and the interplay between reason and revelation as perceived by Imam al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd.¹⁴⁹

Recently, the fiqh of civilization known as "Fiqh Peradaban" in Indonesia has begun to be hotly discussed in academic halls and scientific halaqahs of 'ulamā' in Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). The nomenclature of fiqh peradaban emerged after the General Chairman of the Nahdlatul 'ulamā' Executive Board, KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf (Gus Yahya) proposed transforming jurisprudence from the conventional paradigm to a new paradigm, namely "fiqh peradaban". The Fiqh Peradaban is intended to embody fiqh's dynamic character, which will respond to environmental changes.¹⁵⁰

Furthermore, I would maintain that the Fiqh Peradaban offers a more concrete solution to the sustainable development agenda by combining theoretical-textual and practical-rational approaches based on benefit. This approach allows the reinterpretation of religious texts considering changing social and environmental realities. The Fiqh Peradaban is rooted in Uşûl Fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) and maqāsid (goals) of Sharī'a. On this basis, Fiqh Peradaban has a paradigmatic footing that can be justified academically, ensuring that every phenomenon faced by Muslims is bound by law or can be accessed by law. By using this approach, Fiqh Peradaban is able to bridge the understanding of knowledge, values, ethics, and goals between Islam and secular humanism. NU, through the Fiqh Peradaban, also responds to the tension between classical fiqh traditions and contemporary issues with a moderate approach. This approach not only maintains the classical Islamic boarding school epistemology but also integrates modern scientific epistemology without radicalizing either.

3.2 The History of Fiqh in Islam

Fiqh is essentially the result of the interaction between the 'ulamā' (Muslim scholars) and the social facts surrounding them. History has shown that Fiqh will always be unique and justify plurality in every era and region. Examining the terminology of Fiqh as a specific field in Islamic studies is important. Islam has consistently existed as an ideology under the legal rules of Syarī'a. Syarī'a initially addressed all aspects of religion, including ritual (the relationship between humans and God), ethics, and law on every aspect of human beings (the interaction between humans).¹⁵¹

Simply noted, the definition of Syarī'a has changed and grown throughout history. The Syarī'a was implemented through Islamic law, or Fiqh, until another discipline, called 'aqidah or tauhid, emerged in the second and third centuries of hijriah. Morals was a distinct field of study that also covered ethics. Historical continuity occurs in the definition of Syarī'a. Ibnu Khaldun classified Fiqh as min al-'ulūm al-hadītsati fī al-millah (diverse religious sciences in modern civilization), and it ultimately developed into an independent scientific discipline.¹⁵² Ibnu Khaldun characterized the term Fiqh as the laws of God that regulate the behaviours of mukallaf (adult Muslims who are required to

¹⁴⁹ See Imarah.

¹⁵⁰ Y.C. Staquf and C.H. Taylor, "The Civilizational Origins of Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama and Its Humanitarian Islam Movement," *Hudson Institute*, 2021, 1–15.

¹⁵¹ Y.C. Staquf, "Tajdid Al-Fiqh Al-Islami Wa I'adat Tafkir Al-Ummah Al-Islamiyah," in *Tsaquf Al-Akhyar Al-Nahdliyah Fi Muallafati Al-Ulama Al-Indunisiyah* (Jakarta: LTNU, 2023).

¹⁵² Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah* (Beirut: Beirut: Dār Ihya al-Tarats al-'Arabi, t. th, 1986).

fulfil religious obligations). These laws include wājib (obligatory), harām (forbidden), sunnah (recommended), makrūh (disfavored), and mubāh (allowed), which originated from the Quran and Sunnah.¹⁵³

The era of the Prophet ('aṣr an-nubūwwah) refers to the early era of Islam, during which the Prophet Muhammad lived. The Prophet is a figure who regulates the religious field, political issues, and war strategy as the party with authority. Completion of the Prophet Muhammad's knowledge. At the same time, these three attributes establish the Prophet as a figure who is not only regarded as a religious leader ('ulamā'), but also as a political leader (umarā') and a war (military) commander.¹⁵⁴

The ṣahābah, who were previously ordinary citizens in the Prophetic era, grew in status to become political leaders for Muslims by holding the title "Caliph" in the subsequent era (the era of companions).¹⁵⁵ The Khulafā' Rāsyidūn era is the name given to this period. The Khulafā' Rasyidūn era is a periodic portrait that establishes the period of leadership of Abū Bakar Ash Shidiq, Umar Bin Khatab, Uthman Bin Affan, and Ali Bin Abi Talib. The ideal of leadership was defined as the mastery of three skills: religious, political, and military, during the Prophetic and Khulafā' Rasyidun era. Nevertheless, this was not the case during the Dynasty era. The role of leadership does not require simultaneous ability in these three disciplines of knowledge for an individual with a lineage in a ruling dynasty. Nevertheless, political elites can work in conjunction with religious and military experts to manage the government under their regime in their capacity as rulers. At this time, a typology of authority was established between political leaders (umara'), religious scholars ('ulamā'), and military experts (junūd), each of whom possessed distinct authorities.¹⁵⁶

A scientific discipline that practically discusses matters related to Islamic law based on religious texts is fiqh in the history of Islamic sciences. During the classical era, the themes that were addressed within the realm of jurisprudence included purification (fiqh at-ṭahārah), worship (fiqh al-'ibādah), transactions (fiqh al-mu'āmalah), marriage (fiqh al-munākahah), crime (fiqh al-jināyah), and politics (fiqh as-siyāsah).¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, Fiqh Peradaban is combining a theoretical-textual and a practical-rational approach based on benefits. A textual-theoretical approach to the text involves the analysis of the explicit and implied meanings in the text using Al-Quran linguistic theories, semantics (dilālah), and semiotics ('alāmah). At the same time, the rational-praxis approach employs the advancement of sciences beyond Uṣūl Fiqh to interpret environmental realities by defining, mapping, and quantifying the advantages of practices. Humanity The paradigm of interpretation of present texts and reality is a significant factor in the development of jurisprudence and its manifestations in real space.

In subsequent developments, "Fiqh" was more closely associated with specific study themes.¹⁵⁸ For instance, "Fiqh of Worship" discussed a collection of laws about worship rituals. In the same way, "Fiqh jināyah" addresses a specific set of criminal laws, "Fiqh munākahāt" pertains to aspects of marriage, and "Fiqh al-ahwāl as-syakhsiyyah" (family law) or "Fiqh mu'āmalah" is the study of Islamic law that is relevant to economic issues. Additional Fiqh studies have been conducted, including

¹⁵³ Ibn Khaldun.

¹⁵⁴ W.M. Watt, *Islamic Political Thought*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007); 220-22. Antony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). 9-17.

¹⁵⁵ Ali Abdel Razek, *Islam and the Foundations of Political Power*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). 28.

¹⁵⁶ Muhammad 'Abid Al-Jabiri Al-Jabiri, *Takwin Al-'Aql Al-'Arabiy* (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahdah al-Arabiyyah, 1989). 235-6.

¹⁵⁷ Abdurrahman Al-Jazirī, *Al-Fiqh 'Alā Madzāhib al-Arba' Ah*. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub, 2003).

¹⁵⁸ S. Firdaus, *Epistemologi Fikih Kontemporer (Studi Atas Pemikiran Sahal Mahfudh, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍawī, Dan Wahbah al-Zuhailī)* (Dissertation, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2022). 37.

environmental Fiqh (Fiqh al-bi'ah), women's Fiqh (Fiqh an-nisā), minority Fiqh (Fiqh al-aqalliyat), interfaith Fiqh, multiculturalism Fiqh, and numerous other Fiqh "ideas" that have been the subject of diverse discussions, and the Fiqh of civilization (Fiqh al-hadārah or Fiqh Peradaban) is also included as one of its developments.

The fiqh mujtahids is divided into two types: Aḥl al-Sunnah and Aḥl al-Ra'y. Abu Zahrah said that the existence of these two groups was due to the inequality in the distribution of hadith that occurred at that time.¹⁵⁹ The first group, Aḥl al-Sunnah, was in the Hijaz as the birthplace and residence of the Prophet. Therefore, the collection of narrations attributed to the Prophet is vast and easy to obtain and verify its validity. In this way, this first group uses these narrations as primary sources in carrying out religious teachings and tends to put aside personal opinions. Even mujtahids like Imam Malik bin Anas made the traditions of the people of Medina ('amal aḥl madīnah) one of the normative sources of Islam.¹⁶⁰

Meanwhile, the impact of the second factor above causes mujtahids to have different considerations based on their regional social experience. The differences here are not necessarily between the two groups of jurisprudence above. However, fellow Aḥl al-Sunnah may have different understandings in producing Islamic norms. As happened between Imam Malik and Imam Syafi'i. Even though the two of them had a teacher and student relationship, Imam Syafi'i's richer intellectual wanderings meant that he often had different views from his teacher, Imam Malik.¹⁶¹ Such is the case with the minimum menstrual period for a woman. For Imam Malik, the minimum limit is once out or a day. It differs from Imam Syafi'i, who said the minimum period for menstruation is one day and one night.¹⁶² The menstruation case is only a tiny example of many fiqh cases where there are often differences of opinion among fiqh scholars.

In the following era, each fiqh mujtahid had his followers, so what was called maẓhab was born. The emergence of this normative Islamic community called maẓhab, which has different styles and characters of fiqh opinions, is the main axis for the diversity of religious expressions of Muslim society. It means that a mujtahid's understanding of the sources of the Syarī'ah becomes a guide in forming social practices. Their opinions are affiliated with the community, so they become a model for their followers in their daily activities. Because Islam is a religion that regulates all dimensions of life, this is also the opinion of the mujtahids. At this stage, fiqh becomes an instrument capable of creating patterns of social interaction in society based on Islamic teachings.¹⁶³

3.3 Uṣūl Fiqh and Maqāsid as the Foundation of Fiqh Peradaban

In the philosophy of Islamic sciences, fiqh is a product of ijtihad, which must be based on theoretical elements (Uṣūl Fiqh). The themes discussed by fiqh cannot necessarily be separated from the Uṣūl Fiqh formulations that underlie the object of its reasoning. That is why fiqh peradaban as a product of ijtihad in the era of the Nation-State needs to be analyzed critically through the discipline of Uṣūl Fiqh so that its existence as a discourse has a paradigmatic footing that can be justified academically. At this point, we need to try to epistemic fiqh peradaban discourse. Asy-Syāfi'ī, in his

¹⁵⁹ Muhammad Abu Zahrah, *Tārīkh Al-Maẓāhib al-Islāmiyyah* (al-Qahirah: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, t.th.). 248.

¹⁶⁰ Abu Zahrah. 400.

¹⁶¹ *Waḥdah Al-Baḥṣ al-Ilmī, al-Maẓāhib al-Fiqhiyyah al-Arb'ah* (Kuwait: Idārah al-Iftā', 2015). 59.

¹⁶² Wahbah al-Zuhailī, *Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī Wa Adillatuhu.*, vol. 1 (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, t.th.). 617.

¹⁶³ Firdaus, *Epistemologi Fikih Kontemporer (Studi Atas Pemikiran Sahal Mahfudh, Yūsuf al-Qaraḍawī, Dan Wahbah al-Zuhailī)*. 5.

book *Ar-Risâlah*, stated that there is not a single phenomenon faced by Muslims that is not bound by the law or accessible from the law.¹⁶⁴

Uşûl Fiqh scholars differ in their views regarding matters that are kept silent or not mentioned by religious texts into three opinions. Firstly, those who argue that anything not explicitly mentioned in religious texts indicates that the matter is impermissible and cannot be pursued. Second, those who argue that everything not explicitly mentioned by religious texts shows that these things are permitted or allowed to be done absolutely. Third, those who offer a moderate perspective state that religious texts do not explicitly mention matters that need to be analyzed and discussed first based on their beneficial and public welfare aspects.¹⁶⁵

Uşûl Fiqh was born from the womb of Islamic civilization as an authentic discipline of knowledge. It functions to guide the interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah to guide the path of life. In this case, Asy-Syāfi'ī is recognized to be the first figure to formulate his paradigm in his book *Al-Risâlah*. Asy-Syāfi'ī did not discuss partial issues of fiqh but universal principles (*al-qawâ'id al-kulliyah*) as a procedure for understanding textual propositions.¹⁶⁶ He is considered to emulate the role of Aristotle, who developed the logic of Hellenistic civilization and the development of Greek science. If Uşûl Fiqh is a universal logical-methodological tool, then fiqh is a partial product of the logical-methodological process in the hands of the 'ulamā'. Uşûl Fiqh aims to strive for fiqh products that are benefit-oriented and prevent humans from harm. Abu Ishaq al-Syāṭibi also emphasized that fiqh was built to realize human benefit in this world and hereafter.¹⁶⁷

Imam Al-Syāṭibi did not define *Maqâshid al-Syari'ah* specifically in *Al-Muwâfaqât*. The nomenclature of *Maqâshid al-Syari'ah* and its discussions had already circulated before Al-Syāṭibi several centuries earlier. Al-Syāṭibi emphasized five necessities (*al-dharûriyyât al-khams*), the meeting point of all religions.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, Ibn Al-Qayyim emphasized that the foundation of all fiqh products is the benefit of the world and the hereafter. Everything is based on justice, compassion, benefit, and wisdom. Every product of fiqh that deviates from the principles of justice towards tyranny, from the principles of compassion towards violence, from wisdom to futility is not part of Islamic law, even though it is done through interpreting the propositions of the Quran and Sunnah.¹⁶⁹

Nevertheless, discussion forums rarely develop a methodological style based on Uşûl Fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence). Only the Fiqh is referenced in most methods, which continue to employ the *qaulî* pattern (referring to the act of obtaining a book).¹⁷⁰ Some contend that implementing Uşûl Fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) is equivalent to *ijtihād* activities. However, the increasing stigma is that the door to *ijtihād* has been closed, resulting in the disappearance of the authority to conduct methodological *manhaj* using Uşûl Fiqh.¹⁷¹ This is because the founders of the school of thought could no longer establish their own rules for concluding fiqh law, and it took much work to identify qualified scholars.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁴ Muhammad Ibn Idris Asy-Syāfi'ī, *Al-Risâlah*, (Kairo: Dār al-Hadits, 2005). 474.

¹⁶⁵ 'Abd al-Khalil Abu 'Ied, *Al-Maskût 'Anhu 'inda Ushûliyyîn*. (Jordan University: Risâlah Dukturah, 2005).

¹⁶⁶ Asy-Syāfi'ī, *Al-Risâlah*, 75.

¹⁶⁷ Abū Ishaq Al-Syāṭibi, *Al-Muwâfaqât Fî Ushûl al-Syari'ah*, vol. 11 (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyyah, n.d.).

¹⁶⁸ Al-Syāṭibi. 36.

¹⁶⁹ Ibn Al-Qayyim, *I'lâm al-Muwâqî'in* „an Rab al-„, *Âlamîn*, (Bairût: Dār al-Fikr, Tt), 652., n.d.

¹⁷⁰ S. Firdaus, *Epistemologi Fikih Kontemporer (Studi Atas Pemikiran Sahal Mahfudh, Yūsuf al-Qaradawī, Dan Wahbah al-Zuhailī)* (Dissertation, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, 2022). 45.

¹⁷¹ S.P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996).

¹⁷² Firdaus. 50.

Fiqh, a textual product of ijtihad, is not considered an "authoritative" text.¹⁷³ The primary emphasis of Fiqh is on texts that are essentially the development of comments (syarh) or even comments on comments (hasyiyah), with the main text being lost. This results in the loss of Fiqh's relevance to the practical social life of society.¹⁷⁴ This Fiqh looks stagnant, inflexible, and rigid due to the somewhat pejorative postulate of "Civilization of Fiqh (Peradaban Fiqh)" resulting from these circumstances. By providing the freedom to reinterpret or change, Fiqh should be applied equally in every aspect of Muslim life, including the social order, nation, and state.¹⁷⁵

The epistemic of Hasan Hanafi can be attributed to the theoretical framework "al-turats wa al-tajdīd" (tradition and modernization), which aims to illustrate the "pyramid" of civilization, positing that humans are inextricably linked to the three. The roots of his thoughts are as follows: 1) yesterday (al-maḍī) is personified as turats qadim (the classical treasures of Islam itself); tomorrow (al-mustaqbal) is personified as turats gharbi (treasure of the west); and now (al-hāli) is personified as al-wāqī' (present reality). The three foundations of thought are referred to as "three foundations" (al-jabhah al-tsalatsah), which denotes our position within the triangle of civilization.¹⁷⁶ The classical treasures are cited in Turats Qadim as a source of inspiration for profound and comprehensive thought. Concurrently, Turats Gharbi is positioned as a tenant of civilization, which has a history of approximately two centuries and is associated with modernity. Islam initiated this recognition of Western civilization. Between turats (tradition) and hadatsah (modernity), Hasan Hanafi appropriated Abed Al-Jabiri's diction. The three are inextricably linked, as per Hasan Hanafi. In this instance, it is impossible to circumvent the process of cultural acculturation (al-taṣāqūf or al-tahaddur).¹⁷⁷

The Fiqh Peradaban, initiated by the General Chairman of PBNU (Gus Yahya), has become a significant part of NU's agenda. This agenda is being implemented through hundreds of halaqahs in Islamic boarding schools and educational institutions.¹⁷⁸ The primary objective is to establish harmony and justice by utilizing a contextual approach to understanding religious texts. In Gus Yahya's opinion, the current challenge for Muslims is how they interpret religious texts, particularly the products of classical Islamic law, to address the continually developing challenges of life.¹⁷⁹ The Fiqh Peradaban was established in response to the minor perspectives of numerous experts who believe that the study of Fiqh, particularly in Islamic boarding institutions (pesantren), is in decline and is frequently interpreted strictly. Even though Fiqh is a legal product resulting from istinbāt, fatwa, and ijtihād, the process necessitates media, specifically ushūl fiqh, qawā'idul fiqh, and Maqāshid Syarī'ah.¹⁸⁰

Positioning Maqāshid al-Syarī'ah as the foundation of the fiqh peradaban requires Muslims to understand how Uṣūl Fiqh works, which directs the interpretation of religious texts. It is so that the fiqh peradaban does not end up with ideas that are counterproductive to the goals of fiqh itself, namely seeking benefit and avoiding damage. The scholars have formulated the methodological building of Islamic law by synergizing three structures of epistemic reasoning: historical awareness (al-wa'y al-

¹⁷³ Khaled Abou El-Fadl, *Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2001). 69.

¹⁷⁴ Sahal Mahfud, *Nuansa Fiqh Sosial.*, 7th ed. (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2011). 25.

¹⁷⁵ A. Wahid, *Pergulatan Negara, Agama, Dan Kebudayaan* (Jakarta: Desantara, 2001). 27.

¹⁷⁶ Hasan Hanafi, *Muqaddimah Fi 'Ilm Al-Istighrab* (Kairo: Dār al-Fununiyyah, 1991). 9.

¹⁷⁷ Hasan Hanafi, *Al-Turats Wa Al-Tajdīd, Mauqufina Min Al-Turats Al-Qadim* (Beirut: Al-Muassasah al-Jam'iyah li al-Dirasah wa al-Nasyr, 1992). 14-19.

¹⁷⁸ Triono, "2 Tujuan PBNU Gelar Halaqah Peradaban," NU Online, 2022,."

¹⁷⁹ Staquf and Taylor, "The Civilizational Origins of Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama and Its Humanitarian Islam Movement."

¹⁸⁰ Ahmad al-Raysuni, Muhammad al-Zuhayli, and Muhammad Uthman Shabir, *Huquq Al-Insan: Mihwar Maqasid al-Sharia*. (Qatar: Wizarat al-Awqaf wa Shu'un al-Islamiyah, 2002); 30.;

tarīkhī), theoretical awareness (al-wa'y al-nazarī), and practical awareness (al-wa'y al-'amalī).¹⁸¹ The Fiqh Peradaban, which is based on Maqāshid al-Syarī'ah, could be started by paying attention to religious texts as arguments (al-wa'y al-tārīkhi) and testing their validity. Efforts to take the path of linguistic interpretation (al-wa'y al-nazhari) semantically and semiotically are carried out in line with looking at the world's reality, social change, and so on (al-wa'y al-'amalī). This linguistic observation and praxis process are brought together in one beneficial node. 'ulamā' must consider the benefits contained in the text, as the spirit of the messages of the owner of the Quran and the benefits found, which often change following the changes in space and time.

Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jauziyyah underlines that the fundamental principle of Syarī'a is the well-being of earthly life and the hereafter. The foundation of this is rooted in the concepts of justice (adl), compassion (rahmah), well-being (mas'lahah), and wisdom (hikmah). Any interpretation of Islamic Syarī'ah that does not adhere to the principles of justice, compassion, and wisdom is not considered Islamic, regardless of whether it is based on evidence from the Quran and Sunnah.¹⁸² The main objective of maqāsid al-syarī'ah, which refers to the objectives of Islamic law, is to prevent damage and promote well-being (dar'u al-mafāsīd wa jalb al-maṣāliḥ). The concept consists of two essential components: abstention (al-tark) and action (al-fi'l). More specifically, it entails refraining from causing harm and actively promoting well-being. Human reason can generally be used to determine the well-being and negative global impact. Reason operates via globally accepted principles, personal experiences, established customs, and reliable hypotheses. When there is a disagreement between these welfare objectives, reason is used to determine which one should be given priority, as outlined in the principles of fiqh (al-qawā'id al-fiqhiyyah).

Establishing maqāsid al-syarī'ah (the purposes of Islamic law) as the basis of the Fiqh Peradaban necessitates Muslims to comprehend the principles of Islamic legal methodology (Uṣūl Fiqh) that governs the interpretation of religious texts. The purpose is to prevent the Fiqh Peradaban from incorporating notions detrimental to Syarī'ah's goals. Therefore, based on maqāsid al-syarī'ah, the Fiqh Peradaban can initiate by treating religious writings as historical arguments (al-wa'y al-tarīkhī) and assessing their soundness. The pursuit of linguistic interpretation (al-wa'y al-nazārī) is conducted by considering the syntactic, semantic, and semiotic aspects while also taking into account the realities of the world, as well as changes in global social and political orders (al-wa'y al-'amalī). Observing and applying linguistic principles come together at a central point of concern for well-being, known as maqāsid al-syarī'ah. The Fiqh Peradaban should consider the humanistic well-being mentioned in the texts as the lasting essence of the messages from the text owner (God) and the humanistic well-being found in ever-changing realities influenced by shifts in time, space, and circumstances (*taghayyur al-ahkām bi taghayyur al-azminah wa al-amkinah wa al ahwāl*).

Basically, the issue of muamalat is that the law is permissible. Therefore, when it comes to political issues and political policies, there is no need to ask or doubt whether there is a legal basis for it, what is the basis for the hadith because the important thing is that there are no verses and hadiths found that contradict the political policy or passages that prohibit it. Maybe it is true what was said by a fiqh expert from the Hambali school, namely Ibn Aqil, who was referred to by Al-Jauziyah.¹⁸³

The benefit in this context needs to be (1) weighed and measured in terms of conformity with the maqashid al-syarī'ah and the dalil kulli or the texts of the verses of the Qur'an and as-Sunnah, (2)

¹⁸¹ Al-Syātibi, *Al-Muwāfaqāt Fī Ushūl al-Syarī'ah*.

¹⁸² Ibnu Qayyim al-Jauziyyah, *I'lām Al-Mauqūn 'an Rabbil al-'ālamīn*, vol. III (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1991). 11.

¹⁸³ al-Jauziyyah, *I'lām Al-Mauqūn 'an Rabbil al-'ālamīn*. 751.

The benefits case must be convincing and honest from the results of an in-depth study, (3) the benefits can be felt by the general public, not by a small number of people, (4) the benefits can make things easier, not difficult, for humans to uphold the commandments of good and evil.¹⁸⁴

Criteria (1) Benefits according to Islamic law are the achievement of Syarī'ah goals (maqashid al-syari'ah), which are realized in the form of maintaining the five primary needs (al-dharuriyat al-khams), namely maintaining religion, maintaining the soul, maintaining the mind, maintaining offspring, and maintaining assets (2) Benefits that Syarī'ah justifies are benefits that do not conflict with the text (3) Those who have the right to determine whether something is beneficial or not according to Syarī'ah are institutions that have competence in the field of Syarī'ah and this is done through jama'i ijtiḥad.¹⁸⁵

Muslims are faced with two things: Nusus as-Syariah (Syarī'ah texts) and Maqāsid as-Syarī'ah (purpose of Syarī'ah). Maqāsid as-Syariah is the goal behind Syarī'ah. That's why the relationship between Nusu Syariah and Maqāsid as-Syariah (goals of Syarī'ah) is a relationship of mutual need. Maqāsid as-Syariah requires Nusus As-Syariah, and Nusus As-Syariah requires Maqāsidus Syariah. The two cannot be separated in the leadership of the nation.

3.4 Fiqh al-Siyāsah in Islamic Discourses

According to Bernard Lewis, the political idea of citizenship is not recognized in Islam, and there are no corresponding terms in Arabic, Persian, or Turkish.¹⁸⁶ Al-Affandi challenged Lewis's perspective, stating that it is an incorrect claim despite the agreement of other Arab experts. He asserts that the term Muslim is synonymous with the term 'citizen'.¹⁸⁷ During the Abbasid era, Muslims were free to reside and seek employment in any territory under the rule of other Islamic caliphates. Notable individuals such as al-Syafī'ī, Ibn Khaldun, al-Ghazalī, Ibn Battuta, and numerous others resided in different locations and served under various governing authorities around the Islamic world. Every Muslim is considered a native of any Muslim country.¹⁸⁸

In the field of fiqh al-Siyāsah (fiqh of politics), in addition to these two concepts, other terminologies are recognized, including dār al-'ahd (consensus) and dār al-sulh (peace). Dār al-'ahd refers to a non-Muslim country committed to maintaining peace with an Islamic country. On the other hand, dār al-sulh is a country that ensures Muslims have the freedom to practice their religious teachings, but its legal framework does not explicitly adhere to Islamic law.¹⁸⁹

In the field of Islamic studies, the term "kafir" or "kufr" is frequently used to denote a state of disbelief or lack of faith. Contrary to popular belief, the term "kafir" in the Qur'an does not always signify the opposite of faith. The phrase "kafir" and its variations appear 525 times in a total of 73 letters out of 114, each having distinct intended meanings.¹⁹⁰ However, the commonly accepted interpretation of the term "kafir" is someone who rejects the teachings conveyed by the Prophet SAW, specifically

¹⁸⁴ al-Ghazali, *Al-Mustasfa Fi al-'Ilmi al-Ushul*.

¹⁸⁵ al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqat Fi Usul al-Ahkam*.

¹⁸⁶ Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (New York: Schocken Books, 1998).

¹⁸⁷ M.H. Kamali, "Citizenship: An Islamic Perspective," *Journal of Islamic Law and Culture* 11, no. 2 (May 2009): 126.

¹⁸⁸ Kamali. 125.

¹⁸⁹ Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *Al-Wajīz Fī Fiqh al-Imām al-Syāfī'ī*, vol. 2 (Beirut: Syirkah Dār al-Arḡam bin Abī al-Arḡam, 1997).

¹⁹⁰ Muhammad Fu'ād Abd al-Bāqī, *Al-Mu'jam al-Mufāhras Li Alfāz al-Qur'ān al-Karim* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1981). 605.

about their religion.¹⁹¹ The scholars are influenced by the concept of "kafir" in the context of creed when distinguishing between the Islamic State (dār al-Islam) and the kafir State (dār al-kuffar al-harb). This particular significance undeniably has implications for the standing of individuals throughout society.¹⁹²

In the study of fiqh siyasah, the status of citizens can be classified into four categories: (a) kafir harbī or kafir mu'hārib, referring to non-Muslims who are engaged in warfare and hostile towards Muslims; (b) kafir mu'āhad, referring to non-Muslims who have entered into an agreement with Muslims for a specific period; (c) kafir musta'man, referring to non-Muslims whom Muslims have granted security guarantees; and (d) kafir dhimmi, referring to non-Muslims who reside in an Islamic government and are required to pay an annual tax (jizyah).¹⁹³ Jizyah is a mandatory payment that specific non-Muslims (ahl al-dhimmah) must make as part of their agreement with the Islamic state. This contrasts with Muslims who make payments through zakat. Zakat is a form of taxation imposed on Muslims, contributing to the state's overall revenue. The income obtained through zakat cannot be substituted by alternative financial models throughout the Abu Bakr ra. Era, Muslims unwilling to contribute zakat were compelled to do so.¹⁹⁴

The distinction between the classical and modern notions of citizenship is inherently linked to the variations in the adopted political systems. During the era of conquest and expansion, the rulers were the factions or nations that emerged victorious in warfare. During that period, Islam held political power and implemented a theocratic system of governance. Consequently, there were only two categories of citizenship: Muslim and Żimmy.¹⁹⁵ In an Islamic state, citizenship is based on the requirement of having the same faith or the willingness to adhere to Islamic regulations. Individuals who identify as Muslim or desire to adhere to Islamic laws are considered citizens, irrespective of their skin colour, race, nationality, language, religion, or the ancestral background of their parents.

Otherwise, in a non-Muslim country (dār al-harb), residents are defined as individuals who do not follow Islam and do not acknowledge Islamic rules. Changes in individuals' status can arise due to alterations in established principles. If citizens renounce their faith, cease to acknowledge Islamic law, or reside for an extended period in the area of a non-believer, their status is transformed into that of a non-believer. Similarly, if a citizen from a non-Muslim nation embraces Islam and desires to reside in an Islamic country either through migration (hijrah) or if the entire area becomes an Islamic territory and acknowledges Islamic rules, then their status is altered to that of an Islamic citizen.¹⁹⁶

"Zimmah" refers to an agreement about the Hudaibiyah pact.¹⁹⁷ The arrangement is temporary rather than permanent, as the fuqahā' determines the status of non-Muslim residents in Islamic countries. The term "żimmy" refers to a permanent agreement that allows non-Muslims to reside in an Islamic state. This concept was explicitly established after the conquest of Makkah, also known as "Fath al-Makkah". It was supported by the passage regarding the jizyah (tax) revealed in the 9th year AH, following the conquest of Makkah. In literary interpretation, the terms "żimmah" and "jizyah" are analyzed separately within distinct contexts. The verse of żimmah was given in the context of transient agreements, but jizyah was revealed in the context of an enduring agreement for a non-Muslim residing in an Islamic state. The hadiths that include the term "żimmy" merely serve as an adjective rather than

¹⁹¹ Fahmi Huwaidy, *Al-Muwatthinūn Lā Dzimmīyyūn* (Kairo: Dār as-Syuruq, 1968).

¹⁹² Staquf, "*Tajdid Al-Fiqh Al-Islami Wa l'adat Taqfir Al-Ummah Al-Islamiyah*," in *Tsaquf Al-Akhyar Al-Nahdliyah Fi Muallafati Al-Ulama Al-Indunisiyah*.

¹⁹³ Al-Ghazali, *Al-Wajīz Fī Fiqh al-Imām al-Syāfi'ī*.

¹⁹⁴ al-Zuhailī, *Al-Fiqh al-Islāmī Wa Adillatuhu*.

¹⁹⁵ Abdul Qadir Awdah, *Al-Tasyrī' al-Jināi Fī al-Islām*, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Kātib al-'Arabī, t.t.). 307.

¹⁹⁶ Awdah. 308.

¹⁹⁷ Fahmi Huwaidy, *Al-Muwatthinūn Lā Dzimmīyyūn* (Kairo: Dār as-Syuruq, 1968). 110.

providing a precise definition as indicated by fuqahā'.¹⁹⁸ The term "ẓimmaḥ" was employed by Arabs before the advent of Islam to denote the act of providing safety to neighbouring guests. Arabs refer to a neighbourly pact (ʿaql al jiwār) or an agreement (ad-ẓimmaḥ). Visitors who visit the tribal habitat will be granted protection, just like the tribe's own members.

The purpose of fiqh is the establishment of equitable treatment and fairness among society. 'Alī bin Abi Tālib once stated that justice is essential for the stability of the world, power, and state, regardless of the presence of disbelief. Conversely, the absence of justice can lead to the destruction of a country, even in the presence of Muslims. Ibn Taymiyya also asserted that God would build a righteous government, regardless of whether non-believers lead it, and that God would dismantle an unjust government, even if Muslims lead it. Every fiqh product that fails to generate societal justice within this conceptual framework should be discarded. Take, for instance, the concept of "fiqh of politics" (fiqh siyāsah), which frequently exhibits contradictions with the principles of democracy that necessitate fairness and equal human rights under the legal system. The standard fiqh siyasah formula categorizes non-Muslim populations as "second class" rather than as equal beings to Muslims. These perspectives must transform. This perspective contradicts the principles of modern democracy and the concept of a nation-state like Indonesia. The primary criteria for selection should be professionalism, competence, and capability rather than considering whether someone is Muslim or not or whether they are male or female.¹⁹⁹

The development of fiqh kebangsaan (fiqh al-muwāṭānah) is intricately linked to the discourse among Muslim scholars regarding the interplay between Religion and governance, which is deeply entrenched in the concepts of umma, caliphate, and Syarī'a. Islamic groups who adhere to the oneness of Islamic Religion and politics (al-Islām dīn wa daulah) believe these three principles are indivisible and form a comprehensive unity. According to their statement, Islam does not acknowledge the division between Religion and politics. Islam also does not differentiate between the public and private spheres, which include the state and religious community (ummah), as well as the political authority (khalīfah) and religious authority (syarī'ah).²⁰⁰

The discussion on the structure of the State in Indonesia prior to independence may be traced back to the establishment of the Islamic Association/Sarekat Islam (SI) in 1911. SI is regarded as a direct expression of Islamic nationalism. SI is a platform dedicated to fostering the solidarity of Muslims in Indonesia. It is essential to acknowledge that SI's interpretation of Islamic Nationalism is a component of Islamic internationalism due to its continued influence from the Pan-Islamist movement.²⁰¹

The vocabulary used in fiqh al-muwāṭānah is characteristic of Indonesian fiqh. This fiqh is the outcome of the intellectual effort made by Indonesian academics to adapt Islam to the specific characteristics of their pluralistic society. This fiqh al-muwāṭānah can be considered as a component of the discourse on fiqh al-siyasah (fiqh of politics), as its focus is similar to the topics covered in fiqh al-siyasah, such as the structure of the State, the selection of a leader (imāmah), and other related matters. Ibn Khaldun, also known as Abu Zayd' Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Khaldun al-Hadrami (1332-1406 AD), offered his perspective on the concept of the State. According to Ibn Khaldun, humanity

¹⁹⁸ Huwaidy. 110.

¹⁹⁹ Tim Penyusun, Ed. *Ahkamul Fuqaha Solusi Problematika Aktual Hukum IslamvKeputusan Mukhtamar, Munas Dan Konbes Nahdlatul Ulama (1926-1999 M.)*. xii.

²⁰⁰ A. Salim, *Challenging The Secular State: The Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia* (Hawai'i: University of Hawai'i Press, 2008). 17.

²⁰¹ Michael Buehler, "The Politics of Shari'a Law: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratising Indonesia.," *Cambridge University Press*, 2016.

inherently establishes a civilization or community. In addition, the presence of a society inherently necessitates a leader (ruler) to govern their affairs.²⁰² Religion in isolation is insufficient; it requires the same sense of cohesion and solidarity, known as "aṣābiyyah."²⁰³

Abu al-Hasan Ali Ibn Muhammad Ibn Habib al-Mawardi (972 448H/1058) argued that leadership (imāmah) holds great significance within the framework of shara' command rather than being determined by rationality. In Al-Mawardi's opinion, the requirement to establish the imamate (imāmah) is rooted in the consensus (ijmā') of academics, as seen in the historical development of the institution of al-khulafa' al-ra'shidun during the time of the companions. In al-Mawardi point of view, the imamate serves the purpose of safeguarding and governing the world, as it is an intrinsic aspect of nubuwwah (prophethood). The imamate is considered a religious requirement when scholars agree upon it (ijmā').²⁰⁴

According to Al-Ghazālī, it is the responsibility of the Sultan to safeguard global stability. Religious order necessitates a world order. Adhering to a religious order is necessary for achieving success in the afterlife. The true aim of the Apostles is as follows. The duty of an imam is a religious requirement that cannot be avoided or abandoned. Religion serves as the foundation, and the Sultan assumes the role of its protector.²⁰⁵ From this point of view, it becomes clear that the aspirations of Religion to bring about human happiness can only be effectively achieved when the State is actively involved in human affairs. Al-Ghazali compares the connection between the State and Religion to that of a structure. Religion is the fundamental basis, while the State provides the necessary backing. Both al-Ghazali and al-Mawardi believed that imamate is a religious duty. Nevertheless, divergent perspectives exist regarding the foundation of the evidence employed as arguments. Al-Mawardi relied on the consensus (ijmā') of scholars.²⁰⁶ However, al-Ghazali asserted that imamate is a religious duty that is not grounded in conclusive evidence (qatī) but rather because the objective of Syarī'a (Islamic law) with a rational approach is to uphold order in the implementation of religion (niḡām al-dīn).²⁰⁷

3.5 Modern Context

The notion of a new world order was introduced by George W. Bush in 1992, following significant events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 8, 1989, which marked the separation between West and East Germany. Additionally, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which began with Mikhail Gorbachev's restructuring in 1981 and reached its peak in 1991, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, and the breakup of the Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia in 1991 with the liberation of Slovenia and Croatia, all contributed to the idea of a new world order.²⁰⁸ Even before the emergence of the nation-state, Islamic political civilization defined a model of leadership and areas of influence based on the delegation of authority to parties responsible for governing and coordinating all aspects of social life.²⁰⁹

²⁰² Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*. 91.

²⁰³ Ibn Khaldun. 92.

²⁰⁴ Abu al-Hasan Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi, *Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkām al-Sulṡāniyyah (Mesir: Maktabah Mustafa al-Baby al-Halaby, 1973)*, 3 (Mesir: Maktabah Mustafa al-Baby al-Halaby, 1973). 3.

²⁰⁵ Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *Al-Iqtisād Fī al-I'tiqād* (Mesir: Maktabah al-Jund, 1972). 199.

²⁰⁶ al-Mawardi, *Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkām al-Sulṡāniyyah (Mesir: Maktabah Mustafa al-Baby al-Halaby, 1973)*, 3.

²⁰⁷ Al-Ghazali, *Al-Iqtisād Fī al-I'tiqād*.

²⁰⁸ Alasdair Spark, "Conjuring Order: The New World Order and Conspiracy Theories of Globalization'," in *The Sociological Review*, 2000. 14.

²⁰⁹ M. Castells, *The Power of Identity*. (United Kingdom: Wiley Blackwell, 2010). 16.

Since the end of World War II, global society has entered an unavoidable modern reality. Furthermore, Islamic scientific reasoning was influenced by Western hegemony over the ideal concept of modernity in understanding the actuality of the new civilization. One aspect of conservative reasoning, which is highly sacred to religion, neglects the dynamic reality of human existence. On the other hand, contemporary civilization is trapped in Western hegemony because it has lost its Islamic identity, which has been captured in classical treasures.

According to Samuel P. Huntington, the contemporary world no longer suffers ideological or economic challenges. The conclusion of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union marked the conclusion of this ideological conflict. Currently, the world is engaged in a civilizational conflict without awareness.²¹⁰ The clash of civilizations is distinct from previous conflicts, which united two significant powers. A response to the Western civilization's domination and hegemony is the battle of civilizations. In this conflict, world civilization struggled against hegemony and established modern civilization without becoming involved in Western co-optation.

In addition, based on a humanistic interpretation of Islam, Fiqh Peradaban can directly align with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) discourse, highlighting universally shared human identities and values.²¹¹ Given its goal of benefiting all of humanity regardless of religious beliefs, the Fiqh Peradaban is very suitable and realistically applicable to global development initiatives, such as the 2030 Agenda. The Fiqh Peradaban movement has openly endorsed the UN Charter²¹² and promoted the principles of world peace and human equality. The concept of the fiqh peradaban is intriguing since it establishes a connection between local and global development paradigms and incorporates both bottom-up and top-down perspectives and techniques. This concept establishes a connection between Islamic and secular-humanist ways of understanding knowledge, values, ethics, and their respective goals. In my opinion, the fiqh peradaban serves as a development paradigm that occupies a medium ground between the local development discourse, specifically Indonesian Islam, and the global discourse represented by the 2030 UN Agenda.

Since the Declaration of Human Rights, the global state structure has undergone substantial transformations in the modern era. The act of conquest or expansion has been widely condemned in the world. It impacted the citizenship status of an individual within the nation. Citizenship is now independent of ethnicity, race, and religion. An individual will acquire legal citizenship status upon being officially recognized by a government as a citizen.²¹³

Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Pakistan are examples of countries where there are attempts to merge Religion and State. The Wahhabism doctrine has exerted significant influence and become firmly ingrained in both the culture and the constitution of Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabism concept emphasizes the mandatory nature of loyalty to the ruler, especially in cases where the ruler is tyrannical. It encourages people to exercise patience in dealing with oppressive rulers and condemns armed resistance against them. The wilayah al-faqih theory in Iran mandates that the religious elite must be significantly involved in the country's governance. Khomeini asserted that the 'ulamā' served not just as counsellors but also as active wielders of power. In Pakistan, President Zia al-Haq issued a decree called the Ordinance on Enforcement of Islamic Law on June 15, 1988. This decree granted authority to the 'ulamā' to supervise the official implementation of Syarī'ah in the country and to determine whether

²¹⁰ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

²¹¹ "United Nations. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. N," 2015.

²¹² *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice*. (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945).

²¹³ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

any laws conflicted with Syarī'ah principles. Nevertheless, the decree failed to take effect as it had yet to receive official ratification before Zia's demise on August 17, 1988, resulting from a plane crash.²¹⁴

Pluralism challenges a multi-religious environment. Many Islamic, Christian, Hindu, and other traditional African and Asian religions have diverse perspectives. The ever-increasing number of immigrants from underdeveloped countries adds to the diversity of communities in America and Europe.²¹⁵ Milko Youroukov calls this unique capacity to engage in debate a "dialogical stance." He speaks of dialogical attitudes, including "exclusivism," "inclusivism," "parallelism," and "pluralism."²¹⁶ It relies on Panikkar's characterization of the various strategies that people express in communication praxis.²¹⁷ These four dialogues show how irreconcilable fundamentalism is with interreligious communication. The first approach is the exclusivist approach, which follows the principles of their faith since the texts expound them. Based on the "exclusive language of God" found in scripture, exclusivists reject anything different from what they say. Exclusivists label other religions as "evil" or at least as deviant because they exclude any alternative path of redemption that differs from their approach. Permanent multiplication of rational and theories.²¹⁸ Pluralism, a contemporary catchphrase, consists of the "diversity of cultures, belief systems and values" promoted by human expression and the dread of irreconcilable confrontation. Dehumanizing the "other" instead of allowing different points of view was a daily habit until recently.

According to religious plurality, mutual ignorance and misinterpretation produce all difficulties.²¹⁹ The postmodern and postcolonial worlds almost define themselves by this mentality. Most academics nowadays agree that religious diversity is a reality of our time.²²⁰ It seeks appropriate knowledge and search for shared interests of harmony and cooperation among the adherents of several religious traditions. Pluralism is the existence of several religions at one time and place. Every religion has numerous traditions, more or less; according to the thesis of religious plurality, great global religions' views, ideas, and reactions toward the one ultimate unfathomable divine reality differ.²²¹

Islamic political ideology primarily concerns the position of individuals within this structure. This concept is predicated on the premise that there is a perpetual state of conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, with one group exerting dominance and subjugation over the other. Furthermore, individuals who renounce Islam (apostasy/murtad) are likewise subjected to capital punishment.²²² Political Islam has traditionally been perceived as the dominant force that exercises authority and influence over all entities external to it. Non-Muslims classified as infidels are considered subordinate citizens whose rights and responsibilities differ from those of Muslims in various ways.

²¹⁴ Salim. 27-31.

²¹⁵ Ninian Smart, *The World Religions* (Cambridge: University Press, 1992). 10.

²¹⁶ M. Youroukov, "Dialogue between Religious Traditions as a Barrier against Cases of Extreme Religious Fundamentalism," in *Plamen Makariev (Ed.), Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue* (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001), 65.

²¹⁷ Raimon Panikkar, *The Intra-Religious Dialogue* (New York: N.Y. Paulist Press, n.d.). xiv.

²¹⁸ Michael S. Merry, "Islam versus (Liberal) Pluralism? A Response to Ahmad Yousaf," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24:1 (2004): 124–26.

²¹⁹ Raimon Panikkar, "The Invisible Harmony: Universal Theory of Religion or a Cosmic Confidence in Reality," in *Leonard Swidler (Ed.), Towards a Universal Theology of Religions* (New York: Orbis Books, 1988), 125.

²²⁰ Carl W. Ernest, *Rethinking Islam in the Contemporary World* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004). 44.

²²¹ See Ninian Smart, *Concept and Empathy* (London: Macmillan, 1986). 216.

²²² D. Sumardi, "'Transition of Civil Law to Public Law: Integration of Modern Punishment Theory in Criminal Apostasy'," *Journal Ahkam* 22, no. 1 (2022): 237–59.

The issue of inequality within citizenship is not exclusive to Islam. It also transpired in the historical context of Western nations. During the medieval era in Europe, national citizenship was diminished mainly due to the feudal society's rights and obligations framework. During the later stages of the Middle Ages, the acquisition of citizenship in different Italian and German cities transformed into a means for merchants and privileged individuals to assert their authority. The notion of contemporary citizenship transformed in the 18th century due to the American and French Revolutions. The notion of citizenship entailed the possession of specific freedoms to confront the authoritative authority of absolute kings. In England, "citizenship" pertains to being a royal family member inside a specific district or city.²²³ The matter of citizenship is constantly evolving. The notion of citizenship underwent a significant development with the establishment of civil, political, and social rights, as outlined in the International Convention of 1966.

3.6 New Islamic Civilization

Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, the matter of citizens' status and rights has been extensively discussed among Islamic political thinkers. Abdullah Saeed classifies the connection model between an Islamic state and the rights of citizens into four categories: traditionalists, neo-revivalists (Islamists), modernists, and secularists.²²⁴ Traditionalists, as advocated by conservative scholars, define an Islamic state as one where the legal system of the state enforces Islamic law as formulated by Islamic jurists. Non-Muslims residing in Islamic nations are safeguarded as minority groups or *zimmī*. Some academics mandate that *zimmī* individuals must pay *jizyah*, a sort of tax, to compensate for protection.²²⁵ In this scenario, if the non-Muslim minorities fail to pay the *jizyah*, the Muslim authorities are not obligated to provide them with protection. Nevertheless, several academics contend that within the contemporary nation-state framework, non-Muslims are not considered "conquered" individuals or collectives. According to this viewpoint, it is recommended to regard them as *mu'āhid*, individuals who have committed to peacefully submitting to an Islamic state.

Neo-revival groups assert that the Qur'an and Sunnah are fundamental principles for structuring Muslim society. It is seen in the activities of Ikhwanul Muslimin and Jemaat Islamiyah. Their conviction is firm that the foundation of the Islamic community's existence should be rooted in the principles of *Syarī'ah*. Nevertheless, they possess their interpretation of *Syarī'ah* principles that diverge from traditionalist factions. Contemporary types of scripturalism mainly influence them. They exhibit greater flexibility towards individuals who are not of the Muslim faith while providing Muslim residents with a higher level of dignity. Abu A'la al-Maududi, the originator of Jemaat Islamiyah, categorizes individuals into two groups: Muslims and non-Muslims. Non-Muslims are categorized into three distinct groups about this matter:

1. Non-Muslims who willingly acknowledge the dominance of the Islamic State and are obligated by formal agreements.
2. Individuals who did not practice the Islamic faith and were vanquished in battle by the Islamic State had their lands incorporated into the dominion of Islamic leaders. As evidence of their surrender, they were required to pay *jizyah*, a tax form.

²²³ Gianluca. P. Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation State* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009). 21-2.

²²⁴ A. Saeed, "Rethinking Citizenship Rights of Non-Muslim in an Islamic State: Rashid al-Ghannushi's Contribution to the Evolving Debate," *Journal Islam and Christian-Muslim Relation* 3 (1999): 208–9.

²²⁵ Parolin, *Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation State*.

3. Non-Muslims in the Islamic State are guaranteed protection of their rights as human beings.²²⁶

In addition to the notion above, other alterations in the political landscape have necessitated Islam to make significant adaptations, including re-evaluating the Islamic stance on citizenship. According to Gus Yahya's explanations, the modifications encompass:

1. Shifts in the global political structure, particularly following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a new global arrangement. Historically, nearly every nation or realm has a distinct religious affiliation. Hence, individuals residing in regions governed by a specific state or kingdom are characterized by their religious beliefs. Currently, there is a significant realignment of religious beliefs and practices. While some countries still maintain a religious basis, most nations worldwide have relinquished their religious affiliation in favour of a national identity. Historically, a lack of well-defined boundary regulations between countries resulted in ongoing military interactions shaping the ties between nations. Even neighbouring countries often find themselves engaged in a continuous conflict along their shared borders due to the extent of their military capabilities. Presently, due to the presence of a global system, specifically the United Nations, the integrity of national borders is significantly enhanced, ensuring the preservation of each country's sovereignty. It implies that while regional conflicts cannot be eradicated, the global governance environment has become more stable.
2. Shifts in population characteristics and principles of nationality. Migration is a significant feature of the contemporary world. Migration occurs due to people's ambitions, and economic connections facilitate the movement of individuals across international boundaries. In this case, the population composition in different regions becomes quite diverse. The notable expansion of Muslim communities in regions previously inhabited solely by non-Muslim populations, such as Europe, America, and other locations, is a direct consequence of the migration process. Furthermore, this also has broader ramifications for citizenship in these evolving regions. In previous times, each country or kingdom was assigned a citizenship status based on the religious identity of its residents, as religious identification was a standard criterion. The ruler's religious supremacy served as the foundation for evaluating this status. Individuals who choose a faith that differs from the official state religion can face persecution or are relegated to a subordinate position in society. Currently, the state demonstrates acceptance of the various religious identities of its residents by allowing religious freedom.
3. Alterations in the standard of norms. The practices of disregarding certain human rights that were once accepted in the past, such as slavery, colonization, persecution, and discrimination against minorities, are now universally recognized as crimes under the civil norms established by the international community through the United Nations. The international community has established a framework to facilitate reciprocal rectification among countries that engage in behaviours that contravene the agreed-upon fundamental values.
4. Globalization, propelled by economic interconnections and technological advancements, has diminished the significance of physical boundaries, such as geographical and political limits, in shaping social dynamics. Technological advancements have significantly reduced the physical gaps between locations. Every occurrence, regardless of its location, can initiate a sequence of worldwide ramifications. In contemporary society, the global community has transformed into a unified civilization resembling a vast interconnected village. It is impossible to isolate any region. For instance, if an Islamic nation engages in discriminatory practices against non-Muslims based on traditional fiqh norms, there will be swift protests from non-

²²⁶ I. Ahmed, *The Concept of an Islamic State* (London: Frances Printer Publisher, 1987). 101-2.

Muslim populations worldwide. The chain reaction may result in a global battle that would inevitably lead to the total collapse of civilization.²²⁷

3.7 The Possibility of New Ijtihād in Islamic Law

Scholars have extensively examined the history of Islamic law and jurisprudence in the twentieth century. Their primary focus has been determining the specific time, if any when the "gate of ijtihad" was closed. Although Orientalists have debated the specific details of the chronology of this event, there has been a general agreement, until recently, that this closure did happen. In 1984, Wael Hallaq presented a significant counterargument to this perspective. His article showcased the ongoing use of different types of ijtihad throughout Islamic history. It highlighted its importance in the evolution of theoretical jurisprudence and positive law.²²⁸ Subsequently, numerous works have been dedicated to the topic, contributing to our enhanced comprehension of the ijtihad or taqlid discussions in Islamic history. A key observation that emerges from this collection of research is the significance of differentiating between definitions and interpretations of both ijtihad and taqlid as employed by different authors in different periods and circumstances.

Throughout its recorded history, Muslim education in Southeast Asia primarily emphasized the study of Islamic law or fiqh.²²⁹ Within the traditional setting of the pesantren and kindred institutions in Southeast Asia, this study primarily focused on branch rulings (furu') about specific concerns rather than the sources of law and the methodological principles of jurisprudence (usūl fiqh). Within this context, most scholars and jurists limited their decisions to the regionally recognized Syāfi'ī maḏhab guidelines. However, there is evidence indicating that 'ulamā' from Southeast Asia has been investigating the study of usūl fiqh. Individuals engage in usūl fiqh and practice different forms of ijtihād independently. For example, the Javanese scholar Mahfuz al-Termasi (d. 1919) authored a three-volume publication on usul to enhance his extensive writings on ḥadīth studies.²³⁰ Despite these factors, al-Termasi did not align with modernist reformers. Instead, he strongly identified with traditionalism, characterized by a cultural and intellectual framework where scholars educated and immersed in the pesantren milieu hold exclusive expertise in technical discussions of Islamic law and other Islamic religious sciences.

In the early years of the twentieth century, a new and more inclusive interest in the study of Islamic law and the practice of independent legal reasoning evolved due to the modernizing processes. During this period, Muslim reformers strongly criticized conventional interpretations of Islam and the established rituals that upheld the authority of religious scholars, known as 'ulamā'. One such practice was the certification (ijāza), which played a significant role in traditional Muslim education.²³¹

In contemporary Western political theory and political Islam, citizenship is among the most significant topics in political science. While Muslim nations generally have embraced the modern definition of citizenship grounded on human rights criteria, Islamic political theory has not shown any notable development. Muslims and non-Muslims' positions are still regarded as separating between

²²⁷ Y.C. Staquf, *PBNU: Perjuangan Besar Nahdlatul Ulama* (Rembang: Mata Air, 2020), 14-49.

²²⁸ Wael b. Hallaq, "Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?" *IJMES* 16 (1984): 3-41.

²²⁹ See George Makdisi, "Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh Century Baghdad," *BSOAS* 24 (1961): 1-56; and "Law and Traditionalism in the Institutions of Learning of Medieval Islam," in *Theology and Law in Islam*, Ed. G. E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), 75-88.

²³⁰ See Abd Rahman, "The Pesantren Architects and Their Socio-Religious Teachings, 1850-1950" (University of California: Los Angeles dissertation, 1997). 141-65.

²³¹ Martin Van Bruinessen, "Kitab Kuning: Books in Arabic Script Used in the Pesantren Milieu," *BKI* 146, 1990, 250.

different communal groups. This medieval political framework supposes the existence of authority depending on religion. This perspective arranged people according to their faith. The idea above underlines Islam's political perspective, which divides the state into two groups: *dār al-Islām* (Islamic state) and *dār al-kufr* (infidel state), so characterized as the arena of conflict (*dār al-harb*).²³² Most Muslims live in the political territory known as *Dār al-Islām*, where Islamic law forms the foundation of its governance. Usually, the residents of this area refer to their community as the *ummah*. As long as non-Muslims are ready to pay *jizya* (taxes) to Muslim leaders, this kind of state is supposed to offer protection and safety to them. Known as *dhimmi*, they are small non-Muslim groups safeguarded and free to follow their faith.²³³ Still, the idea of *dār al-Islām* has evolved and is seen differently. Although it does not implement Islamic law or even is under control by non-Muslims, a nation populated by most Muslims is also known as *dār al-Islām* if Muslims are allowed to exercise their faith and beliefs.

In classical Political Islam, any territory outside *dār al-Islām* is regarded as *dār al-kufr*. It refers to a state that is not under the political power of Muslims and is not governed by Islamic law. If a country displays hostility against Muslims, it will be classified as *dār al-ḥarb*, which means it is allowed to launch an assault against it. Therefore, in regions classified as war zones, the principles and regulations of warfare are enforced. In addition to the two regions, another category is *dār al-‘ahd* (the treaty area) or *dār al-sulḥ* (the peaceful area).²³⁴ Non-Muslim individuals will receive protection if they enter into a specific agreement with a Muslim king. Non-Muslims who have entered into a contractual relationship with the Muslim king are considered *musta'mīn*, meaning that their protection and security are ensured.

Thus, as Muslim and non-Muslim relations transformed in the early 20th century, the notion of citizenship became difficult. For Muslims residing in Western countries, where the bulk of the population is non-Muslim, this situation poses an even more significant challenge. According to Thaha Jabir al-Alwani, the leader of the Fiqh Council of North America, western countries that are governed by non-Muslims should not be considered *dār al-ḥarb*. If they were, Muslims would be obligated to emigrate. In the al-Alwani point of view, *dār al-Islām* is a nation where Muslims can fulfil their religious obligations. According to al-Alwani, the United States could be seen as *dār al-Islām* from this perspective. Therefore, Muslims have no justification for harbouring hostility against their country. It is imperative for Muslims residing in the United States to refrain from harbouring any animosity towards their own country, let alone viewing it as *dār al-ḥarb*, a territory of war that should be targeted in the name of *jihād*.²³⁵ Similarly, Muslim immigrants residing in Europe have the challenge of not being able to fully assimilate into European society due to the absence of Islamic law. Consequently, they experience a sense of incompleteness in their Muslim identity as they are unable to practice specific components of Islamic law actively.²³⁶

3.8 NU's Standing Point on Modern Issues

²³² Abd Al-Qādir Awdah, *al-Tasyrī al-Jinā'ī al-Islāmī Muqāranān Bi al-Qānūn al-Wadl'ī*, 1, (Beirut: Muasasah al-Risālah, 1992), 275.

²³³ F.L. Ramaioli, *Islamic State as a Legal Order* (London and New York: Routledge and Francis Group, 2022). 79-83.

²³⁴ J.D. McAuliffe, "Encyclopedia of the Qur'an: Community and Society in the Qur'an," *Leiden: Brill* 1, (2001): 367–85.

²³⁵ Shammai Fishman, *Fiqh Al-Aqalliyat: A Legal Theory for Muslim Minorities* (Washington DC: Hudson Institute, 2006). 5.

²³⁶ Khamami Zada and Nurul Irfan, "Negotiating Sharia in The Secular State: A Case Study in France and Germany," *Samarah Journal* 5, no. 1 (2021): 47–60.

Nahdlatul Ulama tries to respond to the tension between the classical fiqh tradition and contemporary issues with the idea of fiqh peradaban. In the nahdliyin (NU followers) tradition, the thinking methodology used in dealing with tensions like this is a moderation approach, which in this case has a double meaning: on the one hand, not leaving Islamic boarding school (pesantren) or classical epistemology behind, on the other hand, not radically deconstructing it.²³⁷ On the other hand, it does not let go of modern scientific epistemology or deconstruct Islamic boarding school epistemology. On the other hand, it does not allow it to be unrelated to Islamic boarding school or the epistemology of pesantren.

Unfortunately, the topics and discussions brought up at the NU Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban event, mainly were focused on Siyāsah (political) matters, with a tendency to oversimplify and exaggerate them. The provided discussion closely relates to the topic of Fiqh al-Siyāsah (fiqh of politics) in different situations and perspectives, such as the interplay between religion and the state, the dynamics between Muslims of different beliefs, the governance of Islamic states and nation-states, among others, despite the intricate elements of civilization inside the social structure. According to Huntington, civilization is a cohesive cultural entity. This cultural cohesion is established at various levels, from the local to the global, encompassing geographical surroundings, ethnic background, national identity, and religious beliefs.²³⁸

In my interview with KH. Afifuddin Muhajir (Kiai Afif) regarding arguments on the fiqh peradaban (interview with Kiai Afif on 27 March 2024). Kiai Afif said that Fiqh al-Siyāsah is part of fiqh al-Mu‘āmalah. Fiqh al-Mu‘āmalah has different principles from fiqh al-‘ibādah. One of the principles of Fiqh al-Mu‘āmalah is that it is built for the benefit of the people (binaūhu 'ala al-'ilal wa al-maṣālih). Moreover, Fiqh al-Mu‘āmalah is loose, meaning it is permissible (mubāh) as long as no arguments prohibit it. “So, if you are asked about Fiqh al-Mu‘āmalah, you do not need to look for arguments that allow it; it is enough to find no arguments against it”, Kiai Afif said. The legal origin of Fiqh al-Mu‘āmalah is that it is permissible (al-aslu fī al-mu‘āmalah al-ibāhah).

As part of al-Mu'amalah fiqh, according to K.H. Afifuddin Muhajir, "illah (legal reasons) and maṣlahah (benefits) are the basis of one of the principles of fiqh siyasah. Apart from that, K.H. Afifuddin considers muamalah issues to be relatively free until there is evidence that prevents it. From the point of view of fiqh rules, political issues are relatively free. It means that its applicability or validity does not only depend on the availability of textual texts (legal propositions originating from the Qur'an and hadith) but more than that, in the context of siyasah fiqh al-siyāsah prohibitive Syarī'a legal rules can be eliminated and used as a basis for laws. In this case, concessions can be granted based on at least two reasons. First, fiqh as-siyasah can follow the legal principles of fiqh al-mu‘āmalah because it is part of it. Second, politics is not intended as an end goal but as a means to achieve public benefit (interview with Kiai Afif on 27 March 2024).

Fiqh Peradaban prioritizes the promotion of humanist Islam, also known as Islamic humanism, rather than focusing on religion. Kiai Ulil Abshar Abdalla (Gus Ulil) highlighted that NU would communicate the central message of Fiqh Peradaban to the world during the upcoming international conference on Fiqh Peradaban (interview with Gus Ulil on 30 May 2024). The Fiqh Peradaban is a reevaluation, enlargement, and adjustment of the original notions of moderate Islamic Nusantara to enhance Islam's ability to enhance the overall well-being of everyone worldwide. Therefore, it possesses innovative concepts and the capacity to communicate proficiently about sustainable development, mainly because it relies on the methodologies of efficient Islamic legal reasoning and the expression of

²³⁷ Staquf, Y.C., (*Perjuangan Besar Nahdlatul Ulama*. Rembang, Mata Air, 2022.), 58.

²³⁸ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

Islamic law. The Fiqh Peradaban is a hybrid approach between local and global development paradigms. This is due to integrating Islamic principles with secular objectives and humanist values.

Three kinds of legal reasoning are employed in the Bahşul Maşāil NU forum: Qaulī, Ilhāqī, and Manhajī. In addition, two paradigms are utilized: the Bayānī and Burhānī paradigms.²³⁹ These paradigms rely on textual analysis, logical reasoning, and empirical observations. NU reached a new conclusion on Bahşul Maşāil ad-dīniyyah al-maudū'iyah (thematic) during the 33rd Congress in Jombang. The judgment is stated in the 33rd Nahdlatul 'ulamā' Congress judgment Number: 006/MNU-33/VII/2015 regarding Bahşul Maşāil ad-dīniyyah al-maudū'iyah of Nahdlatul 'ulamā'.²⁴⁰

Gus Ulil said that Islam cannot be separated from the development of science. Islamic law needs to adapt constantly to the developments of time. It is one of the essential foundations in the fiqh peradaban campaigned by Nahdlatul 'ulamā' (interview with Gus Ulil on 30 May 2024). The Bahtsul Maşāil ad-dīniyyah al-maudū'iyah (LBM PBNU) during the Banjar National Conference in West Java from 27th February to 1st March 2019 discussed points: state, citizenship, and state law. The decision was made to refrain from labelling non-Muslims as infidels (kāfir), instead referring to them as citizens (muwaṭinūn).²⁴¹ The legal istinbāṭ methodology is not limited to classical fiqh literature ('ulūm ad-dīn) but also incorporates approaches from other disciplines. It aligns with the practices of classical scholars who frequently incorporate other disciplines beyond fiqh to ascertain the legal status of certain issues. For instance, the field of astronomy is used to calculate the beginning of Ramadān and Syawwal, while ikhtilāf al-maṭla' (the difference in time of appearance of the moon, stars, or sun) refers to the differences in determining these dates. Ma'rifat al-qiblah and ma'rifat al-waḳti are concerned with knowing the direction of prayer and the accurate timing of prayer.²⁴²

The intersubjective method was evident in the formulation of choices made by Bahşul Maşāil Maudhu'iyah Munas and the NU Consul, which took place from 27th February to 1st March 2019 in Banjar, West Java. The classification of infidel in classical fiqh has been effectively discussed in social sciences about humanity, equality, and justice. The study of NU's Bahşul Maşāil involves analyzing the idioms of zimmy infidel, harbi infidel, musta'man infidel, and mu'ahad infidel, which are terms from classical fiqh vocabulary that the Islamic State has influenced in a prejudiced manner. They are non-believers who have entered into peace agreements with Muslims. If individuals are considered citizens of dār al-Islam, they hold a second-class status and must pay jizyah. Jizyah is a symbolic representation of submission that must be demonstrated in a way that clearly shows subordination. Al-Ghazālī explains that the surrender of the jizyah should demonstrate ihānah, which means being lowly, submissive, or subordinate. Zimmy willingly submits and bows his head when paying the jizyah. The recipient forcefully grasped his facial hair and struck his mandible. Furthermore, it is obligatory.²⁴³

²³⁹ Hasil-Hasil Muktamar Ke-33 Tahun 2015 Di Jombang, Cetakan II (Jakarta: Lembaga Ta'lif Wa an-Nasyr PBNU, 2016), 150, II (Jakarta: Ta'lif wa an-Nasyr PBNU, 2016).

²⁴⁰ Hasil-Hasil Muktamar Ke-33 Tahun 2015 Di Jombang, 150.

²⁴¹ "Kompas News, 'NU Usul Non-Muslim di Indonesia Tak Disebut Kafir', Published 01 Maret 2019," accessed June 17, 2024, <https://regional.kompas.com/read/2019/03/01/12404031/nu-usul-non-muslim-diindonesia-tak-disebut-kafir?page=all>.

²⁴² Tim Penyusun, Ed. Ahkamul Fuqaha Solusi Problematika Aktual Hukum IslamvKeputusan Muktamar, Munas Dan Konbes Nahdlatul Ulama (1926-1999 M.). (Surabaya: Lajnah Ta'lim wa an-Nasyr (LTM) NU Jawa Timut, 2005). xv.

²⁴³ Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, *Al-Wajīz Fī Fiqh al-Imām al-Syāfi'ī*, vol. 2 (Beirūt: Syirkah Dār al-Arḳam bin Abī al-Arḳam, 1997). 200.

During the NU Congress in 1936 in Banjarmasin, NU officially declared that the Java region (Nusantara), under Dutch East Indies' rule, was considered Dār al-Islam.²⁴⁴ According to KH. Ahmad Shiddiq, the term dār al-Islam that emerged from Congress, is primarily religious rather than political. Dār al-Islam is a geographical area where Islamic principles and practices are prevalent. The concept of dār al-Islām necessitates the active participation of Muslims in upholding public order, preventing theft, and similar responsibilities.²⁴⁵ The explanation provided in the study of fiqh siyāsah differs from the previous explanation. In this context, the term dār al-Islām encompasses three conditions: 1) a country where Islamic law is the governing law and Muslims hold political power, regardless of whether the population is Muslim or non-Muslim; 2) a country where the majority of the population is Muslim, but non-Muslims hold political power; 3) a country or government that allows Muslims to freely practice their religion, even if Muslims are a minority and do not hold political power. Dār al-Islam is the antithesis of dār al-Harb, which can be understood in two ways: (1) a nation lacking Islamic authority, and (2) a political entity where there is no Muslim populace, their rights are not safeguarded, and they are deprived of the liberty to observe their religious doctrines.²⁴⁶

The subsequent inquiry emerges regarding countries not encompassed within the realm of dār al-Islām, such as Indonesia. Indonesia is considered to be in the category of dār al-sulh rather than dār al-Islam, according to the perspective of NU. It means that the legal system in Indonesia does not strictly adhere to the formalization of Islamic law. KH. Mahbub Muafi argued that employing the classifications of kafir harby, kafir mu'ahad, kafir musta'man, and kafir dhimmi is unsuitable. The concept of Kafir mu'ahad is not applicable in the context of Indonesia, as Indonesia is a nation that was established by all its citizens, encompassing both Muslims and non-Muslims.²⁴⁷

Thus, the position of the Republic of Indonesia differs when dār al-sulh is available, similar to dār al-Islam. NU believes all individuals, regardless of their religious affiliation, are considered equal under the law. This perspective aligns with the provision stated in Article 28 D paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution, which affirms that "every individual possesses the entitlement to be acknowledged, safeguarded, and ensured with the assurance of just laws and equitable treatment under the law."²⁴⁸ During the National Conference (Munas) of Alim 'ulamā' and the Grand Conference (Konbes) of Nahdlatul 'ulamā', held from February 27 to March 1, 2019, at the Miftahul Huda Al-Azhar Islamic Boarding School in Banjar City, West Java, the Bahsul Maşāil Diniyah Maudluyah Commission they made a significant decision. It was determined that non-Muslim Indonesian citizens should not be referred to as infidels but rather as al-muwatinun, which means citizens. Abdul Moqsith Ghazali, the Deputy Chairperson of the Bahsul Maşāil Institute of the Nahdlatul 'ulamā' Executive Board (PBNU), explained that the term "kafir" is no longer used due to its frequent misuse by various groups or individuals to label those who hold different beliefs, including fellow Muslims. The term al-muwatinun is employed to prevent the application of discriminatory theological labels to individuals from foreign nations. Al-muwatinun refers to the principle of equality between Muslims and non-Muslims as citizens,

²⁴⁴ N.K. Ridwan, "Muktamar NU 1936 Dan Makna Indonesia Sebagai Dārul Islam'," accessed June 17, 2024, <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/73164/muktamar-nu-1936-dan-makna-indonesia-sebagai-darul->

²⁴⁵ Tim Penyusun, Ed. *Ahkamul Fuqaha Solusi Problematika Aktual Hukum IslamvKeputusan Muktamar, Munas Dan Konbes Nahdlatul Ulama (1926-1999 M.)*.

²⁴⁶ Tim Penyusun, Ed. *Ahkamul Fuqaha Solusi Problematika Aktual Hukum IslamvKeputusan Muktamar, Munas Dan Konbes Nahdlatul Ulama (1926-1999 M.)*.

²⁴⁷ K Alhafiz, "Ini Penjelasan Atas Kontroversi Tiada Orang Kafir Di Indonesia'," accessed June 18, 2024, <https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/103208/ini-penjelasan-atas-kontroversi-tiada-orang-kafir-di-indonesia>.

²⁴⁸ See *Undang-Undang Dasar 1945*, n.d.

implying that their status is the same.²⁴⁹ The Book of Qunyah, specifically in Chapter al-Istihlāl and Radd al-Maḍālīm, is utilized as a reference.²⁵⁰

It is important to highlight that if prior scholars have already addressed the issue of quality in the social sector and have reached a consensus, NU will embrace their opinion. If the circumstances vary but the underlying rationale for the legal ruling remains unchanged, NU will apply the same legislation to the case. This pattern is commonly referred to as the *ilhāqī* method, which involves comparing a legal issue that has not been addressed or resolved in a legal text with a similar issue that has already been addressed in the text (thus having a legal determination) or comparing it with a previously made legal opinion.²⁵¹

It is important to note that when formulating a legal ruling on an issue, NU actively engages several scientists and intellectuals from diverse scientific disciplines in a forum known as the *Bahşul Maşāil Forum*. The NU *Bahşul Maşāil Institution (LBM)* manages and coordinates this forum. The purpose of engaging numerous academics in this manner is to ensure the effective implementation of collective *ijtihād*. *Bahşul Maşāil* serves as the supreme forum of the organization, with the authority to enforce its judgments among NU followers.²⁵²

In this case, NU, through the decision of *Bahşul Maşāil Mauḍū'iyah* in the 2019 National Conference of *Alim 'ulamā'* NU in Banjar, West Java, has progressively dared to take the stance that citizens who are not Muslim (Non-Muslim) cannot be categorized as *kafir* (infidels).²⁵³ With the status of *harbi* (infidels who are in state of war), *mu'āhad* (foreigners of non-Muslims who are bound by a peace treaty during stay in Islamic state), *musta'man* (foreigners of non-Muslims who get security guarantees from Muslim), even *dzimī* (citizen of non-Muslims who are bound by a peace treaty with the Islamic government by paying *jizyah*). It is because these terms, in the era of the nation-state, cannot be applied considering that every citizen has the same status in the eyes of the state, whatever religion they believe in. At this point, NU realizes that terminology is closely related to theological discourse and cannot be immediately identified in civic discourse in the public sphere.

3.9 Conclusion

The *Fiqh Peradaban* emphasizes the dynamic character of *Fiqh*, which responds to environmental changes. This chapter discusses how Indonesian Islamic ideals established locally can contribute to global sustainable development with the idea of *Fiqh Peradaban*. I argue that the *Fiqh Peradaban* offers more substantial things to the world regarding a sustainable development agenda than *Islam Nusantara*, *Islam rahmatan lil alamin*, and *Pribumisasi Islam* (as the ideas of previous NU leaders). The *Fiqh Peradaban*, emphasizing Islamic law, may bring concrete Islamic ideas into the debate on sustainable development while maintaining a secular complexity and legitimizing the 2030 Agenda with Islamic legal reasoning. In contrast to discursive approaches like *Islam Nusantara* and preceding NU concepts, *fiqh peradaban* could significantly impact the situation. As a result, by employing Islamic jurisprudence methods, the *Fiqh Peradaban* can significantly contribute to sustainable development and its interdependent economic, social, and environmental aspects.

²⁴⁹ Alhafiz, “‘Ini Penjelasan Atas Kontroversi Tiada Orang Kafir Di Indonesia’,”

²⁵⁰ Alhafiz.

²⁵¹ Saenong, “*Nahdlatul Ulama (NU): A Grassroots Movement Advocating Moderate Islam.*”

²⁵² Tim Penyusun, Ed. *Ahkamul Fuqaha Solusi Problematika Aktual Hukum Islam* v Keputusan Mukhtamar, Munas Dan Konbes Nahdlatul Ulama (1926-1999 M.).

²⁵³ *Penjelasan-Perumus-Bahtsul-Masail-Munas-Nu-Soal-Polemik-Kafir,* accessed June 15, 2024, <https://nu.or.id/nasional/penjelasan-perumus-bahtsul-masail-munas-nu-soal-polemik-kafir-HJ7a0>.

The development of the Fiqh Peradaban is rooted in the Uṣūl Fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence) and maqāsid (objectives) of the Sharīʿa. Asy-Syāfiʿī's book *Ar-Risālah* emphasizes that there is not a single phenomenon faced by Muslims that is not bound by the law or accessible from the law. Uṣūl Fiqh scholars differ in their views regarding matters that are kept silent or not mentioned by religious texts, with some offering a moderate perspective that religious texts do not explicitly mention matters that need to be analyzed and discussed first based on their beneficial and public welfare aspects.

In addition, I argue that the Fiqh Peradaban provides a more tangible resolution to the sustainable development agenda through the integration of theoretical-textual and practical-rational methodologies rooted in the concept of benefit. This approach enables the reevaluation of religious texts in light of evolving social and environmental circumstances. The Fiqh Peradaban is based on the Uṣūl Fiqh, which are the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, and the maqāsid, which are the purposes of Sharīʿa. Fiqh Peradaban is academically justified by its paradigmatic foundation, which ensures that any occurrence encountered by Muslims is either governed by law or can be addressed through legal means. Through the utilization of this methodology, Fiqh Peradaban successfully facilitates the comprehension and alignment of information, values, ethics, and objectives between Islam and secular humanism. NU addresses the conflict between traditional fiqh practices and modern concerns by employing a balanced approach in the form of Fiqh Peradaban. This approach not only preserves the traditional Islamic boarding school epistemology but also incorporates contemporary scientific epistemology without causing any extreme changes.

In conclusion, the Fiqh Peradaban is a significant development in Islamic thought, emphasizing the dynamic character of Fiqh and its ability to respond to environmental changes. By combining theoretical-textual and practical-rational approaches, this concept can bring concrete Islamic ideas into the debate on sustainable development while maintaining a secular complexity and legitimizing the 2030 Agenda with Islamic legal reasoning. The Fiqh Peradaban also encourages intellectual discourse and aims to re-contextualize the Islamic scientific treasures present in one of the classical Fiqh traditions, considering the realities of a new civilization.

CHAPTER 4

Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban and Religion Twenty (R20)

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses *the halaqah of Fiqh Peradaban and Religion Twenty (R20)* as Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board's (PBNU) concrete steps in campaigning for the idea of the Fiqh Peradaban. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is one of the largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia which has played an active role in promoting the values of religious moderation, peace and harmony in a diverse society. Welcoming the second century of NU, the PBNU held Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban events in 250 locations as a form of progressive step to strengthen the understanding and application of fiqh in the context of modern civilization.²⁵⁴ The theme "Fiqh of Civilization and the New Reality of Civilization" was raised to respond to new challenges for the Indonesian nation, such as radicalism and fundamentalism amidst increasing religious diversity in Indonesia. This event is also an important momentum to strengthen the values of religious moderation in Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) through the involvement of ulama or kyai, and ibu nyai (female ulama) in in-depth intellectual discussions. In the global context, NU is also trying to strengthen its role as a peacekeeper through initiatives such as the R20²⁵⁵ Forum (Religion of Twenty), which aims to promote religion as a solution to global issues.²⁵⁶

I would maintain that the Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban and R20 held by PBNU are strategic steps to integrate Islamic boarding school literature with the realities of today's civilization. It is important to consider new challenges, such as radicalism and fundamentalism, that have emerged amidst increasing religious diversity in Indonesia. Through this intellectual discussion, NU hopes to strengthen the values of religious moderation and respond to the social changes that are occurring. In facing various global challenges such as the energy crisis, global warming, and religious conservatism, NU, through Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban, tries to emphasize the importance of religious moderation. Religious moderation is considered the key to maintaining peace and social harmony in a pluralistic society. NU seeks to strengthen its role as a global peacekeeper through the R20 Forum. By involving religious leaders from various countries, NU hopes to create constructive interfaith dialogue to address global issues such as extremism and terrorism. It is hoped that this forum can become a platform for promoting humanitarian values and social justice in line with Syari'ah principles. Thus, through Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban and the R20 Forum, NU seeks to strengthen the role of religion not only in the national context but also on a global scale in an effort to build a more just, peaceful, and harmonious civilization.

4.2 Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban

²⁵⁴ D. Priyanto, "Apa Itu Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban, Digelar PBNU Di 250 Titik Sambut Satu Abad NU.," *Kompas*, 2022, <https://www.kompas.tv/article/317961/apa-itu-halaqah-fiqh-peradaban-digelar-pbnu-di-250-titik-sambut-satu-abad-nu?page=2>.

²⁵⁵ The R20 (Religion of Twenty) conference, organized by Indonesia, gained worldwide interest. It is an official Engagement Group of the G20 summit and was held on the island of Bali from 2-3 November 2022. The R20 conference convened religious leaders from around the globe to deliberate on the potential of religion as a remedy for pressing global issues, including climate change, poverty, extremism, and terrorism. The objective was to foster unity and reverence among individuals and countries worldwide, with the purpose of establishing a worldwide coalition grounded in common civilizational principles (R20 2022). The R20 demonstrates the strong partnership between Indonesian governmental and non-governmental entities as an initiative by NU that is supported by the Joko Widodo administration (2014–2024). Indonesia has brought religion to the forefront of global politics and has established a precedent for future G20 summits. The following three host countries, India (2023), Brazil (2024), and South Africa (2025), will all organize R20 meetings, following Indonesia's lead.

²⁵⁶ "Statement of KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf, Chairperson of PBNU, in Discussion at TVNU," *Discussion at TVNU* (Jakarta, November 1, 2022).

Welcoming the two centuries of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board (PBNU) held a Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban event at 250 locations. The first series was held at the Krapyak Islamic Boarding School, Yogyakarta, on Thursday, September 11, 2022, and the culmination will be held in January 2023. The results of the halaqah will be brought to the International Conference on Civilization Fiqh in February 2023 to coincide with the centenary of NU according to the Hijriyah calendar.²⁵⁷ Taking the theme "NU Siyasa Jurisprudence and the Reality of the New Civilization," The General Chairman, Yahya Cholil Staquf (Gus Yahya) said that the event was a stepping stone for NU towards dynamic and progressive thinking as had been done by previous NU ulama. These themes were reduced to 5 major themes including: first, Siyasa Jurisprudence and the Nation-State; second, Siyasa Jurisprudence and Citizenship; third, Siyasa Fiqh and Minority Problems; fourth, Siyasa Jurisprudence and the New World Order; and fifth, Siyasa Jurisprudence Between War and Peace.²⁵⁸

Meanwhile, *halaqah* lexically means something circular, rounded, and encompassing. In its development, this term was used for face-to-face learning process activities in congregations with resource persons. The Halaqah of the Fiqh Peradaban, which PBNU implemented as an agenda to welcome the centenary of Nahdlatul Ulama, is a crucial moment. Implementing these activities in various Islamic boarding schools involving ulama, kyai, and bu nyai is a momentum to strengthen the values of religious moderation in Islamic boarding schools. Carrying the theme "NU Siyasa Jurisprudence and the Reality of New Civilization" is very relevant considering the emergence of new challenges for the Indonesian nation, such as radicalism or fundamentalism in the context of increasing religious diversity in Indonesia.

Under the leadership of Yahya Cholil Staquf (Gus Yahya), Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) welcomes all *Nahdliyin* (NU followers) to actively contribute to the promotion of peace and the establishment of a harmonious ecosystem of life, as outlined in the vision of "*Merawat Jagat, Membangun Peradaban* (Nurturing the World, Building Civilization)".²⁵⁹ By assuming the role of a peace enforcer, the community can effectively address and learn from every issue and dispute that arises, developing a more improved societal order.

The tagline "Nurturing the World, Building Civilization" signifies spreading and sharing the compassionate values inherent in the concept of Fiqh Peradaban. NU, led by Gus Yahya, wants to establish itself as a prominent and well-organized advocate for peace on a global scale through the study and application of civil law. To actualize the notion of civilization fiqh, the Executive Board of NU (PBNU) has devised a range of initiatives at the regional, national, and worldwide levels. These events consist of the *Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban*, conducted in 250 regions throughout Indonesia, the first volume of the Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban held in Surabaya²⁶⁰, and the Religion Forum (R20) in Bali.²⁶¹ In addition, various forums have been held to emphasize the significance of PBNU's overarching goal, as expressed in the slogan "Nurturing the World, Building Civilization," which intersects with the significant principles of the Fiqh Peradaban.

According to the chairman of the Institute for Human Resources Studies and Development (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia or Lakpesdam) PBNU, Ulil Abshar

²⁵⁷ Priyanto, "Apa Itu Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban, Digelar PBNU Di 250 Titik Sambut Satu Abad NU."

²⁵⁸ Triono, "2 Tujuan PBNU Gelar Halaqah Peradaban," NU Online, 2022,."

²⁵⁹ Staquf, "Sambutan Ketua Umum PBNU KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf Di Acara Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban Di Pondok Pesantren Al-Anwar Purworejo."

²⁶⁰ Priyanto, "Apa Itu Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban, Digelar PBNU Di 250 Titik Sambut Satu Abad NU."

²⁶¹ Editorial Team, "Pemuka Agama Dunia Forum R20 Terbitkan Komunike Bali 2022," accessed July 7, 2024, <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2022/11/04/17105591/pemuka-agama-dunia-forum-r20-terbitkan-komunike-bali-2022-ini-isi-lengkapnya>.

Abdalla or Gus Ulil (in my interview), the Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban, which is held in various Islamic boarding schools, has two objectives. First, PBNU wants to revive intellectual discussions in the Islamic boarding school environment, as Gus Dur did in the 1990s. Second, PBNU wants to unite Islamic boarding school literature or traditional intellectual treasures with realities in today's civilization. It allows Islamic boarding school figures, kiai and nyai (female ulama), to be involved in conversations on more prominent themes, not just about religion practices or political issues such as regional elections.

Implementing the Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban is an exciting study, considering that in the last few decades, the discussion of Fiqh in Islamic boarding schools (pesantren) has experienced a decline. Even in several Islamic boarding schools, including those within the Nahdlatul Ulama, Islamic jurisprudence with Islamic nuances has become rooted in a strictly understood ideology (taqlid). Fiqh is a legal product from the results of istinbath, fatwa, and ijihad, so the process requires specific tools known as *uṣūl fiqh* and *qawā'idul fiqhiyyah*. It is not surprising that this makes Islamic thinkers such as KH. Sahal Mahfudh²⁶² seeks to integrate religious texts (fiqh) into the reading of social reality so that the spirit of religion is oriented towards the benefit, justice, prosperity, and welfare of the people.

The Fiqh Peradaban places significant importance on a global perspective, dedication to pluralism, and tolerance. Yahya Cholil Staquf highlights the importance of Muslims expanding their comprehension of the ummah in today's global landscape. This awareness should extend beyond the Muslim community and include all of humanity. It necessitates re-examining and implementing Islamic precepts that endorse peaceful cohabitation among different religions and cultures.²⁶³ The second component pertains to the concept of social justice. The Fiqh Peradaban encompasses the equitable allocation of resources and opportunity as a means of applying Islamic principles. It includes enhancing living standards through education, healthcare, and improved economic prospects. The emphasis on this aspect demonstrates the acknowledgment that social fairness is an essential foundation for constructing a durable civilization.

The third issue pertains to the sustainability of the environment. From a sociological perspective, this aspect originates from Yahya Chalil Staquf's argument in the tagline "Caring for the Universe, Building Civilization." The phrase "caring for the universe" emphasizes a moral message and represents preserving peace and harmony in both the natural environment and the social structure. This action is important to avert disorder and suffering. The moral imperative of treating the environment with reverence and benevolence is important for all individuals and groups entrusted with the responsibility to do so. With the rise in environmental damage caused by human behaviors, NU aims to establish itself as a crucial entity in promoting awareness and urging the government and different societal components to prioritize environmental care. NU's enduring commitment to thought and social action in environmental sustainability should persist as a worldwide and national consciousness in nurturing the planet.

The participation of KH. Ali Yafie and KH. Sahal Mahfud, as the Rais 'Am of the Syuriah PBNU during the 1980s and 1990s, developed the concept of environmental fiqh from a religious standpoint, demonstrating NU's longstanding dedication to environmental conservation. Furthermore, the leaders and founders of NU have shown a considerable commitment to environmental sustainability through their active support and leading by example. Furthermore, the leaders and founders of NU have demonstrated a noteworthy commitment to environmental sustainability through their support and

²⁶² See Mahfud, *Nuansa Fiqh Sosial*.

²⁶³ "Statement of KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf, Chairperson of PBNU" (Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban, Jakarta, September 21, 2022).

personal demonstration.²⁶⁴ Therefore, when Gus Yahya's moral message highlights the significance of every individual's obligation towards their surroundings, there is a connection in knowledge between NU's past influential figures and founders and the present NU leadership successors.

Yahya Cholil Staquf believes that inflexible and literal interpretation, without considering the surrounding circumstances, will result in the enforcement of regulations that are not only irrelevant but can also hinder social and humanitarian progress.²⁶⁵ Hence, the concept of the Fiqh Peradaban aims to incorporate global principles like justice, freedom, and equality within the structure of Islamic jurisprudence. Constructive conversation between scholars and other stakeholders is utilized to generate legal interpretations that enhance communal life at the local and global levels. This notion promotes adjusting and being open to change in implementing Islamic law, acknowledging the importance of adequately addressing evolving circumstances and contexts.

4.3 Religion Twenty (R20)

The Nahdlatul Ulama's concept in R20 has emphasized the important role of religion as an instrument for promoting peace and advocating for solutions to conflict and war. NU aims to build sustainable humanitarian stability by consolidating its efforts towards world peace. Religion inspires every aspect of human beings. During its evolution, religion developed connections with political aspects by using an ethical structure to construct governmental institutions and civil society.²⁶⁶ Later, certain groups exploited religious authority to achieve dominant political power and further their objectives.²⁶⁷ In this scenario, the historical trauma caused by war, tyranny, and isolation finally shows religion as an amplifier that causes chronic psychological distress. That situation subsequently led to opposition towards the importance of religion in several aspects of human beings.²⁶⁸ One such event occurred in Europe during the Renaissance. This tragic past did not immediately disappear from the memory of humanity, at least until the end of World War II.

The most strategic approach is to build collective dialogue by uniting all religious leaders worldwide, as proven by the dark history of religion. It was then initiated by the NU Executive Board (PBNU) through the R20 forum, an additional activity of the Group of Twenty (G20) forum. The R20 Forum aims to achieve consensus and agreement among religious leaders regarding world politics and economics. By adopting this perspective, religion, previously associated with politicization and inequality, is now expected to become an inspiration for unity goals and the common good.²⁶⁹

The R20 meeting underlined the need for religious leaders worldwide to join in demonstrating religion as a global solution, as multiple aspects are contributing to numerous crises and threats to the world's future. Global issues and dangers encompass the energy crisis, global warming, food scarcity, and religious conservatism movements that threaten global security. The dialogue in the R20 forum is

²⁶⁴ “[²⁶⁵ “\[²⁶⁶ Jonathan C. Agensky, “Recognizing Religion: Politics, History, and the ‘Long 19th Century,’” *European Journal of International Relations* 23. no.4 \\(2017\\).\]\(https://Www.Nu.or.Id/Nasional/Gus-Yahya-Ungkap-Perlunya-Rekontekstualisasi-Fiqih-Untuk-Cegah-Konflik-TZn3L,” n.d., accessed July 12, 2024.</p></div><div data-bbox=\)](https://Www.Nu.or.Id/Fragmen/Muktamar-1994-Dan-Jihad-Lingkungan-Hidup-EkV9O.Sapariah,” n.d., accessed July 12, 2024.</p></div><div data-bbox=)

²⁶⁷ Andrew F. Cooper, “How Much Is Global Governance Changing? The G20 as International Practice,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 50, no. 3 (2015).

²⁶⁸ Jan Alam, “Religious Identity and Politics: Exploring the Causes of the Political Persecution of Religious Minorities in Kohat District, Pakistan,” 7. No. 4, n.d., 2021.

²⁶⁹ Muhammad Syakir NF, “K o m u n i k e R 2 0 B a l l I : U p a y a Memastikan Agama Sebagai Sumber Solusi Global,” accessed July 7, 2024, <https://www.nu.or.id/nasional/11-resolusi-forum-r20-untuk-pastikan-agama-sebagai-sumber-solusi-global-U9lq4>.

a proactive measure to mitigate any potential issues arising from religious conservatism.²⁷⁰ The influence of this religious conservatism will affect multiple sectors and aspects of life.²⁷¹ The conceptualization of religion as a foundation for ethical principles clearly demonstrates and contributes to the worldwide dilemma. It is anticipated that the participation of religious followers and global leaders will create anticipation for the development of comprehensive and inclusive proposals and suggestions, which cover wider viewpoint.

In the view of PBNU, religion serves not only as a means of justifying ideology but also plays a crucial role in establishing political stability.²⁷² Religion endorses development projects and the principles of fairness and empathy, as it assumes a role in maintaining social order. PBNU uses the R20 forum as a platform to bring together religious and state leaders and various groups worldwide to engage in discussions to address religious and state-related concerns.²⁷³

The R20 forum, created by NU, was established as a response to the absence of discussion platforms for religious leaders to address the internal challenges within their religions. The goal of the R20 forum is to establish religion's capacity to adjust to global economic advancements and challenges effectively. According to PBNU, the present global political and economic circumstances have compelled religion to dialogue with the global economic environment. In addition, PBNU also aspires to religious principles to provide economic conceptions and frameworks in global politics. According to the General Chairman of PBNU, R20 is designed to be an annual event where countries with the highest economic influence can engage in discourse with religion.²⁷⁴

The main religious doctrines discussed in R20 serve as an epistemic foundation for building global harmony. Building world peace is expected to have consequences for politics based on human values. NU seeks to combine religious and governmental systems. NU aims to avoid depicting religion as the cause of hardship and difficulty.²⁷⁵ Therefore, NU advocates working with religious leaders from other countries to build religion as a universal solution. Therefore, engaging in religious discussion is very important in the R20 forum.

Additionally, it is crucial to ensure that the global community, particularly inter-state organizations that represent world powers, considers religion a critical factor in determining cooperation and efforts to identify values that require development in various fields. The R20 Forum does not guarantee that religion is the sole dominant factor in maintaining a harmonious world; instead, it suggests that dialogue among world religious leaders should be a wise approach.

Holland Taylor, CEO of the Center for Shared Civilization Values, affirmed that Nahdlatul Ulama has consistently employed a methodical and institutional approach to foster social integration. Efforts to preserve and enhance social cohesion prompted PBNU to launch a discussion platform between global religious leaders known as the Religion of Twenty (R20). Holland argues that Nahdlatul Ulama's decision to collaborate with the Muslim World League (MWL) is highly suitable, given that MWL, as

²⁷⁰ Editorial Team, "Pemuka Agama Dunia Forum R20 Terbitkan Komunike Bali 2022."

²⁷¹ Jacob B. Hirsh and Jordan B. Peterson, "Spiritual Liberals and Religious Conservatives," *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 4, no. 1 (n.d.): 2012.

²⁷² "Statement of KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf, Chairman of PBNU" (Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban, Jakarta, September 21, 2022).

²⁷³ "Statement of KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf, Chairman of PBNU, in Discussion at TVNU," *Discussion at TVNU* (Jakarta, November 1, 2022).

²⁷⁴ "Statement of KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf, Chairman of PBNU."

²⁷⁵ Mietzner and Muhtadi, "The Myth of Pluralism: Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics of Religious Tolerance in Indonesia."

a global Islamic organization, holds a significant strategic position.²⁷⁶ The event is anticipated to become a global phenomenon. A similar study conducted by Volkov²⁷⁷ explored the role of Lady's Figure Skating in Russian soft power on the global stage. Proctor²⁷⁸ examined the phenomenon of BTS as a means of South Korea exerting its influence and attractiveness on the global stage. Krzymowski²⁷⁹ examines the influence of the European Union and the United Arab Emirates in promoting sustainable development goals with soft power. Mukazhanova²⁸⁰ analyzes the significance of soft power and the methods associated with it in the context of foreign policy. Arif²⁸¹ analyzes the notion of soft power in China's diplomatic strategy and foreign policy.

The event was graced by 40 speakers, comprising representatives from five continents, as well as 7 local speakers from Indonesia. The gathering attracted over 400 attendees from both domestic and international locations. This international event was attended by a total of 160 religious leaders representing various sects and beliefs from many nations. The Religion of Twenty Forum serves as an international venue for leaders representing different religions and nations to come together and express their concerns while advocating for the shared principles of civilization. The main objective of this forum is to ensure that sacred religion may serve as a genuine and dynamic worldwide resource rather than being a cause of issues. This religious forum aims to unite interfaith leaders, particularly from R20 member countries and other parts of the world, to combat the use of identity as a political tool, reduce the dissemination of hate speech within communities, promote unity and respect in diverse societies, cultures, and nations, and foster a fair and harmonious global order that upholds the equal rights and dignity of all individuals.²⁸² The Religion Forum (R20) International Summit of Religious Leaders commenced on Wednesday, November 2, 2022, in Nusa Dua, Bali. The opening ceremony featured the performance of a tambourine by several prominent individuals in attendance. Over 400 guests, both domestic and international, attended the event. The attendees of the event included religious leaders, sects, and ideologies from many nations, each with millions of adherents.²⁸³ The event, organized by Nahdlatul Ulama and the World Muslim League, aims to convene religious leaders from around the globe to engage in the exchange of ideas and discussions, with the objective of incorporating religion to address global issues. Furthermore, it serves to promote organized collaboration among different religions, civilizations, and governments. The adoption of the Religion of Twenty (R20) in Indonesia holds the potential for a lasting worldwide influence.²⁸⁴ Table 1 displays the subjects addressed in the international agenda.

²⁷⁶ Staquf and Taylor, "The Civilizational Origins of Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama and Its Humanitarian Islam Movement."

²⁷⁷ A Volkov, "Ladies Figure Skating as an Element of Russian Soft Power in the International Arena," *J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relations* 4, np. 4 (2021): 1–7, <https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jpsir.20210401.11>.

²⁷⁸ J. Proctor, "Labour of Love: Fan Labour, BTS, and South Korean Soft Power," *Asia Mark J* 22, no. 4 (2021): 79–101, <https://doi.org/10.15830/amj.2020.22.4.79>.

²⁷⁹ A. Krzymowski, "The European Union and the United Arab Emirates as Civilian and Soft Powers Engaged in Sustainable Development Goals," *J. Polit. Sci. Int. Relations* 13, no. 3 (2020): 41–58, <https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2020/13-3/3>.

²⁸⁰ A.Z. Mukazhanova, "The Importance of Soft Power and Soft Power Tools in Us Foreign Policy," *Bull. L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian Natl. Univ. Polit. Sci. Reg. Stud. Orient. Stud.* 135, no. 2 (2021): 7–20, <https://doi.org/10.32523/2616-6887/2021-135-2-7-20>.

²⁸¹ B.H. Arif, "The Role of Soft Power in China's Foreign Policy in the 21th Century," *Int. J. Soc. Sci. Educ. Stud.*, 3, no. 3 (2017): 94–101, <https://doi.org/10.23918/ijsses.v3i3p94>.

²⁸² N.S. Indiraphasa, "Alasan Bali Dipilih Jadi Lokasi Penyelenggaraan Forum R20," *NU Online*, 2022.

²⁸³ "Tingkatkan Peran Agama Di Kancan Internasional, Nahdlatul Ulama Dan Liga Muslim Dunia Gelar Forum Agama R20 Di Bali," *Sanad Media*, 2022.

²⁸⁴ "Religion Forum (R20) International Summit of Religious Leaders Launching Press Conference," *Onus Asia*, 2022.

At the R20 conference, religious leaders, sects, and traditions reached a consensus known as a communiqué. The text below presents the contents of the R20 Bali 2022 forum communiqué. The primary objective of establishing the R20 Forum is to actively foster mutual comprehension, cultivate a culture of tranquility, and facilitate harmonic cohabitation among the global populace, including all ethnicities, faiths, and countries. In order to accomplish this admirable objective, the R20 brings together religious, social, economic, and political figures from throughout the globe to ensure that religion serves as a proactive force for resolving issues rather than causing them.²⁸⁵ The PBNU, in collaboration with the MWL, organized the G20 or R20 Religious Forum event in Nusa Dua, Bali, on 2-3 November 2022. A total of 338 attendees from 32 different nations participated in the R20 event. A total of 124 of these originated from other countries. This forum features a total of 45 speakers hailing from five different continents. This significant advancement is highly valued by all religious groups, particularly the Indonesian Muslim community. Prior to the G20 Summit, the Religions 20 conference hosted a gathering of over 160 interfaith leaders who discussed the significance of fostering religion as a means of addressing global challenges. Holland Taylor states that R20 established Nahdlatul Ulama in collaboration with the World Muslim League in order to empower religious leaders and ensure that religion catalyzes innovative and authentic solutions.²⁸⁶

The accord is very significant, particularly given the multitude of challenges currently confronting the world. The convening of global religious leaders under the auspices of the R20 is anticipated to generate worldwide recognition of the significance of religion in establishing and guiding a beneficial and enduring global governance system. This meeting instilled hope in establishing robust fundamental principles from a religious standpoint to effectively implement the concept of profit, people, and planet (3P), which has gained global consensus. This notion is crucial for fostering growth that promotes sustained enhancements in the economic well-being of the community while ensuring the longevity of its social fabric.²⁸⁷

The R20 Agenda serves as a platform for religious and sectarian leaders with a significant number of followers, including millions or even tens of millions of people. The primary participants are from G20 member countries, but religious leaders from non-G20 countries are also invited. In total, there are 32 countries represented, with a total of 464 invitees, including 170 foreign individuals from five continents. Forty individuals from five different continents were presented as resource persons. In reaction to various worldwide humanitarian crises and their remedies, they articulate diverse religious concerns.²⁸⁸ It demonstrates the significance and pivotal role of the forum.

R20 held a gathering of global religious leaders to engage in an open discourse regarding the various difficulties and crises afflicting the world. Participants were given the chance to articulate their perspectives on how religion may play a role in addressing global concerns.²⁸⁹ The theme of R20 was "Unveiling and Cultivating Religion as a Catalyst for Global Solutions: A Global Movement for Shared Moral and Spiritual Principles."²⁹⁰ Given the difficulties between the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority in India, the tensions between Sunni and Shia in Yemen, and the negative reputation that ISIS's terrorism has given to religion,²⁹¹ it was anticipated that the religious leaders involved would exchange

²⁸⁵ Syakir NF, "K o m u n i k e R 2 0 B a l i : U p a y a Memastikan Agama Sebagai Sumber Solusi Global."

²⁸⁶ Staquf and Taylor, "The Civilizational Origins of Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama and Its Humanitarian Islam Movement."

²⁸⁷ A. Abbas, "Kesepakatan Tokoh Agama Dunia Di R-20 Diapresiasi," *Republika.Id*, 2022.

²⁸⁸ A. Suaedy, "R20, Perubahan Global, Dan Transformasi Agama," *NU Online*, 2022.

²⁸⁹ "https://Rri.Co.Id/Bengkulu/Nasional/76567/Pbnu:-Forum-R20-Peran-Penting-Agama-Dalam-Global," n.d., accessed July 11, 2024.

²⁹⁰ "https://Www.Nu.or.Id/Nasional/R20-Sebagai-Gerakan-Global-Untuk-Bangun-Konsensus-Moral-Dan-Spiritual-Kemanusiaan-DONIV," n.d., accessed July 11, 2024.

²⁹¹ M. Garred and M. Abu Nimer, "Making Peace with Faith: The Challenges of Religion and Peacebuilding, Peace and Security in the 21st Century," *Rowman & Littlefield Publisher*, 2018, 1.

and deliberate upon the vulnerabilities and merits of their respective faiths. However, most of the presenters at the Forum solely emphasized the positive aspects of their religions.²⁹²

R20 has reached a consensus on the Communique, which encompasses significant aspects on how religions might tackle concerns such as disputes based on identity, both within a country and globally, as well as environmental difficulties and other related subjects.²⁹³ R20, intended as a worldwide commitment, should have addressed several issues from the viewpoints of both mainstream and non-mainstream religious organizations. One specific critique of R20 in Bali was its failure to address significant matters like the rights of religious minorities and gender-based inequities.²⁹⁴ The parking situation at R20 under G20 was especially troublesome, as it highlighted the numerous issues and threats related to religion that members of G20 caused.²⁹⁵ Moreover, it is widely thought that Saudi Arabia, the primary patron of R20, played a significant role in inciting the Sunni-Shia conflict in Yemen.

The main topic of R20²⁹⁶ was the application of religion as an instrument for dealing with world issues. Nevertheless, this aspiration necessitates religion to be positioned at the core of numerous global matters. Sociologists frequently engage in discussions over the appropriate extent of religion's involvement in the public domain, deliberating whether it should be limited to the private sphere.²⁹⁷ From the inception of Indonesia, Islam has been advocated to assume a pivotal role in the nation's political framework. The founding fathers, however, only consented to the inclusion of religion as a belief system in society rather than as the basis for the country's political structure. Pancasila was ultimately established as the official ideology of the state, with the aim of inclusively embracing all religions. This perspective on religion does not envision it as a problem-solving entity, particularly in the context of global politics. Religion's role in maintaining peace on a global scale has been perplexing, as it possesses both inclusive and exclusionary qualities. It has served as a unifying force in some parts of the world, but it has also been a divisive factor, leading to several disputes and wars. The desire for religion to serve as the remedy for world issues is not a recent phenomenon. It might be argued that ambition is frequently the cause of its widespread appeal. Within the framework of Islam, the perception of religion as the remedy was prevalent among advocates of political Islam, such as Ikhwanul Muslimin and Hizbut Tahrir.

Scholars are particularly interested in the significant influence of R20 on internal affairs, particularly its impact on Islam in Indonesia. NU is likely to receive the most significant advantages due to the complete absence of participation from Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organizations, such as MUI, Persatuan Islam, and others, in R20. Vice President Ma'ruf Amin, who is a symbolic representative of the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), did not attend the Forum. The R20 program was widely seen as belonging to the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and being endorsed by the government of President Jokowi. Characterizing R20 as the flagship of Indonesian Islam is thus erroneous, as it did not garner widespread endorsement from the majority of influential factions within Indonesian Islam. At the national level, R20 aimed to advocate for a decrease in the influence of identity politics. The R20 Communique explicitly calls for a decrease in the practice of identity politics. Over the past twenty

²⁹² “<https://Www.Nu.or.Id/Nasional/Forum-R20-Hadirkan-Belasan-Tokoh-Agama-Jadi-Pembicara-udeQv>,” n.d., accessed July 11, 2024.

²⁹³ “https://R20-Indonesia.Org/En/News_media/Press_release/Detail/35.Html,” n.d., accessed July 11, 2024.

²⁹⁴ “<https://Www.Detik.Com/Edu/Detikpedia/d-6327038/Ketum-Pbnu-Jelaskan-Alasan-Undang-Tokoh-Agama-Problematik-Ke-Forum-R20>,” n.d., accessed July 11, 2024.

²⁹⁵ “<https://Www.Hrw.Org/News/2021/02/19/India-Government-Policies-Actions-Target-Minorities>,” n.d., accessed July 11, 2024.

²⁹⁶ “https://R20-Indonesia.Org/En/News_media/Press_release/Detail/35.Html.”

²⁹⁷ M.C. Segers, T.G. Jelen, and C.E. Cochran, *A Wall of Separation?: Debating the Public Role of Religion, Enduring Questions in American Political Life* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

years, identity politics has been an integral component of Indonesian Islam, manifesting in its politics, economic ideology, and even the lifestyles embraced within the NU community. A statewide study conducted by the Indonesia Studies Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak revealed that 37% of respondents agreed, while 14% strongly agreed, that the interests of Islam should be given priority. Indonesian Muslims desire increased political influence for their ulama. It was seen in the score results of the survey, where 10% and 27%, respectively, strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with the notion of Islamic leaders exerting more significant influence in the political domain. This score was marginally higher than the percentages of individuals who strongly disagreed (19%) and moderately disagreed (14%) with regard to the same topic.

Consequently, when the present administration of NU agreed to receive substantial financial support from Saudi Arabia to host R20, the stance of NU became unclear. Some individuals have seen this assistance as a sign of a fresh partnership with Saudi Arabia, suggesting that NU is perhaps moderating its previously held stance on Wahhabism. This transition has the potential to be a significant advancement, yet it may also result in unfavourable repercussions. Any critique spoken within NU on Saudi Arabia and even Wahhabism could face severe suppression. The cancellation of LDNU (Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama), which had proposed the elimination of Wahhabism, clearly showed that NU headquarters did not want LDNU to jeopardize Saudi Arabia's support for R20.²⁹⁸ Most of this group is comprised of NU's local members and their religious leaders at the village level. Their primary motivation for joining NU is their opposition to Wahhabism and Salafism. There is concern that the perceived shift in attitude towards Saudi Arabia may undermine the long-standing perception that NU is opposed to Wahhabism and Salafism.

The development of R20's Communique in Bali is an effort to enhance the role of religion in the public domain, with the aim of providing a worldwide answer. It has elicited both adverse and favorable reactions. Seeing religion as a global answer can be interpreted as a process of imbuing international politics with religious influence. Within the framework of Islamic revivalism in Indonesia, R20 has the potential to be used as a justification for the Islamization and implementation of Syari'ah law in the country. However, it is anticipated that R20 will lead to a more progressive direction. The future inclusion of R20 at G20 gatherings is still being determined. The success of this event relies heavily on NU's ability to persuade all G20 stakeholders and global religious leaders of its significance. The successful hosting of R20 in Indonesia can be attributed to the unwavering backing of the Indonesian government and the Muslim World League of Saudi Arabia. While R20 may persist as a worldwide endeavor, its future as an engagement platform within the G20 is still being determined. It is particularly true considering that the majority of G20 member countries hold the belief that religion should be confined to the realm of personal life. Nevertheless, it is highly improbable to anticipate the R20 effort to persist beyond Indonesia's tenure as the chair of the G20, particularly if it transitions to a non-Muslim nation. Lastly, the influence of R20 and its goals on Indonesian Islam is dependent on NU's ability, as the initiator of R20, to persuade Muslim organizations and groups in Indonesia to embrace its recommendations.

In addition, the Widodo administration advocates for the integration of moderate Islamic principles into its diplomatic efforts. The current president has strategically connected himself with "Islam of the Archipelago" and, to a lesser extent, "Progressive Islam" in order to appeal to the large domestic constituencies of NU and Muhammadiyah. However, since 2018, he has increasingly identified with "Islam of the Middle Path." The government employs the notion, as sanctioned by the

²⁹⁸ “[60](https://Voi.Id/Berita/223473/Anulir-Rilis-Ldnu-Soal-Wahabi-Sekjen-Pbnu-Tidak-Ada-Persetujuan-Rais-Aam-Dan-Ketum,” n.d., accessed July 11, 2024.</p></div><div data-bbox=)

Qur'an, as a forum for engaging in discourse and bringing together moderate and peaceful Muslims from various Islamic factions in Indonesia and beyond.²⁹⁹ In 2018, President Widodo extended an invitation to 100 experts from various countries to convene at the presidential palace. The purpose of this gathering was to engage in discussions regarding religious tolerance, anti-violence measures, and moderation, with a particular emphasis on adopting a "Middle Path" approach.

Furthermore, the government implemented the "Religious Moderation" (Moderasi Beragama) policy and declared it a central goal of the National Medium-Term Development Plan 2020-2024. The goal is to promote and integrate religious variety and tolerance, encompassing all religious beliefs. The Ministry of Religious Affairs plays a crucial role in implementing this goal by actively influencing public discussions on religious moderation through public lectures and freely accessible publications.³⁰⁰ Implementing a policy that emphasizes the adoption of a moderate "Islam of the Middle Path" lifestyle is a crucial aspect of the practical approach.

The Religion Twenty (R20) Forum is initiated and chaired by the General Chairman of PBNU, Yahya Cholil Staquf, and Sheikh Abdurrahman al-Khayyat, Chairman of the Muslim World League for Southeast Asia and Australia. The forum, which was opened in Bali (2-3 November 2022) and closed at the Sunan Pandanaran Islamic Boarding School, Yogyakarta, on Sunday, 6 November 2022, was attended by 338 participants from 32 countries. These hundreds of participants were welcomed by thousands of students with various performances.

In the closing agenda, Yahya Staquf emphasized NU's initiative to open a space for dialogue and discussion between religions to resolve global issues related to religion. One of its goals is to create peace and harmony for humanity.³⁰¹ To realize this vision, the R20 forum has mobilized various religious, political and economic leaders from G20 member countries and other countries around the world to take the following stances:

- Prevent the use of identity as a weapon.
- Limit the spread of communal hatred.
- Promote solidarity and respect among diverse societies, cultures and nations in the world, and
- Promote the emergence of an indeed just and harmonious world order built on respect for the equal rights and dignity of every human being.

The question is, what solution can the R20 Forum provide through religion to realize world peace? To answer this, the first step that must be examined is to describe the problems of religion itself, then design a theoretical framework that can be developed to solve these problems, and finally formulate concrete steps (based on the theoretical framework) that R20 can provide for world peace in the future. In this third millennium, the human world is marked by various paradoxes that are interesting and important to describe. Everything is contradictory and upside down. The paradox has been felt in various terms that use the prefix "post" (after/ending) recently, such as post-industry,³⁰² post ideology, post-western, post-literacy,³⁰³ even crazier post-history as if history had stopped. All forms of "post" are now summarized by one general and big term: "post-modern". As a summary of various complex

²⁹⁹ Yang Razali Kassim, "Indonesia's Campaign for Centrist Islam Goes Global," *East Asia Forum*, 2018, <https://eastasiaforum.org/2018/11/16/indonesias-campaign-for-centrist-islam-goes-global/>.

³⁰⁰ Syafiq Hasyim and Norshahril Saat, "Indonesia's Ministry of Religious Affairs under Jokowi," *ISEAS Publishing*, 2020.

³⁰¹ "Statement of KH. Yahya Cholil Staquf, Chairman of PBNU, in Discussion at TVNU,."

³⁰² See Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Book, 1976).

³⁰³ See Oliver Stuenkel, *Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order* (Malden: Polity Press, 2016).

symptoms, the term "post-modern" has indeed become very unclear, too broad and ambiguous. However, to give a loose definition, postmodernism is a term for all forms of critical attitudes towards various aspects of modernity. In the view of Jean Francois Lyotard, "incredulity towards metanarratives". Lyotard defines the postmodern condition as 'distrust of metanarratives.' It means that the postmodern mindset rejects universal truth claims and emphasizes that knowledge is always particular and subjective, not universal and objective. Thus, the postmodern condition is a condition of epistemological uncertainty; knowledge is relativist.³⁰⁴

The R20 Forum is an important platform for addressing the complex interplay between religion and global challenges in the contemporary world. Led by Yahya Cholil Staquf and Sheikh Abdurrahman al-Khayyat, the forum brings together a range of perspectives from religious, political, and economic leaders from the G20 Member States. The R20's emphasis on interfaith dialogue sets it apart, providing a space for open and honest discussion of issues that are often hidden in traditional forums. Unlike conventional interfaith dialogue, the R20 boldly confronts religious conflict, providing a space where leaders, such as a bishop from Nigeria or a representative from Hindu-majority India, can openly address cases of oppression and intolerance. By openly acknowledging and addressing these challenges, the R20 seeks to reshape the narrative around religion, emphasizing the importance of contextual reinterpretation by global religious leaders to address the complexities of the modern world.

In that context, the R20 Forum must build interfaith relations, inviting religious leaders to work together earnestly to promote the idea of religious moderation persistently. They must work in harmony to end the many sufferings and destructions caused by human blindness. If this effort is successful, the R20 Forum can effectively influence international public opinion and succeed in educating the international community about the higher values of life, something that is indispensable for peaceful coexistence and integrated human development. In this way, Indonesia's efforts, especially NU, to create world peace through religion could be realized through the R20 Forum.

However, it is important to note some of the criticisms that have emerged from this. As I have noted elsewhere, the global Islam Nusantara campaign has been dominated in many ways by conservative right-wing figures in several countries, most notably the United States, Hungary, and India.³⁰⁵ Ram Madhav, for example, has praised 'Islam Nusantara' as an argument to attack leftist and liberal Indian politicians – including Muslim politicians – who have questioned the Babri Mosque demolition and the Indian Citizenship Act too much.³⁰⁶ Such statements have provided space for the misuse of 'Islam Nusantara' for sectarian political interests that are not in line with what NU itself aspires to and opposes domestically.

Several other critics, such as the Daily Online Islam Bergerak – which is oriented towards 'Progressive Islam' and tends to be critical as ignoring more progressive Islamic groups, such as peace activists in Rohingya, and there is no agenda to defend Muslims in the R20 program. Aninda Dewayanti also sees the absence of environmental aspects in R20, affirming what was written by Islam Bergerak.³⁰⁷ In addition, as criticized by Muslim activist Heraa Hashmi, the presence of RSS and its political agenda

³⁰⁴ J. Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, 1st ed. (University of Minnesota, 1984). 47.

³⁰⁵ A.R.R. Umar, "Strange Bedfellows: Why Do Far-Right Leaders Support Indonesia's Promotion of Moderate Islam?," *Indonesia at Melbourne*, August 31, 2022, 11 July 2024.

³⁰⁶ R. Madhav, "Indian Muslims Need to Emulate the Indonesian Model.," *Open Magazine*, February 18, 2022, <https://openthemagazine.com/cover-stories/indian-muslims-need-to-emulate-the-indonesian-model/>.

³⁰⁷ A. Dewayanti, "Post-R20 Climate Action: What Can We Learn from Indonesian Muslim Environmentalism?," *Fulcrum*, November 18, 2022, <https://fulcrum.sg/post-r20-climate-action-what-can-we-learn-from-indonesian-muslim-environmentalism/>.

in R20 is a form of 'oddity' in Indonesia's Moderate Islamic diplomacy and insensitivity to India's domestic political conditions, especially with sectarianism driven by RSS (Hashmi 2022).³⁰⁸ In addition, in some ways, Nahdlatul Ulama's role is also very dependent on the figure of C. Holland Taylor, the Heritage Foundation, and conservative networks close to the Republican Party in the United States. This closeness to conservative groups in the West and the global right-wing movement could further raise questions about NU's credibility and position in the broader global political arena.³⁰⁹

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter discusses the concrete programs taken by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) through the Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban event and the Religion Twenty (R20) forum in promoting religious moderation and global solutions to various challenges of modern civilization. PBNU initiated Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban in 250 locations to strengthen the understanding of fiqh in the context of contemporary civilization and respond to new challenges such as radicalism and fundamentalism. In a global context, NU seeks to strengthen its role as a peacekeeper through R20, which aims to promote religion as a solution to global problems such as extremism and terrorism.

Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban and R20 are NU's strategic steps to integrate Islamic boarding school literature with the realities of current civilization, as well as strengthen the values of religious moderation amidst increasing religious diversity in Indonesia. This agenda aims to revive intellectual discussions in the Islamic boarding school environment and unite traditional intellectual treasures with contemporary realities. NU seeks to strengthen its role as a global peacekeeper through initiatives such as the R20 forum, which invites religious leaders from various countries for dialogue to discuss global issues such as extremism and terrorism.

The R20 Forum is expected to become a platform for promoting humanitarian values and social justice in accordance with Syari'ah principles. Religious moderation is considered the key to maintaining peace and social harmony in a pluralistic society. It is important to face global challenges such as the energy crisis, global warming, and religious conservatism. NU, through Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban, emphasizes the importance of religious moderation to maintain peace and social harmony.

R20 faced criticism for not discussing in-depth important issues such as the rights of religious minorities and gender-based injustice. There are concerns that financial support from Saudi Arabia for R20 could influence NU's stance towards Wahhabism and Salafism, which NU has always opposed. NU hopes that R20 can reduce the influence of identity politics and promote religious moderation in Indonesia and the world. The success of R20 as a platform for religious dialogue within the G20 depends on NU's ability to convince global religious leaders of the importance of this forum. The R20 Forum is expected to promote solidarity, respect human rights, and create a just and harmonious world order. NU seeks to invite world religious leaders to work together to persistently promote religious moderation and end the suffering caused by human blindness.

Thus, this chapter emphasizes that Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban and R20 are NU's strategic efforts to promote religious moderation, seek global solutions to the challenges of modern civilization, and strengthen NU's role as a peacekeeper at the national and global levels.

³⁰⁸ H. Hashmi, "Indonesia's Moderate Islam Forum and the BJP.," *Traversing Tradition*, September 14, 2022, <https://traversingtradition.com/2022/09/14/indonesias-moderate-islam-forum-and-the-bjp/>.

³⁰⁹ See Staqf and Taylor, "The Civilizational Origins of Indonesia's Nahdlatul Ulama and Its Humanitarian Islam Movement."

CHAPTER 5

Conclusion

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), as the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia and the world, has played a significant role in promoting religious moderation and peace. Under the leadership of Gus Yahya, NU developed the Fiqh Peradaban as a response to global sociological changes. The Fiqh Peradaban seeks to integrate Islamic boarding school (pesantren) literature with modern realities without eliminating its traditional characteristics. This initiative is implemented through various halaqah in Islamic boarding schools and the R20 forum, which invites global religious leaders to dialogue about contemporary issues.

Fiqh Peradaban is based on *maqāsid al-syarī'ah* (the goal of *syarī'ah*), which emphasizes the benefit of humanity. Gus Yahya stated that conflicts and wars occurring in the modern world must be stopped because they are detrimental to human survival. Therefore, the ulama has a responsibility to advocate for world peace. The Fiqh Peradaban also encourages the reinterpretation of Islamic law to suit the modern socio-political context, considering international policies such as the United Nations charter and human rights. The Fiqh Peradaban is a significant development in Islamic thought, which emphasizes the dynamic character of Fiqh in responding to environmental changes. By combining theoretical-textual and practical-rational approaches, this concept can bring concrete Islamic ideas into the debate on sustainable development while maintaining secular complexity.

The R20 Forum, as part of NU's global initiative, aims to bring together religious leaders from various countries to dialogue about global solutions to issues such as extremism, terrorism, and religious conservatism. This forum is expected to become a platform for promoting humanitarian values and social justice in accordance with *Syarī'ah* principles. The Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban and R20 are NU's strategic steps to integrate Islamic boarding school literature with contemporary realities and strengthen the values of religious moderation amidst increasing religious diversity in Indonesia.

I suggest that NU continue to develop intellectual discussions that integrate traditional and contemporary perspectives to face increasingly complex global challenges. NU also needs to ensure that the financial and political support it receives does not affect the basic principles it holds dear, especially regarding attitudes towards religious conservatism such as Wahhabism and Salafism. In this way, NU can play a greater role in creating a more just, peaceful, and harmonious world order through religious moderation and interfaith dialogue.

In Chapter 1, I introduce the study background regarding Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia and the world. Founded in 1926, NU maintains religious practices taught by traditional clerics. Under the leadership of Yahya Cholil Staquf (Gus Yahya), NU brought about a paradigm shift in Fiqh from local to global through the concept of Fiqh Peradaban. Fiqh Peradaban aims to respond to the current social context which has experienced significant sociological changes, integrating Islamic law with the challenges of modern civilization and international law.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the transformation and development of NU after the post-1998 reform era. The main focus is how NU adapted to social, political, and religious changes in Indonesia after reform. The three main leaders, Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), Hasyim Muzadi, and Said Aqil Siraj, made unique contributions to shaping NU's role in Indonesian society. This transformation is important to maintain NU's relevance and its role in an increasingly complex society.

In Chapter 3, I explain the concept of Fiqh Peradaban introduced by NU as a response to global social change and the challenges of sustainable development. Fiqh Peradaban combines textual-theoretical and practical-rational approaches rooted in the concept of *maslahat* (general welfare). This concept aims

to bring Islamic ideas into the sustainable development debate while maintaining secular complexity and legitimizing the 2030 Agenda on Islamic legal grounds. Fiqh Peradaban also encourages intellectual discussion and aims to recontextualize classical Islamic scientific treasures with the realities of new civilizations.

In Chapter 4, I discuss the concrete steps taken by NU through the Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban event and the Religion Twenty (R20) forum in promoting religious moderation and global solutions to the challenges of modern civilization. PBNU initiated Halaqah Fiqh Peradaban in 250 locations to strengthen the understanding of Fiqh in the context of contemporary civilization and respond to new challenges such as radicalism and fundamentalism. At the global level, NU seeks to strengthen its role as a peacekeeper through R20, which aims to promote religion as a solution to global problems such as extremism and terrorism.

Moreover, in the last Chapter, I emphasize that the Fiqh Peradaban is a significant development in Islamic thought, emphasizing its dynamic character in responding to environmental changes. By combining textual-theoretical and practical-rational approaches, this concept can bring concrete Islamic ideas into the debate on sustainable development while maintaining secular complexity and legitimizing the 2030 Agenda on Islamic legal grounds. Fiqh Peradaban also encourages intellectual discussion and aims to recontextualize classical Islamic scientific treasures with the realities of new civilizations.

5.1 Trajectory

Future studies can explore how the Fiqh Peradaban can be applied to respond to economic and environmental issues. This study can assess the potential of this concept in addressing problems such as poverty, inequality, and climate change.

In the future, Fiqh Peradaban is likely to become a legitimation tool prepared by PBNU to launch government projects. The close relationship between the Gus Yahya era PBNU and the Jokowi government is a strong indication of this possibility. The handover of mining management from the government to NU, which ultimately gave rise to much criticism from many parties towards NU, is quite clear. The defense argument used by PBNU is to use a fiqh approach, which is nothing other than part of the Fiqh Peradaban itself. Subsequent studies likely carry out a study on Fiqh Peradaban in this context after my study.

Fiqh Peradaban emphasizes *maqāṣid al-syarī'ah*, or the goals of *syarī'ah*, one of which is safeguarding humanity's welfare. Well-managed mining projects can provide significant economic benefits for local communities, create jobs, and improve welfare. However, these projects must also consider long-term environmental and social impacts to ensure that prosperity is sustainable and does not harm future generations.

Social and environmental justice are important aspects of the Fiqh Peradaban. Mining projects must comply with these principles of justice by ensuring that mining activities do not unduly damage the environment and provide fair compensation to affected communities. PBNU can play a role in ensuring that this mining project is carried out in accordance with Islamic values that are fair and environmentally friendly.

The relationship between PBNU and the Jokowi government regarding mining projects reflects the cooperation between religious organizations and the government in promoting sustainable development. PBNU can use its influence to ensure that mining projects are managed transparently, responsibly, and in accordance with Islamic ethical principles.

The next studies could focus on specific case studies of mining projects involving PBNU and the Jokowi government. This study can measure the economic and social impact of mining projects on local communities, as well as how the principles of Fiqh Peradaban are applied in managing the project. This study can evaluate environmental policies implemented in mining projects and how these policies are in line with the values of Fiqh Peradaban. The focus can be on environmental impact analysis, mitigation, and conservation efforts carried out in mining projects.

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ATTACHMENTS



Figure 1: Interview with the chairman of the Institute for Human Resources Studies and Development (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia or Lakpesdam) PBNU, Ulil Abshar Abdalla or Gus Ulil



Figure 2: Interview with KH. Afifuddin Muhajir (Kiai Afif)