

ENHANCING ELECTION INTEGRITY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF NGO ELECTION MONITORING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND INDONESIA

A Thesis

**Submitted to the Master's Study Program of Political Science at the
Faculty of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of**

Master of Arts (M.A.)



by:

Perwita Suci

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UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA

DEPOK

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ABSTRACT

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What causes variations in election integrity scores across democratic countries? A number of scholars argue that election integrity scores are influenced by regime type and economic development. Yet there are several countries that have the same regime and economic development but obtain different election integrity scores. By comparing the Philippines and Indonesia, this thesis will try to assess civil society involvement through the level of robustness of election monitoring activities by NGOs, which is considered a key factor in the variation in election integrity values in democratic countries. This is because formal election monitoring institutions are deemed incapable of maintaining free and fair elections. The robustness of an NGO is indicated by the results of its strategy implementation. The strategies used were divided into two types in this paper: new and old strategies. A new strategy is the implementation of a strategy that has never been done by an NGO before; this is characterized by collaborating with international organizations and becoming a pseudo-government partner. Meanwhile, the old strategy is a strategy usually used by NGOs to influence the quality of elections, for instance, becoming the government's antagonists or not collaborating with international organizations. By implementing the former and collaborating with international NGOs, various forms of support can be accessed as a reference and basis for the NGOs to run their election monitoring activities effectively. In addition, becoming a pseudo-government partner also makes it easier to convince the government about the importance of NGOs' presence in free and fair elections. Meanwhile, NGOs that adhere to the old strategy do not receive any support from international organizations and become enemies of the government, which causes the government to crack down on the scope of NGO involvement in election activities.

Keywords: *election monitoring, NGOs, election integrity, Indonesia, Philippines.*

Acknowledgments

I am profoundly grateful to those who have contributed to the completion of this thesis. First and foremost, I extend my heartfelt thanks to my supervisors, Mr. Philips J. Vermonte, Ph.D and Mr. Sirojuddin Arif, Ph.D. Their unwavering support, insightful guidance, and constructive criticism have been indispensable throughout my research journey. Dr. Philips's expert advice and critical perspective have greatly enriched the intellectual rigor of my work, while Dr. Siro's encouragement and detailed feedback have significantly contributed to the development and refinement of my ideas. Their mentorship has not only shaped this thesis but has also been pivotal in my academic and personal growth.

I also wish to acknowledge Mr. Gde Dwitya A.M, my examiner, whose thorough evaluation and astute observations have greatly improved the quality of this research. Dr. Dwitya's feedback has been both enlightening and instrumental in addressing the nuances of my work, and I am deeply appreciative of the time and effort dedicated to the review process.

Special thanks are due to PERLUDEM and NAMFREL for their invaluable support and resources. The data and insights provided by these organizations have been crucial in grounding my research and advancing the understanding of electoral processes and democratic development. PERLUDEM's extensive research and NAMFREL's commitment to electoral integrity have significantly enriched the context and depth of this study. To my family and friends, whose steadfast support and understanding have been a source of strength, I offer my sincere thanks. Your encouragement has been a constant source of motivation, helping me persevere through challenges and maintain focus on my goals.

Lastly, I would like to express my gratitude to the academic community especially FOSS Members and all those who have provided assistance and inspiration throughout this journey. Your contributions, whether direct or indirect, have played a vital role in the completion of this thesis.

Thank you all for your invaluable contributions and support.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problematization

Previous research has demonstrated how electoral integrity is influenced by regime type and economic development (Norris, 2013). Electoral integrity here refers to how the election implementation respects international standards and global norms. International community agencies have endorsed these standards in several authoritative conventions, treaties, protocols, case laws, and guidelines.

The assumption regarding the influence of regime type on election integrity scores is built on the basis that countries that adopt a more democratic regime type tend to have higher election integrity scores. Hence, regime types are distinguished based on the de facto implementation of democratic rules. The classification of the regime is also based on the level of severe electoral manipulation and violations of political freedom as an electoral autocracy (V-Dem, 2017). In line with this, Freedom House (2023) has classified the five regime types: consolidated democracy, semi-consolidated democracy, transitional or hybrid regime, semi-consolidated authoritarian regime, and consolidated authoritarian regime.

Aside from regime type, economic development, such as gross domestic product (GDP) growth, is considered to play a significant role in the election integrity score results. The assumption is that countries with high GDP growth tend to have a higher election integrity score. This aligns with the modernization theory from Lipset (1959), which states that higher economic development tends to be in more democratic countries. Economic growth is considered one of the dominant factors in a country, along with society's readiness to adopt a more mature democratic system. Previous studies argue that a positive relationship occurs between economic development (measured by GDP) and the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity (PEI)—the validity of the PEI values is obtained from an expert assessment of electoral integrity—scores are given to all countries except Singapore (EIP, 2022). In other words, the higher the value of the economic development in a country, the higher the election integrity score will be obtained.

The relationship between economic development and election integrity, as related to Lipset (1959), only frames democratization events in Western countries. Conversely, Przeworski

and Limongi (1997) observed 224 regimes – 101 democratic and 123 authoritarian – in 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. The study found the transition (from authoritarian to democratic) was increasingly likely as the per capita income of the authoritarian regime rose, but only until it reached a level of about US\$6,000. Above that, nations become wealthier when authoritarian regimes became more stable. In line with these findings, Tate’s (1974) research argues that democracy flourishes where the population is educated and literate, not necessarily where it is merely wealthy. The assumption about the relationship between economic development and regime type with election integrity was right, but insufficient, especially when explaining the variation of election integrity scores in semi-consolidated democratic countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines (see table 1.1).

Table 1.1

GDP per capita, democracy level, and election integrity in **Indonesia and the Philippines from 2013-2019**

Year	GDP/capita (by World Bank)	Democracy Level (by Freedom House)	Election Integrity (by Electoral Integrity Project)
Indonesia			
2014 (P)	3,4	64/100 (Partly free)	60 (Moderate)
2014 (L)	3,4	64/100 (Partly free)	59 (Moderate)
2019 (P)	4,1	51/100 (Partly free)	58 (Moderate)
2019 (L)	4,1	51/100 (Partly free)	55 (Moderate)
Philippines			
2013 (L)	2,8	64/100 (Partly free)	48 (Low)
2016 (P)	3,0	74/100 (free)	55 (Moderate)
2019 (L)	3,4	66/100 (Partly free)	48 (Low)

*P: Presidential Election; L: Legislative Election

Data taken from the Election Integrity Project (election integrity score), the World Bank (GDP index), and Freedom House (democracy type) show that 147 countries that fall into the same regime type category (partly free) show variations in election integrity values (see figure 1.1). The scatter plot below shows that the distribution of data on election integrity values in groups of countries that have the same regime type varies greatly. In addition, the positive relationship between regime type and election integrity scores was not proven to be significant. It can be seen that there are very high and very low election integrity points in one vertical line.




Figure 1.1 Values distribution of election integrity score in democratic countries (X; indicating the Country Name (code by number) Y; election integrity score)

In considering Indonesia and the Philippines, according to Arraguay and Sinpeng (2019), both countries are Asian countries with semi-consolidated democracy regime types (Freedom House, 2023). Regarding the initial assumption, Indonesia and the Philippines should have election integrity values in the same category. However, in 2019, when both held elections for legislative members, Indonesia had a higher election integrity score (moderate) than the Philippines (lower). The election integrity score obtained by the Philippines since 2013 has also never been higher than Indonesia's (See Table 1.1).

Second, economic development. According to a report published by the World Bank, economic growth in Indonesia and the Philippines follows a similar trend; both countries experienced a decline in economic growth after the election in 2019. Economic experts argue that the whole world faced an economic decline in 2020 because of the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic (Xiang, 2021). The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic hampered several activities; lockdown policies across the entire world resulted in a sharp decline in human activities in various aspects, such as business, tourism, exports, and imports. The relationship between economic growth and the value of election integrity in a country needs to be reviewed.




Figure 1.2. Scatter plot for values distribution indicated by GDP Growth (X) and election integrity (Y) in democratic countries

The facts above show that the value of election integrity is not only influenced by regime type and economy. Meanwhile, the value of election integrity is produce by assessing the election based on the experts views. According to Hyde and Pallister (2015), quality of elections must be equally as a dignified elections, which are influenced by two main elements: election administration and election observation. Election administration is conducted by state institutions that run the election (electoral management bodies), while observation is done by parties outside the election organizers conduct election observation. These two elements play a significant role in elections that must be addressed.

Indonesia and the Philippines have had election administrations since the first direct election. In Indonesia, election administration falls under the authority of the General Elections Commission (KPU), which was formed in 1999 with 53 members from the government and political parties. Over time, the membership of the KPU were slimmed down, and members were drawn from academia and researchers to maintain the KPU's neutrality to facilitate fair and honest elections. Until now, all election administration matters in Indonesia are handled by the KPU. In line with this, the Philippine election administration is governed by the Philippine Commission on Elections (COMELEC). COMELEC is one of three constitutional commissions of the Philippines that is independent of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Philippine Government. COMELEC was formed in 1940 following the amendment of the Philippine Constitution of 1935. Before COMELEC was established, elections were conducted by the Secretary of Interior. However, there were concerns over the partisan attitude of the Secretary of the Interior to exploit his power and influence to be able to benefit his party in elections.

Yet both countries (Indonesia and the Philippines) prohibited international election observers from monitoring the election. Instead, the government established an election supervisory institution whose existence was included in the state structure to legitimize the election results. In 1982, the Indonesian government established the General Elections Supervisory Committee (Panwaslak) to justify and legitimize the election. However, past elections show that the government also makes decisions for Panwaslak. The Philippine government gives COMELEC full authority to run and supervise the election.

Despite the existence of Panwaslak and COMELEC, the organization of elections in both countries is still considered to lack integrity; the number of cases of fraud during elections indicates this. This includes voter data fraud, voting buying, using state resources for campaigns, and using state structures for incumbent interests (Febriansyah et al., 2020). Because of the fraud being committed by politicians during the election periods, communities engage in various methods to demand more accessible and fair elections, one of which is to conduct election monitoring by the community or through the involvement of non-government organizations (NGOs).

In many countries, particularly in Asia, that have adopted democratic systems, NGOs play a role in election monitoring (ANFREL, 2018). NGOs' involvement in the election process has been a highly debated public issue. Proponents argue that NGO participation during elections can mitigate fraud. In contrast, skeptics contend that this involvement is merely a formality aimed at ensuring that the elections are perceived as procedurally sound and the results credible.

Empirical evidence indicates that, despite the existence of government institutions dedicated to overseeing elections, violations still exist. For instance, the dissemination of false information was reported following the 2022 Brazilian election, spearheaded by former President Jair Bolsonaro (*The New York Times*, 2023). The May 2022 election in the Philippines was marred by fraud, including blatant vote buying, extensive red-tagging of candidates and parties, and several instances of deadly violence (ICHRP, 2022). Additionally, several violations occurred during Indonesia's 2019 election, including breaches of the code of ethics, administrative misconduct, and campaign finance irregularities.

In the context of election fraud in Europe and Asia, state institutions alone have proven insufficient to ensure free and fair elections (Febriansyah et al., 2020). Therefore, the

involvement of other stakeholders is crucial for fostering more credible elections. Kelley (2012) posits that the presence of NGOs during the election period can incentivize election participants to act with greater caution and respect for the electoral process, thereby reducing fraud and enhancing the overall quality of election outcomes. One of the most pressing questions for scholars of comparative politics is identifying the factors that influence NGO participation in election monitoring activities.

From all countries in Southeast Asia that have adopted a democratic system and conduct elections, the Philippines was the first country to conduct election monitoring by civil society. The first time was during the 1951 Philippine senatorial election pioneered by the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) (Hedman, 2001). As time passed, NAMFREL campaigned more vigorously for election monitoring for free and fair elections. Until 1986, Philippine elections were considered the public's most effectively monitored electoral activity (Cruz, 2004; Hedman, 2001). NAMFREL developed into one of the most critical actors in elections, gaining notoriety and credibility after exposing the crimes of the authoritarian regime in 1984.

Similar to the involvement of civil society in Philippine elections, the Indonesian public began to be actively involved in organizing legislative elections in 1997. At that time, the Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP) spearheaded public involvement in election monitoring. KIPP was established in 1995 by activists, journalists, and academics in response to the manipulation of elections by the New Order government. KIPP's enthusiasm for election monitoring continued until the 1999 elections. When KIPP wanted to strengthen its position, NAMFREL and the US-based National Democratic Institute (NDI) substantially and financially assisted KIPP. Since the 2004 direct elections, other election watchdog organizations began to develop in Indonesia. And to date, dozens of election watchdog organizations actively monitor the elections.

Although the Philippines started earlier in election monitoring by civil society, the reality is that the election integrity score in the Philippines is similar to the election integrity score in Indonesia (EIP, 2020). Why is this the case? The assumption is that the robustness level of NGO election observers in the Philippines is lower than that of Indonesia's NGOs. The robustness of NGOs is indicated by the extent in which NGOs can influence the election; for example, in the pre-election stage, NGOs can influence the implementation of election law (Clark, 1995).

Addressing these aforementioned gaps, this paper examines the factors behind the variations of election integrity scores by comparing the Philippines and Indonesia. By investigating the robustness level of NGO election monitoring by adopting new/old form strategies to promote free and fair elections. All of these mechanisms are key to assessing NGO participation in election monitoring and are critical periods in the electoral processes of democratic countries.

1.2 Research question:

By taking up Indonesia and the Philippines as the case study, this research will attempt to answer the research question

1. What causes the variation of election integrity in the Philippines and Indonesia?

1.3 Significance of Study

Comparing the election observers by assessing NGOs election monitoring activity in the Philippines and Indonesia would contribute a significant study on theory building in seeing the role of local NGOs to ensure the value of election integrity. By conducting a comparative study of the two countries, this research seeks to provide an overview of the extent to which election monitoring conducted by local NGOs is able to have a significant impact on the countries' election integrity. With a note that not all local NGOs are able to conduct proper election monitoring, but only strong NGOs have a correlation with the high and low value of election integrity.

1.4 Thesis Structure

The writing of this thesis is divided into five chapters, where the five chapters each contain one topic of discussion that is interconnected and provides an overview for readers to gain a complete picture. Chapter 1 contains the problematization of the topic and the author's reasons for raising the theme of election monitoring and election integrity. Chapter 2 contains the theoretical and methodological foundations used as the basis for the author's framework and analysis. Chapter 3 is the results or findings collected during the research process. Chapter 4 contains the core of the research and in-depth analysis. Chapter 5 is the conclusion, highlighting the key points of the findings and analysis.

CHAPTER II

Theoretical Foundation and Research Design

2. 1. Conceptualizing NGOs' Innovation Strategies

Two theories provide a promising starting point for analyzing election integrity variation in Indonesia and the Philippines. This research will explore the unidirectional relationship between social movements and elections by using social movement theory and social control theory. Social movement theory will be used to identify NGOs as social movement organizations that play a significant role in affecting election integrity by promoting social change. Then, social control theory will be used to explore the various strategies of NGOs to encourage better elections, and how these strategies will influence election integrity scores.

2. 1. a. Social Movement Theory

The discussion about social movement theory started after the prolonged political turmoil worldwide in the 1960s (Isserman & Kazin, 2000). A prolonged decade of extraordinary upheavals worldwide in New York, Chicago, Berkeley, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Tokyo, Mexico City, Prague, Beijing, and elsewhere constituted the most intense period of grassroots mobilization since the 1930s (Edelman, 2001). Social movements demanding the fulfillment of antiwar and civil rights movements, youth and student rebellions, mobilization to defend regional autonomy and the environment, as well as the rights of women, gays and lesbians, older people, people with disabilities, and several other new groups, identities, and its causes converged with an unprecedented wave of anticolonial and anti-imperial rebellions in impoverished regions of the globe.

This variety of social movement phenomena was affected by the emergence of four paradigms of social movements, from mass behavior (Kornhauser, 1959), which continued with Tilly (1978) with his landmark work *From Mobilization to Revolution* which examines the ways people act together in pursuit of common interests. McAdam followed with *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (1983), and Tarrow brought up the rear a decade later with *Democracy and Disorder* (1989). However, all these paradigms seem insufficient to analyze the social movements after the third wave of democratization in several countries.

The newest social movement paradigm is coming from Tilly (2001) on the dynamic of contention (DOC). This paradigm assumes that social movements are broader than movements carried out by society to fight for rights and identity or end economic problems. Social movements can significantly influence other political phenomena, such as elections. The relationship between social movements and elections is associated with the emergence of new political actors and identities (Heaney, 2023).

Furthermore, the DOC identifies the causal mechanisms that recur over a wide range of contentious politics. The DOC specifies the mechanisms linking the movement actors to routine political actors in the electoral process (McAdam & Tarrow, 2010). The six mechanisms offered are: (1) Movements introduce new forms of collective action that influence the election, (2) Movements join electoral coalitions or, in extreme cases, turn into parties themselves, (3) Movements engage in proactive electoral mobilization, (4) Movements engage in reactive electoral mobilization, (5) Movements polarise political parties internally, and (6) Shifts in electoral regimes have a long-term impact on mobilization and demobilization.

This study only uses the first mechanism, whereas the movements introduced new forms of collective action that influence elections. This mechanism assumes that every social movement actor can use innovative strategies to achieve their goals. NGOs have a variety of innovative strategies to influence elections, although all of their strategies are nonviolent resistance strategies. This strategy innovation is then used as a tool to achieve their goals.

From the explanation above, this paper tries to conceptualize a new strategy from social movement theory. A new strategy is one that has never been used or is a form of innovation from old strategies by NGOs to achieve their goals. The novelty of the strategy applied by NGOs is shown by how the NGOs try to create a positive perception of their existence for the government. This perception is gained by building cooperative behavior, with the NGOs not always positioning themselves as the government's nemesis. In other words, the new strategies by NGOs are indicated as a cooperative strategy.

In contrast, the old strategies illustrates how NGOs typically achieve their objectives. Usually, NGOs reach their goals by positioning themselves as opposing forces to the government. NGOs believe that the primary purpose of their existence is to serve as

government evaluators. As a result, their strategies often involve sporadic and hard diplomacy. In sum, the main characteristic of the old form NGO strategy was antagonistic.

New Actor and Identity

The relationship between social movements and elections is often associated with emerging political actors and identities (Heaney, 2023). The archetype of the new actors that arise from this interaction is an individual or party that combines partisan forms and starts a movement. Pirro (2019) highlights this relationship in the emergence of the Jobbik party in Hungary.

Originating in 1999 as a Christian, conservative student movement, this party initially engaged in traditional protest activities. However, as its organizers became more dissatisfied with the right-wing political establishment of their country, they opted to formalize their presence by registering as a political party in 2003. Jobbik presented a platform that combined elements of “radical patriotism, Christianity, and anti-communism” alongside stances against globalization, capitalism, and corruption (Pirro, 2019). Even though they faced an unsuccessful election, by 2018, it had become the largest opposition party in Hungary and perhaps the most well-known far-right party in Europe. This example illustrates that although they did not win the election, the Jobbik movement successfully promoted social change by becoming the most significant opposition in Hungary.

Using the illustration of the Jobbik party in Hungary, the relationship between social movements and elections has also occurred in Indonesia and the Philippines. A group of election experts initiated a movement to promote free and fair elections in the early 1950s (Hedman, 2001) in the Philippines and around 1997 in Indonesia. Then, the movement became NGOs, NAMFREL in the Philippines and KIPP in Indonesia, that committed to conducting election monitoring, which is considered a significant factor in maintaining the integrity of elections (Kelley, 2008).

Tactical Innovation of Social Movement

Ganz (2000) argues that, “Strategy is the conceptual link made by movements by considering the places, the times, and ways to mobilize and deploy the resources, and with the hope the goals will be achieved”. Strategy is how we turn what we have into what we need – by translating our resources into the power to achieve purpose. Two types of strategies are

involved in a social movement: disruption with violence (Piven & Cloward, 1977) and non-violent resistance (Chenoweth & Cunningham, 2013).

McAdam's (1983) analysis of the black insurgency 1955-1970 showed how the viability of social movements by black people in the United States was influenced by the movement's tactical innovation. Furthermore, McAdam (1982) outlined the two crucial prerequisites for the process of tactical innovation. The first is the level of indigenous organization within the aggrieved population; the second is the alignment of groups within the larger political environment. The first can be conceived of as the degree of organizational "readiness" within the minority community, and the second, following Eisinger (1973), as the "structure of political opportunities" available to insurgent groups.

Moreover, there are two types of movement strategies: violence and non-violence. Strategies of violence are often considered adequate for social movements to achieve goals. This kind of strategy is shown in the social movement strategies; for instance, in the 1990s, the civil war between nebulous Islamic insurgency and military in Algeria (Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004), the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe Islamique Armé, GIA) perpetrated a wave of massacres against civilians in villages and hamlets south of Algiers. (Hafez, 2004). This violence was reproduced at lower levels throughout the Middle East, including in Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Libya, Sudan, and Egypt. At the same time, a transnational network of radical Salafis loosely affiliated with Osama bin Laden attacked US targets in Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Kenya, and Yemen.

Nonetheless, non-violent resistance strategies are considered to significantly influence a social movement's success (Schock, 2005). For example, the sit-in strategy during the black insurgency in the 1960s was the most influential strategy that gained much public attention and seized the world's attention (McAdam, 1983). The existence of "modular" or easily adaptable and applicable elements across a range of causes, physical spaces, and social groups makes this strategy considered a highly successful strategy (Tarrow, 2010). In line with that, a movement network also supports the endurance of non-violent strategies (Pavan, 2017). This networking will supply the material or non-material movement needs.




Figure 2.1 Conceptual Flow

2. 1. b. Social Control Theory

Social control theory will be used to analyze how NGO election monitoring activity affects the election integrity score. Social control can take the form of active participation in election monitoring, disclosure of information about violations, or enforcement of moral norms that encourage honest and fair election behavior.

According to Hirschi (1969), social control theory is said to be an understanding of deviant actions that are usually triggered by the absence of supervision or control in the social environment. This theory was originally built from a psychological perspective, which states that humans' basic nature is to disobey applicable laws with a high desire to violate established regulations or rules. Social control theory also helps explain the mechanism of a person's obedience to applicable social rules and values. This theory is an analytical tool to see mechanisms so that human or society behavior stays in line with applicable norms. The effectiveness of NGOs' election monitoring will be assessed using the four elements of social control theory. Where these four elements will determine the extent to which election monitoring activity by NGOs can produce a high election integrity score.

First is attachment, which is the relationship between entities, such as the relationship between domestic election observers and government election institutions. The relationship between domestic institutions and government election institutions is needed to strengthen the position of domestic institutions. NGOs are willing to cooperate with the government to create higher-quality elections. In this case, the NGOs can convince the government to realize their existence, which would help the government to gain a better election; as Febriansyah

(2020) states, government supervisory institutions are insufficient to supervise the election. NGOs use adaptive tactics by establishing reciprocal relationships with the government; for instance, they are involved in election supervision structure and advocate regulation to promote better elections.

Second, involvement is an effort to prevent fraud or minimize cases of irregularities. Conducting voter education programs and producing credible information during the election period is one of the efforts taken by NGOs. Through this voter education, society will have a better understanding of elections, which can increase the public's critical outlook and active participation. Thus, society is expected to report fraud or violations when they see the fraud. In line with that, the availability of credible information supports the public in critical thinking, especially during elections.

Third, commitment is where domestic NGO election observers have a solid commitment to producing a free and fair election and getting a higher election integrity score, as announced by the international election observer organizations (Mowdays et al. 1979). This commitment is carried out by monitoring the election from the beginning to the end of the election process (pre-election, campaign day, election day, and post-election) (Norris, 2014; Kelly, 2012). The commitment of domestic NGOs is also marked by their efforts to educate the public by conducting political education for citizens on an ongoing basis. They also conduct advocacy as a response to systemic failure, which is useful for improving the system in the future to increase election integrity in the future (Renwick, 2010).

Fourth is belief. According to Hirschi (1969), belief is the acknowledgment of the moral validity of the dominant social value system. The social control theory revolves around this variance in the acceptance of social rules since people are more inclined to transgress the rules if they feel less bound by them (Wiatrowski, 1981). According to Hirschi (1969), there is a single dominant set of values, and even criminals may be able to see the value in those values. However, because of their diminished ties to the prevailing social order, they might not feel obligated to them. Election monitoring conducted by NGO election observers rests on their belief in international norms that election results can only be accepted if election monitoring is involved (Kelley, 2008). Not only is this norm believed by NGO election observers, but it is also believed by politicians that the presence of election monitoring by NGOs can provide better elections.

2. 2. The Indicators of NGOs’ Robustness Level

To see the robustness level of NGOs, this paper will use two indicators: *accountability* and *professionalism*, as proposed by Lempert (2015). Lempert argues that these indicators can be used as a tool to measure how strong NGOs are, in terms of the extent to which NGOs are able to meet professional and development standards for "mission" and "vision" oriented organizations and in meeting international law and public policy objectives to solve root causes of issues in a sustainable way. These two indicators are also able to pinpoint the weaknesses of NGOs that often compromise their mission and standards for the sake of vested interests, or are corrupted by the agendas of large donors who have turned them into “businesses” that essentially function as administrative agencies for often illegal donor purposes.

The Organizational Legitimacy and Accountability indicator covers the extent to which NGOs comply with legal, development and governance objectives. One of the key questions to measure this is "Is the NGO accountable to the law, including the protection of beneficiary culture and sovereignty, and does it fulfill its proper role as an NGO in relation to other organizations?". Meanwhile, the organizational professionalism indicator focuses on whether the NGO has a system of professionalism and managerial efficiency and institutionalizes change consistent with its mission and vision. Those indicators are demonstrated in Table 2.1

Table 2.1
Indicators for measuring NGOs robustness level (Lempert, 2016)

		Organizational Professionalism		
		Weak	Moderate	Strong
Organizational Legitimacy and Accountability	Strong	Poorly Managed Mission-Oriented NGO	-	Truly Professional, Mission-Oriented NGO
	Moderate	-	Organization Defining Itself in a Sector but Partly Co-Opted or Opportunistic and in Transition to Donor Driven	-
	Weak	Donor and Profit-Driven Implementing Agency or	-	Colonial or Single Interest-Driven

		<p>organization Undermining Domestic and/or International Principles and Serving Public Relations Function</p>		<p>Organization Effectively Undermining Domestic and/or International Principles</p>
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Furthermore, the robustness an NGOs is characterized by to what extend the NGO can influence or pressure state policies to conduct free and fair elections (Clark, 1995). NGOs' commitment to quality electoral delivery allows them to mobilize community membership coupled with support from international organizations that are highly motivated by the same values. NGOs are able to influence certain policy issues because of their dedication to a limited range of topics, compared with the state's obligation to address a wider range of demands. In line with this, the robustness level of NGOs is also characterized by the received support from society. Many studies have been conducted on the relationship between civil society and democracy, and to make it easier to read the context of civil society, NGOs are considered to make a significant contribution to the implementation of democratic principles through the process of strengthening civil society (Ottoway & Carothers, 2000).

2. 3. Social Movement Strategy, Robustness level of NGOs, and Election Integrity

According to Helmke and Rosenbluth (2009), the success of a democratic system is in part due to the supervision from the people. With people's participation in monitoring elections, candidates who commit fraud or do not comply with the election rules will receive sanctions in the form of popular disappointment, which can have a negative impact on their tenure – if they are elected – with the biggest social sanction being the end of their political career, as people would no longer vote for them.

Seeing the importance of election monitoring to observe the principles of democracy by involving the active participation of citizens, several scholars believe that community-based election supervision can be realized through election supervision conducted with the participation of NGOs (Ottoway and Carothers, 2000). Thus, this paper assumes that the existence of election monitoring by NGOs will affect the democratic principles and produce elections with a high integrity score.

While a variety of social conditions can affect the robustness level of NGOs, this level is based on their strategy implementation to achieve their goals, such as whether they implement a new or old strategy (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010). The new strategy, or cooperation strategy, is where an NGO becomes a pseudo-government partner by being included in the electoral structure form. Thus, the role of the NGO is more robust because the government does not consider it a threat that must be eliminated. However, it is certainly not easy for NGOs to come into the government and become a pseudo-government partner to monitor the elections quietly.

Conversely, if an NGO adopts an antagonistic strategy (old strategy), such as opposing the electoral structure or challenging it, criticizing the government in a radical way will further weaken the position of the NGO. This is due to the assumption of the state that the NGO is a threat and will risk the stability of the state. Not only that, the implementation of an antagonistic strategy will cause unrest and fear in the community so that support from the community decreases.

Other factors that can explain the robustness level of NGOs is support from international organizations. Support from international organizations can only be obtained if NGOs build networks and affiliate with these organizations. International organizations play an important role in strengthening of NGOs. Through international organizations, NGOs can gain material and non-material support to maximize their efforts to create quality elections.

Furthermore, support from society also has a significant impact on the strength of an NGO's position. This claim echoes the burst of recent scholarship on election monitoring by the Mexican Civic Alliance that included volunteers from the public during the Mexican election in 1994 (Lehoucq, 2003). Others scholars have highlighted how society places more trust on state decisions when all government policies are supervised by NGOs, as they are skeptical of the government (Orbista, 2012).

Meanwhile, lower support from international organizations and society will weaken an NGO's position. The NGO will certainly find it difficult to promote a better election if it works alone. It cannot be denied that promoting a better democratic system requires strong material and non-material support.

What explains the links between the robustness level of NGOs and election integrity? Robust NGOs will influence election integrity by controlling the election through several activities: advocacy to produce better a election system (Clark, 1995); creating voter education

programs (Azra, 2016); becoming a credible and trusted source of election information (Kelly, 2012)' election monitoring (Norris, 2014) in every stage of election (pre-election, campaign day, election day, post-election); promoting the international norms; and being affiliated with an international election observer organization.

From the explanation above, the NGOs strategy, and support from international organization and society will facilitate the robustness of NGOs to influence the election integrity. The pseudo-government partner strategy makes NGOs more robust and able to carry out activities to control elections. The pseudo government partner strategy is realized by the entry of NGOs into the electoral structure. Although NGOs have to go through various obstacles to enter the electoral structure and advocate for elections with more integrity.

In line with that, support from society allows NGOs do their best to provide credible information sources for society during the election period. The election reports from NGOs will in turn increase society's efficacy. Increased society efficacy will lead to higher turnout and will have a favorable impact on the quality of elections.

Furthermore, another activity that can be done by robust NGOs to increase the election integrity score is advocating for a better election system as a response to systemic failure and pressing the government to implement it (Renwick, 2010). Through advocacy from NGOs, future election regulations are expected to have an impact beyond free and fair elections. The existence of elections that are far beyond free and fair is able to increase the value of election integrity. Providing political education for citizens is also an activity by NGOs to increase the election integrity score. Through political education, citizens can gain a better understanding of the electoral process. Azra (2016) argues that political education at all levels of society is the most strategic way to "do" democracy. Political education creates more critical and active society participation especially during election periods. This high level of citizen participation during elections is considered one of the crucial indicators to measure the integrity of elections.

Conversely, in the absence of a new strategy, NGO is weakened. They did not has any support either from government or partner (international organization) they does not have the power/authority/rights to monitor the election. This weakening of an NGO directly results in low election integrity. Even though NGOs can still participate in election monitoring, the results are only limited to collecting fraudulent data during the election process, without any follow-up. See figure 2.2.

Hypothesis 1: The higher level of NGOs robustness level leads to a higher election integrity score in the country.

Social Movement Strategy, NGO's Robustness Level, and Election Integrity			
Society condition	Social Movement Strategy	Robustness Level of NGO's	Election integrity
Support from Society and International Organization	Cooperative Strategy (Pseudo-government partner)	→ Higher level of NGOs robustness	→ High election integrity
	+ Antagonistic Strategy (opposite the election structure)	→ Lower level of NGOs robustness	→ Low election integrity

Figure 2.2 Social Movement Strategy, NGO's Robustness Level, and Election Integrity Relationship

2. 4. Research Design

2. 4. a. Data Source

This research will use primary and secondary data. Primary data will be gathered by using the elite interviewing method. Elite interviews are thus a potent source of data for political researchers and can contribute to empirical research in meaningful ways. According to Tansey (2007), elite interviewing will result in the corroboration of what has been established from other sources, prove what a set of people think, make inferences about a larger population's characteristics/ decisions, and reconstruct an event or set of events.

Secondary data was obtained by conducting archival data and library studies. According to Scott and Kelly (2012), archival data improves one's ability to generate appropriate data to better test hypotheses central to political studies, and using archival data will enhance the quality of political science research. The author conducted archival data excavation on election monitoring activities by looking at the official websites of each NGO. Finding electronic archive sources is seen to be one of the most capable and accessible methods because it is expensive to collect new data sets, and it is challenging to do so anywhere but in significant colleges.

Meanwhile, the author adapted findings from a report published by The Electoral Integrity Project for their election integrity data. The Electoral Integrity Project, an independent academic initiative established in 2012, conducts cutting-edge research comparing elections around the world. The Royal Military College of Canada/Queen's University and the

University of East Anglia are where the project is currently headquartered, under the direction of Dr. Holly Ann Garnett and Professor Toby S. James. Professor Pipa Norris started it in 2012 where it was initially based at Harvard University and the University of Sydney.

The author realizes that one of the limitations of this research is the breadth of data. In the future, this research could be expanded by adding data obtained through elite interviews with each of the NGOs studied and through focus group discussions to gain insights on community responses to election monitoring activity.

2. 4. b. Objective of the Study

This research aims to explain the impact of variations in electoral integrity in Southeast Asia and how the robustness level of NGOs is facilitated by the new or old form of strategy implementation. This research also identifies why Indonesia's election integrity score is higher than that of the Philippines, even though the Philippines experienced democratization earlier.

2. 4. c. Methodology

The selection of the two cases in this paper is also motivated by the comparative method proposed by Mill (1971). As written by Skocpol (1980), macro analysis can be done using Mills' "method of difference". This method uses a contrasting case, in which the phenomenon to be explained and the hypothesized causes are present in another ("negative") case in which the phenomenon and the causes are both absent, although they are as similar as possible to the "positive" cases in other respects.

Adopting the method of difference from Mill, the author argues that in the case of election supervision, Indonesia and the Philippines have some significant similarities (see Table 2.2). However, the output (election integrity) obtained in these two countries differs. According to the Electoral Integrity Project Report (2022), electoral integrity in Indonesia in 2019-2021 was higher than in the Philippines. Indonesia is positioned in the moderate electoral integrity category, while the Philippines is in the low electoral integrity category.

To assess this, I will use the comparative method at the macro analysis level using Mill's method of difference. By adopting this, the author argues that while Indonesia and the

Philippines have some significant similarities in their election integrity (see Table 2.2), the output (election integrity) obtained in these two countries is different.

Table 2.2

Comparative method assessing the variation of election integrity in the Philippine and Indonesia

Method of Difference	Indonesia	The Philippines
Overall similarities	(+) The existence of NGO election monitoring (+) Implementing election (+) The government has the official institution to run the election (+) Implementing the presidential system	(+) The existence of NGO election monitoring (+) Implementing election (+) The government has the official institution to run the election (+) Implementing the presidential system
Crucial difference	(+) Cooperative strategy	(-) Antagonistic strategy
Difference Output	High Election Integrity (58 points based on EIP Index 2022)	Low Election Integrity (48 points based on EIP Index 2022)

2. 4. d. Analysis Plan

To see the relationship between the robustness level of NGOs and election integrity, this paper will use a qualitative comparative method and theory-building (Beach & Pedersen, 2013; Falleti et al., 2013). Comparing the election monitoring by NGOs in Indonesia and the Philippines is used to find causality between election monitoring and election integrity and assumes the robustness level of NGOs as an empirical measurement of election integrity (Lijphart, 1971).

This paper also assumes that the newest strategy implementation by NGOs in each case is a plausible reason for facilitating the robustness level of NGOs. I will carry out process-tracing analysis by looking at the dynamics of elections in Indonesia and the Philippines; how these

two countries achieved a stable level of democracy with well-established election implementation, the history of election monitoring activities carried out by NGOs from time to time, the dynamics of the rise and fall of values election integrity in both countries, what is behind these dynamics, and in the end, this paper will answer the big question of why Indonesia has a higher election integrity score than the Philippines despite the Philippines implimenting election monitoring earlier.

In sum, I employ qualitative and comparative methods by using the method of difference as adopted by Skocpol, 1980, and analyzing the data with process tracing. I delineate the election monitoring activities by NGOs, showing how the election integrity of a state is driven by the robustness of NGOs in their election monitoring activities throughout the four stages of elections. Looking at NGO participation across two countries (Indonesia and the Philippines), this comparison demonstrates that new strategies implemented by NGOs is a crucial factor in increasing election integrity through efficient election monitoring activity.

CHAPTER III

Assessment of NAMFREL and PERLUDEM Performance

3. 1. NAMFREL: Antagonistic Strategy

The term “non-partisan election monitoring” was largely unknown globally until the emergence of the Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) during the 1986 surprise presidential election in the Philippines. NAMFREL's efforts to pay close attention to the urgency and impact of impartial election monitoring have attracted global attention. Election monitoring activities are carried out by NAMFREL to ensure integrity and fairness during the election process. NAMFREL's activities during the 1986 elections not only challenged and ultimately helped overthrow the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos but also set the precedent for non-partisan election monitoring around the world.

The longevity of NAMFREL for 40 years is the result of the strategy of the NGO's pioneering election monitoring activities. Since its inception, Jose “Joecon” Concepcion, NAMFREL's founding father, wanted NAMFREL to be a form of resistance for society in the democratic Philippines. Joecon initiated popular resistance in the form of a peaceful demonstration against Ferdinand Marcos in a way that no one had ever thought of before. Through organized election monitoring, Joecon raised the spirits of the Philippine people and attempted to expose the fraud, corruption, and oppression carried out by Ferdinand Marcos.

From the beginning, social movements by NAMFREL implemented coercive strategies, one of which was through demonstrations. Even though its demonstrations are carried out peacefully, it cannot be denied that the strong friction between the government and NAMFREL is still clearly visible until today. The initial friction between the government and NAMFREL occurred after NAMFREL announced the results of the snap presidential election in the Philippines in 1986. At that time, voting and vote counting was still done manually, so NAMFREL mobilized volunteers spread across almost all cities in the Philippines to carry out extensive and in-depth election monitoring.

The results of NAMFREL's monitoring during the election and operation of quick count (OQC) announced Aquino as the winner of the election, contrary to the Commission on Election's (COMELEC) decision. This was also one of the primary triggers for the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986. At that time, NAMFREL collaborated with various

elements of society (business people, educational institutions, churches, and civil society) to ensure the integrity and transparency of elections in the Philippines. When quick count results showed massive fraud in the general election, this sparked widespread anger and dissatisfaction among Philippine society.

Free and fair elections are not an easy thing to achieve, and it took a big struggle for NAMFREL to make it happen. The success of election monitoring activities carried out by NAMFREL in the 1986 elections was the starting point of NAMFREL's struggle. NAMFREL continues to work to create free and fair elections. The main challenge NAMFREL faces in the 21st century is its increasingly limited space due to increasingly stringent government regulations. Restrictions issued by the government in the form of election regulations include limited information, limited participation in election monitoring, and frequent threats that election officers.

NAMFREL has not stopped working for free and fair elections in the Philippines. It uses various methods, including releasing statements to provide information to the public on NAMFREL's opinions, or statements regarding the implementation of the election. These statements also include NAMFREL's harsh criticisms of the government, which is made to ensure that NAMFREL's existence remains significant and is heard by the government.

The automated system used in elections in the Philippines has led to NAMFREL racing to improve the technological skills and knowledge of its members. This is not only to understand the details of the system-based election process in the Philippines but also to use this expertise in technology and information to disseminate information quickly and widely, as well as to mobilize support from the community (through registering NAMFREL volunteers). Through various digital platforms such as websites, Instagram and Facebook accounts, and its YouTube channel, NAMFREL is able to collect reports from the public regarding election violations, monitor the voting process, and provide actual information regarding the election situation in various locations.

NAMFREL's long struggle reflects its tireless commitment to fighting for democracy. Even though it faces many obstacles, it maintains its passion for free and fair elections. In an era where democracy is often threatened by various forces, the role of organizations like NAMFREL is increasingly essential to ensure that democratic rights remain protected and respected.

3. 1. a. Foreign Capital? It's Restricted

Most NGOs in the world receive support from international organizations. The support obtained can take material or non-material form. But this is not the case for NAMFREL. As an NGO that focuses on election monitoring issues, NAMFREL was formed earlier than the international organizations around the world that focus on the same problem. As the initiator of election monitoring, NAMFREL has never received assistance from international organizations in carrying out its activities. So how has NAMFREL survived for 40 years without donors from international organizations? The answer is the firm intention of the initiator of NAMFREL, Jose Concepcion, and support from the religious authority (Catholic Church), private educational institutions, and local businesses in the Philippines.

The absence of donors from international organizations was initially due to NAMFREL being the first NGO to initiate a movement based on the issue of election monitoring. NAMFREL was officially founded in 1984, two years before large-scale demonstrations in the Philippines occurred. NAMFREL's presence in the Philippines is like a candle to illuminate the darkness of authoritarian regimes that are currently in place in various parts of the world, including the Philippines.

Yet another key reason why NAMFREL cannot receive assistance from international organizations is stated in the New ISO: BPSSI November 26, 1991–Omnibus Election Code RA 8173 and RA 7166. The Philippine government regulations state that accredited non-governmental organizations are prohibited from obtaining material assistance from international organizations. If it is found that the organization is receiving aid, the institution's accreditation will be revoked, and the organization will no longer be allowed to carry out its usual activities. Despite this, NAMFREL continues to promote free and fair elections. With the help of modest funds obtained from churches, Catholic educational institutions, and local businesses (see Table 3.1), NAMFREL can still attract millions of volunteers to work together to protect the nation, carry out voter education programs, and monitor elections reasonably.

Several local businesses and professional associations who felt disadvantaged by Marcos' leadership have endorsed NAMFREL's financially. Several local businesses and professional associations also help NAMFREL to carry out election monitoring missions in a number of cities by joining as volunteers. The involvement of members of local business people and

professional associations shows their seriousness in providing support for election monitoring by NAMFREL. This volunteer involvement is also one of the key factors in the success of NAMFREL election monitoring activity in several cities.

Table 3.1
NAMFREL Local Donors

Institution	Cooperation Design	Period	Output
Makati Business Club	Giving money	1985	Demonstration mobilization
Catholic Church	Moral support	1986	Increasing society trust
Education institution	Active participant	1986	Expanded election monitoring activities
San Miguel Corporation	Giving money	-	NGO operation costs
Jollibee	Delivering hot meals to NAMFREL volunteers	-	NGO operation on election week
Metrobank	Giving money		NGO operation costs
The Bistro Group	Delivering hot meals to NAMFREL volunteers		NGO operation on election week
SM Investment Corporation	Giving money		NGOs operation costs

Religious Authority Encouragement

Apart from financial assistance from Philippine businesses, NAMFREL also received moral support from religious authorities in the Philippines and the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church helped NAMFREL to spread its values in several Philippine cities (Hedman, 1999). NAMFREL even received an official declaration of support from the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) before the election took place. In the region of Cebu, several CBCP members and officials also acted as regional coordinators for NAMFREL election monitoring activities.

Additionally, from its inception, NAMFREL was closely linked to the Bishops-Businessmen Conference (BBC), which included several bishops, business leaders affiliated with the church, and a number of academics and religious figures. Bishop Fortich, a board member of the BBC, also served as the national co-chairman of NAMFREL. Overall, at least 20 bishops and one Cardinal served as official NAMFREL coordinators, while Manila's Cardinal Sin, the most politically prominent prelate in the Philippine Church, played a crucial behind-the-scenes role in supporting the national-level lay leaders involved in the 1986 election-watch campaign.

Private Educational Institutions

Higher education institutions have played a crucial role in the mobilization of local NAMFREL branches across cities in the Philippines. However, support for NAMFREL was not confined to private or Catholic schools. Colleges and universities managed by Jesuits and other religious orders, which are part of the nationwide Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP), played the most prominent roles.

NAMFREL in return provides special election education or classes for students at educational institutions. NAMFREL realizes that comprehensive election education is critical to forming a generation of intelligent and critical voters. Therefore, it organizes various educational programs and activities specifically designed for students and students. The young voter education program teaches the younger generation the importance of clean and fair elections, the electoral process, and their role as active and responsible citizens.

Apart from that, NAMFREL has also provided input to policymakers so that special material about elections is included in the education curriculum. This step is intended to ensure that election knowledge can be conveyed and channeled through formal educational institutions. In this way, students can gain a deep understanding of election procedures and systems, as well as related issues such as election integrity, transparency, and citizen participation.

3. 1. b. Government Nemesis

Having implemented a democratic system since 1946, the Philippines has a special government institution to run the election named the Commission on Election (COMELEC).

COMELEC has full authority over the implementation of elections from the pre-election stage, campaign day, election day, post-election, and announcing the election winner. Initial friction between NAMFREL and COMELEC occurred during the snap presidential elections in 1986. At that time, COMELEC announced Ferdinand Marcos as the winner of the election, while NAMFREL announced the opposition as the winner.

The relationship between NAMFREL and COMELEC, the agency authorized to organize and conduct elections, is nothing more than a two-way cold relationship between the government and the NGO. Even though their relationship is two-way, in reality, it takes hard work to convince the government to accept the ideas and input by NAMFREL. Since its inception, NAMFREL has consistently stated its position towards the government, and it is not uncommon for NAMFREL to have opposing arguments with the government.

Even though we have often sent official letters to the COMELEC, the structure means these letters take days to be processed and responded to. For this reason, it is not uncommon for NAMFREL to publish standing positions or what it usually make “*statement letters*” on NAMFREL’s website and personal social media. This statement letter usually contains arguments from NAMFREL personally responding to the rules or policies issued by the COMELEC. The arguments can be in the form of supporting or criticizing the policies that are being implemented.

Those statement letters became more viral on social media and attracted public attention. To reduce government distrust, COMELEC once warned NAMFREL to be wiser when making and publishing statement letters. COMELEC stated that if the statement letter contained criticism, it was a good idea to send the argument to COMELEC first before posting it on social media and on websites. NAMFREL originally agreed to this, but complicated bureaucracy again became an obstacle to accessing the letter and receiving an immediate response. Nevertheless, NAMFREL feels that the statement letter uploaded on social media and the website is purely to provide information about NAMFREL’s position to the public. NAMFREL strives to be a channel that the public can rely on to find out as detailed information as possible regarding the implementation of elections.

Realizing the potential of NAMFREL, COMELEC is trying to build a good relationship with NGO. For instance, COMELEC invited NAMFREL to attend as a participant in discussions ahead of 2020 the election. NAMFREL worked with COMELEC in preparation for the 2020

election through its participation in the COMELEC Advisory Council (CAC), the Automated Election System (AES) Steering Committee, and the Random Manual Audit Committee (RMAC) meetings.

Yet obstacles to election monitoring have remained. It is not uncommon for NAMFREL to face barriers in the form of violence, especially when monitoring elections in voting booths. Several cases of violence have even been experienced directly by NAMFREL volunteers in the Buluan area, Maguindanao; Malabang, Lanao del Sur; San Luis, Aurora; Baybay City, Leyte, Cotabato City; and Tagbilaran City (NAMFREL; 2022).

3. 2. *PERLUDEM: Cooperative Strategy*

Election monitoring in Indonesia began in 1997, around the same time as the NGO Independent Election Monitoring Committee (KIPP) was founded, on March 15, 1996. This institution was formed by activists, journalists, and academics, as well as with the support of 20,000 volunteers. KIPP, inspired by NAMFREL, revealed various violations in the elections at the end of the New Order.

The 1999 election was a new era for public openness in for expressing political aspirations after 32 years of being restrained by the New Order regime. At that time, new political parties emerged from various community groups, growing to 48 political parties in total at the time. This phenomenon marked a new era in Indonesian democracy, where public participation in the political process increased.

In 2004, for the first time, the presidential election was held directly. This election was widely monitored by 25 institutions accredited to the KPU, including monitoring carried out by the mass media. During this time, other election monitoring NGOs were formed, such as the Voter Education Network (JPPR), the Indonesian Election Monitoring Community Network (Jampi), Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), the Institute of Research, Education and Information of Social and Economic Affairs (LP3ES), and FORMASI. Election monitoring in 2004 was supported by 14,000 volunteers, and for the first time, used social media platforms such as YouTube and Skype.

Unfortunately, NGOs that focus on promoting the values of free and fair elections are increasingly fading. They no longer frequently carry out in-depth election monitoring activities, and criticism of the government regarding regulations and the electoral system is rarely heard. One of the causes of the lack of election monitoring institutions is that election activities are dominated by state officials. In Indonesia, the entire election process involves state institutions, from drafting regulations and implementation to supervision. The dominance of state actors is slowly diminishing the significance of election monitoring NGOs. The election supervision mechanism is also regulated in such a way that all reports regarding election violations can only be reported and will be processed through state institutions.

The biggest problem is that when the entire election process is dominated by state actors, it is not only the election monitoring NGOs that fade but the activities of civil society in Indonesia are blunted. This condition will have a long-term effect on the health of Indonesian democracy. It is appropriate for a country that adheres to a democratic system to strengthen the role of civil society, especially in controlling all democratic processes and supervising the government in carrying out its role, not the other way around.

Institutionalized election monitoring activities are unique to Indonesia. Historically speaking, the election supervision institution in Indonesia was first formed by President Soeharto in 1982 under the name the Election Implementation Supervisory Committee (Panwaslak Pemilu). Behind the idea of establishing an election monitoring institution to create elections that were fairer and free from fraud, the formation of the Panwaslak Pemilu was one of the New Order's strategies to dampen the aspirations of the two rival parties to Golkar. The 1977 election was the starting point for the New Order government's anxiety to form the Election Supervisory Committee. In 1977, the two parties participating in the election, the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), protested against the election, which they claimed was dominated by fraud.

The protests launched by both parties had quite an impact at that time, which the government saw as disrupting the stability of the state and creating a large wave of public distrust toward the government in office. To overcome this, the government established an election monitoring institution whose function was to supervise the election process and which held the authority to impose sanctions on election participants who violated regulation. Instead of creating an official channel as a mouthpiece for the people regarding fraud, in reality, the

formation of the Panwaslak Pemilu was intended to quell the aspirations and protests raised by political parties and civil society. Under the pretext that all reports of fraud during the election process had been handled by the authorities, once again, state institutions succeeded in taking away the right of political parties or civil society to play an active role in the election process.

Therefore, in most established democratic countries, or even across Southeast Asia, there are no official election monitoring institution like the Election Panwaslak, renamed BAWASLU, in Indonesia. Most have an election management body with the authority to organize and carry out elections, with the right to supervise elections entirely down to civil society. Political parties' participation in election monitoring activities is also relatively high because they do not want to be harmed by fraud committed by opposing political parties.

However, these circumstances do not mean Indonesia does not have NGOs that play an active role in election monitoring activities in order to maintain the quality of democracy in Indonesia. One NGO still active in electoral issues is the Association for Elections and Democracy (PERLUDEM), which is the result of an initiation from several members of the 2004 Panwaslak Pemilu, Didik Supriyanto, Topo Santoso and Siti Noordjannah Djohantini, among others. The idea to establish PERLUDEM emerged on the sidelines of the Panwaslak evaluation meetings after the 2004 legislative and presidential elections, which, in the end, was responded to positively by all participants.

PERLUDEM was founded in January 2005 with the legal entity status of an association. PERLUDEM is an NGO that focuses on advocating for government policies on general election issues. The birth of PERLUDEM aims to complement the attributes that Indonesia, as a democratic country, should have. PERLUDEM is intended to be an independent and trusted channel for people who want to report election fraud during the election period.

Looking at the longevity of election monitoring NGOs, PERLUDEM realized that it was not easy to become a strong and sustainable NGO amid the onslaught of government regulations that increasingly restrict election monitoring activities. This has been exacerbated by the decline in public awareness, accompanied by the apathy shown during recent elections (Bjornlund, 2004). PERLUDEM adopted various new strategies to strengthen itself and avoid repeating the decline of former election monitoring NGOs election. The two main strategies implemented since 2005 were collaborating with international organizations and becoming a

pseudo-government partner. These two strategies have allowed PERLUDEM to survive and sustain until today. However, this does not mean that PERLUDEM's struggle to promote the values of free and fair elections is without challenges.

Furthermore, the role of international organizations in strengthening the role and position of PERLUDEM in Indonesia is very significant. PERLUDEM realizes the need for support from international parties to back up all its activities that will be carried out. It cannot be denied that election monitoring activities require high costs, and providing education for citizens requires contributions of knowledge from international parties that have a more established democratic system. Therefore, several international organizations have played an essential role in the success of the various election monitoring activities carried out by PERLUDEM, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), US AID, International IDEA, and so forth.

3. 2. a. Cooperation with International Organizations

PERLUDEM realizes that elections are a complicated democratic instrument. There are at least four main elements in elections: systems, actors, management, and law enforcement. The existence of PERLUDEM as an NGO can make a significant contribution to the fourth element, law enforcement. Law enforcement in elections in Indonesia is divided into two areas – law enforcement in cases of violations and in disputes. Election violations are actions that conflict with or are not in accordance with laws and regulations relating to elections. In contrast, election disputes refer to conflicts that arise either between election participants themselves or between election participants and election organizers, stemming from decisions made by the KPU in any of its branches.

Election violations are divided into administrative and criminal violations. Election administration violations encompass breaches in the processes, procedures, and mechanisms integral to the management and execution of elections at all stages of their implementation. Meanwhile, criminal election violations are acts or actions that violate the criminal offense articles regulated in the Election Law.

Complicated law enforcement mechanisms, especially in Indonesia, reduce people's active participation in monitoring elections. Therefore, PERLUDEM placed itself as an independent institution to bridge people's aspirations to election management institutions, supported by international organizations.

The first collaboration with international organizations carried out by PERLUDEM was with the UNDP in 2005. At that time, the UNDP was looking for an institution to implement a program to increase democracy in Indonesia through educational activities for voters. The founders of PERLUDEM, had a good reputation in all circles, and their expertise in the field of elections was beyond doubt. The UNDP invited PERLUDEM to establish cooperation in the first program, which was to open election classes that could be attended by every level of society.

PERLUDEM has collaborated with several other international organizations to support election monitoring activities and education for voters. The collaboration between PERLUDEM and International IDEA focused on a voter education program titled the Lecture Series on Elections in 2020. This voter education program was carried out in order to continue implementing educational programs for voters even though the world was experiencing the pandemic. This lecturer series on elections discussed a different theme in each session. Even though it was carried out online, the program was never empty of enthusiasts, for instance Southeast Asia Election & Democracy Series of Discussion Vol.1 has 283 views.

Another form of collaboration carried out between PERLUDEM and International IDEA in 2021 was aimed at academics. The institutions organized an international conference with the theme "Reforming the Financial System of Political Parties in Southeast Asia: Towards Greater Transparency and Accountability," which was held on September 13, 2021. This event was initiated in commemoration of National Democracy Day, which falls every September 15.

The international conference also involved a number of election monitoring organizations from Southeast Asia, including LENTE (Philippines), Bersih 2.0 (Malaysia), PRADET, and Women Caucus (Timor-Leste). The international election experts from four Southeast Asia countries were gathered to examine and talk about the difficulties in implementing political party finance reform in Southeast Asia as well as ways to increase the efficiency of the region's political finance frameworks. Overall, the conference produced an agreement on challenges that still exist, particularly on oversight capabilities and making political finance inclusive for women and other underrepresented groups, in spite of advances made in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste in raising the transparency and accountability of political finances. Furthermore, in order to strengthen its position and

increase its role and function, PERLUDEM also collaborates with several international organizations that focus on expanding the democracy index (see table 3.2)

Table 3.2
PERLUDEM Data for Cooperation with International Organization

International Organization	Cooperation Design	Period	Output
UNDP	Program Funding	2005	Voter Education Program
International IDEA	Program Funding and Book Launching	2019	Book Launch <i>Penerapan Teknologi Pungut Hitung untuk Indonesia</i>
	Program Funding	2020	Voter Education Program (Lecturer Series on Elections)
US AID	Program Funding	2021	International Conference
International IDEA	Program Funding	2021	International Conference
	Facilitating App Launch	2022	Electoral Redistricting App (ERA) launching
Australia Award	Program Funding	2022	An online talk show for young voter education
US AID	Program Funding	2023	Regional Conference
Center for Digital Society	Program Funding	2023	Voter Education Program (Digital and Election Issues)

3. 2. b. Pseudo-Government Partner

The cooperative strategy (new strategy) implemented by PERLUDEM to influence the quality of elections in Indonesia is to become a pseudo-partner of the government. PERLUDEM realizes that NGOs do not have significant power to fight the government in a coercive way. Learning from NAMFREL and several other election monitoring

organizations, it knew that coercive strategies do not always succeed in having a significant impact on the quality of elections.

PERLUDEM has collaborated with several government institutions in Indonesia, including the Home Affairs Ministry (KEMENDAGRI), the General Elections Commission (KPU), and the Elections Supervisory Agency (BAWASLU). Even though it collaborates with various state institutions, PERLUDEM still maintains its commitment as an independent NGO. This is realized in the form of collaboration. For example, PERLUDEM was asked by the Home Affairs Ministry to carry out research titled “Evaluation of the Efficiency of the Implementation Budget and Campaign Funds for Simultaneous Regional Elections.” Unfortunately, the research carried out by PERLUDEM, together with the Home Affairs Ministry, is not intended to be disseminated widely.

The collaboration carried out by PERLUDEM with state institutions is part of PERLUDEM's strategy to convince state institutions that the presence of non-governmental institutions such as PERLUDEM is necessary in the entire election process in Indonesia. Therefore, it is not uncommon for PERLUDEM to receive invitations from the KPU, BAWASLU and Constitutional Court among other state institutions for various kinds of activities or programs, including the training they facilitate, the public discussions they hold, and research. These collaborations provide a clear picture of PERLUDEM's efforts to maintain a balance between contributing to the improvement of the democratic system and maintaining its independence from political influence. The forms of PERLUDEM's collaborations with state institutions can be seen in Table 3.3.

Establishing collaboration with state institutions does not always have a positive impact. PERLUDEM members were asked to be expert witnesses by the KPU in an election dispute trial. Even though they were only expert witnesses, several parties who filed disputes considered PERLUDEM as having a bias toward the defendant party. PERLUDEM is now more careful when accepting cooperation from state institutions, only accepting collaboration with state institutions in the form of training facilitators, resource persons in public discussions, or scientific research, which is usually accompanied by recommendations.

The collaborations between PERLUDEM and the government is also one of the reasons that the government is confident in giving accreditation to PERLUDEM. NGO accreditation is the responsibility of BAWASLU to monitor the performance of election organizers and

participants so that they comply with existing statutory provisions. The accreditation of election observers is renewed every election event. Since its formation, PERLUDEM has always been one of the accredited NGOs that monitor national election events.

Table 3.3
PERLUDEM and Government Collaboration

Government Institution	Cooperation Design	Period	Output
KEMENDAGRI	Research Funding	2020	Research on Evaluation of the Efficiency of the Implementation Budget and Simultaneous Regional Election Campaign Funds
BAWASLU	Collaboration in voter education		Facilitator in the BAWASLU training program
	Press discussion collaboration	2007	Press discussion
	Workshop collaboration	2022	Workshop on monitoring the formation of electoral districts
KPU	Facilitator	-	Expert witness in election dispute council
	Facilitator	2017	Facilitator in election class program
National Security Council	Private discussion	October, 2016	Discussion on election regulation codification
Constitutional Court	Private discussion	June 2016	Discussion on election regulation codification
Cabinet Secretariat	Private discussion	July 2016	Discussion on election regulation codification

PERLUDEM understands that transparency and openness are the keys to gaining the trust of the public. Therefore, every form of collaboration and cooperation carried out with government institutions is always documented and reported openly. This includes activity reports, research publications, and various other forms of communication that can be accessed by the wider community. In this way, PERLUDEM not only proves its commitment to transparency but also encourages public participation in the democratic process.

Establishing cooperation with the government is not an easy thing, especially when it comes to maintaining neutrality. PERLUDEM has navigated this challenge by setting clear boundaries in every collaboration it undertakes. Almost all forms of cooperation between PERLUDEM and government institutions are external. This means that, even though it is often involved in collaborative programs with the government, PERLUDEM has never been included in the government's internal structure.

It cannot be denied that many of the PERLUDEM members were previously members of the Panwaslak Pemilu. However, when they joined as official members of PERLUDEM, they no longer served in the internal government structure. It ensures that every form of cooperation and collaboration carried out with government institutions is carried out on the condition that PERLUDEM remains free to provide criticism and suggestions without any pressure or influence from any party.

Establishing good relations with the government by collaborating in order to increase democratic values in Indonesia is one of the advantages of PERLUDEM, which is able to convince the government of the importance of election monitoring NGOs. The government does not feel threatened by the presence of PERLUDEM, and the NGO has the status of a pressure group that has the right to supervise the government so that democratic values are maintained.

Despite this, friction between the government and PERLUDEM often arises. The most recent case occurred when PERLUDEM criticized President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo's statement *“The president and ministers may take sides in elections as long as they do not use state facilities”* on the election campaign. President Jokowi stated there was no prohibition for heads of state from campaigning, including ministers, as long as they did not use state facilities.

PERLUDEM considered the president's statement to be very shallow and had the potential to be a justification for the president, ministers, and all officials under him to actively campaign and show partiality in the 2024 elections. In his statement, President Jokowi only referred to Article 281 paragraph (1) of Law No. 7/2017 concerning elections, which states that election campaigns involving the President, Vice President, Ministers, Governors, Deputy Governors, Regents, Deputy Regents, Mayors and Deputy Mayors must comply with the provisions of not using office facilities, except for security facilities for officials country in accordance with statutory regulations, and must undergo leave outside the responsibility of the state.

According to the Election Law, state officials, structural officials, and functional officials are prohibited from making decisions or taking actions that benefit or harm any of the election participants during the campaign period. As a follow-up to this regulation, PERLUDEM urged BAWASLU to act firmly and responsibly in handling and cracking down on all forms of non-neutrality and partiality by state apparatus and officials who openly benefit sure election participants. Apart from that, BAWASLU was also asked to take action against all parties suspected of taking advantage of government programs and policies to help ensure election participants.

3. 3. Election Monitoring Activities by NGOs

Election monitoring activities carried out by NGOs are very varied and cover various essential aspects to ensure fair, transparent, and democratic elections. Usually, NGOs will carry out several election monitoring activities such as advocacy, voter education programs, election monitoring in four stages of an election, and dissemination of election information.

3. 3. a. NAMFREL; 15 Years Advocating QR Code Scanner App

Since the Philippine 2010 national and local elections, COMELEC has adopted automated elections to replace the manual system. Changing this system requires thorough preparation, not only from the organizer but also from election monitoring NGOs, such as NAMFREL. NAMFREL continues to improve the skills of members and volunteers, especially in the fields of technology and information. Now, the majority of central NAMFREL administrators have background expertise in the fields of technology and information.

This expertise in the field of technology and information is the basis for NAMFREL to advocate for the government to continue to improve the electoral system both at the national

and local levels. One form of advocacy intensified by NAMFREL for the national and local elections in 2022 was the implementation of a hybrid system. In a hybrid system, the votes in the polling station places/clustered precincts would be manually counted, but the transmission would be automated. The biggest reason of system implementation to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections, and assure the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot in order that the results of elections, plebiscites, referenda, and other electoral exercises shall be fast, accurate and reflective of the genuine will of the people (Republic Act No. 8436). Unfortunately, Congress did not pass the law to adopt such a system, and COMELEC exercised its authority under the Election Automation Law to use the existing Automated Election System (AES) for the election.

The rejection of the hybrid system proposed by NAMFREL did not stop NAMFREL from advocating for other systems to create accessible and fair elections. NAMFREL focused its attention on exploring possible areas of AES improvement and proposed several measures to enhance AES transparency. NAMFREL promoted five standards to improve the AES, including a shift to open source licensing of all AES software, use of the Election Markup Language (EML) throughout the election process without conversion to another format, a New Ballot Format where candidates per position are randomly assigned a unique number and the names of the candidates are arranged following their randomly assigned unique numbers, Proper Implementation of Personal Digital Signatures, and quick response (QR) codes on the voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) and election return (ER).

Of the five standards offered by NAMFREL, COMELEC has only adopted one standard, which is QR codes on the VVPAT and ER. This standard was implemented in the 2022 national and local elections. However, whether it contained the candidates voted for could not be verified since COMELEC denied NAMFREL's request for the data dictionary of the QR code in order to complete NAMFREL's QR code scanner app. The QR code on the ER contains only the hash code.

NAMFREL stated that it proposed this QR code scanner app 15 years ago to COMELEC. It should be noted that plans to discuss AES in the Philippines have been underway since 1995. At that time, it was more popular to call computerized elections. The AES was pilot-tested in several provinces during the 1996 election. Meanwhile, AES was conducted in several provinces during the 2008 election.

3. 3. b. NAMFREL Online Voter Education Program

Education for voters is an essential element that must be carried out by the government and other stakeholders, including NGOs, to promote better elections. Voter education can also be said to be the process of providing information, knowledge, and understanding to the public regarding various aspects of elections, including their rights and obligations as voters, election procedures, how to vote, and the importance of active participation in the democratic process.

Voter education programs are a key part of NAMFREL’s activities to convince the public that one way to change the future of the country is through the active involvement of citizens, especially in election activities. The following are several voter education program activities held by NAMFREL (see Table 3.4).

Table 3.4
NAMFREL Online voter education program

Program Title	Location	Date and Time	Program Name
Botante Bits	Online platform/ social media	September, 2021	1. Pagbato sa new normal 2022 national and local elections 2. Ang automated election system 2022 3. Bantay ng Bayan 4. online briefings

3. 3. c. Direct Participation in Election Monitoring Activity

Election monitoring in every stage of the election process is carried out by almost all NGOs that focus on election issues. For NAMFREL, of the four stages of the election process,

monitoring during election day is the most crucial activity to carry out. Fraud on election day is likely to occur, especially in the Philippine, with violence often occurring in voting booths.

Therefore, from the beginning of conducting election monitoring, NAMFREL opened the widest possible opportunities for the public to become part of NAMFREL as volunteers who would carry out direct observations at the voting booths. Before carrying out direct monitoring in the field, volunteers are usually provided with various questionnaires that have been prepared by NAMFREL so that monitoring runs systematically. NAMFREL also holds workshops and training for volunteers who pass the registration before joining the election monitoring in the field.

Table 3.5.
NAMFREL Election Monitoring Activities

Dimensions	Monitoring Activity
Pre-Election	
Electoral Procedures	<p>*Information about voting procedures made widely available.</p> <p>NAMFREL facilitated all information about the voting procedure on social media.</p> <p>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i2RloBD_k4M</p> <p>https://www.instagram.com/p/CbeBW0YhnjJ/</p>
Campaign	
Campaign Media	<p>*Parties/candidates did not have fair access to political broadcasts and advertising.</p> <p>Campaign posters of only one candidate could be seen along highways.</p>
Campaign Finance	<p>*Wealthy individuals buying votes in elections.</p> <p>Several vote-buying incidents happened in Magalang, but no one wanted to testify. The increase in vote-buying was affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, following the extreme economic decline for several segments of societies.</p> <p>*Some state resources were improperly used for campaigning.</p> <p>Political rallies in another area could not be conducted by candidates because of a ban by the incumbent mayor.</p>
Election Day	
Voting Process	<p>*Some voters were threatened with violence at the polls.</p> <p>Unknown assailants opened fire and killed three members of a barangay patrol action team; assailants were fired at a helicopter in which a relative</p>

	<p>local candidate was onboard. Fistfight or riots between supporters.</p> <p>*Fraudulent votes were cast.</p> <p>Different names appeared on the VVPAT when another candidate was voted.</p> <p>*The process of voting was not easy.</p> <p>Tech issues during election day, such as VCM-related (paper jams, issues with SD cards, and late replacement of problematic machines).</p> <p>*Voters were not offered a genuine choice at the ballot box.</p> <p>Worsening secrecy of votes.</p> <p>*Some form of internet voting was available.</p> <p>Voting is using the system; every system was based on the internet.</p>
Post-Election	
Vote Count	<p>*The results were announced without undue delay.</p> <p>The election results were announced very early because the vote calculation uses an automatic system.</p> <p>*Votes were counted fairly.</p> <p>Voters are counted by machines, so society cannot monitor the mechanism; they can just monitor the activity in the polling stations.</p> <p>Suspicion of cheating occurs because sometimes the election officers did not give a copy of the election result in a certain polling station.</p> <p>*Domestic election monitors were restricted.</p> <p>Only accredited NGOs can monitor the election (enter the polling station). So far, there are no international organizations allowed by COMELEC to hold election monitoring activities in the polling stations.</p>
Electoral Authorities	<p>*The authorities allowed public scrutiny of their performance.</p> <p>NAMFREL (the accredited NGO) can monitor or scrutinize the election officers' performance. However, they did not have any power to argue with election officers.</p>

3. 3. d. Source of Information

One of NAMFREL's commitments to promoting better elections and improve democracy in the Philippines is to become a trusted source of information for the public. NAMFREL shares information regarding election issues on various platforms such as Instagram, YouTube, Facebook, and various websites.

The information most frequently shared by NAMFREL usually regards voter registration. For NAMFREL, voter registration in a completely manual election system is crucial. If there is an error in the voter list – for example, a number of voters whose names were not registered in the system – then the voter would not be able to cast their vote. Of course, in an electoral system that uses a proportional representation (PR) system, one vote greatly influences the election results. Another possibility is an error when a voter has their name listed more than once. For this reason, NAMFREL usually focuses more on disseminating information regarding voters' obligations to register themselves and double-checking whether their names have been included on the voter list after registering.

3. 3. e. PERLUDEM: Encouraging Advocacy

The collaboration built by PERLUDEM with many state institutions allows PERLUDEM to advocate for government policies well. Several pieces of legislation passed by the government are the result of PERLUDEM's thinking. A number of technical regulations, such as the parliamentary threshold implemented in Indonesia in the 2024 elections, are also the result of advocacy carried out by PERLUDEM.

PERLUDEM usually advocates for the government through legal channels. For example, when filing a lawsuit over PERLUDEM's disagreement regarding parliamentary thresholds. PERLUDEM filed a lawsuit regarding the 4 percent parliamentary threshold, which has been regulated in Law No. 7/2017 concerning elections. The applicant submitted the lawsuit for material review with case number 116/PUU-XXI/2023 and was recorded in the Electronic Constitutional Case Registration Book (e-BRPK) on September 11, 2023.

The lawsuit filed by PERLUDEM contains at least four main points;

1. Grant the petition requested by the applicant in its entirety;
2. Declare Article 414 paragraph (1) of Law No. 7/2017 concerning general elections as long as the phrase "at least 4 percent of the number of valid votes nationally" is contrary to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and has no binding legal force as long as it is not interpreted as "Political parties participating in the election must meet the vote acquisition threshold determined based on rational calculations mathematical and carried out openly, honestly and fairly in accordance with the principles of a proportional electoral system";

3. Order the President and the DPR [House of Representatives] as Law Makers to immediately make improvements to the parliamentary threshold provisions in Law No. 7/2017 concerning general elections by formulating the parliamentary threshold figures in Law No. 7/2017 concerning general elections based on rational, mathematical calculations, and carried out openly, honestly, and fairly in accordance with the principles of a proportional electoral system;
4. Order the decision of the Panel of Constitutional Judges of the Republic of Indonesia to be published in the State Gazette.

In the preliminary hearing held on October 3, 2023, the attorney for the PERLUDEM applicant said the parliamentary threshold was one of the important variables of the electoral system, which would have a direct impact on the process of converting votes into seats. Furthermore, PERLUDEM states that in a proportional election system, the vote acquisition of a political party must be in line with the number of seats obtained in the legislative body. Fiddling with parliamentary thresholds without further study could result in the failure of a proportional electoral system.

Indonesia has implemented a proportional system for electing members of parliament since the elections held in 1999. However, the results were the opposite because the percentage of votes obtained by political parties was not in line with the percentage of seats obtained in parliament. Therefore, the petitioner, in its provisions, asked the Constitutional Court to make the Review Case of Article 414 paragraph (1) of the Election Law submitted by the petitioner a priority case for examination at the Constitutional Court.

In the Material Review Session of the Election Law, which was held on February 29, 2024, the Constitutional Court granted part of the request by stating that the provisions of Article 414 paragraph (1), which regulates the parliamentary threshold of 4 percent, are still valid for the 2024 Election.

In considering the decision resulting from the trial, the Constitutional Court stated that the parliamentary threshold policy had violated people's sovereignty, the principles of election justice, and fair legal certainty for all election contestants, including voters who exercised their right to vote, therefore, starting in 2029 the parliamentary threshold must be recalculated.

Apart from parliamentary thresholds, PERLUDEM also often provides advocacy regarding rules or regulations regarding elections to the competent authorities. Among them is regarding women's representation in elections. PERLUDEM provided a recommendation that 30 percent of seats in electoral districts be filled by female candidates in number 1 so as to open up opportunities for female candidates to compete in many electoral districts, and they also stated it was best to implement an alternating/50:50 system between female and male candidates in positions ballot.

Even though not all of these recommendations have been adopted into the Election Law, at least the advocacy regarding women's representation of 30 percent has reopened the opportunity for female candidates to take part in the five-year contest. This advocacy is the result of hard work and collaboration between PERLUDEM and various civil society organizations, women's activists, and advocacy groups, who have struggled for years to ensure that women's voices have their rightful place in the political process in Indonesia. Apart from these two cases, PERLUDEM has also submitted several advocacies not only for the government but also for all of society (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6
PERLUDEM Advocacy

Issues	Period	Link
Money politics regulation	2016	https://perludem.org/2016/04/27/ini-saran-perludem-untuk-revisi-uu-pilkada/
Overseas special constituencies	2017	https://perludem.org/2017/05/30/aspirasi-diaspora-indonesia-sudah-saatnya-dibentuk-dapil-khusus-luar-negeri/
Police and military neutrality in election	2018	https://perludem.org/2018/01/09/tni-polri-dalam-kontestasi-pilkada-2018-pertahankan-supremasi-sipil-jaga-netralitas-tni-polri/
Guaranteeing the protection of voters' private data	2018	https://perludem.org/2018/11/30/pemilu-demokratis-harus-menjamin-perlindungan-data-privasi-pemilih/

Simultaneous election design	2019	https://perludem.org/2019/05/01/perludem-pemilu-serentak-indonesia-adalah-yang-terumit-di-dunia/
Eliminating the stigma against people with disabilities	2019	https://perludem.org/2019/01/17/hentikan-stigma-terhadap-penyandang-disabilitas-mental/
Eliminating the phrase “already/ever married” as a voter requirement	2020	https://perludem.org/2020/01/30/perjuangan-untuk-menghapuskan-frasa-sudah-pernah-kawin-sebagai-syarat-pemilih-masih-panjang/
Prepare detailed rules regarding campaign rules on social media	2020	https://perludem.org/2020/12/06/temuan-awal-konten-kampanye-media-sosial-pilkada-2020/
Objections to the presence of government elements in the KPU and BAWASLU Selection Team	2021	https://perludem.org/2021/11/09/icw-perludem-dan-pusako-kirim-surat-keberatan-ke-presiden-terkait-unsur-pemerintah-di-timssel-kpu-dan-BAWASLU-yang-tidak-sesuai-dengan-uu-pemilu/
Fighting for women's right	2023	https://perludem.org/2023/05/18/perludem-suara-perempuan-penting-dalam-kontestasi-politik/
Opening campaign opportunities on campus in debate and discussion formats	2023	https://perludem.org/2023/07/17/perludem-usulkan-kampanye-di-kampus-tidak-dilarang-asalkan-format-debat/

3. 3. f. Election Education Program for All

PERLUDEM has carried out educational activities for voters since its inception. In collaborating with the UNDP, PERLUDEM received fresh funds to start an election monitoring organization by holding educational programs for voters. PERLUDEM continues to expand its reach to commit to upgrading educational activities for voters. These include holding joint discussions with journalists, holding conferences at regional and international levels, and utilizing internet platforms as tools to expand the dissemination of activities.

Voter education is one of the three main activities carried out by PERLUDEM to promote free and fair elections. PERLUDEM often participates in efforts to increase the understanding of election philosophy among stakeholders, community leaders, and the wider community. Yet the type of education carried out by PERLUDEM is not limited to citizens but is also used to increase the knowledge and skills of election officials and election observers; this is one reason for creating collaboration between PERLUDEM and the government.

The forms of voter education activities carried out by PERLUDEM vary greatly, from holding formal training such as special election classes, light talk shows that discuss election issues, podcasts, and YouTube infographic videos, to providing online-based libraries. The form of voter education activities carried out by PERLUDEM can be seen in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7
PERLUDEM Voter Education Program

Program Title	Launch Date	Link
<i>Kelas Khusus Perludem</i>	2012 - now	https://perludem.org/2021/10/11/kelas-khusus-perludem-kkp-demokrasi-dan-pemilu-negara-pemerintah-dan-partai-politik/
<i>DESUS: Digital and Election Issues</i>	2019 - now	https://perludem.org/2023/03/21/digital-and-election-issues-desus/
<i>Regional Conference</i>	2023	https://perludem.org/2023/09/08/regional-conference-strengthening-electoral-integrity-in-southeast-asia-lesson-learned-from-five-years-of-respect-program-implementation/
<i>Diskusi Media</i>	2007 - now	https://www.instagram.com/p/CEVX6kmheYK/

3. 3. g. Election Monitoring Activity

PERLUDEM's election monitoring began in 2015. Its monitoring activities covered all elections taking place in Indonesia. These ranged from elections at the regional level, such as regional head elections (governors, mayors, and regents) and Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD), to national-level elections, such as presidential elections and legislative member elections (DPR). Collaboration with the government and its accreditation also allows PERLUDEM more space.

Election monitoring activities carried out by PERLUDEM are visible at all stages of the election (pre-election, campaign day, election day, post-election) even though the monitoring carried out by PERLUDEM is predominantly during the pre-election period. This can be seen in the lawsuit filed by PERLUDEM against the Constitutional Court and its change in policy on the threshold for presidential candidacy mentioned earlier in the thesis.

In the lawsuit, PERLUDEM argued that the Constitutional Court's decision on the meaning of Article 6A Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution was an inappropriate leap. The reason was that the Constitutional Court interpreted the article as constitutional engineering, encouraging parties that have the same or similar platforms, visions, or ideologies to form a coalition to nominate the president and vice president as high-ranking executive officials for the presidency.

PERLUDEM also identified that the Constitutional Court was inconsistent in interpreting the meaning of the presidential system. The Constitutional Court stated that the president and the DPR have their respective powers. However, in reality, the presidential threshold is determined by the party's acquisition of seats in the DPR. This interpretation is, of course, crucial, and it can be seen that the election law is unfair to smaller parties. It is impossible for a new party to nominate a presidential candidate that meets the predetermined presidential threshold requirement of 4 percent of the national vote.

However, PERLUDEM noted (PERLUDEM, 2015) that the election process had been carried out in accordance with applicable law. For example, in the process of resolving disputes over the nomination of Regional Heads in 2015, PERLUDEM indicated that the KPU's decision to cancel the nomination of one of the regional head candidate pairs had been approved by the Supreme Court. The decision to cancel regional head candidates by the KPU includes Central Kalimantan Province. The cancellation of the regional head nomination was caused by the

candidate pair falsifying political party support to fulfill the requirements for candidacy support.

In line with this, the decision of the Constitutional Court Number 60/PUU-XIII/2015 regarding individual candidates in regional head elections is also indicated as being able to minimize the inequality between the requirements for nominating regional head candidates running as individuals and as part of political parties.

Furthermore, in the second stage of the election, namely the campaign period, PERLUDEM indicated that there were money political activities such as buying and selling votes, which occurred in a number of areas, including Batu City, Jepara in East Java, and Pati Regency, Central Java.

PERLUDEM actively participated in supervising the election in the third stage of the 2015 election, namely election day. From the results of its observations, PERLUDEM stated that on election day, logistics at all polling stations (TPS) were complete and in accordance with procedures. Not only that, several areas, such as East Tebet in South Jakarta also provided special ballot templates for the blind.

During the post-election period, as votes were being counted, PERLUDEM stated that the vote counting process was fair and open, with initial indications that the polling stations were filled with voters who witnessed the vote counting and recapitulation process. Apart from that, PERLUDEM also observed that there was a process for disputes over election results submitted to the Constitutional Court. However, PERLUDEM deeply regretted the actions of the Constitutional Court, which rejected more than 130 dispute reports over regional election results on the grounds that these reports did not meet the formal requirements as regulated in Law No. 8/2015. Other election monitoring activities carried out by PERLUDEM can be seen in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8
PERLUDEM Election Monitoring Activity

Dimensions	Monitoring Activity
Pre-Election	
Electoral Laws	Electoral laws were unfair to smaller parties https://perludem.org/2018/01/12/kegagalan-mk-melindungi-

	konstitusionalitas-pencalonan-presiden/
Electoral Procedures	Election were conducted in accordance with the law https://perludem.org/2015/12/25/siaran-pers-menguak-proses-penyelesaian-sengketa-pencalonan-kepala-daerah
Boundaries	Boundaries were impartial https://perludem.org/2016/03/23/siaran-pers-perihal-calon-perseorangan-dan-revisi-uu-pilkada/
Voter Registration	The electoral register was inaccurate https://perludem.org/2023/06/27/kpu-ri-temukan-300-data-ganda-perludem-tanda-partai-politik-memaksakan-diri-penuhi-komposisi-caleg/ https://perludem.org/2021/05/06/daftar-pemilih-dalam-pemilu-peluang-tantangan-pengelolaan/
Party Registration	Only top parties successfully registered https://perludem.org/2017/10/23/evaluasi-hasil-pendaftaran-partai-politik-peserta-pemilu/
Campaign	
Campaign Media	Social media was used to expose electoral fraud https://perludem.org/2022/02/19/perludem-minta-anggota-kpu-BAWASLU-terpilih-bisa-pertegas-aturan-main-kampanye-di-medsos/
Campaign Finance	Wealthy actors bought votes https://perludem.org/2017/02/20/pemantauan-pilkada-2017/ https://perludem.org/2024/01/17/pura-pura-terbuka-menyingkap-kepalsuan-laporan-dana-kampanye-parpol/ https://perludem.org/2023/04/02/soal-kasus-pembagian-amplop-berlogo-pdip-perludem-konsekuensi-kampanye-diperpendek/
Election Day	
Voting Process	The process of voting was easy. Postal ballots were available, and special voting facilities were available for the disabled. https://perludem.org/2017/02/20/pemantauan-pilkada-2017/
Post-Election	
Vote Count	Votes were counted fairly https://perludem.org/2017/02/20/pemantauan-pilkada-2017/
Post-Election	Parties/candidate challenged the result https://perludem.org/2015/12/21/siaran-pers-catatan-awal-persiapan-

	perselisihan-hasil-pilkada-2015-di-mahkamah-konstitusi/ Any disputes were resolved through legal channels https://perludem.org/2016/02/02/siaran-pers-melihat-proses-pembuktian-perselisihan-hasil-pemilihan-kepala-daerah-2015-di-mk/
Electoral Authorities	The election authorities were impartial https://perludem.org/2024/05/21/cegah-jual-beli-suara-perludem-minta-mk-lanjutkan-sengketa-ppp-partai-garuda-ke-pembuktian/

3. 3. h. Source of Credible Information

Another PERLUDEM activity to increase citizen participation and to promote democratic values is by providing trusted information. Apart from providing information using social media, PERLUDEM created a special website, *Rumahpemilu.org*, containing news and information regarding elections in 2012. *Rumahpemilu.org* is an Indonesian election news and data portal dedicated to providing complete and accurate information regarding the implementation of elections in Indonesia. This democracy advocacy media not only reports on ongoing elections but also presents historical data covering all elections that have been held in Indonesia since the 1955 elections. Therefore, this website is often used as a source of information, especially regarding the history and development of elections in Indonesia for the public and is used as a reference for researchers, academics and political observers.

Rumahpemilu.org was created on the basis of neutrality and impartiality, which means this website is not used to report aspects of contestation, electability, elite intrigue, or the internal problems of election participants or political parties. Upholding the principles of neutrality and impartiality is done to avoid the emergence of reporting bias which could have a negative impact on public trust. The existence of *Rumahpemilu.org* also aims to increase political literacy and election awareness for all levels of Indonesian society. Therefore, it is not surprising that the website provides all forms of information regarding the latest news, opinions regarding electoral issues, and statistical data related to elections, packaged in clear language that is easy for everyone to understand. The political literacy activities carried out by *Rumahpemilu.org* can also be seen from several voter education programs that have been carried out indirectly, including by containing information about election systems and procedures. In all, *Rumahpemilu.org* involvement is an effort to oversee a better democratic processes and to increase participation in the election process.

CHAPTER IV

Comparative Analysis of NAMFREL and PERLUDEM Strategic Pathways

4. 1. Cooperative Vs. Antagonistic Strategy

NAMFREL and PERLUDEM are domestic NGOs that focus on election monitoring issues. Both organizations aim to promote free and fair elections by ensuring the election is run with good procedures. Since their inception, both NGOs have claimed that all their activities are independent and not influenced by external interests. They are not affiliated with government interests; on the contrary, serving as key actors in monitoring and overseeing government performance, especially during election periods.

Despite their shared focus, the strategies employed by these NGOs to achieve their goals are sharply different. NAMFREL is primarily concerned with the technology used during elections, whereas PERLUDEM focuses on the rules and regulations governing the electoral process. Consequently, it is not surprising that nearly 80 percent of NAMFREL's members are IT experts, while PERLUDEM's members are predominantly legal experts. Another fundamental difference between these two election monitoring organizations lies in their strategies for achieving their objectives. So why are political experts not dominating election monitoring activities?

Elections are the core of modern democracy. They are usually a political agenda that directly involves citizens (Renwick, 2010). However, only a few political experts are involved in preparing the election agenda. The involvement of IT experts during election activity in the Philippines is due to the dominance of automated IT systems in all election processes. Thus, the involvement of IT experts is considered more important than political experts to monitor and review the election process. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, more legal experts are involved because election participants often change election regulations to maximize the potential for victory.

Despite this, the involvement of legal experts in election activities in the Philippines is becoming more visible. One example is the election monitoring NGOs LENTE, which is dominated by young people and legal experts. Formed in 2007, LENTE particularly focuses on the procedural aspect of elections. LENTE claims that to gain better, free, and fair elections, the electoral procedures must be followed, then good recommendations should be

issued to the election institution. Conversely, the involvement of an IT expert in Indonesian election activities began in 2014 with the creation of the *KawalPemilu.org* website. *KawalPemilu.org* was initiated to protect the people's vote in the elections through fast and accurate real count technology. The platform was created by several Indonesian citizens.

In contrast to NAMFREL and PERLUDEM, which have been accredited by the state, LENTE and *KawalPemilu.org* are not accredited as election observers as issued by the state. However, the presence of both in the election process reflects that citizen involvement can have a very significant impact on strengthening democracy. LENTE once provided recommendations, adopted by COMELEC, regarding the need for a special committee to handle vote-buying problems during election activity, the existence of those committees has since reduced cases of vote buying in the Philippines. In line with that, *KawalPemilu.org* provides a platform for all citizens to contribute to counting election votes. Indirectly, those activities have increased societal involvement during the election process. As domestic election monitoring became more widespread and proved to be effective, incumbent governments in many countries have found its presence more threatening—Yemen, Romania, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, and Egypt (Bojrnlund, 2004).

The term "accreditation" for election observers issued by state institutions is a reflection of how the state highly controls election monitoring activities in the Philippines and Indonesia. The state has restrictions and limits the freedom for NGOs that have accreditation. In the Philippines, for example, accreditation permits allow NGOs access to important election data and they are permitted to carry out direct monitoring at ballot stations. However, state institutions have put in place a number of strict rules for election monitoring institutions that receive accreditation, one of which is that they are not permitted to receive assistance or carry out collaborations that involve financial processes with external parties or any international organizations.

It is feared that the regulations prohibiting NGOs from collaborating with external parties or international organizations could reduce the independence of election monitoring institutions. However, this concern can still be overcome, for example, with decision-making procedures that encourage organizational decision-making based on NGOs' initial beliefs and intentions and reduce or eliminate the relevance of bargaining and preference aggregation (Gehring, 2023). Prohibiting NGOs from expanding their network with external actors or international organizations will slow the NGOs' growth (Snow and Zurcher, 1980). Without support from

international organizations, NGOs did not have a supervisory system for the newest norm or an innovation strategy to promote better elections, and NGOs also do not have resource stability to carry out maximum election monitoring activities.

As explained by Heaney (2023), the relationship between social movements and elections typically introduces new actors or political identities. This has been evident in both the Philippines and Indonesia. These two election-monitoring NGOs emerged and gained prominence following significant interactions between citizen-led social movements and electoral activities. In the Philippines, NAMFREL, the election monitoring initiator, came to prominence after announcing election results that contradicted those of COMELEC. In Indonesia, PERLUDEM was established due to friction among election monitors who felt frustrated by the involvement of state institutions in election monitoring activity. They believed the involvement of state institutions had diminished the role of citizens in the democratic process.

As independent organizations focused on election monitoring, both NAMFREL and PERLUDEM face significant challenges in advocating for free and fair elections. To achieve this, they implement various strategies. According to Smithey (2009), strategy serves as the conceptual connection we establish between our resources' locations, timings, methods of deployment, and the objectives we aim to accomplish. It is the process of transforming what we possess into what we require by converting our resources into the power needed to fulfill our purpose. The differing strategic implementations by both NGOs result in varying levels of robustness, which in turn affect the caliber of their election monitoring activities.

Based on the findings in the previous sub-chapter, it is evident that both organizations (NAMFREL and PERLUDEM) advocate for the same values. However, the author observes that the strategies employed by each to achieve their goals are vastly different, which accounts for the significant disparity in their levels of robustness. Several works of literature state that NGOs have the capacity to create opportunities for movement success through implementing effective strategies, especially if NGOs are able to develop innovation strategies to balance dynamic political, environmental, and cultural conditions while implementing static strategies will lead to setbacks and failure for the movement (Jasper, 1997; McAdam, 1983; Morris, 1993)

Election monitoring activities conducted by NGOs are typically closely linked to government or state institutions that oversee elections. Therefore, the extent of the contributions that NGOs can make is influenced by the strategies they employ, including how they engage with election organizers. Other factors, such as support and collaboration with international organizations, can also impact the effectiveness of NGOs' election monitoring activities.

In terms of strategy implementation, NAMFREL employs an old strategy characterized by sporadic and frontal opposition to the government. This approach is considered traditional because directly criticizing the government is a common tactic used by social movements to achieve their goals. NAMFREL was seen as a catalyst for the demonstrations in the Philippines following the announcement of the 1986 snap election results. At that time, NAMFREL conducted independent election monitoring, mobilizing thousands of volunteers and publicly announcing election results that contradicted the official decisions of COMELEC. NAMFREL's stance was perceived as a strong resistance against the government and the electoral commission at that time.

While it is undeniable that NAMFREL's strategy five decades ago yielded significant success for the democratic struggle in the Philippines, the question arises whether this strategy remains relevant today. The author's assumption is that it does not. Presently, the Filipino public's concern for democratic values is not as strong as it once was. This is evidenced by Bongbong Marcos's victory in the 2022 Philippine national election. If the Filipino people still had a vivid memory of Ferdinand Marcos's dictatorship, it seems unlikely that they would have elected the son of a dictator who undermined democracy and brought long-term suffering to the Philippines, such as soaring Philippines debts (Forbes; 2015), corrupt in several industries; coconut levy fund scam (Rappler.com; 2017), election corrupts practice (New York Times; 1969), etc.

The harsh criticism NAMFREL has frequently directed at COMELEC over the past decades appears to have lost its relevance. The grievances and critiques raised by NAMFREL have not significantly contributed to empowering citizens to promote free and fair elections. This is evidenced by the low level of public concern in the Philippines about election issues, COMELEC's minimal appreciation for NAMFREL's recommendations, the declining number of volunteers participating in election monitoring activities year after year, and the low engagement rates on NAMFREL's social media platforms.

In addition to vocally opposing the government, another strategy adopted by NAMFREL is maintaining its independence by not collaborating with international organizations. NAMFREL's reluctance to collaborate with international organizations is caused by many arguments stating that collaboration with international organizations will bias the election monitoring results. While it is understandable that in the 1980s, election monitoring activities were not widely popular, making it reasonable for NAMFREL not to establish partnerships with international organizations, this approach persisted even as democratization waves increased globally and more organizations focused on democracy and elections emerged. Despite these changes, NAMFREL has continued to refrain from collaborating with these entities. Even though these behave also affected by government law

The relationship between NAMFREL and international organizations has been limited to mere awareness of each other's existence. NAMFREL's reluctance to form partnerships with international organizations has contributed to its weakened position as an election-monitoring NGO in the Philippines. As Klandermans and Oegema (1987) pointed out, building networks is one of the four aspects that can drive the development of social movements. Moreover, social movements typically use networks for member recruitment. Klandermans and Oegema's (1987) main argument is that no matter how successful a movement is in mobilizing consensus or how great its mobilization potential is, if it lacks access to recruitment networks, its mobilization potential cannot be realized. Since its inception, NAMFREL has rarely collaborated with international organizations, forming partnerships primarily with local businesses, churches, and educational institutions in exchange for their support. NAMFREL has never opened opportunities for collaboration with international organizations, limiting their interactions to information exchange.

Conversely, PERLUDEM employs a new strategy (cooperative strategy); these strategies are rarely adopted by previous election-monitoring NGOs, pretending to be a government partner. This strategy is considered new because other NGOs focused on election monitoring in Indonesia had not previously employed it. PERLUDEM recognized the need for a new strategy to advocate for free and fair elections. Observing the diminishing significance of election-monitoring NGOs in Indonesia and their lack of a significant role like NAMFREL in the Philippines, PERLUDEM decided to adopt this new strategy to strengthen its position in promoting electoral integrity.

The cooperative strategy implemented by PERLUDEM has significantly expedited its progress toward achieving its goals. This aligns with McAdam's (1986) assertion that novel strategies or methods adopted by social movements can enhance their effectiveness. By becoming a pseudo-government partner, PERLUDEM has gained the opportunity to conduct comprehensive election monitoring. This includes overseeing election regulations, directly participating in the training of election officials, monitoring ballot stations on election day, and even participating in post-election dispute resolution (if cases exist). However, securing such extensive access is not an easy feat. PERLUDEM had to implement a series of strategies to earn the government's trust and convince it that PERLUDEM's presence was a crucial part of Indonesia's democratic maturation process, which in turn affects election quality (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010).

The engagement of PERLUDEM with the government is not immune to several issues. One being the risk of its independence if PERLUDEM too often contributes to the government agenda. For instance, in every single election held, PERLUDEM is always registered as a part of an accredited election monitoring organization by BAWASLU. On these occasions, several events held by BAWASLU have included PERLUDEM members as keynote speakers, or trainers in BAWASLU workshops. However, if these activities occur too frequently, they run the risk of PERLUDEM feeling unable to critique election institutions.

Nevertheless, PERLUDEM has not fallen into this trap. Even though PERLUDEM was accredited by BAWASLU, invited to several activities, and has held a voter education programs together, it has not reduced PERLUDEM's ability to criticise the government institution. After receiving accreditation, PERLUDEM was more able to pursue improved election regulations. PERLUDEM feels the accreditation given by BAWASLU is a legal way to monitor the election process in all stages, as PERLUDEM can gain all election data.

The accreditation certificate given by BAWASLU to election monitoring institutions is a symbol of permission to carry out monitoring in accordance with the work area. In this case, accreditation is only given to election monitoring institutions that register and can meet the requirements set by BAWASLU. In BAWASLU Law No. 4/2018, it is stated that election monitoring is an activity carried out by election observers. In this case, the election observers referred to are NGOs, legal entities, overseas monitoring institutions, foreign election institutions, and representatives of friendly countries in Indonesia, as well as individuals who have registered with BAWASLU and have obtained accreditation from BAWASLU. Election

monitoring activities carried out by citizens or institutions that do not have accreditation from BAWASLU are no longer permitted. On the one hand, the existence of this regulation has blunted the role of citizens as the main controlling force in a democratic country. However, this regulation can minimize disinformation on the election from irresponsible parties, as citizens can rely on the accredited institution to get valid election information.

Furthermore, PERLUDEM has strengthened its position by collaborating with several international organizations that share a similar focus, such as International IDEA, the UNDP, and US AID. Wilson and Orum (1976) noted that building networks to become more robust involves expanding the organization's reach, particularly at the local level, and forming coalitions with other organizations. As discussed in a previous sub-chapter, most of these collaborations have involved voter education programs. The partnerships that PERLUDEM has established with international organizations have strengthened its position both *de facto* and *de jure*. *De facto*, PERLUDEM's existence and capabilities are recognized by other countries, as evidenced by its invitations to deliver guest lectures, and it is widely known among organizations focused on democracy. *De jure*, the Indonesian government has frequently awarded PERLUDEM, such as the 2019 Best Civil Society Organization in its Governance award.

In summary, NAMFREL has opted to adopt an older strategy, positioning itself as an NGO that openly and boldly expresses its discontent with the government whenever it perceives electoral regulations or decisions by election authorities as undemocratic. This approach has led the government to view NAMFREL as a potential threat to political stability and the positions of certain powerful actors. Consequently, NAMFREL's activities are heavily regulated and restricted by the government.

On the other hand, PERLUDEM has adopted a new strategy, which more subtly convinces the government to achieve a robust democracy, particularly through the elections, which necessitates PERLUDEM's election monitoring activity. This strategy has led the government to see PERLUDEM not as a threat but as a partner and a controlled group, ensuring that elections proceed properly. As a result, the government frequently seeks PERLUDEM's opinions on electoral regulations and involves them in training election officials, among other activities. As McAdam and Tarrow (2010) note, the impact on political phenomena, including elections, depends on a movement's proficiency in adopting new forms of engagement.

Furthermore, the strategies employed by NAMFREL and PERLUDEM in collaborating with international organizations are markedly different. NAMFREL has closed off opportunities for cooperation with international organizations, which has resulted in limited financial resources and consequently hampering their ability to maximize election monitoring activities. In contrast, PERLUDEM has strengthened itself through collaborations with international organizations. PERLUDEM receives substantial funding from these organizations, channelled into democracy-strengthening programs, allowing them to escape resource vulnerability.

Moreover, partnerships with esteemed international organizations such as International IDEA, US AID, and UNDP have bolstered PERLUDEM's position, demonstrating its globally recognized capabilities to the government. This has led the government to increasingly view PERLUDEM as an invaluable ally. These two innovative strategies employed by PERLUDEM have significantly enhanced its role and position in fostering election integrity through election monitoring, political education, advocacy, and more, compared with NAMFREL. Implementing new strategies in social movements significantly influences NGOs' robustness level and effectiveness in their activities. The newer strategy will tend to be more robust for NGOs to achieve their goals and produce social change.

4. 2. Between Robust/Weak NGO Activity and Election Integrity

The involvement of NGO activities during the election process will produce a better election (Bjornlund, 2004). During the election process, NGOs usually play a key role in strengthening civil society through four channels: advocacy, voter education, election monitoring, and providing reliable information. All election participants aim to win the election, and this can be achieved in two ways: winning fairly or winning by cheating the regulations. Therefore, it is necessary to have a controlling role from the community during the election process, in which case NGOs have the power to carry out these tasks and functions.

Previous research conducted by Hirschi (1969) illustrates that a controlling role is needed in any situation because every individual has it in their nature to break or disobey the rules. This also applies to the election implementation process; state institutions, such as organizers and even election supervisors formed by the state, are insufficient to carry out control functions

(Febriansyah, 2020). This was declared in the 1990 Copenhagen Document that “the presence of NGO observers can enhance the electoral process” (Bjornlund, 2004).

4. 2. a. Pursuing Advocacy

NGOs' activities during the election process, which greatly contributed to election integrity scores, are needed at the advocacy stage in election regulations. As mentioned by Bjornlund (2004), election law is becoming the new battleground. In many cases, such as in the Philippines and Indonesia, a few NGOs have argued the most important stage in carrying out the election monitoring activity is during the arrangement of draft election regulations before the election laws are implemented—the pre-election stages. These pre-election stages become more crucial with the involvement of politicians who want to win the election or maximize the potential for victory through various means, one way being through carrying out electoral reform (Renwick, 2010).

NGOs, which are transnational actors (Clark, 1995), are significantly able to provide advocacy or input to state actors to reconsider the rules that will be established. Since their inception, both NAMFREL and PERLUDEM have advocated to ensure the implementation of higher-quality elections. Based on the researchers' findings, NAMFREL is more likely to advocate for policies that relate to election technicalities, such as the counting system, while PERLUDEM is more focused on advocating to create better election rules, such as parliamentary thresholds and resolving election result disputes.

It took at least 15 years for NAMFREL to advocate the recommendations they submitted to the COMELEC. The recommendations NAMFREL has advocated for are measures to enhance AES transparency. Of the five standards proposed by NAMFREL, only one standard was adopted by COMELEC. This illustrates that election monitoring institutions face increasingly narrow public spaces to carry out advocacy in the 21st century. According to Chaudhry (2022), there are two main factors that cause governments to limit the scope of advocacy for NGOs; the first one is the nature of the threat posed by these groups and the consequences of cracking down on them.

The threat felt by the Philippine government began with the presence and direct involvement of NAMFREL in the snap presidential election activities in 1986. As one of the pioneering election monitoring NGOs, NAMFREL's remarkable success in leveraging election monitoring to harness the Philippine public's disgust with the Marcos regime showcased the

power of domestic election monitoring and inspired numerous similar initiatives around the world.

In the beginning, NAMFREL was a success story in promoting better elections because it had powerful allies. Today, NAMFREL's position is not as strong as before. After the issuance of regulations by COMELEC on accreditation for the licensing of election monitoring institutions, rights, and authority of NAMFREL have been indirectly stripped away. The administrative crackdown action adopted by the Philippine government is the choice to curb NAMFREL and harm democracy. As Chaudhary (2022) mentions, “States are more likely to use administrative crackdowns, especially in dealing with long-term threats, such as when NGOs influence electoral politics. However, violent crackdowns are useful in the face of immediate domestic threats, such as protests.”

The issue of accreditation is not only experienced by NAMFREL; several election monitoring institutions including in Ukraine, Romania, Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan have also experienced restrictions over similar election monitoring activities, all of which are regulated in election laws (Bjornlund, 2004). At first glance, the accreditation burden given by COMELEC to NAMFREL only prohibited NAMFREL from collaborating or accepting foreign assistance. However, if we look closely, the absence of support from international organizations will gradually paralyze the organizations. Building networks in social movements is a necessity for movement sustainability, robustness, and the promotion of values (Pavan, 2016; Smithey, 2009).

It cannot be denied that the administrative crackdown decision adopted by the Philippine government because it felt threatened by the existence of NAMFREL was also caused by the NAMFREL's strategy. Even though we have entered an era of democratic consolidation, NAMFREL still uses sporadic strategies to achieve the movement's goals. Even though NAMFREL has never used violent strategies, NAMFREL's attitude shows its position as an independent institution that will continue to supervise the government, and when there is something wrong with the rules, policies, or regulations, especially regarding elections decided by the government, NAMFREL is at the forefront to oppose that matter.

The glory days experienced by NAMFREL in 1986 caused the organization to be overconfident in carrying out the same strategy. It did not realize that as time goes by, the sociopolitical conditions of the Philippines have changed. It necessitates a strategy rich in

innovation and strategic adaptation to increasingly dynamic political and cultural environmental conditions (Smithey, 2009). As stated by McAdam (1983), the novelty of strategies and tactics used by social movements will have an effect on increasing movement attention and bringing the movement closer to movement success.

On the other hand, several election regulations in Indonesia were adopted from the results of thoughts and studies carried out by PERLUDEM. The access to election data obtained by PERLUDEM is generally wider than that of NAMFREL. The view of state actors regarding the presence of PERLUDEM is inversely proportional to COMELEC's view of NAMFREL. Even though both have received accreditation from state institutions, PERLUDEM is still free to build network by collaborating with international organizations or receiving foreign assistance.

The ease of access received by PERLUDEM in terms of advocating for election regulations depends on the strength of PERLUDEM's role in election monitoring activities in Indonesia. If the government in the Philippines feels there is a threat from the presence of election monitoring NGOs, it is the opposite in Indonesia. PERLUDEM has succeeded in building its image so that it does not threaten the government or political stability in Indonesia. For this reason, the Indonesian government, neither the KPU nor BAWASLU, has provided regulations that could weaken the position of election monitoring institutions. Election monitoring activities as a whole are citizens' civil rights.

PERLUDEM realizes that election monitoring activities carried out in many countries with a sporadic strategy have resulted in the weakening of institutions or the destruction of movements carried out by the government through administrative or violent crackdowns (Chaudhry, 2020). Therefore, by reading and understanding political dynamics in Indonesia, PERLUDEM innovated election monitoring strategies and succeeded in achieving its goals (McAdam, 1983).

Furthermore, PERLUDEM is able to build its image as one of the key elements to improve the quality of democracy, one of which is by monitoring elections. Thus, some of the advocacy work initiated by PERLUDEM was accepted and transformed into election law. The accreditation permit obtained by PERLUDEM also does not limit PERLUDEM's activities in building a network with external parties or obtaining foreign assistance. However, with this accreditation, PERLUDEM members are often involved in training

activities or seminars held by government institutions (KPU or BAWASLU). Of course, the government provides incentives for PERLUDEM's involvement as a facilitator or speaker at various events.

However, the government's open attitude sometimes raises further questions: what is the purpose of this attitude? There are at least two possible answers to this: first, the government strongly desires acceptance by its regional peers, and monitoring efforts may face fewer restrictions in areas with stronger democratic ties. Countries can leverage aid conditions, diplomacy, public shaming, and other forms of international pressure to uphold electoral integrity standards. As stated by Renwick (2010), the motivation of actors (politicians) purposing electoral reforms is not always to maximize their power; sometimes, they may be more idealistic to increase democratic value, for example, in Hungary and Czechoslovakia 1989. Second, "Pseudo-democrats" might have their own motivations for allowing international observers or domestic election monitoring to operate. They likely aim to signal their compliance with international norms and present themselves as aligned with the "good guys."

Historically speaking, Soeharto's formation of an election monitoring institution (Panwaslak Pemilu) was primarily to involve "pseudo-democrats" to avoid political conflict and disrupt the stability of power. It seems that the attitude reflected by government institutions today is almost similar to the conditions during this period. Election monitoring activities by the state are considered a tool to erode citizen participation. With the existence of BAWASLU, people cannot report fraud that occurs during the election process to the authorities. All election violations or fraud can only be reported to BAWASLU and can then only be processed by BAWASLU and submitted for follow-up to the competent authorities. Until now, BAWASLU has not provided a website or portal for the public to view the reporting process submitted by the people, so a reporter does not know whether the report they have made has been processed or whether it is just a pile of files that have never been read. In short, the current existence of BAWASLU only extends the bureaucratic process to crack down on election fraud that occurs.

4. 2. b. Voters Education Program

One of the efforts usually initiated by election monitoring NGOs to increase democratic values and maintain the quality of elections is conducting voter education programs. In

general, elections are political activities that involve direct citizen participation. Therefore, in order to achieve the continuity of elections, citizens need to be well educated, especially regarding elections.

In the very beginning, the voter education project was held in 1962 as a collaborative effort by various groups in the United States—the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the National Urban League, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)— which joined together advocating for black voter education through the Voter Education Project (VEP). VEP was carried out in several areas, such as the southern black population in the rural Black Belt and Mississippi delta regions, where the rate of fraud and manipulation carried out by white election officials was very high through manipulated literacy tests and complex registration forms to prevent even literate blacks voting form. At the beginning of the project, only about a quarter of voting-age southern blacks were registered. Then, the percentage of southern adult blacks registered to vote increased from 25 to 40 percent (Levy, 2015).

Apart from increasing the level of citizen participation in registering as voters and voting on election day, the voter education program is also aimed at increasing or changing voter behavior, especially as a preventive action when a population is facing fraud by election participants, such as vote buying, bribery, etc. Election watchdog groups, public-minded corporations, government election bodies, reformist political parties, and other civic educators sometimes attempt to reduce vote-buying by implementing “demand-side” reforms aimed at changing voter behavior. These reforms often take the form of civic education initiatives (Schaffer, 2007).

Many civic educators worldwide have kept their message straightforward and appealing to voters: accept the money, but vote according to your conscience. In Bulgaria, the Roma party encouraged their supporters to “eat their meatballs but vote with your heart.” Civil society groups in Zambia urge voters to “eat widely but vote wisely.” Jaime Cardinal Sin, archbishop of Manila during the end of Ferdinand Marcos, advised voters to “take the bait but not the hook.”

Seeing the importance of education programs for voters, NAMFREL and PERLUDEM seek all kinds of innovations to provide a viable education for the community. For NAMFREL, it carries out voter education programs, which are disseminated via the internet. NAMFREL

realized that one of the most effective ways to provide educational services to citizens is through educational videos uploaded via social media platforms. Meanwhile, PERLUDEM focuses on educating citizens through seminars, workshops, and conferences and also spreads light information through social media platforms.

If we look at the number of voter education program activities carried out, PERLUDEM has carried out more programs than NAMFREL. Over the last 10 years, NAMFREL has carried out one voter education program, while PERLUDEM has carried out four. The content is also different; NAMFREL relies solely on social media, uploading videos lasting around 15-20 minutes, while PERLUDEM maximizes its potential by opening "special election classes," regional/international conferences, and conducting citizen education through podcasts that discuss the latest election issues packaged in a different language. Easy to understand by various levels of society (see table 3.7).

The effectiveness of these voter education programs can be seen from how many citizens are involved in the activities carried out or how wide the reach of the programs are on social media. One citizen education program run by PERLUDEM, *Kelas Khusus Pemilu*, is able to provide a quota of up to 250 participants. Meanwhile, the voter education program carried out by PERLUDEM is assessed to have a higher reach via the YouTube platform compared with NAMFREL. PERLUDEM's YouTube channel has 252 average daily views, while NAMFREL only had six daily views in the last two years (see Figure 4.1).




Figure 4.1 NAMFREL and PERLUDEM YouTube Daily Averages

Even though NAMFREL appeared first and claimed to be maximizing technology to carry out election monitoring activities, in reality, the NAMFREL official account was created in 2013, two years later than PERLUDEM's YouTube existence (see Figure 4.2). The total

number of videos uploaded by PRELUDEM is four times more than the content provided by NAMFREL. Even though the contents of the videos have not been examined in detail, the researcher assume that the videos uploaded by both have the same level of attention.




Figure 4.2 NAMFREL and PERLUDEM YouTube Basic Data

PERLUDEM's ability to carry out voter education programs cannot be separated from the presence of foreign assistance. Almost all voter education programs, Desus (digital and election issues), regional conferences, etc. (see table 3.7), are the result of PERLUDEM's collaboration with international organizations. It cannot be denied that financial support from international organizations was endorsing several voter education programs by PERLUDEM. On the other hand, creating a voter education program without foreign assistance has remained difficult for NAMFREL. Limited financial resources are a challenge for NAMFREL in improving election integrity through regular voter education programs. The support from local businesses received by NAMFREL is very limited, and almost all of these funds are used for organizational and operational purposes, as well as the implementation of election monitoring on election day.

4. 2. c. Election Monitoring in All Stage of the Election Process

As has been previously mentioned, one indicator to assess the quality of an election is to look at election conditions in four stages: pre-election, campaign, election day, and post-election (Norris, 2013). Furthermore, the involvement of NGOs is considered a key factor for assessing the quality of elections. Therefore, election monitoring carried out by NGOs at the

four stages of the election is used as an indicator to see the extent to which NGOs' involvement is able to influence election integrity.

From the findings obtained, the two NGOs have made serious contributions to monitoring the elections during the election process. The difference lies in the amount of supervision carried out on each dimension of election issues. In the recent election process, PERLUDEM has been involved in election monitoring in 11 dimensions; meanwhile, NAMFREL has only six dimensions in total (see Table 4.1). The difference in the level of involvement in election monitoring activities by the two NGOs is influenced by the robustness level of the NGOs; the stronger the NGO, the higher the impact on involvement in all stages of the election.

Table 4.1
Comparison of Election Monitoring Activity by NAMFREL and PERLUDEM

Dimensions	NAMFREL	PERLUDEM
Pre-Election		
Electoral Laws		✓
Electoral Procedures	✓	✓
Boundaries		✓
Voter Registration		✓
Party Registration		✓
Campaign		
Campaign Media	✓	✓
Campaign Finance	✓	✓
Election Day		
Voting Process	✓	✓

Post-Election		
Vote Count	✓	✓
Post-Election		✓
Electoral Authorities	✓	✓
Total	6	11

The main factor that influences the robustness of the level of NGO election monitoring can be seen in the strategies used by NGOs. Since its formation NAMFREL used coercive and sporadic strategies against the government. For the government, this posed a threat to political stability and the government's position, and in the end, the government took steps to impose an administrative crackdown on NAMFREL through accreditation.

As an accredited election monitoring agency, NAMFREL is prohibited from obtaining foreign assistance or allies with international organizations. It cannot be denied that carrying out election monitoring activities requires high funds, while the funding obtained by NAMFREL is not enough to finance significant election monitoring activities.

In contrast, PERLUDEM, which from the start used a pseudo-government partner strategy, made PERLUDEM more flexible in carrying out election monitoring. The accreditation obtained by PERLUDEM does not limit PERLUDEM's ability to expand its network or receive foreign assistance. The various collaborations carried out by PERLUDEM with international organizations make it easier for PERLUDEM to obtain facilities aimed at expanding election monitoring activities. The sense of security and trust created by PERLUDEM for the government makes the government increasingly confident that the presence of PERLUDEM is needed to strengthen democracy through joint efforts in creating elections with integrity.

4. 2. d. Source of Information

The final indicator of the involvement of NGOs in influencing election integrity is the extent to which NGOs are able to provide credible and reliable information, especially on election

issues, to the wider community. The availability of credible information can increase the public's acceptance of election results (Kelley, 2008). In line with that

Both NGOs, NAMFREL and PERLUDEM, strive to become a bridge of information between the public and the electoral system. Both believe that elections are a complicated political activity, full of dynamics and intrigue. Therefore, NGOs are needed to simplify the information available and ensure transparency is maintained. Apart from that, the misuse of information, such as the spread of fake news, disinformation, or the covering up of election fraud, often occurs during elections. Autocrats undermine the popular will by restricting political rights and concealing their misconduct through a lack of transparency while spreading confusion with disinformation from state media, government-backed groups, and supportive international voices (Merloe, 2015).

Credible election monitoring NGOs and international observers establish ethical principles and effective methodologies to ensure they accurately assess elections and counter disinformation with unbiased analysis. Promoting democratic norms for open election data, upholding political rights, and showing solidarity with these human rights defenders will help support credible elections. Both NGOs disseminate information and maintain transparency in almost the same way by utilizing social media—Instagram, Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter—and providing a website that contains complete information or data regarding the election. The fundamental difference between the two NGOs lies in the effectiveness of the activities they carry out.

NAMFREL uses Instagram to attract the attention of young people. It seeks to raise the enthusiasm of the younger generation to participate in election monitoring activities by facilitating them to become smart voters who know the details of election rules and regulations. However, NAMFREL's efforts to maximize Instagram as a source of election information for voters have not produced results. If we look at the results of social media analysis, NAMFREL's Instagram account has only 231 followers, while PERLUDEM's has 204,000 followers.

The low number of NAMFREL Instagram followers shows that at least the information provided by NAMFREL via Instagram can only reach 231 people. Meanwhile, PERLUDEM's reach can be 100 times higher. It is assumed that this condition occurs

because Instagram users in the Philippines make up only around 64 percent of the population, lower than Facebook and YouTube users (see Figure 4.2).




Figure 4.3 Most Used Social Media Platforms in the Philippine

However, the efforts of the two NGOs in facilitating information sources for citizens are considered a commitment made by election monitoring institutions. Both are trying to maintain democratic values to continue to exist in their respective countries. Even though sometimes the efforts made are not optimal, at least the involvement of NAMFREL and PERLUDEM in election activities is able to increase public trust and participation, which will lead to the implementation of elections with integrity.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Election monitoring activities by NGOs are now the main requirement for legitimizing election results and upholding democratic principles. However, in reality, not all election monitoring institutions have the same access to carry out comprehensive monitoring activities. By conducting a comparative study of two countries, the Philippines and Indonesia, This research analyzes the main causes of variations in election integrity scores. This research assumes that the involvement of election monitoring NGOs in both countries has a significant influence in determining the level of election integrity.

Previous research conducted by the Election Integrity Project (EIP) 2013 assumed that the election integrity score was influenced by two factors: regime and economic development. However, this is not enough to explain certain conditions where several countries have the same regime and economic growth but get different election integrity scores. Apart from that, research conducted by Pepinsky (2009) stated the same thing: that somehow, good economic development tended to emerge as an authoritarian regime, for example, in Middle Eastern countries.

The findings in this research indicate that variations in election integrity values are influenced by the involvement of robust NGO election monitoring during the election process. PERLUDEM's strong involvement Indonesian elections has contributed to the high election integrity score. The involvement of NGOs allows election participants to be more careful in carrying out the entire election process and avoid fraud because of the tight monitoring carried out by PERLUDEM. On the other hand, in the Philippines, the weakness of the election NAMFREL, caused by the limited space for NGOs to operate, has resulted in low election integrity scores.

The strong position or involvement of election monitoring NGOs is due to the strategies used by the two NGOs. NAMFREL, as the initiator of the election monitoring movement, chose a sporadic and frontal strategy to achieve its goals. Meanwhile, PERLUDEM seeks a more subtle strategy of "pseudo-government partner." With a sporadic strategy, NAMFREL received an administrative crackdown from the government's COMELEC. COMELEC limits NAMFREL's room for movement with a number of election regulations, one of which is the issue of accreditation. In Philippine election law, only accredited NGOs can do election

monitoring activities; then, if an NGOs is accredited, it is prohibited from receiving foreign assistance in order to maintain independence and avoid bias. Instead of receiving benefits, the accreditation actually limits NAMFREL's space to expand its network and receive support to carry out activities that can improve election integrity.

Meanwhile, the strategy launched by PERLUDEM makes the government feel that the presence and involvement of election monitoring NGOs is necessary to maintain election integrity. Even so, the dilemma faced in Indonesia could be more complex because the government's attitude is too open and raises questions. It does not rule out the possibility that the government is also implementing "pseudo-democrats" to provide a positive image to citizens and other countries.

Even though both NGOs have obtained accreditation from the government, the flexibility of the two is very different. PERLUDEM has full rights to build networking or collaborate with international parties to improve election integrity. The cooperation carried out by PERLUDEM usually involves voter education programs and resource funding so that PERLUDEM can meet its operational needs. Meanwhile, NAMFREL only gets support from local businesses in the form of money, moral support from the church, and membership support from educational institutions.

The strong position of NGOs also has an impact on four activities carried out by NGOs to improve election integrity: advocacy, voter education programs, election monitoring in all election stages, and acting as a source of information. Of these four indicators, PERLUDEM is far superior to NAMFREL. PERLUDEM is able to advocate for government policies in a short time, unlike NAMFREL, which took 15 years to successfully advocate for an automated election system. PERLUDEM's voter education programs are diverse and long-lasting. Meanwhile, NAMFREL only provides education to residents through infographic videos posted on social media. Meanwhile, of the 11 dimensions of election activities that need to be monitored, NAMFREL can only cover six dimensions, while PERLUDEM completes its task by monitoring all dimensions. In terms of providing information, both make every effort to provide correct and accurate information to avoid disinformation and reporting election fraud.

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