Aligning Policies, Maintaining Power:

State-Society Conflicts and State Responses to Food Crises in Indonesia and Nigeria

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Abstract:

Despite the importance of food for both economic and political reasons, why do governments respond differently to food crises? To answer this question, this article assesses the politics of state responses to food crises in Indonesia and Nigeria in the 1960s and 1970s. Using the state-in-society approach to politics, this research finds that variation in state-society conflicts explains the differences in Indonesia's and Nigeria's responses to the food crises. Conflicts between the state and urban workers led Nigeria to align its food policies with the need to contain urban workers' grievances, while in Indonesia, conflicts between peasants and the state led the government to align its food policies with rural development to eliminate the source of rural threats. State responses to food crises are therefore context-dependent policies, deeply influenced by the salient form of state-society conflicts.

KEYWORDS

food crisis, state-in-society approach, power resources, political threats, state-society conflicts, rural development, urban bias, Indonesia, Nigeria

Food is very important for both economic and political reasons. Food availability and price stability are key elements of domestic political stability. Food shortages may generate mass protests, and can even lead to regime change, as food riots often become a channel for the public to express a wide variety of popular grievances (Hendrix & Haggard, 2015; Lagi, Bertrand & Bar-Yam, 2011). Economically speaking, food is required to maintain a productive labor force. Food shortages will adversely affect productivity (Arcand, 2001; Bliss & Stern, 1978). In developing countries, food production is often instrumental for economic growth, as a substantial portion of the labor force works in the agricultural sector. In 2017, around 50.48 percent of the population in low- and middle-income countries lived in rural areas (World Bank, 2017). Despite the crucial role of food in both economics and politics, why do governments respond differently to food crises?

This article aims to address this question by examining the responses of the governments of Indonesia and Nigeria to food crises in the 1960s and 1970s. In Indonesia, food availability fell from 107kg to 92kg per person between 1960 and 1965 (Mears & Moeljono, 1981). Consequently, food prices skyrocketed in the mid-1960s, ultimately contributing to a regime change in 1966 (Sjahrir, 1986). Despite the government's efforts to address the problem, food shortages continued to be a serious problem for Indonesia in the following years. Moreover, in 1972, a severe drought affected Indonesia's rice production and turned the country into one of the world's largest rice importers (Bresnan, 1993). In Nigeria, food availability also fell in the early 1960s. Although sorghum production increased by 1.6 percent between 1960 and 1970, yam and cassava production dropped by 9.4 and 14.4 percent, respectively, over the same period (Olayide, 1976). As in Indonesia, a severe drought (the Sahel drought) hit Nigeria in 1973-74 and adversely affected the

country's food production, especially in light of Nigeria's population growth, which grew by 3.6 percent per year from 1963 to 1973 (Adepoju, 1981).

Without ignoring the impact of the droughts, long-term neglect of the food production sector by both the Indonesian and Nigerian governments contributed to the two countries' food crises in the 1960s and 1970s. During the colonial period, Indonesia and Nigeria had expanded the cultivation of cash crops, such as sugar in Indonesia and groundnuts in Nigeria, but paid little attention to the importance of food crops (Boomgaard, 1989; O'Malley, 1990; Korieh, 2010; Sano, 1983). While diversifying agricultural exports, the expansion of commercial agriculture undermined domestic food production. Imposed and controlled by the colonial governments (the Dutch in Indonesia and the British in Nigeria), food policies deprived the indigenous peasants of the financial resources required to pursue technological change and other agricultural improvements. Most of the profits from agricultural exports were instead taken by the colonial governments, and no significant changes were brought to the local agricultural systems (Elson, 1984; Helleiner, 1966). Even at the end of the colonial era, food production in Indonesia and Nigeria still relied on traditional smallholders who lacked supplies of modern agricultural inputs and equipment as well as effective sources of credit and marketing facilities (Helleiner, 1966; Partadireja, 1974; Tomori & Fajana, 1979).

Other than the similarities in the development of their agricultural sectors, Indonesia and Nigeria also shared many similarities in their economic and political conditions. The two countries had similar political regimes at the time of the food crises. After a few years of democracy in the early independence period, the two countries were ruled by militaries until both states were democratized in the late 1990s (Lewis, 2007). Additionally, Indonesia and Nigeria were rich in natural resources such as oil, so their economic development followed similar trajectories. Until

the 1970s, Indonesia and Nigeria were still agrarian countries. Not only was agriculture the most important source of employment, but the contribution of agriculture as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) was also high, about 30 percent in Indonesia and 32 percent in Nigeria (Lewis, 2007).

Nevertheless, despite these similarities, the governments of Indonesia and Nigeria responded differently to the food crises they experienced in the 1960s and 1970s. In the former country, the crisis led the authoritarian Soeharto government to pursue rural-biased policies. Not only did Soeharto expand the coverage of the country's rice intensification program, which had been introduced by the previous Soekarno administration, but he also made rice production the leading sector of economic growth (Rudner, 1976). The goal is two-fold. Other than raising food supplies, the Soeharto government also aimed to improve the economic condition of rural areas so that both urban and rural grievances could be eliminated. Under Soeharto, Indonesia expanded its agricultural extension system and developed a new agricultural credit system that reached millions of small-scale farmers across the country (Bolnick, 1987).

By contrast, Nigeria pursued urban-biased policies in response to its own food crisis. To some extent, the crisis led the country to pay more attention to the food crop sector (Sano, 1983), but rather than tackling the problems faced by small-scale farmers as Nigeria's main food producers, the government instead fostered the development of large-scale food production by large agri-businesses and state-owned enterprises. Measured by the nominal rate of assistance (NRA),[2] state subsidies for food producers in Nigeria decreased in the 1970s and 1980s, while

[2] NRA measures the gap (in percentage) between what producers receive for their products given the government's policies and what they would receive without the policy (Anderson & Martin, 2009).

NRA to food producers in Indonesia increased significantly during this period (Figure 1). What explains this policy divergence?

FIGURE 1. Here

This article employs the state-in-society approach to politics to address the above question. The approach takes the influence of societal actors into account without neglecting the role of the state in economic development. Extending previous works on the political economy of rural-biased policies (Pierskalla, 2016; Poulton, 2014a), I explore the causal mechanism linking state-society conflicts and state responses to food crises. The governments of Indonesia and Nigeria faced two different types of state-society conflicts: conflicts with rural forces in Indonesia and conflicts with urban workers in Nigeria. I hypothesize that state-society conflicts affect governments' responses to food crises by shaping the types of policy alignment pursued by the government to deal with both crises and state-society conflicts. Conflicts with urban workers will lead the government to align food policies with efforts to address urban workers' grievances, while conflicts with rural elements, such as small-holder farmers, will lead the government to align food policies with rural development.

To test this hypothesis, I use the most similar system design exploiting the inter-systemic commonalities between Indonesia and Nigeria and the different values of the hypothesized causal variable to explain the differences in the policy responses of the governments of Indonesia and Nigeria to the 1960s-70s food crises (Przeworski & Teune, 1970). As summarized in Table 1, Indonesia and Nigeria shared many similarities in terms of the governing regime, socioeconomic backgrounds, economic resources, and agricultural development trajectories, but they showed a

stark contrast in the types of conflict faced by the government and policy responses to the food crises.

TABLE 1. Here

Drawing on state archives, biographies of state leaders and other key figures, and secondary materials, this article confirms that the variation in state-society conflicts explains the differences in Indonesia's and Nigeria's responses to the 1960s-70s food crises. Indonesia insisted that efforts to increase domestic food production should bring economic development to rural areas and peasant farmers, so the country aligned its food provision policies with strong commitments to rural development. In contrast, no such commitment was shown by the successive military generals that led Nigeria between 1960 and 1980, with the country instead relying on food imports and the development of large-scale food production. While benefiting state farms, private companies, and big capitalist farmers, the policy deprived the millions of small-scale farmers as Nigeria's main food producers of the public funding needed to help them increase their production.

These findings have notable consequences for the political study of rural development and state responses to crises. First, in opposition to neo-classical economists, who insist upon the importance of getting prices right (Krueger, Schiff & Valdes, 1988), and statist scholars, who argue the market will not work adequately without the state having an effective developmental role (Skocpol, 1985; Bezemer & Headay, 2008), this article shows that power resources of societal forces, especially rural ones, do matter for rural development. Rural forces' organizational capacity to punish or reward the ruling elites can affect the extent to which the government will pursue pro-rural policies. Second, this article contributes to broadening the scope of political research about

state responses to crises. Discussion about state responses to crises among political scientists has been concentrated on macro-economic problems such as debt, fiscal crisis, inflation, or recession in general (for example, Frieden & Walter, 2017; Gourevitch, 1987; Remmer, 1990; Pempel, 1999; van de Walle, 2001). Research on crises should include a variety of collective stress situations other than macroeconomic problems. By focusing on food crises, this study shows the significant impact of state-society conflicts on the development of policy alignment by governments dealing with crises.

The article is organized as follows. After the introduction, it discusses the theoretical framework that guides the study. This will be followed by a discussion on the origins of state-society conflicts in Indonesia and Nigeria in the third section. The next two sections detail the article's core argument on the impact of different types of state-society conflict on state responses to food crises. The article ends with discussion and conclusion.

STATE-SOCIETY CONFLICTS, POLICY ALIGNMENT AND STATE RESPONSES TO FOOD CRISES

Existing works on the politics of agricultural policies offer two competing views about state responses to food crises, yet none provide a satisfying answer. First, the society-centered theory suggests that variation in state responses to food crises results from differences in the lobbying power of farmers, especially rich or big farmers, in the two countries. However, some works cast doubts on the validity of the society-centered theory, as the effect of farmers' collective action on agricultural subsidies has been mixed at best. The effect was positive in some models (Beghin & Kherallah, 1994; Thies & Porche, 2007), but negative in others (Dutt & Mitra, 2010;

Fulginiti & Shogren, 1992; Olper, Falkowski & Swinnen, 2014; Olper, 2001). In Indonesia, no big farmers had significant influence on agricultural policymaking during the crisis period. Second, in opposition to the society-centered theory, state-centered scholars argue that state autonomy and capacity determine whether a country will provide subsidies to domestic farmers (Skocpol & Finegold, 1982; Chang, 2009). In Indonesia, some researchers may associate state autonomy and capacity with the influential role of the Soeharto government in promoting agricultural development (Vu, 2010). However, such a perspective neglects the political origins of Soeharto's concerns with the rural sector. In Oatley's words (Oatley, 2006, p. 108), "the state-centered approach lacks [the] explicit micro-foundations" of why Soeharto pursued agricultural development.

This article uses the state-in-society approach to address these weaknesses. It focuses on the role of state-society conflicts in shaping state elites' preferences. State-society conflicts can affect the strategic calculation of state elites considerably as such conflicts can generate political threats to the elite. The effect of state-society conflicts on state elites' political decisions can even be more influential than the effect of shared goals. The importance of economic rewards to contain mass grievances may lead state elites not only to cooperate but also to foster economic growth (Poulton, 2014; Routley, 2012). In East Asia, for instance, Donner, Ritchie and Slater (2005) found that threats of disruptive mass unrest contributed to the rise of developmental state regimes in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. This type of regime was instrumental in fostering miraculous economic growth supported by the development of strong industrial bases. Specifically regarding agriculture, researchers also found that political threats were the strongest factor behind the implementation of growth-promoting agricultural policies. The effect of threats to regime survival

from (the lack of) state assistance to farmers is more consequential than the effect of other factors like democracy (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2014; Poulton, 2014b).

Not only do political threats, especially those involving lower socio-economic classes, induce changes in the political incentives of state elites, but these threats also pave the way for the rise of the state's relative autonomy. To contain the threats, state elites often implement a two-pronged strategy of repression and economic development (Rich & Stubbs, 1997). While the former is meant to end the threat immediately, the latter is intended to address the source of grievances that might again radicalize the masses. State elites will not hesitate to move against the interests of the dominant economic groups if such a move is considered necessary to address the source of grievances. Rueschmeyer and Evans (1985, p. 63) argue that "[A]s the state apparatus is called on to take a more active role in repressing subordinate groups, it becomes more willing to move against dominant groups as well."

State autonomy results not from state leaders' voluntary actions but from certain patterns of state-society relations, such as threats (Yee, 2004). In the rural sector, the implementation of land reforms in countries like South Korea and Taiwan illustrates well the tendency of the political elite to act autonomously in dealing with the danger of threats from society. In South Korea, against the interests of landlords, the government redistributed land to landless peasants in the early 1950s to contain peasant radicalization. As documented by Shin (1998), conflicts between landlords and tenant peasants had worsened since the 1930s, and, in the absence of adequate responses from the Korean government, peasant discontent escalated and exploded into a major agrarian revolt in

1946.[3] The revolt led the South Korean government, with the support of the United States government, to implement land redistribution in early 1950. Similarly, land redistribution by the Kuomintang government in Taiwan was due to the country's agrarian conflicts. According to Kay (2006, p. 30), Taiwan's agrarian reform "was implemented against the background of a popular uprising in 1946 and the need for the Kuomintang government to gain popular support in the countryside."

From the power resource theory, the powerful impact of political threats can be explained by the fact that these threats embody a strong base of power that can be used to punish state elites. Unlike the behavioral approach to power, which focuses on the analysis of decision-making and sees the effect of power primarily in terms of how an actor exercises power (how one influences the final decision), the power resource perspective suggests researchers should analyze the effect of power based on the differences in power resources between actors. The power lays not in "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance" (Weber, 1947 as cited in Korpi, 1985, p. 31) but instead, as Korpi (1985, p. 33) argues, in "the attributes (capacities or means) of actors (individuals or collectivities), which enable them to reward or punish other actors". Rational actors will act based not only on their own expectations but also on their expectations of the expectations and actions of others. Additionally, they will act based on their evaluation of the differences in the means or power resources available to them and others affected by their acts. Therefore, political threats are likely to trigger a strong response from the elite, as these threats endanger their political sustainability.

[3] The number of tenancy disputes increased significantly from 4,804 cases in the 1920-32 period to 136,175 cases between 1933 and 1939 (Shin, 1998, p. 1325).

In a time of crisis, political threats will shape government responses, as the crisis may aggravate the damaging effect of the threats on elite power. Consequently, as summarized in Figure 2, state responses to food crises may differ across similar cases, depending on the type of threat faced by the government. State elites are likely to align policy responses with the effort to eliminate these threats. Threats from peasant farmers will lead state elites to align the policy response with rural development, since it will be difficult for the state to contain threats from peasant farmers if the policy response does not bring significant improvement to rural economies, especially to the livelihoods of peasant farmers. By contrast, threats from urban workers will lead the government to align policy responses with efforts to address urban workers' economic grievances. In such a case, cheap food policies may be preferable to rural development, as the former directly addresses the interests of urban workers in the short term.

FIGURE 2. Here

DIVERGENT THREATS: RURAL AND URBAN FORCES IN INDONESIA AND NIGERIA

In the mid-twentieth century, food crises generated similar pressures for the governments of Indonesia and Nigeria to lower food prices. In Indonesia, dramatic increases in rice prices – which shot up from IDR 8 per kilogram in 1960 to IDR 621 per kilogram in 1965 (Ibrahim, 2011) – generated protests in many cities, with demonstrators asking the government to lower the prices of rice and other necessities like gasoline. Food protests erupted again in 1973 following further rice price increases since September 1972 (Tempo, 1972a). In Nigeria, food shortages in the early 1970s added inflationary pressures to the already-fragile economy, torn by the Nigerian civil war

of 1967-70. Food prices rose by 15 and 21 percent in 1969 and 1970, respectively, with the price of food further increasing during the 1972-74 Sahelian drought (Nafziger, 1972). The prices of staples like millet and corn increased by two- to nine-fold between 1970 and 1974 (Mortimore, 1989, p. 54). Just like in Indonesia, urban protests erupted in Nigeria, especially after the end of the civil war.

Nevertheless, food politics varied considerably between the two countries. First, landlessness was more prevalent in Indonesia than in Nigeria. In Indonesia, the expansion of the colonial economy exacerbated socioeconomic stratification among the local population. Many poor peasants had to sell their lands to cushion the negative impacts of the colonial system on their subsistence lifestyles. Burger (1984) notes that the number of landless farmers increased from 20 percent of the total population in 1869 to 37 percent in 1929; by the late 1950s, this figure had increased to 60 percent (Slamet, 1965). In contrast, landlessness was not a major issue in Nigeria. To avoid conflicts with the local population, the British colonial government passed the Lands and Native Rights Proclamation in 1910, which restricted the development of large plantations by Europeans and enforced the implementation of customary land tenure for Nigerians. By putting control and ownership of land in the hands of chiefs or village heads, the law impeded the growth of land sales and provided a guarantee for every community member to have access to land (Korieh, 2010). After independence, the Gini coefficient of land inequality in Nigeria (0.37) (Jazairy, Alamgir & Panuccio, 1992) was significantly lower than that of Indonesia (0.55) (Volrath & Erickson, 2007).

Second, peasant farmers were politically more influential in Indonesia than in Nigeria. In the former, peasant farmers emerged as one of the strongest political forces in the years preceding the food crisis. The high level of land inequality allowed the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai*

Komunis Indonesia or PKI) to cultivate strong political and class consciousness among the peasantries. Peasant farmers could be organized into a strong revolutionary force thanks to PKI's rural strategies. Since the early 1950s, under the party's new leadership, PKI abandoned its former strategy of proletarian revolution, which had failed in 1926-27, and now concentrated its works on rural areas. According to D.N. Aidit, PKI's new chairperson, "the agrarian revolution was the essence of the people's democratic revolution in Indonesia" (Mortimer, 2006). PKI cadres worked tirelessly to organize peasant farmers behind the party and its affiliated organizations, especially the Indonesian Peasants Front (*Barisan Tani Indonesia* or BTI) (Mortimer, 2006).

Even though PKI's rural strategies did not abandon the party's relationship with urban workers, from the 1950s PKI faced fierce competition from other political actors to gain workers' support. Trade unions proliferated during this period, but many were linked with political parties (Ford, 2009; Hadiz, 1997). Additionally, for the first time, the military began to seek to officially intervene in labor affairs, especially from the late 1950s, as the nationalization of Dutch companies by President Soekarno paved the way for the military to take a greater role in the economy. The military established the Labor-Military Cooperation Body (*Badan Kerja Sama Buruh Militer*) and later the Central Organization of Socialist Employees of Indonesia (*Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Sosialis Indonesia*) to intervene in labor affairs. This intervention decreased labor protests significantly (Hadiz, 1997). Although PKI maintained its grip on leftist trade unions, the expansion of the party's influence among workers was more limited than it was among peasant farmers. While the All-Indonesian Federation of Workers' Organizations (*Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia* or SOBSI), the PKI-affiliated trade union federation, was reported to have 2.7 million members in the late 1950s (Hadiz, 1997), BTI membership soared from 800,000 in 1954

to 3.9 million in 1957 (Hindley, 1964, p. 165). In September 1964, BTI announced its membership had risen to over 8.5 million (Huizer, 1980, p. 96).

With the party's massive membership among poor and landless peasants, PKI's unilateral action in 1963-64 to occupy the lands where these peasants worked resulted in significant concern amongst other political actors, including the army (Wanandi, 2012). Enmities between the army and PKI built up in the late 1940s and further escalated as PKI's influence in rural areas continued to grow into the 1950s. The conflict culminated in the so-called G30S (*Gerakan Tiga Puluh September*, or the Thirtieth of September Movement) incident, a failed move by a group of leftist officers from the presidential palace guard, the Cakrabirawa Regiment, which killed six army generals (Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003). The army, which rose to power immediately after the incident, used the killing as a pretext to outlaw PKI and violently purge its members, resulting in the deaths of between 200,000 and 1 million accused communists (Cribb, 2002). Yet, despite the army's ruthless reaction, several PKI leaders managed to build cells of resistance in parts of the country (Hearman, 2010; van der Kroef, 1971), which, at least to some extent, maintained the threat that PKI had created.

The fact that PKI had such massive influence in rural areas made the military government pay specific attention to the potential effect of PKI sympathizers on domestic political stability, especially as the military government under Soeharto was mandated to hold an election in 1971. The military strictly controlled the election, making it far from free, but Soeharto had to ensure the political support of the population for his government. Other than prohibiting former PKI members and followers to be voters or candidates in the election (Crouch, 1971), Soeharto pursued rural development to eliminate rural grievances and increase his government's political legitimacy, especially in rural areas (Liddle, 1985).

Unlike in Indonesia, peasants were politically weak in Nigeria. The growth of export agriculture in the country had not transformed peasant farmers into rural capitalists or landless proletarians (Williams, 1988). Political consciousness among the peasantry as a group was low. Cooperative society as the dominant form of peasant organization was controlled by political elites, which often rendered cooperative society into a channel of patronage (Forrest, 1981). This problem was further exacerbated by the salient tendency among political elites to mobilize mass constituencies along ethnic lines. Under certain circumstances, like the fall of commodity prices that disrupted peasants' income, peasants might rise in rebellion against the government. For example, the fall of cocoa prices in the late 1960s led Ibadan farmers to organize the Agbekoya rebellion in protest of the high taxes imposed on farmers (Beer, 1976). However, the lack of organizational capacity made the peasantry dependent on other actors like politicians for leadership (Williams, 1974). It was also difficult for the peasants to keep the movement intact once the initial goal of setting up the movement had been met. Small inducements from the state could easily break up the leadership of the movement, allowing the government to tame the movement within the framework of state regulation (Beer, 1976).

Rather than the peasantry, it was the urban workers that had strong political influence in Nigeria. Political developments after independence changed the way many labor leaders, especially those of bread-and-butter unions who usually eschewed political activities of trade unions, perceived Nigerian politicians. Unlike the radical leaders, who were critical of not only the British colonial government but also Nigerian elites, moderates blamed the British for Nigeria's economic problems. But now, as the British had gone, moderates shifted blame for the country's economic problems to the government of Nigeria. This new awareness helped eliminate ideological gaps between moderate and radical leaders and paved the way for their cooperation.

Led by the radical Nigerian Trade Union Congress, all federations of trade unions in the country agreed to form a Joint Action Committee (JAC), tasked to demand a raise in wages (Cohen, 1974). The decline of the real value of income had become the main grievance among workers during the period; wages had not increased since 1959, despite inflation of roughly 20 percent in the cost of living (Diamond, 1988). As the government showed no serious response to the demands of the JAC, workers' discontent escalated, leading the union leaders to organize a general strike in June 1964. Involving over 800,000 people all over the country, the strike lasted for two weeks and forced the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) to negotiate with workers (Melson, 1970).

The frequency of labor strikes increased as workers' economic conditions deteriorated in the 1970s. Inflation rose significantly, especially during the Nigerian civil war. The rise of government spending due to the war, the increase in demands for food, and higher transportation costs in war-torn regions increased inflationary pressures on the economy. Food prices rose by 15 percent in 1969 and 21 percent in 1970 (Nafziger, 1972). Labor strikes proliferated as workers demanded the rise of wages on the bases of the rising cost of living (Lubeck, 1986; Peace, 1974). The FGN established a wage committee named the Adebo Commission to address workers' discontent, but the selective implementation of the Commission's recommendations angered workers and generated more protests in many industrial centers. Second, the inflationary pressures of the Oil Boom in 1973 brought workers to the street. Also known as Udoji strikes (named after the Commission created by the FGN to address the rise of labor protests), the strike involved over 126,000 people and caused a loss of 357,028 man-days of work, even higher than the impact of the Adebo strikes (78,474 workers and a loss of 224,470 man-days of work) (Ubeku, 1983, p. 167). Fearing the growing power of the labor movements, in the late 1970s the FGN sought to control labor organizations. Nevertheless, the labor movements were able to maintain their autonomy,

organizing another general strike in 1981, showing the strength of the labor movement in Nigeria for galvanizing workers' demands and grievances in front of the FGN (Otobo, 1981). The strength of the labor movements in Nigeria generated a different type of food politics from that of Indonesia.

RURAL DEVELOPMENT VERSUS 'CHEAP FOOD' POLICIES: DIVERGENT RESPONSES TO FOOD CRISES

State-society conflicts affected state responses to the food crises in Indonesia and Nigeria. In Indonesia, newly installed President Soeharto insisted that economic development was necessary to eliminate PKI's influence in rural areas and to address the country's multidimensional problems. In his address to a 1966 seminar on economic and financial problems held by KAMI (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*, or the Indonesia University Students Action Front) and the University of Indonesia's Faculty of Economics, Soeharto stated that "efforts to overcome our current economic problems should be put in the context of restoring the security after we have successfully crushed the physical strength of G30S" (Soeharto, 1966, p. 22). While crushing PKI and prohibiting its former members and followers, most of whom lived in rural areas, from participating in the 1971 election, Soeharto paid serious attention to rural development. In line with the pressing need to increase food supplies, he shifted Indonesia's development agenda from state-led industrialization to rural development. Reflecting on his development policies, he wrote in his autobiography:

> "I thought, reflected, and traced all the events that we had experienced since the formation of this Republic until the occurrence of the G30S/PKI … I came to a major conclusion …

that all the problems we experienced had their origins in the neglect of economic development" (Soeharto, 1989, p. 232).

Perhaps there was no one policy area more significantly influenced by Soeharto than that of food. Not only did Soeharto play a leading role in shaping the government's food policies, but he also played an important role in determining Indonesia's food production targets and how these targets should be achieved. Against his economic advisors' suggestions to limit the scope of state control of food distribution to military personnel and certain sections of the civil service, namely those living in poor and remote areas, and release as much domestic produce to the market as possible for public consumption (KOTI, 1966), Soeharto instead pushed for the expansion of state provision of food to cover not only all civil servants but also parts of the general population. He believed that leaving food to the market would be very risky as any fluctuation in food prices would adversely affect his political stability. To manage this, Soeharto established a state logistics agency named Bulog (*Badan Urusan Logistik* or State Logistics Agency) in 1966. Despite the difficult financial conditions faced by the government and the high cost of rice provision, Soeharto insisted that food should be made available in sufficient amounts so that food prices could be stabilized, and instructed Bulog to "manage the distribution of staple and other food necessities in all the regions so that food would not disturb my task in restoring the security" (Sriwidodo, 2002, 112).

More than extending the government's role in food distribution, Soeharto also expanded the government's involvement in food production. Without consulting his ministers, Soeharto raised the target quantity of rice production from 10.52 million tons in 1969 to 15.4 million tons in 1974, a 47 percent increase in five years. For his economic advisers, this target was unrealistic. In addition to the excessive administrative capabilities required, projected levels of income would

not be sufficient to consume such a high level of production (Hansen, 1973). Nevertheless, Soeharto defined the problem of food production not in terms of the quantity that the country might produce or consume but more in terms of the political necessity of ensuring food availability. He believed that the government's capability to ensure the availability of food in sufficient quantity and at affordable prices was an absolute prerequisite for the maintenance of domestic political order. Soeharto was afraid that due to the prevalence of poverty in the country, food shortages were likely to cause political instability and aggravate the political threats from PKI (Sriwidodo, 2002).

As the government struggled to deal with the food crisis, the resurgence of PKI resistance cells in several regions strengthened Soeharto's belief that a repressive approach would not be sufficient to eliminate the influence of PKI in rural areas. In his report to the Fifth General Session of the People's Consultative Assembly in 1968, Soeharto stated that "the improvement of people's standard of living and economic welfare is not only the urgent need of the people but also an effective tool to contain the influence and interference of the remains of the PKI forces" (Soeharto, 1968). Five years later, in 1973, he reiterated this commitment to rural development at his subsequent People's Consultative Assembly address, stating that the effort to redistribute the benefits of economic development would continue to assume an important role in his administration's development policies, as a failure to do so would provide an opportunity for the remains of PKI to rebuild its organization (Soeharto, 1973).

Compared to Indonesia, Nigerian elites showed no serious commitment to food production or rural development. While realizing the negative impacts of the Nigerian civil war on food production, President Yakubu Gowon's post-war reconstruction plan said little about how Nigeria should deal with the problem. In fact, it was industrial development rather than agricultural that

occupied Gowon's attention. Instead, Gowon and his successors addressed Nigeria's problem of food shortages by importing more food from overseas. Nigeria's maize imports soared from 8,882 to 40,481 tons between 1970 and 1979, while rice imports increased from a tiny 1,749 tons to 567,899 tons during the same period (Adesimi & Aderinola, 1983). In line with the recommendation of the Adebo Commission, the main goal of the FGN's food policies was to lower food prices so that workers could maintain their standards of living despite low wages (Eyoh, 1989).

The origins of Nigeria's cheap food policy can be traced back to the idea of price control that circulated among Nigerian policymakers since the 1960s. As stated by Philip C. Asiodu, permanent secretary under the Gowon administration, "control of the prices of basic goods demanded by industrial workers may be employed to ensure that wages do not spiral to the detriment of industrial development" (Asiodu, 1993, p. 193). Yet, it was not until the 1970s, when labor protests proliferated in the country, was the policy institutionalized in state policies. According to the Adebo Commission, which was appointed by Gowon to review workers' wages shortly after the end of the Nigerian Civil War, food supplies should be given greater attention in order to address urban workers' demands for higher wages. To quote the Commission's report, "It was clear to us that, unless certain remedial steps were taken and actively pursued, a pay award would have little or no meaning and could indeed make the matters worse" (Bates, 1981, p. 135). Therefore, the Commission further suggested that it was important for the government "to improve the food supply situation" so that the rise of food prices could be contained (Bates, 1981, p. 135).

In June 1975, the FGN set up another commission – the Anti-Inflation Task Force (AITF) – to contain the rise of labor protests. Like the Adebo Commission, the AITF highlighted the importance of increasing food supplies to reduce food prices and inflation. While realizing the

problems faced by peasant farmers, such as inadequate agricultural inputs and extension services and a lack of credit facilities and appropriate technology, the AITF did not make small-scale producers the main subject of their development programs. Unlike Soeharto, General Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria's head of state from 1976 to 1979, believed there was no serious problem in the countryside: "I'm told that many farmers show all the sign of prosperity –bicycles, radios, even scooters" (West Africa, 1976, p. 1610). Rather than focusing on the problems facing peasant farmers, the AITF proposed instead a two-pronged strategy that combined state support for small-scale farmers and large-scale agricultural production (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1975). Although the AITF's proposal in principle did not discriminate against small-scale producers, the agency's recommendation essentially paved the way for Nigeria to put more resources into the development of large-scale food production by the state and private large agri-businesses. As will be shown below, the allocation of resources for large-scale agricultural projects far exceeded those allocated for small-scale producers.

The rise of a civilian government under President Shehu Shagari in 1979 did not bring significant changes to Nigeria's agricultural policy orientation. As food deficits continued to be a serious problem, Shagari stated that food production would be one of his development priorities, and introduced the Green Revolution Program, which focused on two things: the expansion of the agricultural development projects initiated by the World Bank during Gowon's era and the development of large-scale irrigation (Koehn, 1990). Yet, like the previous administrations, the Shagari government made the fight against inflation the main goal of its agricultural policies. Rather than enhancing rural development, the Green Revolution Program was intended primarily to provide cheap food for urban consumers. As Shagari himself argued, "We must work relentlessly to combat inflation …. As agriculture is the backbone of my administration's policy,

I hope that food will be made cheaper, thus improving the real earnings of our people" (Tijjani & Williams, 1981, p. 111).

THE STATE, POLITICAL THREATS AND THE RURAL SECTOR

The drive to contain the political threat shaped not only the form of policy responses to the food crises but also the way the Indonesian and Nigerian governments implemented the policies. In Nigeria, although the food crisis helped remold the country's agricultural policies from export-oriented to food-oriented (Sano, 1983), no significant changes were made to the way the government treated the food production sector nor the fate of the millions of small-scale farmers, who were the country's main food producers. As a proportion of the development budget, agricultural expenditure in fact declined during the 1970s, even as the country faced a food crisis. The share of agricultural expenditures in the development budget fell from 13.6 percent in the First National Development Plan (1962-1968) to 10.5 percent in the Second National Development Plan (1970-1974) and finally to just 6 percent in the Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) (Henley, 2015).[4]

In nominal terms, however, Nigeria's agricultural spending increased significantly in the 1970s. Fertilizer subsidies rose from US$8.86 million in 1975-76 to US$107.1 million in 1978-79

[4] The poor performance of the FGN's rural development efforts was further exacerbated by the lack of attention to rural infrastructural development. In fact, rural infrastructures had been neglected since the colonial era. Although millions of Naira were poured into infrastructural development projects such as roads, water supplies, and electricity, the countryside received little from these expenditures (Olatunbosun, 1975).

(Forrest, 1981).[5] Public spending on agricultural credits also increased from the early 1970s (Watts, 1987). However, the increase brought no significant changes to the marginal position of smallholders in Nigeria's economy, as the spending for large-scale agricultural projects far exceeded the allocations for small-scale producers (Koehn, 1990; Palmer-Jones, 1987). Under the revised Third National Development Plan, Nigeria allocated 59 percent of its agricultural expenditures to the development of large-scale irrigation and food farms. In contrast, the country spent only 2 percent of its agricultural budget on the National Accelerated Food Production Projects, which were intended to help small-scale farmers (Fuady, 2012; Forrest, 1981). Under the Shagari administration, the Green Revolution Program, as Nigeria's main program for small farmers, received only 4.1 percent of the total capital investment for agriculture in 1980 (Sano 1980), considerably lower than the 72.7 percent allocated for large-scale irrigation and food farms (Koehn, 1990). Credit provisions also discriminated against peasant farmers: between 1978 and 1988, US$184 million went to 812 big, capitalist farmers receiving on average US$226,795 per borrower. In contrast, only US$107 million was disbursed to 49,811 small farmers, for an average US$2,125 per borrower (Okolie, 1995).

The FGN expected that the development of large-scale food production would help the country increase food production and disseminate mechanized agricultural production among peasant producers. However, none of these goals materialized. The development of large-scale agricultural production did not help peasant farmers to adopt modern agricultural technology. The policy only encouraged the rise of a new class of farmers, consisting of wealthy businesspeople,

[5] This dramatic increase in the allocation of fertilizer subsidies was partly caused by the rise of fertilizer prices in international markets in the mid-1970s (Forrest 1981).

military officers, and bureaucrats. Political connections with the regime allowed these 'overnight' farmers to gain state subsidies to develop large-scale farms (Beckman, 1987; Clough & Williams, 1987), marginalizing the peasant farmers, as the policy deprived these small producers of the public funding they needed to increase production. In fact, many studies demonstrated that these large-scale production schemes showed no better record than peasant production for raising production. Farm settlements failed to improve the organizational and productive capacity of the participating farmers. The predominant role of the government in the management of the farms adversely affected farmers' participation in decision-making. Returns on individual investments were also unprofitable (Olatunbosun, 1971). Consequently, food production in Nigeria continued to decline during the 1970s. Using the agricultural output of 1969-72 as the basis of comparison (1969-72=100), Bienen (1988) found that food production declined from 92 in 1974-78 to 85 in 1982-83.

In contrast, the prevalence of rural threats in Indonesia made the food crisis a catalyst for the economic transformation of rural areas. Not only did Soeharto allocate additional resources to the agricultural sector, but he also showed a strong commitment to rural development. Previously, Indonesia's development policies were aimed at correcting structural imbalances between the industrial and agricultural sectors (Zahri, 1965). Under Soeharto, especially during his early decades in power, the Indonesian government focused on the agricultural sector. Soeharto expanded the coverage of the previous administration's rice intensification program, *Bimas* (*Bimbingan Massal*, or Mass Guidance), and allocated more resources to rice production. Agricultural spending nearly tripled from 10.5 percent of development expenditures in the 1961-69 period to 30.1 percent under the First Five-Year Development Plan (1969-74), which laid the foundation for the country's concerted efforts to achieve self-sufficiency in rice (Henley, 2015).

Beyond increasing the agricultural development expenditures, Soeharto closely watched the implementation of the government's agricultural programs to ensure that the rice production targets could be met. Adjustments were often made to improve the design and implementation of the *Bimas* program, and Soeharto was not hesitant to overhaul elements of the program if they did not work as expected. Critiques against the *Bimas Gotong Royong*, which was launched in 1968 to achieve Soeharto's ambitious goal of self-sufficiency, led Soeharto to abandon the program and replace it with the Improved *Bimas* program in 1970. The former program had put the decision-making power over the use of production inputs not with the farmers but with the government through the operation of the firms contracted to provide agricultural inputs and credits to the farmers, while the new Improved *Bimas* program allowed farmers to select the fertilizers and pesticides based on their own needs, as the program provided agricultural credits to farmers on an individual basis (Hansen, 1973). The government developed a new agricultural credit system to reach millions of small-scale farmers across the country (Bolnick, 1987).

To further support food production, Indonesia also enforced producer price policies that guaranteed the profitability of rice cultivation for farmers. Called a 'farmer's formula', the policy established a minimum relationship between rice and fertilizer prices, thus maintaining the incentives for farmers to increase production (Afiff & Timmer, 1971). The government also paid serious attention to the development of rural infrastructure. Not only did the government rehabilitate existing irrigation systems, many of which had been damaged by conflict and lack of maintenance, but they also expanded irrigation systems by building new dams and irrigation networks (Roeder, 1969). Public spending on the construction of new irrigation networks rose from 22.3 percent of total irrigation expenditure in the First Five-Year Development Plan (1969-74) to 31.9 percent in the Second Five-Year Development Plan (1974-79) (Suhardiman, 2014).

The government also built roads, bridges, and rural markets, and villages were provided with development funds to build rural infrastructure (Mubyarto, 1989). In summary, the Indonesian government made nearly every effort to ensure that the state policies to raise domestic food production would give maximum economic benefits not only to food consumers in urban areas but also to farmers as food producers in rural areas.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Drawing on the comparative study of Indonesia's and Nigeria's responses to the food crises, this article demonstrates that social forces matter for economic development. The political threats that these forces may pose to a regime's survival press the elite to act decisively. They may promote economic growth or development policies that will benefit the key actors behind the threat to contain it. Nevertheless, the extent to which the threat brought by social forces will bring economic good to the nation depends on the type of forces mobilized and the underlying political-economic structure of the society.

In Indonesia, political threats from PKI's massive influence in rural areas drove the Soeharto government to promote agricultural development in dealing with the food crisis. Not only did the government pour millions of rupiah into the agricultural sector, but it also shifted the country's development priorities from the industrial sector to the agricultural one. By aligning food policies with rural development, the Soeharto government sought to ensure that food production would benefit not only urban consumers but also peasant farmers as food producers. In two decades, the country succeeded in raising its domestic food production and achieving self-sufficiency in rice in 1985. Calorie consumption per capita increased from 1,792 in 1965 to 2,533

in the early 1980s. In rural areas, the headcount poverty ratio declined from 58.5 percent in 1970 to 16.9 percent in 1984 (Bevan, Collier & Gunning, 1999).

In contrast, political threats from labor movements in Nigeria led the FGN to pursue cheap food policies to contain the threat. The pressure to provide food in urban areas as fast and cheaply as possible drove the FGN to rely on food imports from overseas. To some extent, Nigeria also poured millions of Naira into the agricultural sector to increase domestic food production. However, rather than addressing the problem faced by peasant farmers to increase their production, the policy was meant to support the development of large-scale agricultural production by state farms and big, capitalist farmers. Agricultural production in Nigeria stagnated or even further declined during the 1970s and early 1980s. Using the agricultural output of 1969-1972 as the basis of comparison (1969-1972=100), Bienen (1988) showed that agricultural production, in general, declined from 91 in 1974-78 to 84 in 1982-83, while food production declined from 92 to 85 during the same period. Calorie consumption per capita decreased from 2,185 in 1965 to 1,083 (Bevan, Collier & Gunning 1999).

In industrial countries, the strength of trade unions contributed to the development of the welfare state (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi, 2006), yet labor movements in developing countries can lead to urban-biased policies that are detrimental to the agricultural sector. While it does not necessarily lead to the rise of what labor scholars call the "labor aristocracy" (Freund, 1984; Parpart, 1984), which is detrimental not only to farmers but also to workers, urban threats may tilt the direction of economic policies towards benefiting the workers and the industrial sector at the expense of other economic actors, especially farmers and the agricultural sector.

As far as agricultural development is concerned, the findings of this research highlight the importance of the political organization of rural forces. Many argue that a strong agricultural foundation is required for economic development (Bezemer & Headay, 2008; Chang, 2009; Skocpol & Finegold, 1982). Yet, it is not so clear how such a foundation can be built. While acknowledging the importance of the state in promoting agricultural development, this article highlights the importance of the political-economic context in which the state can play a constructive role in promoting agricultural development. The effectiveness of state intervention in the agricultural sector requires more than technocratic skills. In developing countries where agriculture remains a substantial part of the economy, credible threats from rural forces will be necessary for the state to undertake the difficult task of pursuing rural development (Pierskalla, 2016; Poulton, 2014).

Nevertheless, threats from the rural forces are not a sufficient condition for the emergence of favorable policy changes, especially for lower socio-economic classes (Pierskalla, 2016). Other than the threat itself, factors such as mobilizational processes and strategies employed by the societal forces, as well as the political opportunities and constraints generated by the mobilizational processes, may also contribute to shaping how a state responds to the threat and, thus, influence the content and form of the policies implemented. Future research should go beyond the origins of agricultural development and pay more attention to the distributional outcomes of policies, especially in rural areas. A focus on the variation in rural threats and their impacts on the implementation of rural-biased policies can be a good start to assessing the distributional outcome of agricultural development among different groups of farmers. Regarding the effect of political threats, it is also important to assess how such threats affect government policies on a variety of socio-economic issues other than food crises.

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FIGURES



(Data source: Anderson & Valenzula, 2008).

FIGURE 1. NRA for importable agricultural products in Indonesia and Nigeria, 1970-1985



FIGURE 2. State-Society Conflicts and State Responses to Food Crisis

TABLE

TABLE 1. Case Selection

	Indonesia	**Nigeria**
Political regime	Authoritarian, military rule	Authoritarian, military rule
Share of agriculture to GDP (1970)	30%	32%
Structure of agricultural production	Dominated by small-scale producers	Dominated by small-scale producers
Natural Resources	Rich in natural resources	Rich in natural resources
State-Society Conflicts	Conflicts between the state and rural forces	Conflicts between the state and urban workers
Responses to the Food Crisis	Rural-biased	Urban-biased

Source: Compiled from various sources.