Muna, M. RifqiNia DelianaNizar Lukman2024-08-152024-08-1520242024-08-15https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14576/267This study attempts to explore the contribution of the US as a patron country in alliance relations to the economic development of its client countries. One form of this contribution is the provision of foreign assistance that can be used as capital to develop the economy of the client country. However, the question is why in its allocation there are often uneven dynamics among its client countries so this study attempts to explore what causes the US to provide a large amount of foreign assistance to some of its client countries while others do not, this can be the main reason why some US alliance countries have good economic development while others have poor development by analyzing the case of South Korea which tends to receive a more significant amount of aid while the Philippines with a smaller amount. The two main factors that will be studied are the level of threat and the level of alliance cohesion which exhibit patron-client dynamics in alliance relations can explain the phenomenon. Those two main variables can determine differences in foreign assistance allocation; the main method is process tracing, part of Qualitative which seeks to find causal mechanisms with a time sequence. The results of this study indicate that the US allocates more foreign assistance to client countries when the level of threat and the level of alliance cohesion are high, while if one of the factors is low then the allocation of assistance is also low. This research is expected to contribute to international relations, especially for those trying to see how security can influence the political economy.enAll Rights ReservedPatron-Client relationUS-South Korea allianceUS-Philipines allianceThreat perceptionAlliance cohesionForeign assistanceEconomic developmentExamining patron-client dynamics : the US alliances and disproportionalities toward South Korea and the Philippines in cold war eraThesisNIDN2027116301NIDN2027118503KODEPRODI67101#Political ScienceNIM02212210008