Divergent responses to a common threat : Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar’s reactions to Iran’s nuclear program 2020-2025

Abstract

This research aims to examine that why the three states i.e. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE diverge in their responses when they had a common threat. It adopts the Walt’s balance of threat as the theoretical framework to draw the analysis. The research is entirely qualitative, taking references from official statements issued by the IAEA, citing the reports of relevant think tanks i.e. Arms Control Association, Congressional Research Service, Stimson Center etc. and also analyzing the journal papers. It uses descriptive approach to examine the responses of the three states against the common threat by following the indicators i.e. aggression, perception of the threat, alliance formation and diplomatic ties. The findings say that when the Iranian threat was at its peak, the states adopted a soft approach towards it. This approach ultimately failed in the June 2025 war when Israel attacked the Iran giving rise to regional security threats. The research further argues that the different responses of the Gulf states should not be considered as the weakness of their leaders instead it was the rational approach adopted by the leaders in response to the regional complex security structure. During 2020-2025, the Gulf were not only struggling with the threat of Iran’s nuclear program instead they were also having the risk of war, declining credibility on the US, economic projects, all these factors collectively shaped the GCC’s response. This study’s main argument became more significant, when Iran’s nuclear program was targeted in the early 2026 (by Israel and the US), the Gulf states again responded to the situation differently.