Secrecy as a path to a negotiated settlement between enemies : a case study of the U.S. – Taliban peace process

Abstract

The 2020 US-Taliban Doha Agreement marked a pivotal moment in recent international conflict resolution history, raising important questions about how adversaries can engage in efforts to end conflict despite long-standing violent confrontations and the absence of trust. This study examines how secrecy, especially through back-channel negotiations, enabled the possibility of a formal agreement between adversaries. It examines the conditions under which adversaries opt for covert talks to move toward negotiated settlements. The research is based on ten semi-structured elite interviews with key informants, including the lead U.S. negotiator, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, senior Taliban, and previous Afghan government officials, and a U.S. military expert. A qualitative thematic analysis was conducted to identify core patterns and insights. Findings indicate that secrecy functioned as a structural enabler, allowing negotiators to test proposals, preserve internal legitimacy, and gradually lead the process to a formal deal. The study also found that battlefield stalemates contributed to a shift from military to political strategies, making back-channel diplomacy more feasible. The research applies Wanis-St. John’s backchannel negotiation framework to this context and extends Zartman’s Ripeness Theory by suggesting that secrecy can create the perception of a “way out”. By analyzing a rarely examined phase of the U.S.-Taliban negotiation, this study provides new insights into peace processes between adversaries in asymmetric conflicts. However, the study highlights that while secrecy can facilitate progress in negotiations, its excessive use can create long-term obstacles to sustainable peace.