Sectarian power-sharing and its implication in foreign policy making : a comparative study of Iraq and Lebanon

Abstract

This thesis investigates why Iraq and Lebanon, despite having similar sectarian power-sharing systems, had divergent foreign policy outcomes during the Syrian Civil War. I argue that this divergence is explained by the unique nature of each state's internal fragmentation, which produces a structural logic of underbalancing. Using a synthetic framework of constructivism, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and neo-classical realism, the study finds that Lebanon's foreign policy was subject to "factional capture," where a hegemonic Hezbollah unilaterally undermined and reversed the state's official policy of neutrality. In contrast, Iraq experienced "factional paralysis," where competing militias gridlocked the government, resulting in a "neutrality by default" situation. This research contributes a new comparative framework for analysing foreign policy in hollowed-out states by shifting the unit of analysis for underbalancing theory from the state as a single unit to the intrastate level.